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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the myriad ways the Imperial/Chinese Post Office contributed 
to the formation of the modern Chinese state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
In particular, this is a study of how the nineteenth and twentieth century internal and external 
crises in China began a process in which the Post Office played an instrumental role in 
transforming the presiding state of an agrarian empire into a centralizing nation-state.  In the 
midst of that transformation, the Post Office contributed to the shift of the locus of sovereignty 
from the person of the Emperor to the impersonal state. 
Originating in 1896, the Chinese Post Office became universal within the country by the 
Communist victory in 1949.  The Post Office survived as an administrative entity throughout this 
entire period because its foreign and Chinese administrators pursued strategies to insulate, 
protect, and strengthen this “non-political” institution from external disruption and territorial 
division.  In the midst of protecting its territorial integrity, the Post Office also challenged and 
out-competed six other pre-existing postal services on Chinese soil.  In attaining its monopoly, 
the Post Office occupied the entire geographically-defined territory of China as the postal 
monopolist and attained international recognition as sovereign in postal affairs.  As a new-style 
interventionist central government institution, the Post Office not only carried mail, but also 
heavily subsidized the modern press and offered a wide variety of “public services” such as 
money orders, parcel post, postal savings, and simple life insurance to transform society and the 
economy as an “extramarket” force mitigating some of the negative effects of capitalist 
development.  Coupled the Post Office’s role as an extramarket agent was its creation and 
control over a new “information infrastructure” for the modern Chinese nation-state.  Within this 
infrastructure, the Post Office coordinated all modern and traditional forms of transportation, 
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filling in the gaps with its own couriers, to revolutionize the sense of space, time, and speed in 
Chinese society and create a new informational environment for the modern nation-state.  
Controlling that infrastructure allowed the Post Office to become the most important censoring 
institution of the Republican state through its ability to place institutional controls on the 
circulation of information.  If the Post Office intervened negatively in the public sphere through 
censorship, it also positively advocated for itself by creating its corporate identity through the 
use of sophisticated public relations techniques that blurred the lines between public information 
and advertising.  Finally, the Post Office was one of the most important state institutions 
maintaining contact with overseas Chinese networks through its long-term relationship with 
Qiaopiju remittance firms.  In the midst of that relationship, the Post Office facilitated the 
transnationalization of the state by creating its own overseas remittance network.  
In sum, this dissertation argues that sandwiched between the establishment of a modern 
Postal Service in 1896 and the Communist takeover in 1949, the late Qing, warlord, and 
Nationalist governments created the structures of an internationally-recognized, and internally-
coherent, independent and territorially-sovereign state.   One of the most important state 
institutions in this process was the Chinese Post Office. 
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Postal Song 
 
 
寄書致遠， Mailing letters to faraway,  
馳驛行空。speeding across the land.  
我們是大家的鱗鳴。We are everyone’s fish and birds. 
 
政令班宣，Delivering political orders and announcements, 
文化溝通，Cultural communications. 
我們是將命的先鋒。We are the vanguard of leadership.  
 
匯兌往來，Postal remittances to and fro 
調節金融，Regulating finances.  
儲金保壽。Savings and insurance. 
 
尚儉移風。Promoting frugality and influencing morals,  
責任重重，都在我郵政員工。 These are the great responsibilities of the postal 
staff. 
 
奮勉勤忠，Diligence and loyalty, 
責任重重，都在郵政員工。These are the great responsibilities of the postal staff.  
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It is the Invention of the Post which has produced Politics 
 
 
-- Montesquieu, 1725 
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Introduction 
The Directorate General: The Post Office and the Chinese State 
 
Few branches of the central government more strikingly illustrate the birth, growth, and 
extension of the modern, centralizing Chinese state as the Post Office.  Under Théophile Piry as 
Postal Secretary (1901-1915), Henri Picard-Destelan as Co-Director General (1915-1928), and 
numerous Chinese Directors General (1928-1949), the Post Office directed the primary 
communications, transportation, and financial networks of the Chinese government serving 
exemplary duty to the state and providing reliable services to the public.
1
  The head of the 
Chinese Post Office, his commissioners, and his numerous staff became the architects, engineers, 
and operators of the largest civilian state institution.  At its greatest extent, the Post Office 
consisted of 72,000 offices, a staff of 40,000 employees, and a network of 400,000 miles of mail 
routes.  
Originating in 1896, the Chinese Post Office became universal within the country by the 
Communist victory in 1949.  It had an agency in every community of import and an army of 
workers in every province.  Under a program of rural free delivery started in 1935, the reach of 
the Post Office extended to every town and village in the Republic.  It carried mail for everyone 
from the lowliest peasant sending a New Years’ greeting to vital state documents passing 
between Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong.  The Post Office transmitted millions of magazines 
representing every political stripe, trade circulars for shopkeepers, books for students, and 
material for the blind.  By degrees, the Post Office also facilitated economic growth, market 
integration, and welfare services by offering parcel post, money orders, postal savings, and 
                                                 
1
 The official administrative name of the Post Office from its founding to the 1911 Revolution was the Inspectorate 
General of Posts (郵政總局) (1896-1911), but it was known popularly as the Imperial Post Office (IPO) 
(大清郵政).  From 1911 to 1949, its name was the Directorate General of Posts (郵政總局) (1911-1949) or Chinese 
Post Office (CPO).  The head of the Post Office was known as the Postal Secretary (1896-1911), the Postmaster 
General (1911-1915), Associate Director General (1915-1917), Co-Director General (1917-1928), and Director 
General (1928-1949). 
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simple life insurance.  It delivered telegrams, conducted censuses, created its own romanization 
system, issued atlases and maps, and sold revenue stamps.  Postage stamps, institutional flags, 
uniformed mailmen, and offices physically symbolized the spread of the postal institution.  The 
Post Office also maintained carriage contracts with traditional and modern transportation firms, 
contributing most directly to the development of Chinese aviation through direct subsidies.  
Finally, the Post Office trained an extensive staff of civil servants to be familiar with the most 
modern administrative techniques, eschew politics, and give loyal devotion to the central 
government.  The Chinese Post Office, it is no exaggeration to say, was one of the most 
important state institutions of the late Qing and Republican eras. 
How, one might naturally ask, has the importance of the Post Office been neglected for 
so long?  The lack of scholarly appreciation of the Post Office is a reflection of its apparently 
mundane and uncontroversial activities.  The state’s decision to carry mail, however, was as 
revolutionary to people in the nineteenth century as the computer was to the twentieth.  Of late, a 
few scholars have begun to study postal history in various national settings such as the United 
States and Japan.  While each sees the creation of the postal service as profoundly shaping the 
structure of the modern nation-state, no one has yet more broadly theorized the intimate 
relationship of modern postal services to the birth of modern nation-state system.  While I cannot 
offer such a theory here, it is suggestive that the appearance of modern postal services as “one of 
the mainsprings of modern civilisation”2 coincided approximately in time to the spread of the 
nation-state system.
3
  In China, there have been a few dedicated scholars working on the history 
                                                 
2
 F. H. Williamson, “The International Postal Service and the Universal Postal Union,” Journal of the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs 9: 1 (January 1930), 68. 
3
 Although there are always minor disputes about the exact dates of origin for any modern postal system, understood 
as a state-run “public enterprise” carrying mail for the general populace, the general dates are: Europe/England 
(early 17
th
 century), Americas (late 18
th
/early 19
th
 century), Middle East, South Asia, East Asia (mid- to late 19
th
 
century), which coincided with or followed the spread of the nation-state system.  For examples of recent postal 
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of the Chinese Post Office.  Until the 1970s, former Directorate administrators such as Zhang 
Liangren, Liu Chenghan, and Lou Zuyi authored most of the works on Chinese postal history.
4
  
In 1970, Ying-wan Cheng published her pre-history of the modern Post Office emphasizing its 
delayed establishment as an example of the “retardation of modernization.”5  Although Cheng’s 
modernizationist paradigm is no longer current, her work, as well as several others in the early 
1980s, began laying the groundwork for more in-depth study of the Post Office.  In the early 
1980s, mainland scholars began gaining access to some archival materials, particularly of the 
Customs Administration, which officially administered the Post Office from 1897 to 1911.
6
  
Numerous other document collections appeared in the early 1990s with the loosening of access 
to the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing, where the Directorate’s own records were stored 
after 1949.
7
  Taiwanese scholars, too, began utilizing their Republican-era archives to reconstruct 
the history of the Post Office in the early twentieth century, but their works, like many of those 
produced by mainland scholars since the mid-1990s, are primarily focused on the establishment 
                                                                                                                                                             
history, see the works by Richard Kielbowicz, Richard R. John, Patricia L. Maclachlan, Adam Silverstein, and 
David M. Henkin in the bibliography. 
4
 Zhang Liangren, Zhongguo youzheng (The Chinese postal service), 3 vols (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1935-
1936); Liu Chenghan, Cong you tan wang (Discussing the postal service), 4 vols (Taibei: Guangwen shuju, 1969); 
Lou Zuyi, Zhongguo youyi fada shi (A history of the development of postal service in China) (Kunming: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1940).  Each of these scholars produced numerous works on the Chinese postal service.  For other titles, see 
the bibliography. 
5
 Ying-wan Cheng, Postal Communication in China and Its Modernization, 1860-1896 (Cambridge: Harvard East 
Asian Monographs, 1970), 102. 
6
 Zhongguo jindai jingji shi ziliao congkan bianji wenyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo haiguan yu youzheng (Chinese 
customs administration and the postal service) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983). 
7
 e.g. Yuan Fenghua and Lin Yumei, “1949nian Guo-Gong shuangfang juban tongyou  tonghui dang’an ziliao xuan” 
(Selections of archival material on the handling of mails and remittances between the Guomindang and Communist 
areas in 1949), Minguo dang’an “Republican Archives” 3 (1988): 28-45; Yang Bin, “Youzheng zongju deng guanyu 
‘Jiu-yi-ba’ shibian hou chuli Dongbei youwu jingguo mi chenggao” (Draft confidential despatches of the Directorate 
General of Posts, etc., on handling Northeastern postal affairs after the September 18
th
 incident), Minguo dang’an 
“Republican Archives” 3 (1990): 22-26; Huang Lihui, comp., “Xinhai geming qijian duli ge sheng gexin youzheng 
de bufen shiliao” “Materials on the postal reform of independent provinces during the 1911 Revolution,” Minguo 
Dang’an “Republican Archives” 7 (1991): 6-11. 
A number of important primary source collections also came out of provincial archives in the early 1990s. Qiu 
Runxi, et al. ed., Tianjin youzheng shiliao (Historical materials on the postal service of Tianjin) Six vols (Beijing: 
Beijing hangkong hangtian daxue chubanshe, ?-1992). 
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of the Post Office, its growth, and internal development.
8
  While both mainland and Taiwanese 
scholars are now producing new articles on postal history almost every year, their works are 
usually narrow in scope.  One of the purposes of this dissertation, then, is to integrate previous 
scholarship on the Post Office with primary documents unearthed at the Second Historical 
Archives to write a history not only of the Post Office, but more importantly its contributions to 
the construction, development, and extension of the modern Chinese state.
9
 
 Describing the Post Office, its organization, and many services is a simple matter, but 
understanding its role in the development and restructuring of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Chinese state is not.  While this study focuses on the history of the Post Office, 
it is, unequivocally, a history of the changes in the Chinese state.  In particular, this is a study of 
how China’s nineteenth and twentieth century internal and external crises began a process in 
which the Post Office played an important role in transforming the state from one presiding over 
an agrarian empire to one centralizing a nation-state.  In the midst of that transformation in 
China, the locus of sovereignty shifted from the person of the Emperor to the impersonal state 
rather than to “the People” as a form of popular sovereignty – the Post Office was at the center of 
that shift.
10
 
 
The Presiding Agrarian State in Late Imperial China 
The late imperial Chinese state, born in the Song dynasty (960-1279), is the classic example of a 
small bureaucratic monarchy capable of governing an enormous agrarian multi-ethnic empire.  
                                                 
8
 The two best examples of this type are: Xu Xuexia, Jindai Zhongguo de youzheng, 1896-1928 (Modern China’s 
postal service, 1896-1928) (Taibei: Sili dongwu daxue, 1992); Yan Xing (A. S. Pan), Zhonghua youzheng fazhan shi 
(History of the expansion of China’s postal service) (Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, 1994).  
9
 The Second Historical Archives in Nanjing has some 30,000 files of postal material to which I was fortunate 
enough to have access. 
10
 This dissertation was written and defended before the publication of Peter Zarrow’s After Empire: The Conceptual 
Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012) and consequently I 
have not been able to fully engage this important book in any depth. 
5 
 
Made up of an Emperor and royal family, a bureaucracy staffed by literary elites, and the 
socializing role of Confucian ethics, the late imperial state allowed the emperors to assure 
obedience from their subjects, collect taxes, administer justice, and, with the occasionally 
assistance of the military, suppress rebellion.  This basic model proved adaptable to periods of 
alien rule such as the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing dynasties (1279-1368, 1644-1911) and 
sustained and devastating warfare during such times as the Ming-Qing cataclysm (1640s-1660s).   
 At the head of the state was the Emperor who stood at the apex of a complex hierarchical 
bureaucracy.  Beneath the emperor was, after 1730, the Grand Council, followed by the Grand 
Secretariat that advised the emperor on policy matters and handled routine paperwork.  The 
Boards of Appointments, Finance, Rites, War, Punishments, and Public Works handled the 
collection and processing of information and implementation of policy.  Although the Boards 
appear similar to modern ministries, they had limited authority to make policy – they could not 
issue orders to provincial or local officials, but had to secure the Emperor’s approval beforehand.  
Even within one of the Boards, the two Presidents and four Vice-Presidents had to jointly decide 
on policy matters before petitioning the throne.  Out in the provinces were imperial viceroys who 
governed the affairs of two or more provinces, provincial governors, intendants, prefects, and 
county magistrates, but it was primarily the magistrates who carried out the administrative 
functions of government.  In the early nineteenth century, there were roughly 1300 county 
magistrates governing a population of some 350 million.  Although both small and occasionally 
cumbrous, the imperial government functioned effectively enough to achieve its primary goals.   
The reason the late imperial state could govern such a large population with its small 
bureaucracy was because of its limited goals.  Practically, the imperial government administered 
the physical realm, but dynasts and philosophers theoretically conceptualized the Emperor as 
6 
 
presiding over a civilization – a civilization made up of the entire world or “all under Heaven” 
(天下).  As the Son of Heaven, the Emperor’s primary duty was cosmological – to maintain the 
balance between Heaven and Earth through the performance of state rituals.   As such, it was not 
the Emperor or his officials’ duty to regularly interfere in the lives of his subjects, but simply to 
reign over the people loosely to ensure the socializing effects of Confucian ethics played their 
proper role in governing the population.  Scholars typically call this late imperial government a 
“presiding” or “superficial” state to emphasize its general laissez faire attitude towards the 
public.
11
  There were times when the late imperial state was capable of vigorous action, but 
generally speaking it preferred to perform only the most basic functions of government such as 
collecting taxes, administering justice, raising military forces, and maintaining certain types of 
infrastructure such as river dykes and canals.
12
 
From the Song through the eighteenth century, the late imperial state largely succeeded as 
a great universalist empire made up of a multi-ethnic, heterogeneous population by maintaining 
cosmic harmony and local stability through the spread of Confucian morals and civilization.  In 
actual administration, the late imperial state held together a highly diverse population with the 
appearance, if not always the reality, of standardization across the empire while granting local 
officials wide latitude in governing local populations.  When the system functioned effectively, 
as in most of the eighteenth century, powerful emperors physically expanded the realm, 
agriculture flourished, scholarship increased, and peace reigned.  When confronted by numerous, 
complex crises in the long nineteenth century, the small imperial government proved incapable 
                                                 
11
 Julia C. Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927-1940 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 12; Mary B. Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: 
Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), 13. 
12
 Pierre-Etienne Will, “State Intervention in the Administration of a Hydraulic Infrastructure: The Example of 
Hubei Province in Late Imperial Times,” in The Scope of State Power in China, edited by S. R. Schram, 295-347 
(London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1985). 
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of effectively responding to global economic effects, significant population growth, the 
weakness of its military, huge peasant rebellions, and the challenge of Western imperialism. 
 
The Long Nineteenth Century and the Crisis of the Imperial Order, 1790-1911 
To any percipient observer in the 1790s, the Qing government was showing all the classic signs 
of dynastic decline.  The once invincible Banner armies saw their last great victory against 
Nepalese Ghurkan forces in Tibet in 1791-92, but they proved ineffective against the guerilla 
tactics of the huge White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804) forcing the already unpopular Banner 
forces to turn to simple brutality against the local population.
13
  In the capital, the lowly imperial 
bodyguard Heshen (和珅) had secured the unwavering loyalty of the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736-
1796) who eventually appointed him Grand Councilor.  Heshen proved exceptionally corrupt 
using his position to appoint cronies throughout the bureaucracy who helped him pilfer fabulous 
sums.  At the height of his power, Heshen stood by the Qianlong Emperor to receive a new type 
of visitor, a British representative, Lord McCartney, sent to establish diplomatic relations and 
tear down the restrictive Canton System of Trade.  Not long after McCartney’s failed mission, 
the Qianlong Emperor died and his successor, the Jiaqing Emperor (1796-1820), destroyed 
Heshen’s power, rallied the Banner forces to crush the White Lotus Rebellion, but failed to 
restore the empire to its former glory.
14
    
Unbeknownst to the imperial government, global transformations in the political, 
demographic, and economic landscape were creating challenges the late imperial government 
                                                 
13
 Aside from official peculation during the White Lotus Rebellion, regular army funding proved such a drain on the 
Imperial Treasury that it brought an end to Qing expansionism.  Yingcong Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: 
Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 226.   
14
 As a recent group of scholars argue, however, the Jiaqing Emperor and his officials were able to re-stabilize the 
Empire through various reforms that allowed it to survive another century.  Ironically, it was through these reforms 
that the Qing Court initiated the “state breakdown” that would evolve over the next century.  For a summary of this 
new work, see: William T. Rowe, “Introduction: The Significance of the Qianlong-Jiaqing Transition in Qing 
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would be unable to solve.  Since the sixteenth century, the Pacific Columbian Exchange had 
brought new crops and improved species to China, which diversified diets and the agricultural 
economy.  The Portuguese, Dutch, and British began to arrive and flood the empire with New 
World silver to purchase Chinese silks, tea, and porcelain.  The eighteenth century economy 
flourished under such conditions as did the population.  Eighteenth-century economic growth 
was coupled with a long period of peace that doubled the population between 1741 and 1800 
when it reached about 300 million.  Soon enough, however, this great population explosion 
would bring about structural shifts in political, social, and economic life that would turn the 
prosperous eighteen century into the disastrous nineteenth.  As the population continued to 
increase, competition for increasingly scarce land resources led to sharper competition for jobs, 
rising prices, and conflicts between Han migrants and ethnic minorities on the periphery. 
As the internal crises mounted, the British East India Company traders were already 
creating the framework for a global narco-empire designed to replace New World silver with 
opium grown in India to purchase tea for consumption in Europe.  Although the trade started 
slowly enough, by the 1830s the opium trade resulted in a massive outflow of silver from the 
Qing empire.  The outflow of silver effectively raised taxes on Chinese peasants because they 
had to convert their copper into silver.  The peasants were thus facing numerous challenges – 
local government corruption, increased tax rates, and population pressures on the land.  
By the 1830s, numerous high officials, many of them new-style statecraft thinkers such 
as the famous anti-opium Commissioner Lin Zexu, recognized they were confronting problems 
on a massive scale.  The long-term effects of Heshen’s corruption continued to plague local 
government, population pressures forced large-scale internal migration that touched off local and 
sometimes regional rebellions, and the rapid influx of opium and outflow of silver was 
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devastating the overall economy.  Facing an unprecedented series of crises, the average imperial 
official struggled to find solutions that would be sanctioned by tradition, but a few also started to 
pursue more radical responses. 
After the British victory in the Opium War (1839-1842) and the outbreak of the Taiping 
Rebellion (1851-1864), the late imperial state was constantly buffeted by a series of internal 
rebellions and external wars.  The emergence of the Unequal Treaty system governing the 
relations between the Qing dynasty and the Western Powers coupled with what seemed a never-
ending series of regional rebellions slowly undermined the foundations of the late imperial state.  
Philip Kuhn, in a brilliant series of essays examining the crises that beset the Qing in the 
nineteenth century, argues that some Qing officials recognized in these crises a broad 
“constitutional” challenge to the structure of the presiding agrarian state.15  There were a variety 
of responses to these numerous challenges – the granting of unheard of authority to local gentry 
to form militia to contain the peasant rebellions, a traditional-style Confucian restoration during 
the Tongzhi period (1861-1875) to re-stabilize rural society, joint public-private self-
strengthening projects to industrialize the country from the 1860s to 1890s, and explicit demands 
for political reforms in the late 1880s and early 1890s.  All of these movements shared the tacit 
assumption that fundamental reforms to the structure of the late imperial state were necessary not 
just for to ensure the state was not extinguished (亡國/滅國), but also for the survival of the race 
in a social Darwinian struggle between ethno-nations (民族).16 
When the Japanese Empire defeated the Qing in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), all 
previous efforts to reform the state appeared to have failed.  Recognizing the extent of the crisis, 
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a new coterie of reformers, spearheaded by Kang Youwei (康有為) (1858-1927), advised the 
Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875-1908) to enact a series of wide-ranging reforms to the structure of the 
state known as the Hundred Days Reforms (1898).
17
  Concerned with the implications of the 
reform movement, Empress Dowager Cixi carried out a palace coup against the Emperor.  
Shortly thereafter, the Boxer Rebellion broke out, which Cixi used to declare war against the 
foreign powers.  After the disaster of the Boxer Rebellion and the Western occupation of Beijing 
in 1900 even conservatives within the central government admitted the need for radical political 
change.  In the immediate post-Boxer period, the Empress Dowager launched the New Policies 
reforms (1901-1911) that intentionally restructured the state as a modern-style centralizing 
ministerial government.
18
  Within a decade, the reforms began transforming the ancient agrarian 
empire into a thoroughly modern state designed to defend its territorial and administrative 
integrity: the government abolished the civil service examinations, reorganized the Six Boards 
into modern ministries, and undertook reforms in education, the military, and commerce as well 
as setting a timetable for the introduction of a constitutional monarchy.  By delegitimizing the 
Confucian rationale for imperial rule and creating the framework of a powerful centralized state 
capable of interfering with society, however, the New Policies reforms alienated conservatives, 
liberals, and revolutionaries who created new opposition groups that quickly sapped government 
autonomy.  The Qing fell to an uneasy alliance of Northern militarists, Southern 
constitutionalists, and Republican revolutionaries in the 1911 Revolution. 
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Defining the Modern State 
Most recent studies of the state begin with Max Weber’s influential work on the sociology of the 
state.  Weber simply defines the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”19  This legitimacy, 
Weber argues, rests on one of three ideal-typical models: tradition or the “eternal yesterday” of 
customs sanctioned by the past; the charisma of the individual leader; or, by the belief in the 
validity of “legality” as based on rational, internally-coherent laws.  Although Weber emphasizes 
that few actual states represent any of his ideal types – most being hybrids – the majority of more 
recent studies of the state have focused on Weber’s rational-legal type as the basis of the modern 
state with its constitutions, bureaucracies, and laws.  Neo-Weberians thus shift focus away from 
Weber’s emphasis on violence/coercion towards the effectiveness and legitimacy of bureaucratic 
administration.  A general definition of the state from this perspective is usually something like: 
the modern state is a set of autonomous institutions exercising supreme political authority within 
a geographically-defined territory.
20
  That is, the state is no longer a “human community” in 
these works, but a “set of institutions.”  It is these institutions that jointly possess supreme 
political authority, a monopoly of ‘legitimate’ coercion, administer a given territory, and have a 
capacity to capture revenue for the support of state activities.  Finally, scholars of sovereignty – 
the idea undergirding Weber’s “legitimate” – also argue that within a nation-state system, a state 
                                                 
19
 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 78. 
20
 Edward S. Greenberg, “State Change: Approaches and Concepts,” in Changes in the State: Causes and 
Consequences, edited by Edward S. Greenberg and Thomas F. Mayer (Newbery Park, NY: Sage Publications, 
1990), 12; Colin Hay and Michael Lister, “Introduction: Theories of the State,” in The State: Theories and Issues, 
edited by Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 8; Anthony D. 
Smith, “State-Making and Nation-Building,” in States in History, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 235. 
12 
 
must achieve de facto and de jure international recognition as sovereign in order to discursively 
and physically defend its borders.
21
   
According to either the Weberian or Neo-Weberian definitions, there was no state either 
in the last decades of the late Qing or in the early Republic.  Liang Qichao (粱啟超) frequently 
made the same observation in the first decade of the twentieth century by calling the Qing 
“stateless” (無國).22  There was clearly a set of institutions or corporate structure claiming status 
as the state (the government), but there was no single body holding political ultimacy, much less 
one commanding an effective force monopoly.  It was, Liang wrote, “a Court without a State.”23  
Or, in the words of an anonymous journalist in the late Qing, it was “a dynasty and not a state” 
(朝代也﹐非國也).24  Huang Jie (黃節), a conservative and proponent of National Essence, 
argued that China appears to be a country, but for the past two hundred years [under the 
Manchus] it had been “literally statelesss.”25  In January 1896, Sir Robert Hart, Inspector 
General of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, wrote:  
 
The Government of China is a puzzle: it to-day looks like a lot of quicksilver on a 
flat surface with little curleycues cutting across to join larger ones and these again 
splitting up and forming new centres without seeming rhyme or reason!...There is 
a Govt. and it continually is felt, but it’s more of an atmosphere than a body and 
there’s no locating it for grappling purposes.26 
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Hart’s inability to locate the State for “grappling purposes” is a problem that continues to 
plague historians of China.  Hart had difficulty locating “the state” because he, like many 
Westerners of his time, considered the modern nation-state as the juridical-political form (國體) 
necessary for enjoying what was once called the “Comity of Nations” (國際禮讓) but more 
widely understood as sovereign state autonomy in international law.
27
  By the late Qing, the 
imperial state had lost considerable sovereignty over its rule making (setting customs tariffs), 
allowed the existence of an imperium in imperio (International Settlements/Concessions), lacked 
legal control over foreigners on Chinese territory (extraterritoriality) as a result of the Unequal 
Treaties, had few internationally-recognized borders, and had little understanding of international 
legal precepts such as consular jurisdiction, diplomatic immunity, the constitutional foundation 
of foreign affairs powers, or similar notions of international law premised on notions of Christian 
civilization.
28
  Internally, the Qing had granted extraordinary juridical powers such as corporal 
punishment and tax collection to non-state local elites during the Taiping Rebellion and was 
incapable of retrieving them once the rebellion was defeated.  After the Sino-Japanese War, the 
late Qing presiding state began the long-term process of transitioning to a modern centralizing 
state legitimized by rationally-defined rules and regulations.   
At the core of the Qing reforms designed to modernize the state was the assumption that 
there must be a shift away from a traditional model of the state in which the Emperor’s authority 
was based on custom, ritual, and the sanction of the Mandate of Heaven towards a legal-rational 
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state in which both the imperial family and state bureaucrats would be governed by an authority 
constituted of written rules and procedures such as laws, constitution, and regulations.  By the 
Boxer Rebellion (1900) high Qing officials were already uncertain about the locus of sovereignty 
in the Qing state.
29
  During the Rebellion, many of the most powerful Viceroys in central and 
southern China formed the Mutual Protection Pact of the Southeastern Provinces (東南互保) to 
work with the foreign powers to avoid external intervention in their provinces.  In so doing, these 
insubordinate Viceroys expressly described the Court’s order to declare war on the foreign 
Powers as a “fake decree” (矯旨).30  A few years later, the Court itself began to redefine the 
Emperor’s role in cosmological terms.  By creating new state rituals around Confucius, the Court 
shifted the status of the Emperor’s vis-à-vis the Sage – henceforth the Emperor and people would 
be one body  (君民一體) in the veneration of this religio-philosophical figure.  In so doing, the 
Court was effectively sacrificing ruler sovereignty for sovereignty embodied in the impersonal 
state.
31
  At the same time, the late Qing state was intentionally restructured itself as a rules-based 
ministerial government during the New Policies Reforms in 1905/06.
32
   
That an uneasy alliance of social groups unified by anti-Manchu sentiment toppled the 
dynasty in midst of this shift to a centralizing state should not be surprising.  Once the Qing state 
signaled the abandonment of its traditional source of legitimacy by abolishing the civil service 
examinations, restructuring the government, sponsoring plans for a constitutional monarchy, and 
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organizing various representative assembles, the legitimacy of the imperial system disintegrated.  
Although the late Qing Court and the Republican revolutionaries both worked to maintain and 
then successfully transition from a multi-ethnic empire into a multiethnic country, almost all 
observers of Yuan Shikai’s dictatorial presidency (1912-1916) and the warlord era (1916-1928), 
agreed that no central state existed in China.
33
  The idea of the state, however, continued to work 
in the minds of Chinese of every political stripe who were “awakening” to their peril in the late 
Qing and early Republic.
34
  Late Qing and Republic officials, reformers, local militarists, 
moderate constitutionalists, urban merchants, student agitators, or political revolutionaries might 
differ immensely in their vision for modern China or its form of government, but they saw 
themselves as new-style “citizens” who, Shen Sung-chiao argues, could not “escape the shadow 
of the state.”  Most understood citizenship as making them “people of the state” and as such 
there should be a modern China and one with a strong state.
35
  “The state,” Shen opines, “was the 
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ultimate goal of one’s existential concern.”36  How might we understand the challenge faced by 
late Qing reformers, postal administrators, and other “vicarious statesmen” like Yan Fu, Liang 
Qichao, and others who “could not forget the goal of state power,” while simultaneously 
imagining how they conceptualized their role in the creation of the modern state?
37
  
The work of the Neo-Statists provides some guidance.
38
  While there are some Neo-
Statists who speak of “the State” in holistic terms, most understand it as constituted of a number 
of different institutions, bureaucracies, and agencies engaging in activities that individually 
increase the strength of the state or its degree of stateness by understanding it in its own right as 
an autonomous political entity with its own goals and capacity to achieve them.  The intellectual 
genealogy of the Neo-Statists implicitly goes back to the Hegelian idealist metaphysical theory 
of the state.  Idealist philosophers of the metaphysical state strove to demonstrate that a separate 
Will of the state existed apart of the individual will of its members – “The State is the Divine 
Idea as it exists on Earth.”39  As the metaphysical theory of the state evolved, some of its basic 
ideas were expounded upon by organicist thinkers such as Johann K. Bluntschli.
40
  Bluntschli 
argues there is a fundamental distinction between the “idea” of the state and its “conception.”  
While the conception of the state is related to the nature and characteristics of actual states, the 
“idea” of the state is a picture in the minds of the public “as not yet realized,” but to be 
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pursued.
41
  John W. Burgess expands on Bluntschli’s argument by defining the “idea” of the 
state as something “perfect and complete” while the conception is the state developing towards 
and approaching perfection.
42
  The distinction drawn between the “idea” of the state and its 
“conception” is essential for understanding the situation in late-nineteenth and early twentieth-
century China.  Although the “conception” of the state existed in rudimentary form (those 
bureaucracies straddling the 1911 Revolution) or not at all, the subjects and citizens of the late 
Qing and early Republic, and particularly government bureaucrats, continued to act with the 
“idea” of the state in mind.  Numerous Chinese scholars, most notably Liang Qichao, embraced 
the organicist interpretation of the State as expounded by Bluntschli.
43
  Others, such as Yan Fu 
(嚴復), transformed liberal thinkers such as Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill into 
spokesmen and advocates for a strong state.
44
  If we can assume the “idea” of the state continued 
to exist “as not yet realized,” we might ask how it was realized.   
It is the Neo-Statists again who provide the answer when they implicitly link the 
otherwise opposing Weberian empirical sociology of actual states and the Hegelian-inspired 
metaphysical theory of ideal states by positing the State is as an autonomous political entity with 
its own goals and capacity to achieve them.
45
  Granted, few social scientists, Weberian-inspired 
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or not, would claim the modern state is working towards some ethical end, but they do consider 
the state as an autonomous actor as did the proponents of the metaphysical theory of the state.
46
  
In so doing, the Neo-Statists are not only connecting Weber’s social science definition of the 
state with the metaphysical formulations of Hegel and his intellectual descendents, but are also 
rejecting the dominant Marxist theory of the state.  Scattered throughout Marx’s works are two 
theories of the state.
 47
  In Marx’s early work on the state he posits it as a superstructural 
reflection of capitalist relations of production and therefore representing the interests of the 
bourgeoisie.
48
  In his later work, Marx grants the state a certain level of autonomy suggesting the 
substructure does not necessarily determine the superstructure.  There are, Marx argues, certain 
conditions under which the permanent institutions of the state – the bureaucracy – are able to 
assert their authority without reference to the dominant class.  Taken to its logical conclusion, 
then, the Neo-Statists argue that the state is an autonomous bureaucratic entity standing apart 
from the class system.
49
  
 
We are still left with the problem of how to conceptualize the purpose of government 
institutions continuing to exist in a country without a state.  R.M. MacIver pushes us towards our 
conclusion when he speaks of “state-institutions” that maintain the idea of the “incarnate state” 
and work to extend the logic of power of the corporate structure of the state to make it coexistent 
with political society.
50
  Since, in MacIver’s terms, such state-institutions are “in Society” their 
purpose “is not the will for a policy but the will for the state.”51 State-institutions can therefore 
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bring into being, or accentuate, social relations across considerable reaches of time and space 
giving meaning to the state as a political community governing a territorial unit over which it 
claims sovereignty. 
What we have, then, is an idea of how state-institutions like the Post Office can work 
toward actualizing the state.  As Philip Abrams so ably puts it, it is the “state-idea, projected, 
purveyed, and variously believed in” by bureaucratic institutions that helps transition from the 
presiding state of the late Qing to the centralizing modern state of the Republic.
52
  As understood 
in this dissertation, then, the Post Office as a state-institution in a state-less society pursuing 
three goals – autonomy, organization, and stateness.  In pursuing each of these goals, I 
understand the state-institution of the Post Office as a historical subject with its own interests 
(creating the state) not reducible to those of a social class.  By “autonomy” I mean freedom of 
the state from interference by civil society, but also from foreign imperialism.  Autonomy in this 
sense stems from the idea of sovereignty, itself understood as the supreme authority to possess 
coercive power (law, rules) within the territory claimed.  Although all actual states have only 
relative degrees of autonomy, state administrators work towards achieving exclusive control of a 
given territorial area over which it can exercise jurisdiction and law enforcement, but also protect 
it against foreign encroachment.  By “organization” I mean the various government institutions 
that not only carry out their activities in accordance with laws, regulations, etc., but also the 
corporate organization of government institutions that transform the abstraction of the state into 
the actual exercise of sovereignty.  Finally, by “stateness” I mean the relative degree to which 
institutions like the Post Office are able to successfully imbue subjects and citizens with an 
ideology of impersonal state sovereignty.  One of the most important elements of the modern 
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state – the one separating it from all other forms – is the idea of impersonal state sovereignty.  
With impersonal state sovereignty, the legitimacy of the state resides not in the personal ruler 
(the emperor) or in an abstract “popular sovereignty of the people” but in the state itself.53  It is 
this sense of the impersonal state which proved so troubling to Chinese in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries for whom this was an entirely alien idea.
54
  Simply put, the overarching 
purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate the various ways in which the Post Office increased 
its autonomy, expanded its organization, and achieved a higher degree of stateness, both for itself 
and the impersonal centralizing modern state. 
 
A Global Design: International Bureaucrats in a Cosmopolitan Service 
Although I view the Post Office as primarily a Qing/Chinese government institution carrying out 
internally-defined goals, the Post Office between 1896 and 1928 was unquestionably a semi-
colonial or, to use John K. Fairbank’s term, synarchic institution jointly administered by 
foreigners and Chinese.
55
  The Post Office was one of three such institutions along with the 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service and the Salt Gabelle (latterly Salt Inspectorate).  There has 
long been considerable controversy about the nature of the Customs, Post Office, and Salt 
Gabelle with some scholars seeing them as wholly representative of imperialist interests, others 
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viewing them as institutions of informal empire, and some as shifting from a joint Sino-foreign 
administration to one more aligned with imperialist interests over time.
56
 
In the pages that follow, I take the controversial position that the synarchic, or semi-
colonial, character of the Post Office was of relatively little consequence to its history.  
Certainly, the role of foreigners in the Post Office proved of great importance at certain moments 
(discussed in Chapter 1), but the uniqueness of such moments reveal the otherwise insignificant 
role of foreigners as foreigners in the Post Office.  The type of foreigners who served in the Post 
Office, their motivations for going to China, and the manner in which they conducted themselves 
all suggest they constituted a short-lived, but unique group of largely anonymous, certainly 
unknown, cosmopolitan group of “international bureaucrats.” 
Unlike the Imperial Maritime Customs Administration that employed thousands of 
foreigners in its century of existence, the Post Office typically had only 110-120 foreigners in its 
service, reached a peak of 131 in 1925, and then precipitously declined in the late 1920s as the 
Nationalists took power.
57
  By 1932, there were only 47 foreigners left in the Post Office and that 
number continued to dwindle to less than 20 by 1937.  As with the Customs, who administered 
the Post Office from 1896 to 1911, the foreign staff was predominantly British, usually 
constituting between 40-50%, but with a strong cosmopolitan contingent made up of French, 
Germans, Americans, Italians, Portuguese, Swiss, Japanese, Norwegians, and others.  Early on, it 
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was recognized that the foreign staff would play a different role in the Post Office than the 
Customs.  As Shanghai Postmaster Brewitt-Taylor wrote in 1905, “The number of Foreigners on 
the I.P.O. Staff will always be, and must be, small compared with the number of Chinese.  Their 
part being to stiffen the ranks rather than to do the actual fighting.”58 
Who were the men who “stiffened the ranks” and what were their motivations for joining 
the Post Office?  Most of the early recruits came directly from the Customs Service.  Men 
entered the Customs Service, Catherine Ladds argues, for a variety of reasons.  Those hoping to 
join the prestigious “indoor” staff with its higher status in foreign settler society in China, were 
usually drawn from the professional, middle-class in Europe, but who had little specialized 
training.  Some were familiar with China, but most were simply seeking a reliable career with the 
possibility for advancement.  By contrast, the outdoor staff, socially lower in status in Treaty 
Port China, viewed Customs employment as a temporary measure as they shifted between work 
on ships, the docks, or other “blue collar” employment.59  The indoor Customs staff assigned to 
postal work typically saw it as an “Irish promotion.”60   
In contrast to the Customs, the early postal secretaries recognized the problems of 
recruiting Europeans for postal work and defined their ideal candidate in strikingly different 
terms than the Customs.  In 1901, Postal Secretary Jules van Aalst described why typical 
Customs recruits were unsuitable for postal work:  
The European element is expensive: often afflicted by illness and climacteric 
perturbations: often ignorant of Chinese ways and language: often attracted by 
wine, women, or pleasure: often anxious to be elsewhere than at work.  To get 
white men from abroad is even more dangerous than to pick up what we find here, 
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for we get cats in bags and our home recruits if not rendered useless by sickness 
are often rendered so by disillusion and nostalgia.
61
   
 
Many of the early foreign postal staff did come from “what we find here” and were 
similar in status to the Customs outdoor staff – a cosmopolitan group of transient employees 
constituting the foreign “flotsam and jetsam” of Chinese ports who were looking for more settled 
indoor employment.
62
  The Post Office offered them more opportunities and better social status 
in the foreign community.  Some were recruited in the more formal Customs fashion in Europe, 
but they frequently failed to succeed in China.  Part of the problem were the work requirements 
in the Post Office – long hours, lower pay than in the Customs, frequent transfers to isolated Post 
Offices, regulations forbidding marriage for five years, and so on.  Whether picked up in China 
or recruited from Europe, the foreign staff of the Post Office felt postal work was hard with only 
mediocre prospects for promotion.  Most of the men who joined quit within the first few years – 
some were wracked by loneliness, others mental exhaustion, some became neurotic, others 
paranoid, and at least one committed suicide.  Others were shuffled out for marrying local 
women, having “Jew friends,” or being overly fond of drink.  
Those who succeed in the Post Office constituted the elite executive staff, usually postal 
commissioners, or Directorate employees.  Some like Théophile Piry (served 1874-1915), Frank 
Poletti (s. 1906-1948), A. H. Hyland (s. 1892-1932) were one of several generations of the same 
family to serve in the Customs or the Posts.  Other outstanding individuals such as the 
Norwegian Erik Tollefsen (s. 1896-1926, 1929-31) or the Frenchman A.M. Chapelain (s. 1905-
1943) rose to prominence through dint of hard work and perseverance – with a fair bit of 
politicking.  Essential to their occupational survival was the ability to adapt to China, master 
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classical and spoken Chinese, and function within the British-style civil service system where 
individual initiative was often met with suspicion or outright hostility.  Of the lesser known 
employees who managed to survive in the Post Office for more than a few years, a description 
from one of their Service Records suffices to represent the qualities sought in such men – “very 
methodical employee, well experienced in postal affairs, willing, and disciplined.” 
As with the Customs men, the foreign postal staff came to China or joined while living in 
China for a variety of reasons – none of which was to further the specific imperialist interests of 
their own country.  Granted, the control of the Post Office by Piry and H. Picard-Destelan from 
1901 to 1928 bolstered the French imperial position vis-à-vis the British in their internecine 
struggle for prominence among the imperialists, but neither Piry nor Destelan appear to have 
specifically sought to expand French imperial ambitions.  Even after their rise to power, roughly 
fifty percent of the foreigners in the Post Office were British.  As Piry wrote in 1910, “no foreign 
power is disposed to come forward and claim any special advantage or position [in the Post 
Office].”63  
All this is to say, foreign postal officials were not “great men” and rarely attained 
notoriety for their work, never published diaries, and only one or two published memoirs of any 
kind.  The only general qualities they shared was a general, non-specialist Western education, a 
social commitment of service for the sake of principle (or income), a willingness to try to adjust 
to work in China, and the fortitude to try to rise through the ranks of a British-style civil service.  
I describe them as a group of anonymous, cosmopolitan, international bureaucrats because their 
agenda – if they ever conceptualized it as such – was to spread certain Western ideas in China.  
In particular, they seemed to regard nationality as of a deep and desirable human significance 
and saw the world through the lens of the nation-state system.  Their “global design” for China, 
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as seen from their practices and policies within the Post Office, was not to further the 
subjugation of the country to imperialism, but to make China a secure and equal partner in the 
world system as defined by “the West.”  To achieve their goal, the foreign postal staff sought to 
spread the ideas and practices of Western international law, the nation-state as the highest form 
of political organization, and the modern British-style civil service bureaucracy as the most 
efficient means of government administration. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
The origins of the modern Chinese state are impossible to determine conclusively.  The general 
tendency among scholars has increasingly pushed the origins of the modernizing state 
incrementally backwards in time.  For decades, scholars emphasized the impact-response model 
focusing on the rise of anti-imperialist nationalism as the core issue redefining the state in the 
early twentieth century, but this interpretation was a teleological projection of the establishment 
of the Communist state in the 1950s.
64
  Those who looked at Republican-era efforts at state 
formation saw them as “abortive.”65  Once Deng Xiaoping repudiated the Maoist revolutionary 
paradigm in the late 1970s, however, historians such as Robert Bedeski began arguing that the 
framework for the unified state of the early Communist period was the result of “moderately 
successful” state-building efforts by the Nationalist Party during the Nanjing decade.66  In the 
early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant re-emergence of new 
states and questions about their origins, Douglas Reynolds radically re-interpreted the New 
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Policies Reform (新政) era, which he re-defined as the period between 1898 and 1911, arguing 
that it was state-sponsored reforms of this period that caused a “revolution” in thinking about the 
structure of the state.
67
  Although initially greeted with much skepticism, Reynolds’ re-
periodization of the origins of the modern Chinese state has gradually gained acceptance, 
particularly among political historians.
68
   Since the early 1990s, the general trend among 
historians of China has been a shift away from the studies of the state towards civil society, 
particularly exploring the issue of citizenship to understand the transfer of sovereignty from the 
ruler to the people.
69
  The study of sovereignty is vital to our understanding of changes to the late 
imperial state, but so too are the institutional means by which the impersonal, centralizing state 
began to express its own sovereignty.   
From the perspective of the Post Office, the origins of the modern centralizing state 
should be located in a little known reform movement launched by the Guangxu Emperor in the 
immediate aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War.  During this movement (1895-1898), Guangxu 
initiated reforms in education, industrial development, government administration, and military 
reorganization.
 70
  Although the Court enacted a number of reforms, the Guangxu Emperor’s 
most radical departure was to sanction the creation of the Imperial Post Office (大清郵政) on 20 
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March 1896.  This sanction was not the extension of the traditional presiding state, but the onset 
of a series of efforts to create a centralizing modern state.
71
 
To address the role of the Postal Service in the transition to a modern centralizing state, I 
divide the first half of the dissertation into four chapters.  Chapter One argues that the foreign 
administrators of semi-colonial institutions such as the Post Office, as with the Imperial 
Maritime Customs Service and the Salt Gabelle, shared the statist imperative with Chinese 
government officials.  That is, foreigners in Chinese government service maintained the 
presupposition of the state as the legitimate expression of the aspirations of “China.”  In so 
doing, they were working within the discursive field of the modern State and focused on the 
process of state-making to achieve their goals.  More specifically, the foreign and Chinese 
administrators of the Post Office sought to preserve China’s territorial and administrative 
integrity by engaging in a “nation-wide project” to bring post offices to every village, town, and 
city, transmit news and spread cultural and educational influences to every community, and offer 
innumerable postal and peripheral services to the entire population.  Absolutely essential to the 
Post Office’s ability to effectively protect China’s territorial integrity was to preserve its own 
administrative entity when almost all other government institutions failed to do so.  Numerous 
attempts were made to either interfere with the administrative operations of the Post Office or 
divide it territorially.  When external or internal forces threatened the administrative or territorial 
integrity of the Post Office, its staff understood them as threats against the idea and reality of the 
Chinese nation-state.  Postal administrators pursued a series of strategies to insulate, protect, and 
                                                 
71
 Even before the late nineteenth century, there were centralizing tendencies in the late imperial state.  Beginning in 
the Song, emperors occasionally made changes to the structure of the state to increase centralization, particularly 
through increasing the number and scope of laws by Ming Taizu, stricter surveillance through the repeated 
introduction of the baojia mutual surety system, creation of ad-hoc administrative bodies such as the Grand Council 
in the Qing, and tighter control over communications through such institutions as the Yongzheng Emperor’s Palace 
Memorial System.   
28 
 
strengthen the institution and the larger state from external disruption and territorial division.  By 
promoting the Post Office as a non-political or impartial institution, the foreign administrators of 
the Post Office retained their autonomy even as the foreign and Chinese postal staff endured 
terrible hardships, humiliating persecution, personal financial loss, physical harm, and even 
death to protect the administrative and territorial unity of the Post Office. 
The Qing government that established the modern Post Office had an essentially pre-
modern level of stateness.  The Qing government recognized the need for some “reform,” but 
usually responded simply by grafting modern bureaucratic institutions like the Post Office onto 
the existing government without granting it the usual authority given to modern state institutions.  
Chapter Two, then, is a study of the various methods employed by postal administrators to gain 
sovereignty over postal affairs by outcompeting five separate postal services serving different 
constituencies – the government-run postal relay (驛站) and post station (舖) systems for 
imperial officials, the Wenbaoju (文報局) for overseas Chinese officials, the Minxinju (民信局) 
serving Chinese businesses and private individuals, the Municipal Council Local Post Offices 
(工部書信館) handling mail for the foreign settler communities, and the Foreign Post Offices 
(客郵) connecting foreigners in China with their home countries.  The competition between the 
Post Office and these other postal services is not only the story of conflict between the state and 
private business, both foreign and domestic, but also reveals the increasing power and authority 
of the modern state itself as it fought to consolidate its sovereignty.  The Post Office’s pursuit of 
a national monopoly thus provides an opportunity to explore the nature and processes of state-
making as the acquisition of autonomy from and supremacy over other postal services, the 
occupation of the entire geographically-defined territory of China as the postal monopolist, and 
attainment of international recognition as sovereign in postal affairs. 
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Although the origins of the Imperial Post Office are briefly narrated from different 
perspectives in the first two chapters, Chapter Three begins with a detailed examination of 
debate held amongst foreign and Chinese officials over the creation of an interventionist state 
institution like the Post Office.  In the debate, scholars and government officials brought together 
two on-going discussions – on the nature of relations between the state and civil society and 
between the government and capitalism – that helped rationalize the creation of the Post Office.  
Once created, its establishment proclaimed the emergence of a more aggressive central state 
driving its own reforms.  The second section of this chapter examines the creation of the postal 
network, its offices, and basic provision of services leading up to a case study of postal subsidies 
of newspapers, magazines, and books showing the great lengths to which the state would go to 
facilitate the flow of information throughout the country to bind it together.  In addition to 
typical communications services, the Post Office also provided banking and transportation 
facilities that put the central government into business, but for particular reasons.  By offering 
such a wide variety of “public services” such as money orders, parcel post, postal savings, and 
simple life insurance, postal administrators not only wanted to create a strong, centralizing state, 
but also one capable of transforming society and the economy as an “extramarket” force 
mitigating some of the negative effects of capitalist development. 
Having discussed the creation of the postal network, its competition with other postal 
services, and its services, Chapter Four is an examination of the Post Office’s creation of an 
“information infrastructure” for the modern Chinese nation-state.  Within a fifty year period from 
1890 to 1940 there was an unprecedented expansion in printing and publishing, the introduction 
of communications technologies like the post office, telegraphs, telephones, and radio, and a 
rapid development in transportation with the growth of steamships, railroads, modern roads, 
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automobiles, and airlines.  These communications and transportation industries and routes 
reinforced each other; they were complementary institutions working together to revolutionize 
the sense of space, time, and speed in Chinese society.  The transportation and communications 
revolutions forged in these decades by government bureaucrats, foreigners, businessmen, and 
ordinary Chinese profoundly altered existing patterns of life.  The movement and circulation of 
information, people, and goods at incredible speeds, in great volumes, and at regular intervals all 
contributed to reshaping the country and laying the foundation for the modern Chinese nation-
state. At the heart of this network was the Chinese Post Office.  It melded all old and new types 
of transportation and communications and transmitted all forms of information and media.  In 
bringing together the communications and transportation systems, the Post Office revolutionized 
the informational environment of China.   
“The Nation comes into being with the creation of the State.  It is the consciousness…of 
political connection and unity which lifts the Nation above the People,” wrote Johann Bluntschli, 
who was translated approvingly by Liang Qichao.
72
  How to bring about this “consciousness…of 
political connection”?  In the new epoch of modernity, print capitalism played the crucial role in 
forging this sense of political connection, however, the too often privileged link between popular 
nationalism, print capitalism, and the founding of revolutionary states, slights the role of state 
power in promoting and shaping their nations/citizens.  At the center of the remaining chapters in 
this study is the belief that the politics of communications in China were entangled in the politics 
of the nation.  The foreign and Chinese administrators of the Post Office believed they could 
bring about such connections between the State and its citizenry – “the full and harmonious 
development of the entire nation” – through a process scholars call nation-building.  The Post 
Office would encourage the population to identify with the nation, foster individual participation 
                                                 
72
 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, 86.   
31 
 
in national life, and increase the people’s sense of commitment and loyalty to the national 
community.   
Chapter Five examines the Post Office’s efforts via negationis to define “legitimate 
speech” and a loyal “civil society” through its role as a censor of the State.  The Post Office was 
the institution most capable of carrying out censorship from the late Qing through the Republic 
because of its role in transmitting information throughout the public sphere.  By examining 
censorship through the Post Office, we can detect that state-sponsored censorship gradually 
evolved from the late Qing desire to maintain social stability by ridding the country of rebel 
elements through violent, uninstitutionalized and unsystematic means to late Republican 
ideologically-informed checks on seditious, subversive, and traitorous elements through the 
placement of institutional controls on the circulation of information in the Post Office.  The shift 
from violent acts of suppression to institutional control on circulation followed changing 
government definitions of seditious discourse and the advent of modern bureaucratic institutions 
like the Post Office able to control the flow of information.  The Post Office therefore played the 
central role in facilitating the development of modern, less violent, but more ideological forms of 
censorship in the public sphere.    
As an actor within the public sphere, the state also positively advocated for itself.  
Chapter 6 looks at the variety of ways in which the Post Office created its corporate identity and 
distributed it throughout the country to foster the nation’s commitment to and confidence in the 
State.  Postal administrators culturally constructed the Postal Service as a fast, efficient, and 
modern institution to serve the needs of its citizens at the very moment when various innovative 
practices broadly related to publicity helped to simultaneously transform older and create new 
notions of the state.  In direct response to the growth of a public sphere and as part of larger 
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global and local trends towards “good government,” the Post Office began emphasizing its 
relations with the public through publicity campaigns.  As both a new government institution in 
the late Qing responding to the public sphere and an institution finely-attuned to the importance 
of communications, the modern Chinese Post Office provides an avenue to approach the 
complex relations between the public, state-sponsored public relations, and institutional identity 
as they emerged in the twentieth century.  This chapter focuses specifically on the construction 
of the Post Office’s corporate identity through its yearly Working Reports, advertising, its use of 
color branding, the uniforms worn by postal workers, and behavioral regulations for postal staff.  
These various “media” – print, color, clothing, and bodies – were just some of the ways the Post 
Office engaged the public by discursively and visually presenting itself as a modern, 
competitive, innovative, efficient, service-oriented, and trustworthy state institution.   
Finally, Chapter 7 investigates the state’s role in the creation of a transnational Chinese 
community through the Post Office.  The nation is usually defined politically through citizenship 
or ethnically through race, but in the early twentieth century the Chinese state also intervened in 
the transnational social spaces occupied by overseas Chinese.  The purpose of this intervention 
was not only to create a deterritorialized cultural identity of Chineseness, but also to gain access 
to the financial resources of overseas Chinese communities in order to strengthen the economic 
foundation of the state.  The relationship between the Chinese Post Office and the Qiaopiju 
(僑批局) remittance firm network constitutes one of the most important long-term contacts 
between the state and overseas communities in the early twentieth century.  To understand these 
contacts, this chapter is both an examination of the Qiaopiju as a “colonial modern” form of 
business and its interactions with the Chinese state through the Post Office.  By describing the 
Qiaopiju as a “colonial modern” form of business, I emphasize their melding of culturalist 
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business practices with capitalist profit-making strategies to thrive in the interstitial gaps between 
nation-states, colonies, and empires and link overseas Chinese to the homeland through the 
movement of people, remittances, goods, and information.  Although the Qiaopiju thrived in 
these interstitial gaps, they also confronted the Chinese state through the Post Office.  From the 
Post Office’s perspective, this confrontation allowed the state to facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of transnational Chinese communities by encouraging “diasporic nationalism” as a 
method of transnational reincorporation into the state.  The Chinese state sought to reincorporate 
the overseas Chinese by emphasizing the responsibility of diasporic communities to contribute 
economically to the burgeoning state.  One of the ways to make such “contributions” was to send 
their remittances back “home” either through Qiaopiju or the Post Office or, eventually, both in 
cooperation.  The relationship between the Qiaopiju and the Post Office, however, was not 
without conflict.  During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Qiaopiju’s continued success, in spite of 
tightening postal regulations, forced the Post Office to both poach and co-opt many of the 
Qiaopiju’s business and organizational strategies to break their stranglehold on the loyalties of 
overseas remitters.  Upon the outbreak of World War II in 1937, the Post Office followed a dual 
policy of direct cooperation with the Qiaopiju while simultaneously transnationalizing itself by 
building its own overseas network through a series of agency agreements between the Post 
Office and international banks.  Time and again, however, the transnational dexterity and 
flexibility of the Qiaopiju overmatched the superior political and financial resources of the 
Republican-era states. 
In sum, this dissertation argues that sandwiched between the establishment of a modern 
Postal Service in 1896 and the Communist takeover in 1949, the late Qing, warlord, and 
Nationalist governments created the structures of an internationally-recognized, and internally-
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coherent, independent and territorially-sovereign state.   One of the most important state 
institutions in this process was the Chinese Post Office. 
 
A Note on Organization 
This dissertation is intentionally organized in a non-linear fashion.  Each chapter is a mini-
history of the Post Office, but with a longitudinal focus on specific themes and salient features of 
postal history.  Only in combination can there be an appreciation of the complexity of the Postal 
Institution and its myriad activities.  The initial inspiration for this approach came from reading 
Sima Qian’s Historical Records (史記).  Sima Qian frequently narrates a single event from 
multiple perspectives or includes details of a single event in different chapters requiring a careful 
reading to understand all the elements of a particular historical episode.  I have not intentionally 
sought to try the reader’s patience, but by re-narrating certain events, such as the founding of the 
Post Office, my purpose has been to acknowledge the multiple causes behind events.  As Noël 
Carroll writes, “a single event can play a different role in different causal chains.”73  Even with 
such multiple narratives, I have not exhausted the possible interpretations available, but hope that 
this work spurs other scholars to examine the heterogeneous history of the Post Office and its 
involvement in countless aspects of modern Chinese history. 
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Chapter 1 
Protecting China’s Territorial and Administrative Integrity:  
The Chinese Post Office and the Centralizing State 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the millennia-old Confucian state system had already 
endured a century that included two of history’s largest agrarian-millenarian rebellions and more 
than a half century of imperialist military aggression, political manipulation, and economic 
exploitation.  The Qing state ceded considerable political control to local elites to mobilize 
militia and provincial-level officials to raise armies independent of the central government to 
defeat the rebellions, but the process resulted in a devolution of government authority that 
seriously weakened the state.  In an attempt to strengthen itself, the Qing government launched a 
conservative “restoration” of the imperial order in concert with sanctioning provincial viceroys 
to create “self-strengthening” projects, but both proved failures with China’s defeat in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95).  Shocked by their loss, late Qing reformers, who had already begun to 
intellectually undermine the Confucian ecumenical worldview, introduced the Hundred Days’ 
Reforms of 1898.  Empress Dowager Cixi and Yuan Shikai feared losing their power and carried 
out a coup d’état against the Emperor and his reformist advisors.  Shortly thereafter, resentment 
against foreign privilege and dynastic weakness led to the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion. 
As the foreign powers amassed troops along the coast preparing to attack Beijing and lift 
the Boxer’s siege of the Legation Quarter, American Secretary of State John Hay, concerned the 
powers would partition China after occupying the capital, issued the second of the famous “Open 
Door” notes.  In his circular telegram, Hay declared United States policy was to “preserve 
China’s territorial and administrative entity.”1  The Post-Boxer Qing government, as with all 
later state regimes in China, was quick to adopt Hay’s language as goals of the “quiet revolution” 
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 For the content of all the open door notes, see: William R. Wheeler, China and the World-War (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1919), Appendix IV. 
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of the xinzheng (新政) or New Policies reform era (1898-1912).2  Within a decade, the reforms 
began transforming the ancient agrarian empire into a thoroughly modern state designed to 
defend its territorial and administrative integrity – the government abolished the civil service 
examinations, reorganized the Six Boards into modern ministries, and undertook reforms in 
education, the military, and commerce, and set a timetable for the introduction of a constitutional 
monarchy.  By delegitimizing the Confucian rationale for imperial rule and creating the 
framework of a powerful centralized state capable of interfering with society, the New Policies 
reforms alienated conservatives, liberals, and revolutionaries who created new opposition groups 
that quickly sapped government autonomy.  The Qing fell to an uneasy alliance of Northern 
militarists, Southern constitutionalists, and Republican revolutionaries in the 1911 Revolution.
3
 
The unstable coalition of provincial-level political and economic elites, military leaders, 
and revolutionaries held together by anti-Manchu rhetoric quickly vanished in a maelstrom of 
violence and war.  Within in a few years, the newly-established Republican government was 
itself de-legitimized in a series of tragi-comic revolutions, including Yuan Shikai’s monarchical 
fiasco and a Protect the Constitution Movement led by military strongmen defending an 
illegitimate constitution.  When Yuan died, the country plunged into more than a decade of 
warlord struggle that engendered territorial disintegration, local violence, and social division.  
Cultural and intellectual elites responded by generating the New Culture and May Fourth 
movements (1915-1923) that mixed political nationalism and cultural iconoclasm to working 
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 Hay’s subtle use of “entity” was quickly abandoned as the foreign powers agreed to protect the territorial and 
administrative “integrity” of China.  Ge-Zay Wood, The Genesis of the Open Door Policy in China (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1921), 129.  On the New Policies era, see: Meribeth E. Cameron, The Reform Movement 
in China, 1898-1912 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931); Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First 
Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The 
Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1993). 
3
 e.g. Joseph W. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China:  The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976); Edward Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 
1895-1913 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
37 
 
towards a new-style modern Chinese nation-state.  Their inability to overthrow warlord rule and 
bring an end to Western imperialism, however, led many intellectuals to turn against liberalism 
in the early 1920s in search of political alternatives.  
Politically-oriented intellectuals finally settled on Leninist party structure and democratic 
centralism as the two revolutionary tools most likely to bring down the warlords and eject 
Western imperialists.  The Nationalists and Communists cooperated in launching the Northern 
Expedition to unify the country militarily, but once the National Revolutionary Army reached 
Shanghai Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) turned against the Communists in the White Terror of 
April 1927.  The Nationalists immediately established their capital in Nanjing and began 
working to create a territorially- and administratively-unified state.  Although the Nationalists 
accomplished part of their agenda, the Japanese invasion and the outbreak of World War II 
interrupted their efforts.  From July 1937 to the end of the Civil War in 1949, the state and 
country remained divided.  Only in the early 1950s did the People’s Republic of China complete 
territorial unification and the creation of a strong centralized state administration. 
As this brief narrative demonstrates, late Qing modernizers, New Policies bureaucrats, 
warlord rulers, elite intellectuals, and political revolutionaries all shared an interest in the statist 
imperative.  That is, a deeply ingrained belief that China must have a strong, unified, centralizing 
state.  The ardent belief in the need for a strong state was necessitated by the bare semblance of 
administrative and territorial integrity from the late Qing throughout the Republic.  Chinese and 
foreign political observers recognized there was no central unified state – there were many 
governments claiming such status, but never did a single one govern the entire country; instead, 
numerous mini- or quasi-states continued to operate with more or less autonomy acting as a 
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centrifugal force in Chinese state-making.
4
  Despite the existence of separate governments, most 
Chinese maintained the presupposition of the state as the legitimate expression of the aspirations 
of “China.”  In so doing, they were all working within the discursive field of the modern State 
and focused on the process of state-making to achieve their goals. 
Historians of China have disagreed about the centripetal force bringing the state back 
together in Republican China.  The currently accepted interpretation places the origin of the 
Nationalists’ and Communists’ state-making agenda in the New Policies reforms, but recognizes 
they failed to bolster the already weak Qing state.  Instead, it was the Nationalists who were able 
to actualize part of the New Policies state-making agenda by creating a small number of strong 
institutions that laid an effective framework later utilized by the Communists to build their state.
5
  
While this narrative is essentially correct, it overlooks a number of pre-existing institutions of the 
late Qing government that survived throughout the Republican era by making significant 
contributions to the creation of the modern state.  These institutions were the semi-colonial, 
foreign-administered, and Chinese-staffed Maritime Customs Service, Salt Inspectorate, and the 
Imperial/Chinese Post Office.
6
  The foreigners who administered these three services strongly 
felt their broader mission was, harkening back to Hay’s second note, to protect and preserve 
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China’s territorial and administrative integrity.  While the Customs Service and Salt Inspectorate 
both performed some broader services for the government, they were primarily important as 
revenue-generating agencies and limited geographically either to the Treaty Ports or salt-
producing areas.
7
  By contrast, foreign and Chinese postal staff saw the construction of a modern 
nation-state as “their Service” – what they invariably called the Post Office – service to their 
parochial concerns, but also service to the broader idea of strong nation-state for China.  
That foreign and Chinese postal administrators could imagine such a role for the Post 
Office in the turbulent decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should not be 
surprising.  Many government officials and academics around the world during that period made 
a distinction between “the government” and “the state.”  Government institutions, bureaucracies, 
and agencies were seen as the physical manifestations of a more ethereal state.  As Robert Hart 
described it, the state was “more of an atmosphere than a body.”8  The “idea” of the State could 
survive both the disintegration of a government, but also help reconstitute it through the process 
of state-making.  In enacting a state-making agenda, institutional actors thus distinguished 
between what Bluntschli called the “conception” of the state as the characteristics of actual states 
as they progressed through history and the “ideal” State as “perfect and complete.”9   
Postal administrators believed they could help bring this perfect and complete state to 
fruition by engaging in a “nation-wide project” to bring post offices to every village, town, and 
city, transmit news and spread cultural and educational influences to every community, and offer 
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innumerable postal and peripheral services to the entire population.
10
  As Director General Guo 
Xinsong would write in 1935, the Post Office  “must be present anywhere and everywhere.”11  
Indeed, the Post Office truly was everywhere.  It quickly became the largest civilian government 
service, employed more workers than any other government institution, controlled a nation-wide 
communications network, and offered an astounding number of services to the general public 
and other branches of government.  Absolutely essential to the Post Office’s ability to effectively 
perform these state-making functions was its ability to maintain both its administrative and 
territorial integrity when almost all other government institutions failed to do so.  Numerous 
attempts were made to either interfere with the administrative operations of the Post Office or 
divide it territorially.  When external or internal forces threatened the administrative or territorial 
integrity of the Post Office, its staff understood them as threats against the idea and reality of the 
Chinese nation-state.  Foreign and Chinese postal staff would endure terrible hardships, 
humiliating persecution, personal financial loss, physical harm, and even death to maintain the 
administrative and territorial unity of the Post Office.  When they succeeded in fending off such 
attacks, they felt they were profoundly contributing to the maintenance of Chinese nation-state 
by operating the Post Office as a national service throughout the entire country and across 
decades of turmoil. 
 
The “Daughter Service”: The Customs Years, 1896-191112 
Sir Robert Hart, Inspector General of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, had been 
advocating the creation of a national postal service for more than thirty years when the Guangxu 
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Emperor finally gave his approval in 1896.
13
  The timing of the Emperor’s edict made Hart less 
than sanguine about imperial motivations.  The Qing had just been resoundingly defeated and 
forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki granting Japan a huge indemnity of 200 
million taels, roughly equivalent to the government’s entire yearly income.  By establishing a 
modern postal service, Hart wrote, “They are…hoping to get revenue out of it, and talk of 
introducing stamps – thinking they might thereby raise the equivalent of the Likin [transit 
taxes].”14  The Qing’s hopes were based on a new trend amongst Western governments that were 
raising new revenues by selling stamps, particularly commemoratives, to collectors and private 
speculators in the 1880s and 1890s.  Since philatelists would never use the stamps, their sale was 
almost total profit to the state.  In China, both the Local Post Offices of the Treaty Port 
Municipal Councils and the foreign-controlled Alien Post Offices were already famous for 
producing speculative stamps designed solely for sale to European and American collectors.  The 
creation of the Imperial Post Office from Hart’s perspective was thus largely a knee-jerk reaction 
to China’s loss in the Sino-Japanese War and the need for additional state revenue to help pay 
the war indemnity.   
Fearing the domestic viability and international credibility of the infant postal service 
might be destroyed by a cash-strapped Qing state before it proved a success, Hart decided to 
insulate and protect it by having it “literally housed and fed” by the Customs Administration.15  
As Inspector General of Posts, Hart based the Imperial Post Office’s organization, regulations, 
and staff structure almost entirely on the Customs model.  Hart made each customs office a 
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district head post office, each customs district a postal district, each customs commissioner a 
postmaster, and had his staff undertake all secretarial and statistical duties – something many of 
the commissioners deeply resented.
16
  Many of the customs indoor and outdoor staff suddenly 
became district and deputy postmasters or postal inspectors and officers – the only unique postal 
staff were sorters and couriers.  Internal regulations governing salaries, leave, allowances, 
promotion, and so on were also drawn from existing customs regulations.  One of Hart’s early 
postal secretaries, who ran the day-to-day operations of the Post Office, described the Post Office 
as “just like the ivy unable to stand by its own strength and relying on the oak, the Customs, for 
its support.”17  Hart’s strategy was based on a complex calculation of political interests both 
within the Qing government itself, but also amongst the foreign powers who were eagerly 
jockeying to place one of their own nationals at the head of a Chinese government service.  Qing 
officials, Hart believed, would not interfere with the smooth-functioning and financially-
lucrative Customs Service nor would the foreign powers endanger the repayment of Qing loans 
and debts, which were secured by customs revenues, by playing politics with the Post Office.  
The foresight of Hart’s policy was demonstrated before the Post Office even opened when he 
blocked French efforts to place their countrymen in the new service by refusing to appoint 
anyone not part of the existing customs staff.
18
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Coupled with nesting the Post Office inside the Customs, Hart also ordered his early 
postal secretaries H. Kopsch, F. E. Taylor, and Jules A. van Aalst to pursue a policy of “festina 
lente” (make haste slowly) in postal expansion to keep the Service dependent on the Customs.19  
Hart’s idea was to imitate the tortoise rather than the hare – “I shall proceed quietly, warily, and 
cautiously, and develop slowly and safely.  No hurry!”20  If the Post Office grew too quickly, he 
feared, it might be subject to the machinations of either the Qing or foreign governments.  Hart’s 
policy, which Postal Secretary Jules van Aalst described ambiguously as “keeping our receipts 
low in order to keep greedy wolves from swallowing us,” kept the Qing government and the 
French at bay.
21
 
In the late nineteenth century the French carved out their own sphere of influence in 
southwest China to counter British influence in the Yangzi Valley, but the French were also 
desirous of having a Frenchman head up an influential Chinese government service to balance 
Hart’s position in the Customs Administration.  Scholars have long held that the French control 
of the Chinese Post Office after 1901 was the result of negotiations between the French and Qing 
governments, but this was not the case.
22
  M. Dubail, Charge d’Affaires of the French Republic, 
sent a note to the Zongli Yamen on 9 April 1898 requesting the Qing “take account of the 
recommendation of the French Government in respect to the selection of the [postal] Staff.”  
Concerned with balancing the interests of the foreign powers, the Qing government acquiesced.
23
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When the French approached him, Hart wrote, “they draw back on finding that it is in a 
dependent and undeveloped condition.”24  Hart went so far as to admit pushing postal 
development in a “half-hearted way knowing the French want it as soon as it is on its legs and 
independent.”25  Hart’s go-slow policy had kept the Post Office in such a rudimentary state the 
French decided not to trouble with it.  Although Hart’s go-slow policy preserved the Post 
Office’s administrative integrity, his decision to isolate post offices in the treaty ports, use 
unenthusiastic customs commissioners, and shape the Post Office “along Western lines,” was 
starting to restrict its development and make it a target of anti-foreign sentiment.
26
  Facing 
numerous internal criticisms by his commissioners and seeing the Customs increasingly 
entangled in conflicts between the foreign powers and the Qing government, Hart turned over 
day-to-day operations to the Frenchman A. Théophile Piry as the new postal secretary.
27
  What 
Hart turned over was only the beginnings of a real national postal service – there were only 176 
post offices in the entire empire with less than 1,000 employees handling only 10 million articles 
of mail matter in 1901.
28
  Piry’s promotion was not the result of French pressure, however, but 
stemmed from Hart’s decision to “act sharply” against van Aalst who disobeyed one of Hart’s 
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direct orders – something happening with greater frequency in Hart’s last years.29  As late as 
1906, Hart was still recommending to the Qing government not give France control over the Post 
Office for fear all the foreign powers would scramble for similar rights.
30
    
Théophile Piry’s appointment as postal secretary transformed the Post Office. 31  Under 
Piry’s guidance, the postal service began a fifteen-year period of restructuring and rapid 
development.  Piry was considered, even by his critics, “an exceedingly clever and capable 
postal expert, and could invariably decide the most complex postal question at the shortest 
notice.”32  Key to his success was gradually pulling the Post Office away from Customs 
protection.  Piry understood the initial necessity of slow, careful development, but saw Hart’s 
policy as keeping the Post Office from attaining its full potential.  To reach that potential, Piry 
would have to create a new Post Office “to meet national ideas and customs and to suit the 
requirements of a Chinese Administration.”33  Emboldened by his vision, Piry slashed postage 
rates, rapidly expanded the number of offices, and quickly extended the postal network.  In only 
three years, the Post Office grew to 1,319 establishments handling 66 million articles over a 
network of 33,000 miles.  Along with rapid expansion, Piry also began re-organizing districts 
and postal routes to “suit Chinese ideas of jurisdiction” in 1909.34  Instead of Treaty Ports, Piry 
moved all Head Offices to provincial capitals and divided districts into sub-sections.  When Piry 
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completed the redistricting in 1910, he was administering a postal service of 5,357 offices 
transmitting 355 million pieces of mail over 120,000 miles of routes.
35
  After a decade at the 
helm of the Post Office, Piry announced: “Everything that an honest and intelligent foreign 
administration, carefully adapted to Chinese ideas, methods and conditions of transport…could 
do has been done with, it may be said, complete success.”36 
The successful creation of a modern-style Post Office capable of being separated from 
the Customs increasingly made it the target of New Policies reformers attempting to reorganize 
and bureaucratically rationalize the Qing government.  In 1901, the Qing began to transform its 
central government structure into a ministerial system with the reorganization of the Zongli 
Yamen into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Five years later, the government replaced all the 
traditional Boards with modern ministries and created several new ones, including a Ministry of 
Posts and Communications (郵傳部).37  The new Ministry’s administrative portfolio 
theoretically gave it oversight of all steamship, railroad, telegraph, and postal affairs, but the ad 
hoc nature in which modern communications industries had been organized in the nineteenth 
century forced the Ministry into conflicts with numerous quasi-government agencies or other 
government institutions over the question of administrative control.
38
  The Ministry saw control 
of the Imperial Post Office as a natural extension of bureaucratic rationalization, but the Post 
Office was housed in the newly-established Department of Customs Affairs (稅務處) under the 
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Customs Service.  Piry recognized the Ministry’s logic, and thought the move would take place 
sooner or later, but began “to entertain certain forebodings” about what the Ministry meant by 
rationalization.  In December 1908, Piry had his answer when Minister Chen Bi (陳璧), 
notorious for his anti-foreignism, put forth eight proposals that included reducing Piry to an 
advisor and replacing the entire foreign staff.  Chen’s proposals, wrote Piry, would have seen 
foreign control of the Post Office “go to atoms.” 39  What Piry and his advisors demanded in 
exchange for moving into the Ministry was to retain foreign control and keep the Post Office 
above politics.  Particularly feared was the kind of political in-fighting and corruption that led to 
Chen’s dismissal in February 1909, which brought an end to the Ministry’s attempted takeover.40  
Piry saw continued foreign control of the post office as absolutely essential to its administrative 
integrity; being taken over by the Ministry without iron-clad assurances of administrative 
independence was unthinkable in the bureaucratic wars consuming Beijing as the New Policies 
continued going forward.   
In 1910, the new Minister of Posts and Communications, Xu Shichang (徐世昌), 
launched a more vigorous effort to negotiate for control over all forms of communications in the 
empire, including the Post Office.
41
  He pressured Piry by establishing a postal school with some 
600 students and sent 20 of them to Austria to study postal administration.
42
  Although Xu 
wanted to eliminate foreign control, he was also willing to compromise if the Ministry achieved 
at least nominal oversight.  Throughout late 1910, Piry and Officiating Customs Inspector 
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General Francis Aglen discussed the implications of the separation of the Posts from the 
Customs.  Piry saw separation as an opportunity for the Post Office to become a true postal 
service, staffed by experts, and run entirely on its own lines, but wanted to ensure foreign control 
after transfer to the Ministry.
43
  Aglen, too, would use his influence to secure Piry’s position, but 
he also wanted the Ministry to repay the Customs for all postal costs dating back to 1896.
44
   
In early 1911, Piry, Aglen, and the new Minister, Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷), negotiated 
the transfer.  The three agreed the Customs and Posts would be separated on 28 May and the Post 
Office would become part of the Ministry.  The Ministry would have a Chinese Director, but 
Piry would retain absolute control as postmaster general.
45
  Except for a small hiccup over 
repayment to the Customs for postal outlays, the transition went smoothly.
46
  Over the next ten 
months the only changes Piry introduced were in the nature of window-dressing: the Post Office 
was now styled the Directorate General of Posts (郵政總局) and the official designations for all 
postal employees and offices were changed in accordance with Ministry practice.  Before issuing 
an important circular, Piry liked to acknowledge the Emperor by submitting it for “Imperial 
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Sanction,” but this was a mere formality.47  When the Qing government abdicated nine months 
later, Piry’s negotiated settlement with Minister Sheng effectively saved the Post Office. 
 
A “Mephitic Atmosphere”: The Post Office in the 1911 Revolution 
The outbreak of the October 1911 Revolution posed numerous challenges for Postmaster General 
Théophile Piry and the Post Office.  Piry’s successful defense of foreign control of the Post 
Office, considered essential for preserving its administrative integrity, placed the Directorate in 
an anomalous position during the Xinhai Revolution.  As an official branch of the Qing 
government, the Post Office became a target of anti-Manchu armed rebels in the south who 
threatened the territorial integrity of the Service.
48
  Once the armed phase of the revolution gave 
way to a struggle amongst the revolutionaries and military strongmen for control of the new 
government, the Post Office faced new threats to its administrative integrity as different 
“government” representatives tried to take over the Post Office.  Throughout the conflict, Piry 
employed a number of strategies to protect the Post Office as an institution of the internationally-
recognized Chinese government, but he also treated the Post Office as a semi-colonial institution 
that could stand aloof from domestic conflicts when necessary.  Nothing epitomized Piry’s 
approach more than his unusual declaration of the Post Office as “provisionally neutral” 
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(臨時中立) during the conflict over control of the republican government after the Qing 
abdication in February 1912.
49
      
During the armed phase of the revolution, from October 1911 to February 1912, Piry and 
the postal staff pursued two strategies to maintain the territorial unity of the Post Office.  When 
rebels in radical hotbeds like Changsha and Wuhan objected to the physical symbols of Qing 
authority related to the Post Office, the foreign postmasters willingly lowered the Qing flag, 
removed the words “Great Qing” (大清) from the signs and lintels of the Post Offices, and 
destroyed all postal cancellers mentioning the Qing.
50
  By assuaging local anger, Piry hoped the 
pliant attitude of the Post Office would keep the rebels from pressing additional demands.  The 
policy was partially successful, but the rebels also wanted postmasters to surrender their seals of 
office and to install censors in post offices.  While Piry willingly removed unimportant offensive 
symbols, he absolutely refused to tacitly or legally recognize the rebels by allowing postmasters 
to hand over the symbols of office or allow censorship.  When the rebels continued pressing for 
censorship, Piry threatened to close the post offices to cut the revolutionaries off from the outside 
world.
51
  Every postal commissioner succeeded in putting off the revolutionaries, except L.C. 
Arlington in Changsha who became a “turncoat” when he signed an agreement with the 
revolutionaries to refuse censorship from both sides thereby recognizing the legitimacy of their 
demands.
52
  Arlington, as we will see below, also played a significant role in another attempt to 
dismember the Post Office in 1930.  Overall, the Post Office weathered the early months of the 
Revolution with great success – soldiers did take a few offices by force, some districts became 
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isolated for a few months, a few suspended operations, and the foreign postmaster of Xi’an was 
wounded.
53
  Looking back, Piry proudly wrote: “The Post Office…stood its ground and, to the 
advantage of the Service and public alike, all parties shortly realized the inexpediency of 
interference.”  Key to the Post Office’s success, Piry believed, was his cautious approach and 
decision to remove the symbols of Qing identity thus showing the Post Office was a “national 
institution” that could be “everywhere treated as neutral.”54 
In the Qing dependencies of Tibet and Mongolia, by contrast, the Post Office became 
entangled in the larger struggle of the Qing/Republican states to maintain control over these 
areas.  In both places, the Post Office had only recently begun operations in concert with the 
efforts of the newly-established Ministry of Dependencies to re-assert imperial suzerainty in the 
face of British and Russian intervention.  In Tibet, the establishment of post offices came in the 
wake of Imperial Commissioner Zhang Yintang’s (張蔭棠) new tripartite treaty with Tibet and 
England recognizing Chinese suzerainty.  In 1909, Postal Secretary Piry secured the agreement 
of the Indian Postmaster General to route mail from China through Hong Kong, Calcutta, and 
Siliguri on the Indo-Tibetan border to Yadong in Tibet.  Postal connections to Lhasa and several 
other cities opened in early 1910 followed by the opening of an arduous overland route from 
Batang in Sichuan to Chamdo in early 1911.
55
  Piry also began postal operations in Outer 
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Mongolia in 1909 with a route from Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) on the Great Wall through Urga and 
thence to the Chinatown (maimaicheng) on the Mongolian side of Kiakhta.
56
 
The impact of the 1911 Revolution was quickly felt in both Tibet and Mongolia.  In 
Tibet, the Manchu amban was ousted and the Chinese postal staff had to “run for their lives.”57  
The Post Office tried to reopen connections in 1912 and 1913, after Tibetan lamas requested 
service, but continued warfare in their “wide, remote, and scarce-civilised regions” kept Piry 
from making much effort.
58
  In Mongolia, a group of nobles formally declared independence 
from China in December 1911 when they installed  Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu as the Holy 
Emperor (Bodg Khan) of a new Buddhist theocratic state.
59
  Despite a few incidents in which the 
Mongols forcibly ejected postal personnel, the Post Office was able to maintain some operations 
in Mongolia during this period, including the extension of a 4,400 mile route from Beijing 
through the Ordos region to Xinjiang.
60
   
In February 1912 the Qing emperor in Beijing abdicated and the chaos of the first months 
of the Revolution began to settle down as the republicans started to form their new government.  
When the dynasty collapsed, Piry acknowledged the new state of affairs by adopting the solar 
calendar, eliminating all terminology related to the imperial order, changing the name of the 
Imperial Post Office of the Great Qing (大清郵政) to the Chinese Post Office (中華郵政), and 
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issuing two commemoratives celebrating the Revolution and the establishment of the Republic.
61
  
Despite acknowledging the new state of affairs, Piry still took a cautious approach to the 
republicans with good reason.  Sun Zhongshan, the provisional president of the Nanjing 
government, soon began negotiations with Yuan Shikai, who virtually everyone recognized as 
the only leader capable of holding together the country, to assume the presidency.  During the 
negotiations, however, members of the Nanjing and newly-established Beijing government under 
Yuan began engaging in a series of political struggles over control of various state institutions.  
In the midst of these struggles, New Army generals, old bureaucrats, and new-style liberal 
administrators sought to re-establish the central power of the state, but there was also a powerful 
trend towards “boisterous provincialism” and agitation for a confederate political system.62   
Théophile Piry saw the republicans as lacking a legitimate central government, deplored 
the independent action and lack of cooperation among the confederates, and sought to keep the 
Post Office above republican politics until a single authority emerged.  In the spring of 1912, it 
was not armed soldiers who threatened the Post Office, but “upstarts dressed in swallow-tail 
coats and bowler hats – looking for all the world like gollywogs” who began trying to bluff 
postal commissioners into surrendering their authority to the newly-established, but 
unrecognized Nanjing government.
63
  In Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Nanjing, various “postal 
secretaries,” “Postal Commissioner Generals,” and “Postmaster Generals” suddenly appeared 
announcing they had been appointed to take over the Post Office.
64
   The reigning chaos was no 
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longer on the battlefield, but in the halls of Nanjing, Beijing, and the provincial capitals as the 
republicans fought amongst themselves for control over various government institutions.  Not 
wanting to endanger the administrative integrity of the Post Office, Piry declared it 
“provisionally neutral.”65  Until there was a legitimate republican government, Piry continued 
acting as though the Qing still existed: “There is only one Government,” he wrote in March 1912 
after the Qing abdication, “only one Board of Communications and one Chief of the Postal 
Service and their seat is Beijing.”66  Until more than a modicum of stability was achieved 
between the Nanjing and Yuan Shikai’s Beijing government, Piry refused to join the new 
Ministry of Communications (交通部).   
In early April 1912, the reigning confusion among the Nanjing and Beijing governments 
began to resolve itself.   During the transition between the Nanjing and Beijing provisional 
governments, three Ministries of Communications existed simultaneously – the Nanjing Ministry 
of Communications, the Beijing Ministry under Tang Shaoyi (唐紹儀), who would soon become 
Prime Minister,  and the old Qing Ministry of Posts and Communications continued to operate 
under Liang Shiyi (梁世詒), who simultaneously held the sinecure post of Director General of 
Posts.
67
  By the end of April, only the new Beijing Ministry of Communications was still 
operating under Shi Zhaoji (施肇基), the newly named Minister of Communications.  Once the 
mess between the ministries was resolved, Piry began recognizing the new Beijing Ministry in 
his circulars in late April.  Piry had succeeded in preserving both the territorial and 
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administrative integrity of the Post Office in its most challenging hour.  “When the mephitic 
atmosphere stirred up by the Revolution was dissipated,” he wrote, “the Service was found…in 
good working-order, firm-set on the rock of its customary and long accepted rules and 
regulations and looking to the one central authority in Beijing for guidance.”68   
In late 1912, Yuan’s financially-strapped government was undoubtedly tempted to 
interfere with the Post Office, but he was already having enough trouble with the foreign powers 
who were aggressively snapping up additional rights during the chaos of the revolution.  In the 
initial military clash, Inspector General of Customs Francis Aglen ordered his foreign 
commissioners to take over the collection of customs duties, something the Customs had never 
done under Hart, and deposit them in foreign banks.  The Qing government approved this policy 
in January 1912, to protect their own revenue, but Aglen retained these rights after Yuan set up 
his government.
69
  The Salt Gabelle, another lucrative source of government funds, was also 
quickly snatched from Yuan’s grasp.  In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Yuan had to 
rely on international funding for his government because the provincial governors refused to 
remit taxes to Beijing.  Yuan turned to the International Banking Consortium for a large loan, but 
the Consortium wanted Yuan’s government to allow foreign experts to reorganize and manage 
the Salt Gabelle in exchange for what became known as the Reorganization Loan of April 
1913.
70
  Confronted by internal dissention caused by Yuan’s complicity in the assassination of 
Nationalist Party parliamentary leader Song Jiaoren and the strength of pro-Nationalist 
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provincial governors, Yuan decided to accept the Consortium’s demands and lost control of the 
Salt Gabelle revenue.   
The relationship between Yuan Shikai’s Ministry of Communications and Piry’s 
Directorate General of Posts remained distant.  The Ministry created its own Director General of 
Posts, and several other postal sinecures, but they simply rubberstamped the foreign postmaster’s 
decisions.
71
  While the Ministry’s officials took their ease, Piry concentrated on postal 
expansion.
72
  In 1913, he reorganized and introduced new types of post offices creating a clear 
administrative hierarchy among them.  Head Offices now oversaw First, Second, and Third-
Class Offices in urban areas as well as Town and Rural Box Offices (城邑信櫃/村鎮信櫃) and 
Rural Stations (村鎮郵站) in the countryside.73  When Piry did recognize Ministry authority, it 
was only over petty matters such as renaming post offices or carrying out censorship against 
banned publications.
74
  When there were conflicts between the central government and regional 
forces, such as during the Second Revolution in 1913 or the Protect the Constitution War of 
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1915, the Post Office retained both its territorial and administrative integrity through its well-
known policy of being an “impartial” government institution.75   
 
“Disciplined Vitality and the Power of Resistance”: The Directorate in the Warlord Era76 
Although remaining administratively independent in the early Republic, once the Post Office 
started showing a profit it came under increasing pressure from the Ministry of Communications 
and physical attacks by warlord soldiers and local bandits who found postal surpluses an enticing 
source of plunder.  In May 1915, Piry handed over control of the Directorate General of Posts to 
Henri Picard-Destelan (1878-?), who then became Associate Director General (總辦), the new 
English designation for Postmaster General.
77
  Although Destelan was considered by some to be 
“an enigma” fascinated by postal details, but lacking in vision and simply “following a rut,” he 
presided over the only sustained profitable era in Chinese postal history.
78
  Between 1915-1926, 
the Directorate turned record profits every year and funneled most of the money back into postal 
expansion.
79
  By 1921, there were 11,032 major establishments in cities and towns with an 
additional 24,427 minor establishments in rural areas for a total of 35,459 post offices linked 
together by roughly 230,000 miles of mail lines.  In almost every area of postal activity business 
more than doubled during this period. 
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Out in the provinces, the warlord era was a challenging time for the Post Office.  On the 
one hand, warlord soldiers were often a financial boon to the Post Office.  Soldiers might rob and 
loot offices on occasion, but they also relied heavily on them for either remitting their pay or 
sending their spoils back home.
80
  In 1918, for example, a warlord conflict engulfed Changsha, 
but in the following weeks post offices throughout the city were “simply packed from early 
morning to after three o’clock with soldiers demanding money orders.”81  Explaining this 
phenomenon, Destelan credited the Post Office’s reputation as “an institution unconcerned with 
party strife” working for “the general good of the country.” 82  On the other hand, rural bandits 
thriving during the chaos of the warlord era frequently targeted isolated post offices and rural 
couriers.  The Directorate’s yearly reports during this period are filled with stories of brigandage, 
robbery, piracy, looting of offices and the wounding, kidnapping, maiming, or murder of postal 
staff by bandits or highway robbers.  In 1915, for example, bandits murdered 11 couriers and 
robbed several hundred others in the performance of their duties.  Things were worse the next 
year when brigands killed 25 couriers and robbed more than 400.
83
  Despite the attacks, Destelan 
felt the Post Office held the country together during these tumultuous times: “It is impossible to 
conceive to what extent the course of the country’s history during the past decade would have 
varied,” Destelan wrote, “had not the National Post existed in such a state of development….The 
unifying influence of the National Post is undeniable.”84 
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The unifying influence of the Post Office was not undeniable in Outer Mongolia.  In 
1915, the Post Office had once again begun to spread in Mongolia after Beijing government 
representative Chen Lu (陳籙) negotiated a tripartite treaty with Mongolia and Russia 
recognizing Chinese suzerainty.  By 1919, the Mongolian economy was in a shambles forcing 
the Holy Emperor to fully rejoin China.
85
  The next year, however, White and Red Russian 
forces brought their civil war into Mongolia.  Most Chinese post offices had to close down in 
1921 with the victory of the Reds, but the Directorate continued using its route through southern 
Mongolia until 1924.  When the Mongolian People’s Republic was established in November 
1924, the Post Office closed this southern route.  The Post Office was the last Chinese state 
institution to withdrawal from Outer Mongolia.
86
 
In Beijing, the financial health of the Directorate General of Posts quickly became a 
target for the central government.  As soon as the Post Office started showing profits in 1915, the 
Minister of Communications “began to flirt” with Destelan hoping he would he would “grease 
the palms” of his superiors in the warlord government.87  When Destelan refused, the Ministry 
stopped rubberstamping decisions and started finding fault with petty issues trying to force 
Destelan to hand over part of the surplus.  Destelan held out for five years, but by 1921 the 
central and provincial governments were buried in debt to the tune of 364 million Mex.  Among 
central government institutions, the Ministry of Communications remained one of the most 
financially viable capable of bringing in an estimated profit of 40 million per year, but little 
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profit reached Beijing because of financial exactions of provincial warlords.
88
  What little did 
trickle in was quickly consumed by other ministries who turned the Ministry of Communications 
into a “milch cow.”  By late 1921, the Ministry of Communications itself was “dry as a bone” 
and had to take out some $24 million in loans against its revenues, which it was then forced to 
advance to the virtually bankrupt Ministry of Finance.
89
  In the midst of this financial crisis, the 
Ministry had little choice but to vehemently demand Destelan turn over a significant portion of 
postal profits.  Destelan finally agreed to transfer 40% of the Post Office’s yearly surplus to the 
Ministry starting in 1921 for “handling postal affairs.”90  Now insatiable, the Ministry continued 
pressing for more and Destelan agreed to 50% in 1923-24.  Although Destelan foiled a Ministry 
scheme to mortgage postal profits for eight million dollars in 1925, he had to agree to raise the 
Ministry’s administrative fee to 60% of postal profits.91  The payments to the Ministry certainly 
had a negative effect on postal development, but it was a trade Destelan was willing to make to 
retain autonomy over Directorate policy and maintain administrative integrity.   
The most serious threat to the integrity of the Post Office during the latter part of the 
warlord era was not over finances, but provincial warlords catering to public outrage caused by a 
postage increase.  In early October 1922, the Post Office announced a small rate increase on 
letters and newspapers to outlying provinces to fund expansion.
92
  Over the next two months, 
newspaper editors, magazine publishers, book sellers, educational institutions, religious groups, 
and commercial associations filled the press with protests against the rate increase, particularly 
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the increase on newspapers.
93
  Seeking to ally themselves with the public, and the press, 
numerous provincial warlords entered the fray.  Zhang Zuolin of the Three Eastern Provinces, He 
Fenglin of Shanghai, Chen Jiongming of Guangdong, Zhao Hengti of Hunan, Lu Yongxiang of 
Zhejiang, and Liu Xiang of Sichuan all demanded an immediate cancellation of the increased 
newspaper rates.
94
  When the Directorate did not abide their instructions, some of the warlords 
despatched soldiers to occupy post offices and restore the original tariff at gunpoint.  In Sichuan 
matters looked grim for the survival of the Post Office.  The Provincial Assembly began taking 
steps to assume full control of all post offices to run them as a provincial concern.  Zhejiang 
authorities starting making similar noises.  As the protests and warlord pressure reached its 
crescendo, the Directorate backed down because the situation had become “critical for the 
maintenance of the Post Office as a national service.”95  Destelan and the foreign postal 
commissioners could not understand why a small rate increase had engendered public and 
warlord protests of a “political character,” but when warlords threatened to “ruin the national 
service by splitting it up into several provincial services” the Post Office acquiesced to their 
demands. 
Although warlords never demanded funds from provincially-based Head Post Offices, 
Destelan had ready-made plans for stymieing their efforts that proved effective against Sun 
Zhongshan’s Guangzhou Government.  If warlords approached post offices to seize funds, postal 
commissioners were to stress two points: first, that the nature of the postal service as a national 
institution meant there were no funds for local post offices to turn over; second, that any 
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interference with the Post Office would inevitably involve international complications not only 
because postal commissioners were foreigners, but because China handled a significant amount 
of international mail.
96
  When Sun Zhongshan’s representatives approached the Guangzhou Head 
Post Office in the fall of 1923, Destelan’s policy worked to perfection.  As head of the cash-
starved Guangzhou Government, Sun Zhongshan was desperate for new sources of funding to 
reorganize his party, build a military force strong enough to challenge local warlords who kept 
ousting him, and strengthen the overall Nationalist movement.  Having signed the Sun-Joffe 
Agreement in January, Sun also began taking a more aggressive posture towards foreign 
imperialism, particularly against the Customs Administration, Salt Inspectorate (formerly Salt 
Gabelle), and Post Office.  By late 1923, the Guangzhou government had already demanded and 
received the province’s share of revenue from the Salt Inspectorate and now Sun began 
demanding Guangdong’s share of the Customs revenue.  During the ensuing controversy 
between Sun and the various foreign powers who sought to protect the integrity of the Customs 
Administration, Sun also despatched Chen Youren (陳友仁 Eugene Ch’en), one of his foreign 
affairs advisors, to the Guangzhou Head Post Office.  Chen began a series of negotiations with F. 
B. Tolliday, the Guangdong postal commissioner, for the province’s share of the postal surplus.  
Chen threw numerous arguments at Tolliday: Tolliday must recognize the divided nature of the 
“national” government and deliver up his surpluses to the local authorities, the foreign powers 
were unconcerned with the Post Office since its profits play no part in servicing China’s foreign 
debt, and the Post Office was a subordinate institution of the Guangdong government and must 
obey its commands.  Knowing Destelan’s probable answer, Chen also suggested Tolliday need 
not report these demands to the Directorate in Beijing since it was merely a local matter.  
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Tolliday, following the Directorate’s playbook for such situations, explained that although 
Guangdong’s postal accounts might show a surplus, these funds were already earmarked for 
payment to contract carriers, secretarial and statistical work in Beijing, stamp printing in 
Shanghai, and other shared expenses, and so could not be separated from the overall postal 
budget.  Frustrated by Tolliday’s arguments, Chen simply fell back on the demand that the 
surpluses not be remitted to Beijing.  Tolliday eventually agreed and, taking a page from 
Customs Inspector General Aglen during the 1911 revolution, simply deposited the surplus in a 
Hong Kong bank under his own name.
97
  Shortly thereafter, the foreign powers intervened 
threatening Sun’s government with gunboats if he continued harassing the Customs 
Administration.  Sun backed down and Tolliday sent his funds to Beijing.
98
 
 
“Adjusting the Machinery of Administration”: The Nationalistization of the Post Office, 1927-37 
Prior to its contact with the Nationalists during the Northern Expedition (1926-1928), the Post 
Office had portrayed itself an “impartial” institution known for its rational bureaucracy, 
innovative services, efficient administration, and public service orientation.  Central to the Post 
Office’s prior success was its corporate ability to show “discretion in act and word” and remain 
“absolutely non-political.”99  As a “non-political” institution, the foreign and Chinese postal staff 
all felt they were serving the collective interests of the country rather than any particular political 
regime.  During the Northern Expedition, the Post Office, like the Customs and Salt Inspectorate, 
would find itself facing a united front of Nationalist and Communist parties professing a strongly 
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political anti-imperialist ideology that viewed the triumvirate of semi-colonial, foreign-controlled 
institutions as representing China’s national humiliation.   
To weaken individual foreign postal commissioners, United Front agents fostered 
dissention through anti-imperialist rhetoric, orchestrated public protests, funded and created 
postal workers’ labor unions, and instigated strikes against foreign control of the Post Office.  
During the first months of the Expedition, Nationalist and Communist agents organized some 
twenty to twenty-five local postal labor unions.  Many of the unions demanded immediate 
recognition by the postal authorities, increases in pay, and shorter hours, but most of the agitation 
was political rather than economic in nature.  In Changsha, Nationalists and Communists held 
numerous marches against foreign control of the Post Office shouting anti-foreign slogans and 
likening the postal staff to pimps and whores.
100
  Strikes broke out in Changsha, Hankou, 
Jiujiang, and Suzhou against foreign control of the Post Office.
101
  In concert with internal 
dissention, the Nationalists also interrupted Directorate finances by threatening to seize postal 
funds, confiscated them, or disrupted their remittance to Beijing.
102
  Finally, the Nationalists and 
Communists also used a number of political strategies and diplomatic ploys to flummox postal 
commissioners into legally recognizing the Nationalists or surrendering their offices.  The 
Nationalists tried to re-appoint foreign commissioners thereby giving the Nationalists control of 
those districts, tempted various commissioners with promises of making them the new co-
director general, and negotiated with Destelan trying to get his agreement to the establishment of 
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a Southern Directorate with authority over the Nationalist-occupied districts.
103
  While the labor 
agitation and financial interference had their effect, Destelan and the postal commissioners 
simply stonewalled the Nationalists refusing to recognize any external authority. 
In November 1927, the newly-established National Government created its own Ministry 
of Communications headed up by Wang Boqun (王伯群).104  Minister Wang immediately 
appointed a postal secretary (郵政司長) within the Ministry to oversee national postal affairs and 
created a Southern Directorate General of Posts.
105
  To the post of director general, Wang 
appointed Liu Shufan (劉書藩), who had previously been a commissioner in Co-Director 
General Destelan’s Beijing-based Directorate.   With the Nationalists occupying all the southern 
postal districts, and with his own Directorate, Liu Shufan began pressuring Destelan to open 
negotiations for joint control of postal affairs throughout the country.  Destelan refused to 
negotiate directly with his former subordinate, but did appoint a representative who worked with 
Liu over a three month period to produce an agreement for joint control of all postal districts, 
which was signed on 6 February 1928.
106
  During the period of joint administration, Destelan 
remained in control of the daily affairs of postal districts throughout the country, but all his 
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decisions had to be countersigned by Liu.  Recognizing the agreement meant an end to foreign 
control of the Post Office, the powers protested, but were unwilling to intervene.
107
  Destelan 
decided he could not work with the Nationalists and soon left the country and retired.  In June 
1928, the Beijing government collapsed and the Nationalists’ Ministry of Communications 
closed the Northern Directorate.
108
  All authority now resided in the Nationalists’ Chinese 
Directors General.
109
   
With Liu Shufan’s appointment, the Nationalists began the process of politicizing the 
Post Office.  Although Liu had been a member of the Post Office since 1898, becoming the first 
Chinese postal commissioner in December 1915, his appointment represented the worst kind of 
Nationalist personalism.  While commissioner of Guizhou, Liu maintained friendly relations 
with Civil Governor Wang Boqun, their children had married each other, and when Wang was 
made minister of communications he immediately appointed Liu.
110
  Liu, whom the Chinese 
staff derisively called “the Postal Emperor,” immediately undertook a number of changes to 
Directorate policy.  He forcibly retired a significant number of foreigners declaring there would 
be no new hires, but those remaining could leave of their own accord.
111
  He also eliminated 
more than 1,000 of the Chinese staff.
112
  Liu then instituted a number of cost-cutting measures 
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such as reducing the amount of leave, decreasing compassionate allowances, and replacing 
retirement pensions with lower annual gratuities.  In a nod to his new political masters, Liu 
revised the in-house civil service examinations to reflect Nationalist Party ideology, required all 
postal supplies to be made of national products, and declared Chinese the official Service 
language.
113
   
Liu was clearly the Nationalist’s man, but he quickly got caught up in one of the great 
contradictions between Nationalist ideology and practice.  During the Northern Expedition, the 
Nationalists and Communists organized postal labor unions throughout the country to agitate 
against foreign control of the Post Office.  Once the Nationalists carried out the anti-communist 
White Terror, they began the process of “yellowing” the labor movement by corporatizing it.  
Labor unions were purged of communist elements, workers had to attend party indoctrination 
classes, and the government held new union elections in which they ensured pro-government 
leaders took control.  The Nationalists specifically targeted the postal workers’ unions because of 
their size, strength, and distribution throughout the country.
114
  In the Shanghai Postal Workers’ 
Union, the Nationalists appointed sympathetic elements to organize a purge committee in early 
1928, which then forcibly reorganized the union.  The new union leaders, all Nationalists, were 
almost immediately forced out by underground communist elements who physically threatened 
them.  In their stead, the membership elected a “non-political” leader named Shen Tiansheng.115  
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In the summer of 1928, Shen presented a list of sixteen demands to Liu Shufan.
116
  When Liu 
continued ignoring the demands, more than 2,000 purportedly deradicalized members of the 
Shanghai postal workers’ union struck demanding increased wages, benefits, and Liu’s job.  A 
reporter for the North China Herald gleefully declared the strike, “the first serious threat to 
[Nationalist] power which has been attempted.”  The strike was not only a test of the 
Nationalists’ new labor policy, but also one between Liu Shufan and the postal workers. 
On the second day of the strike, the union was holding a rally on the grounds of the 
Shanghai Head Post Office in the International Settlement.  While the Settlement’s riot squad 
kept an eye on the rally, the Municipal Council requested the National Government send 
representatives to the Post Office.  A short time later, a truckload of Chinese soldiers arrived 
with “business-like Mauser pistols” to disperse the striking workers.  The government’s strong-
arm tactics played right into the workers’ hands.  The union immediately issued a manifesto 
charging Liu with using the Settlement police, “the claws and teeth of the imperialists,” against a 
pro-Nationalist union.  Having revealed Liu’s “conspiracy with the imperialists,” the workers 
asked the Shanghai Branch of the Nationalist Party to remove him.  The Party Branch, not 
knowing Liu had personal connections with Minister Wang Boqun, agreed to Liu’s dismissal. 
As the strike entered its third day, no less a figure than Jiang Jieshi stepped in to end it.  
Jiang gave a speech in which he stated unequivocally that public sector unions were forbidden 
from striking against the government.  Any such strikes, ipso-facto, must be led by communists 
since the Nationalist Party had proven itself sympathetic to labor.  While Jiang’s thinly-veiled 
threat worked from above, Minister Wang Boqun worked from below promising a small wage 
increase.  Wang also negotiated with the local Party Branch to withdraw their agreement to Liu’s 
dismissal.  On October 6, four days after the strike began, the workers went back to work.  The 
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October 1928 postal workers’ strike was a pivotal moment revealing the Nationalist Party-State 
in the midst of its transition to a corporatist labor system.  The union, still inspired by Nationalist 
rhetoric and promises during the Northern Expedition, expected vastly improved conditions once 
Chinese took over the Post Office, but soon found that Nationalist politicization and control of 
the labor movement was their goal.  In the months that followed, the union was re-yellowed with 
the ardently pro-Nationalist Lu Jingshi (陸京士), a close associate of Green Gang leader Du 
Yuesheng, appointed as leader.    
Liu Shufan escaped the strike with his job intact, but decided to take an extended trip to 
the London Conference of the Universal Postal Union.   Before leaving, Liu selected Lin Shi 
(林實), a councilor in the Ministry with no postal experience, to serve as acting director 
general.
117
  Personalism was again behind the appointment.  Not only were Liu Shufan and Lin 
Shi fellow townsmen, but Lin also had the political support of Wang Jingwei’s Reorganization 
Faction and Zhang Qun in the Political Science Clique.  Lin, a purported opium smoker, rarely 
appeared in the Directorate.
118
  Lin’s ineptitude and absences left control of the Directorate to the 
upper-level executive staff.  While the staff struggled internally to maintain its administrative 
integrity against the politicization of the Nationalists, two new territorial threats emerged. 
The success of the Nationalists in taking over the Post Office encouraged two similar 
attempts in succeeding years by local warlords and their civil counterparts.  Immediately after 
the collapse of Zhang Zuolin’s Beijing government in May/June 1928, many of its members fled 
north to Manchuria.  Zhang’s assassination by the Japanese in early June, led these newly arrived 
and out-of-work bureaucrats to begin jockeying for positions in Zhang Xueliang’s government.  
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Since there were pre-existing provincial governments in the three northeastern provinces, many 
of the new arrivals began scheming to take over existing institutions like the post office outside 
the provincial government’s control.  The attempted takeover of the two Manchurian postal 
districts was spearheaded by several high-level officials of the former Beijing Ministry of 
Communications, particularly Li Yuhua (李毓華), the former Director General of Posts and new 
Superintendent of Posts for the Three Eastern Provinces, and Chang Yinhuai (常蔭槐),  a former 
deputy director of the Ministry and recently appointed civil governor of Heilongjiang.  In the fall 
of 1928, Li and Chang began making a series of demands to Mukden Postal Commissioner  F. 
Poletti, including a monthly subsidy to the Fengtian government and space in the Head Office for 
Li and his staff.  Poletti refused and Chang threatening to fire the two northeastern postal 
commissioners.  Poletti reported the threat to Nanjing where the Nationalists and Zhang 
Xueliang were negotiating for union of the country.
119
  When the union was made in January 
1929, Zhang Xueliang ordered Chang and Li to stop harassing the Post Office.  Having been 
stymied in his effort to take over the Post Office, Li now focused on the introduction of a new 
parcel post tax that would, he told his superiors, provide significant sums to the provincial 
treasury.  After another series of confrontations, Li finally forced his way into the Head Office 
with a police escort and forcibly took control of some rooms for the new parcel post tax offices.  
A few days later Li Yuhua requested a conference with Poletti to discuss how much money the 
new tax would raise.  When Poletti reported a yearly total of only $500,000, Chang Yinhuai’s 
representative exclaimed “is that all!”120  Shortly thereafter, Zhang Xueliang executed Chang 
Yinhuai, fired Li Yuhua, and abolished the parcel post tax.  Chang was not executed for his 
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interference with the post office, but it was portrayed by Zhang Xueliang as one factor in 
Chang’s efforts to block the unification with the Nationalists.  
The second challenge to the territorial unity of the postal service came in the spring of 
1930 when the warlords Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang were building a coalition of Anti-Jiang 
Jieshi political and military forces.  Joined by the leftist Reorganizationist and rightist Western 
Hills factions, Yan and Feng formed the Enlarged Conference of the Guomindang with its seat of 
government in Beijing to challenge Jiang’s Nationalist Government for control of China in what 
would become the Anti-Jiang War of 1930.
121
  In the run-up to the military showdown, Yan 
seized most Nationalist government offices in his provinces, the telegraph and telephone 
exchanges, and shut down pro-Nationalist newspapers.  He also wanted to seize the customs 
houses and post offices in north China.  In late April 1930, Yan and Feng, assisted by the British 
adventurer Bertram L. Simpson (Putman Weale) and former postal commissioner L.C. 
Arlington, the “turncoat” who recognized the Republican revolutionaries back in 1911, began 
negotiations to take over the Customs House.  When Hayley Bell, the customs commissioner, 
bungled the negotiations Simpson took the Tianjin Customs House establishing an independent 
customs administration.
122
  In this midst of these events, Yan Xishan also despatched a 
delegation to negotiate with Beiping Postal Commissioner F. A. Nixon for control of the Beiping 
and Tianjin post offices.  Unlike Bell, who simply abandoned his post, Nixon wore down Yan’s 
representatives with his arguments.  Nixon hammered on the standard arguments against 
dividing postal districts emphasizing that no single district could actually produce a surplus 
because of the overlapping fiscal responsibilities shared by all.  “Any break in any part of the 
scheme,” Nixon explained, “throws the whole machine out of gear.”  Nixon also suggested that 
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the Post Office would continue to function as usual no matter who ruled the local area, “it has 
always been the policy of the Service to be absolutely non-political, and to carry out its work 
under one or half a dozen governments under one central administration, which keeps entirely 
clear of politics.”123  In the face of such resistance, Yan’s representative agreed that dividing the 
postal administration was unnecessary. 
Having fended off two attempts to divide the Directorate, the foreign and Chinese postal 
suddenly found themselves facing the return of Liu Shufan to the Directorate in early 1930.  
Upon returning from his “research trip,” Liu and Minister Wang Boqun attempted to dismantle 
the financial foundation of the Directorate.  In December 1929, Wang Boqun had politically 
maneuvered himself into the presidency of the China National Aviation Corporation and would 
soon sit on the Board of Directorates Eurasia Aviation Corporation, where he was joined by 
Liu.
124
  The two relatives not only guaranteed lucrative airmail contracts to the airlines, but also 
substantial subsidies directly from the Post Office to the airline companies.
125
  More damaging to 
the Directorate, Liu orchestrated the creation of a new Directorate General of Postal Remittance 
and Savings Banks (郵政儲金匯業總局) in February 1930, to which Wang appointed him 
Director General.
126
  The new D.G. of P.R. & S.B.’s sole purpose appeared to be to siphon off 
savings and remittance funds while requiring the Directorate General of Posts to actually handle 
all transactions.  It was generally understood by the postal staff that Liu and Wang’s move was 
designed to circumventing the Post Office’s independent system of accounting allowing them 
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access to postal funds.
127
  When postal employees criticized Liu for stealing postal funds, he had 
a histrionic nervous breakdown, but managed to recover in time to take over the new Directorate.  
As a later Director General wrote, Liu “lost a bone, put picked up some fatty meat.”128  
Frustrated with the financial impact of the airline contracts and subsidies and the creation 
of the Directorate General of Postal Remittance & Savings Banks, the upper- and lower-level 
postal staff launched the “protect the postal foundation” movement (鞏固郵基運動).  Both 
Director General Liu Shufan and Minister Wang Boqun quickly resigned their positions before 
the movement reached its crescendo in May 1932.
129
  The movement’s organizing committee 
demanded the abolition of the D.G. of P.R. & S.B., the cession of all airline subsidies, 
enforcement of the original postal civil service examination system, and that the Ministry only 
use postal funds for postal purposes.  When movement representatives were rebuffed by the 
Ministry, the Shanghai Postal Workers’ Union and Postal Employees’ Association both declared 
a strike on 22 May 1932.  In the days following, postal workers struck in dozens of cities across 
the country.
130
  The postal workers’ strike lasted five days and paralyzed communications 
throughout the country.  The magnitude of the strike and the unusual demands by the workers 
called for a strong government response.  Qian Chunqi (錢春祺), who had been named Director 
General of Posts to replace Liu, and Long Dawen (龍達文), postal secretary in the Ministry of 
Communications, were both immediately fired and detained for “instigating” the strike.  After a 
series of negotiations, the government agreed to the formation of a special Postal Economic 
System Research Committee made up of civil leaders and Nationalist Party heavyweights, which 
                                                 
127
 Huo and Lou, “Youzheng chujin huiye ju jianwen,” 125-26. 
128
 On Liu’s breakdown, see: North China Herald, 9 September 1930; Huo, “Huiyi Guomindang shiqi,” 93-94. 
129
 Wang and Liu both resigned in January 1932. 
130
 The sources on the 1932 postal workers’ strike are numerous.  The best at situating it within the larger postal 
workers movement is: Shanghai youzheng zhigong yundong shi (The history of the Shanghai postal service labor 
movement) (Beijing: Zhonggongdang shi chubanshe, 1999).  In English: North China Herald, 24 & 31 May 1932. 
74 
 
eventually recommended amalgamating the two Directorates, which occurred in March 1935.
131
   
The protect the postal foundation movement and the May 1932 strike shows the postal workers 
had internalized the desire to be “free from and above politics,” meaning free from the politics of 
the National Government, seeing it as vital to showing there were “men of repute” running the 
Post Office.
132
 
The strike had been widely seen as embarrassing to the National Government since it shut 
down communications across the country and required a star-studded negotiating team to resolve 
it.  Not only were strikes by public workers forbidden by law, but Lu Jingshi and the other 
Nationalist union leaders in the Post Office, who were supposed to support the government, 
sided with the workers to defend the administrative and financial integrity of the Service.  
Although Liu Shufan appeared to have resigned in the nick of time, the Nationalists allowed a 
corruption case to go forward against him and his replacement.  The Examination Yuan 
convicted both men of embezzling funds.
133
  The strike and its aftermath cleaned out the 
incompetent directors general from both Directorates, the Postal Secretary Long Dawen, and, a 
few months later, contributed to the cashiering of the Minister of Communications Chen 
Mingshu.   
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“A Truly Modernized Nation”: Zhu Jiahua, Technocracy, and Postal Reform  
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 was a watershed in the Nanjing decade.  
While political favoritism predominated in many government appointments prior to the Mukden 
Incident, the sudden and immediate threat to the territorial unity of the country pushed the 
Nationalists to re-evaluate their style of governance.  In the months ahead, Jiang Jieshi refocused 
his policies to achieve internal unity and military-industrial development in preparation for a 
full-scale war against Japan.  Purely political ministerial and high-level government appointees 
were eschewed in favor of more well-qualified technocrats who could undertake the reforms 
necessary to modernize the country.
134
  Within the Ministry of Communications, this new policy 
led to the appointment of Zhu Jiahua (朱家驊), a German-educated polymath technocrat as 
Minister of Communications.   
Upon his appointment as Minister of Communication in November 1932, Zhu Jiahua 
faced a crisis in the Post Office.  The politicization of previous directors general, their inept 
leadership and corrupt practices, coupled with massive floods along the Yangzi, and the loss of 
the Manchurian districts to the Japanese in 1931/32 resulted in unprecedented postal deficits of 
5.8 million in 1931 and 4.1 million in 1932.  To tackle these crises, Zhu appointed Xu 
Changcheng (徐昌成), an exceptional postal expert, to the position of deputy director general, 
the Frenchman A.M. Chapelain to the vital position of Shanghai Postal Commissioner, and 
promoted a number of highly-trained foreign and Chinese postal commissioners.
135
  In the 
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directorship, Zhu appointed two old friends in succession, Huang Naishu (黃乃樞), an 
experienced, if colorless, postal administrator and Tang Baoshu (唐寶書), one of Zhu’s 
classmates from Germany.
136
  Although Huang and Tang were essentially political appointees, 
Zhu himself directed the reforms in the Post Office aided by the technical postal staff while 
Huang and Tang did very little themselves. 
During his tenure as Minister from 1932-1935, Zhu Jiahua overhauled the Ministry of 
Communications through a series of far-reaching reforms.  He expanded all communications 
industries, particularly steam navigation, civil aviation, and telecommunications.
137
  To 
counteract mounting postal deficits, Zhu immediately ordered a policy of strict retrenchment in 
postal spending, the retirement of some 1,300 employees, and significant budget cuts in all 
offices.  Zhu also renegotiated contract rates with common carriers, expanded carriage by airmail 
and motor coach, and shut down the Minxinju private postal firms.  Having drastically cut the 
budget, Zhu extended some postal routes, opened new, cheaper postal establishments, and 
introduced a wide variety of new services to increase revenue.  By the end of 1933, Zhu’s 
policies succeeded in producing a surplus of 1.5 million yuan for the Post Office.  Having 
reversed postal economic trends despite the total loss of the Manchurian districts, Zhu convened 
a National Postal Conference in 1934 looking for additional ways to expand business.
138
  After 
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the Conference, Zhu introduced a small packet service, ordinary expresses, postage stamp 
booklets for collectors, started selling newspapers, magazines, and books through the Post 
Office, and secured an agency contract for the sale of revenue stamps through postal 
establishments.  To reduce the role of the future Directors General, Zhu also empowered all 
postal commissioners with greater local authority and, shortly thereafter, changed their title to 
Postal Director (郵政管理局局長) to represent this change.139     
Having secured the health of the Post Office, Zhu appointed Guo Xinsong (郭心崧)  as 
the new director general in May 1934.  Zhu Jiahua and Guo had a personal history together, but 
Zhu’s technocratic leanings led him to select Guo for his expertise in economics, his probity, and 
loyalty.
140
  During his tenure in the Directorate, Guo cultivated excellent relations with the 
upper-level staff and proved a more than capable administrator during the tumultuous years of 
World War II in China holding the position of director general until 1942.  Guo brought a steady 
hand to the Directorate and focused on knitting the country together through inland extension.  
The Northern Expedition and a general decline in the postal economy had slowed inland 
development to about 800 new offices a year in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but in 1934, Guo 
launched a new rural expansion movement, particularly to border areas.
141
  No longer would post 
offices need to be self-supporting, but extension would occur in poor rural areas so that those 
places might “develop culturally and commercially” by being linked through the state.142  
Between 1934 and 1937, the Post Office opened a record number of new rural offices each year: 
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3,609 in 1934, 5,106 in 1935, and an all-time high of 18,413 in 1936.  Coupled with its new rural 
offices, the Post Office also introduced rural free delivery across the country so that “all places in 
China are finally drawn into the postal net.”143  On the eve of World War II, there were 72,690 
post offices tied together  through a network of 400,000 miles of routes.   
The Post Office’s non-political identity, bureaucratic efficiency, and public service 
orientation helped provide administrators and lower-level staff members with enough corporate 
solidarity they were able to resist the effects of the Nationalists’ politicization.  The Post Office’s 
carefully constructed identity as a non-political “impartial” institution working above politics 
was partially tarnished by the Nationalists appointment of a series of incompetent party 
representatives who threatened the financial stability of the Directorate.  Concentrated resistance 
by upper-level staff and two strikes by purportedly corporatized postal labor unions, however, 
defended the postal base.  The Post Office did not recover complete bureaucratic autonomy in 
the early 1930s, but after weathering a series of crises, the appointment of one of the most well-
known technocrats of the Republican era, Zhu Jiahua, brought much needed stability to the 
Directorate, which was carried on into World War II by Director General Guo Xinsong. 
 
“The Post Office Alone Retained Her Integrity”: The Chinese Post Office and Japan144 
From the Mukden Incident in September 1931 to the victory in the War of Resistance in 1945, 
the Directorate’s primary goal was to preserve some semblance of territorial integrity in the face 
of constant Japanese aggression.  One of the keys to the Directorate’s success during this period 
was using foreign postal directors, protected by extraterritoriality and international law, as a 
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brake on Japanese aggression.  The success of the Post Office in maintaining control in 
Manchuria longer than any other Nationalist institution significantly contributed to a major 
policy shift by the Nationalist Government.  During the Manchurian crisis, the Nationalists 
suddenly abandoned negotiations to abrogate the Unequal Treaties, which had been moving 
forward successfully up to 1931.  After 1931, the Nationalist pursued an unstated policy of using 
foreign-controlled international settlements, concessions, and even individual foreigners as 
“islands” of economic strength and resistance to Japanese aggression.145  In concert with using 
foreigners and their settlements against the Japanese, the Post Office, like the Nationalist 
Government in general, also pursued a policy of negotiated settlements with Japan in 
Manzhouguo and during World War II.  This combination allowed the Directorate to maintain 
postal connections with Manzhouguo from 1935 to 1941 and with the Japanese occupied zones 
during World War II from 1937 to 1943. 
The Japanese invaders of Manchuria in the fall of 1931 almost immediately took over 
most Nationalist government offices and institutions, but could not dislodge the two foreign 
postal commissioners in Manchuria.  Protected by extraterritorial privilege, the postal 
commissioners defended the Post Office from Japanese military forces allowing the Nationalist 
Directorate to maintain control over postal affairs.  The Japanese harassed and murdered some 
postal employees, but hesitated to seize the post offices because of their concern over the 
international implications of arresting or executing the foreigner commissioners.  Although every 
other Nationalist government institution had withdrawn from Manchuria by the time the 
Japanese formally established the state of Manzhouguo on 1 March 1932, the Chinese Post 
Office continued to exist.  The Manzhouguo Ministry of Communications eventually notified the 
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foreign commissioners that Manzhouguo would take control of the post offices on 1 April.
146
  
The commissioners responded by secretly sending all funds, stamps, archives and other valuable 
items south of the Great Wall through foreign companies and banks, but they refused to leave by 
the deadline.  Japanese and Manzhouguo authorities fell back on all the old schemes trying to 
trick the commissioners into recognizing the new government or physically intimidate them, but 
their efforts all failed.
147
  The foreign commissioners were still operating all post offices in 
Manchuria in July 1932 when the Ministry decided continued operations were untenable.  Later 
that month, the Directorate ordered the closure of some 2,800 post offices in the Northeast.  
Shortly thereafter, the Nanjing Ministry of Communications announced a postal blockade of 
Manzhouguo.     
In the months prior to the postal blockade, Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei began pursuing 
a policy of negotiated settlements with the Japanese.
148
  Over the next five years, the Nationalists 
would sign an armistice ending the Shanghai War (1932), the Tanggu Truce (1933), and the He-
Umezu (1935), and Qin-Doihara Agreements (1935).  The least known of these settlements was 
the reopening of postal communications with Manzhouguo.  The impetus for lifting the postal 
blockade came in mid-1934 when the Universal Postal Union, the international governing body 
for postal issues, decided to allow the transmission of mail between Europe and East Asia on the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad, which passed through northern Manzhouguo thus breaking the 
Nationalists’ postal blockade.149  After the Postal Union made its decision, the League of Nations 
passed its own resolution allowing mail to pass through Manzhouguo, but clearly indicated that 
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postal relations did not violate the international non-recognition policy.  The National 
Government protested the decision, but Jiang Jieshi also realized the League had given him 
political cover to reopen postal relations with Manzhouguo.
150
   
In mid-August 1934, Jiang met with Huang Fu (黃郛), the chairman of the Beiping 
Political Affairs Council who had negotiated the Tanggu Truce, to design an approach towards 
Japan on the postal issue.  Although there is no record of their conversation, they apparently 
agreed to use one of Wang Jingwei’s newest protégés, Gao Zongwu (高宗武), to be their 
political front man.
151
  Gao, barely out of college, had come to Jiang’s attention with a series of 
articles on Japan published in the Nationalists’ Central Daily (中央日報).  Although invited to 
be one of Jiang Jieshi’s personal secretaries, Gao preferred to work with Executive Yuan 
President and Foreign Minister Wang Jingwei, who was crafting China’s broad policy towards 
Japan.  With Wang’s recommendation, Gao became acting head of the Asia Bureau in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the most important post for dealing with Japan.  Gao’s first mission 
was as political representative on the negotiating team for establishing postal relations with 
Manzhouguo while Yu Xianglin (余翔麟), a commissioner with great experience in complex 
postal issues, was the Directorate’s representative.152 
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The negotiations started on late September in Beiping and would last until early January 
1935.  The two sticking points in the talks were the nature of the relationship between the 
Directorate and its Manzhouguo counterpart and whether the name “Manzhouguo” would be 
allowed on postage stamps and other postal ephemera sent into China.  Not wanting to recognize 
the legality of Manzhouguo in any way, Gao Zongwu adamantly pushed for a private third-party 
business to handle mail exchanges between the two administrations.  The Japanese, however, 
remained steadfast in their demand for direct relations.
153
  On 30 October, Jiang Jieshi fearing 
the negotiations might break down left his forward headquarters in his fifth bandit suppression 
campaign against the Communists to fly to Beiping to meet with Gao and Yu.  Jiang ordered 
them to abandon the idea of using a third party.  On 7 November, Jiang’s National Defense 
Committee passed the “New Scheme for the Postal Connection Negotiations” (通郵談判新方案) 
formally rejecting the use of a special business organization to handle postal exchanges.  Wang 
Jingwei and Gao Zongwu, who both understood the Japanese better than Jiang, ignored Jiang’s 
directive and continued pressing for an ambiguous institution like a privately-run postal agency 
(郵務代辦所) with a name such as the Oriental Minxinju (東方民信局).  They believed such an 
institution might satisfy the Japanese because it was part of the Directorate’s postal network, but 
privately owned.  A week later, Jiang flip-flopped approving the idea.  
The negotiations reconvened in mid-November.  The Chinese side presented their postal 
agency idea, but the Japanese continued demanding direct relations between the two postal 
administrations.  Negotiations broke down once again.  Three days later, both sides appeared 
more flexible.  The Japanese agreed to the establishment of a third-party postal agency, if its 
name did not appear in any official records of the negotiating sessions.  Gao, however, feared 
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that without the agency’s name in the official record, the Japanese would later claim direct 
relations between the two states had been established.  At this point, Huang Fu intervened 
ordering the Chinese negotiators to accept the Japanese demands, but the negotiators hesitated 
unsure who gave Huang Fu permission to change policy.  Jiang had ordered the change, but had 
asked Wang Jingwei to inform Huang to distance himself from the negotiations.  To strengthen 
his control over the negotiations, Wang also despatched another of his protégés, Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Tang Youren (唐有壬), to carry on the talks.154  On 23 November, both sides 
held the final talks.
155
  Tang ultimately compromised allowing the record of minutes to state that 
postal connections would be between the postal administrations of the two sides through 
“exchange offices” (轉遞機關).  The Japanese, however, pressed for a clearer statement on 
direct relations.  After a grueling all-night session, the two sides reached an unusual compromise.  
The official records of the negotiations kept by both sides would be purposefully inconsistent – 
the Chinese records could show relations through a third-party intermediary while the Japanese 
version would stress direct relations.  Both sides agreed to show their respective governments 
their own record of the talks, but not to make any of the records public.
156
  On 25 November 
Tang Youren gave the Chinese version of the agreement to Wang Jingwei for presentation to the 
Political Conference of the Central Executive Committee and the National Defense Conference, 
both of which accepted the agreement.  
From the postal perspective, the agreement represented a victory.  The Directorate was 
not forced into direct relations with the Manzhouguo postal administration, but had the Tianjin 
Head Post Office sign a contract with a retired postal employee named Huang Zigu (黃子固), 
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who was authorized to open exchange offices (匯通轉遞局) in Shanhaiguan and Gubeikou for 
transferring mails to and from Manzhouguo.  Huang would not be an official employee, but 
would receive a commission on the amount of mail handled like other postal agencies.  Both 
sides also agreed that Manzhouguo would only use stamps without the word “Manzhouguo” or 
any derivation thereof; postal cancellers would use the English rendering of place names; and, 
documents exchanged between the two administrations would use Gregorian calendrical dates.
157
  
On 10 January 1935 postal connections started and continued smoothly until 1941. 
 
Lonely Islanders: Foreign Postal Directors and Occupied Postal Districts, 1937-1945 
In the months following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937 that started World War 
II in Asia, the Directorate began crafting a policy based on the initial experience of the foreign 
postal directors in Manchuria and the use of intermediary institutions in the negotiated settlement 
to reopen postal connections with Manzhouguo.  As the Japanese invasion began, the Directorate 
ordered most employees in the northern and eastern postal districts to flee inland, but reopen 
operations in the nearest free area adjacent to the occupied zones.  In each of the occupied postal 
districts, the Directorate had left behind a skeleton staff controlled by a foreign postal director.  
As in Manchuria in 1931/32, the Japanese did not arrest or execute foreign postal staff for fear of 
involving the other foreign powers.
158
  With foreigners in control of occupied postal districts, the 
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Directorate was able to retain most of its control and keep mail moving between the occupied 
zones and Free China throughout most of the war.   
The Japanese and collaborator governments, including Wang Kemin’s North China 
Provisional Government in Beijing and Liang Hongzhi’s Reformed Government in Nanjing, 
would not remove foreign postal directors, but did everything in their power to harass and 
interfere with their work.  Wherever possible the Directorate had shifted the location of Head 
Offices in the occupied zones into foreign-administered concessions or settlements to reduce 
interference, but the collaborator governments still had enough reach to force the foreign 
directors to adjust postal policy to suit Japanese desires, make them accept Japanese deputy 
directors, and frequently cut off communications and the flow of funds between the occupied 
districts and the Directorate.   
When the Japanese and collaborator governments strenuously objected to the postal 
directors constantly referencing the Directorate when sensitive questions arose, the Kunming 
Directorate, it had moved in June 1938, authorized the creation of “General Affairs Offices” 
(辦事處) in every occupied postal district in March 1939.  The General Affairs Offices usually 
existed only on paper and served as an intermediary between the Head Post Offices in the 
occupied zones and the Kunming Directorate.  When the Japanese pressed postal directors of 
Head Post Offices on certain changes in policy, the foreign directors then contacted the Kunming 
Directorate through the General Affairs Offices.  The General Affairs Offices, with its 
purposefully ambiguous name, also served as links between postal districts in the occupied 
zones.  In Shanghai, the Directorate appointed postal director A.M. Chapelain as the director of 
the Shanghai General Affairs Office to oversee postal operations in Japanese-occupied areas of 
86 
 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui.
159
  From the Beiping General Affairs Office, Director 
Poletti administered the districts of Beijing, Shanxi, and West Henan.  The Directorate also 
named Hebei Postal Commissioner Caretti as director over East Henan, Shandong, and Hebei.  
In other cases, such as in Guangdong and Fujian, the General Affairs Offices were physical 
places established in nearby free areas serving as exchange offices between the head offices in 
occupied Guangzhou and Fuzhou and the Kunming Directorate.
160
 
From these General Affairs Offices, the foreign directors tried to maintain as much 
control for the Kunming Directorate as possible while still maintaining cordial relationships with 
Japanese authorities through the regular Head Post Offices.  For example, in December 1939, 
Chapelain signed an official agreement with the Japanese Field Post Office for the mutual 
exchange of mail, used commemorative postal daters celebrating the establishment of Wang 
Jingwei’s government, flew the flags of Manzhouguo, the Empire of Japan, and the Peace 
Government over post offices, and officially referred to the occupied zones as the “peace 
area.”161  In exchange, many of the Head Post Offices in the occupied zones received subsidizes 
for working expenses from local Japanese military authorities.
162
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To maintain connections with the outside world, the Directorate established two special 
offices.  In the British crown colony of Hong Kong, the Directorate created the Hong Kong 
Sorting Office of the Guangzhou Post Office (廣州郵局駐港分信處) under the administration of 
W. D. Murray, a British subject, in early 1939.  The office was in charge of transmitting mails 
and funds from abroad into Free China and received mails from within China and exchanged 
them with the Hong Kong Post Office for transmission abroad.
163
  When Hong Kong fell to the 
Japanese in late December 1941, the Kunming Directorate opened a new international route 
through French Indo-China by creating an Exchange Office in Haiphong (海防郵件轉運處), 
controlled by the Frenchman J. Jouvelet, which served the same functions of the Sorting Office 
until early 1943. 
In March 1940, Wang Jingwei returned to Nanjing and established his new Nationalist 
“Peace” Government, which incorporated the other two collaborator governments.  Although 
Wang envisioned that his new government would have actual power, the Japanese who had 
sponsored its creation hesitated to allow Wang’s government to actually undertake 
administration in the occupied zones.  Although both Wang Kemin and Liang Hongzhi’s 
governments had their own Directorates General of Posts, they failed as actual administrative 
bodies.  Wang’s new government continually pressed the Japanese for the establishment of a 
new Nanjing-based Directorate.  In August 1940, the Japanese Embassy in Shanghai, which had 
been acting as a “buffer state” between Chapelain and Wang’s Nanjing government, met with 
Shanghai Postal Director Chapelain asking him to accept an appointment from the Nanjing 
Ministry of Communications, if it established a Directorate, and accept its orders.  Chapelain 
accepted the terms understanding that he would be now serving two masters, but considered 
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maintaining personal control of the eastern districts to have been the essential point.
164
  To have 
refused to work with the Nanjing government “would be suicidal,” he wrote, but suggested the 
two sides agree that there would be no public evidence of the change and it would be considered 
an internal affair.
165
  In response to the Japanese move, the Kunming Directorate strengthened 
Chapelain’s authority by creating a new post for him styled “Foreign Deputy Director General” 
(外副局長) in recognition of his virtually independent control of the east coast districts.  
Chapelain’s new post allowed him greater latitude in negotiating with local Japanese authorities 
and Wang’s Nanjing government.166  Despite securing Chapelain’s agreement, the Japanese still 
refused to grant Wang’s government the power to create its own Ministry of Communications 
and Directorate General of Posts.
167
 
Four years into the war, the foreign postal directors began questioning their continual 
isolation.
168
  Cut off from communications with the Kunming Directorate, and with little 
connection to Chapelain in Shanghai, they felt “actual prisoners” of the Japanese and 
collaborator governments.  Director General Guo Xinsong continued pressing them to “ remain 
at your posts as long as possible” to preserve the territorial unity of the Post Office.169  Despite 
Guo’s wishes, some of the foreign postal directors in North China had had enough.  In April 
1941, they wrote a letter stating their case: “We have been struggling heart and soul to save the 
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Service and maintain it united,” but “we have reached the very end of our tether” because of “the 
inferno in which we are compelled to work.”170  With no end to the war in sight, some of the 
foreign postal directors began retiring in the summer of 1941, others shortly after the outbreak of 
the broader Pacific War in December, but a few stayed on and continued to fight. 
For the foreign directors still at their posts in early 1943, external events soon forced 
them from office.  In the fall of 1942 American and British representatives met to decide how to 
sustain Nationalist resistance to Japan while also giving the Chongqing government a public 
relations victory.  The Americans and British announced they would be abrogating the Unequal 
Treaties in January 1943.  Before the formal signing, Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing government 
officially declared war on the United States and Great Britain and announced its own compact 
with the Japanese for the rendition of all Japanese and other foreign settlements and concessions 
in China.  Shortly thereafter, Mussolini’s Italy and Vichy France also began the process of 
abrogating their Unequal Treaties as well.  With the Unequal Treaties abolished, Wang’s 
Nanjing Government and the Japanese no longer had to worry about violating the 
extraterritoriality of the foreign postal directors.  In March 1943, the Nanjing Ministry of 
Reconstruction (南京建設部), which oversaw the newly-established Nanjing Directorate 
General of Post, fulfilled the agreement made with Chapelain in 1940 to issue its own 
appointments to all the remaining foreign postal directors in the occupied zones.
171
  The Nanjing 
Government then ordered Chapelain and the others to take formal control of all postal districts in 
the occupied zones.  Once that was accomplished, the Nanjing Government dismissed all the 
                                                 
170
 Letter from E. Caretti, F. Poletti, E. Nordstrom, E. A. Cavaliere, A. O. Hyland, J. McLorn, and V. L. D’Alton to 
D. G. Guo Xinsong, 29 April 1941 in SHAC137(5).2832. 
171
 Nanjing jianshebu jian zong zi di 446 hao xunling (Instruction no. 446, Nanjing Ministry of Reconstruction), 5 
March 1943 as enclosure to Youzheng zongju zhu Hu banshichu gonghan di 234/1858, zhuren Zhapeilin (Shanghai 
banshichu circular letter no 234/1858, Shanghai Banshichu Director Chapelain), 29 March 1943 in SHAC137.5684. 
90 
 
foreigners from their positions in June 1943.
172
  Having lost control to the Japanese, the 
Chongqing Directorate, having moved from Kunming in late 1942, ordered the General Affairs 
Offices closed in December 1943 thus breaking all postal ties with the occupied areas.
173
   
The sudden and unconditional surrender of Japan in mid-August 1945 caught the 
Directorate by surprise.  Chongqing postal administrators quickly threw together a number of 
rules and regulations pertaining to the takeover of postal districts in the “reoccupied areas” 
(收復) controlled by Japan since 1943 as well as the “recovered” (光復) districts in Manchuria 
and Taiwan.
174
  Most of the east coast and northern districts were retaken in September and 
October 1945.
175
  The Directorate returned to Nanjing in November and began operations on 
Taiwan that same month.  On Taiwan, the Directorate worked through a new administrative 
organ, the Committee for Administering Posts and Telecommunications (郵電管理委員會), 
which itself simply took over a well-functioning postal service built by the Japanese since 
1895.
176
  In Manchuria, however, the Directorate divided the region into four new postal districts 
(Liaoning, Jinzhou, Jilin, and Heilongjiang), but had to contend with de facto control of most of 
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the rural areas in Jilin, Liaoning, and Jinzhou by the Communists as well as the total loss of 
Heilongjiang.   
 
Postal Connections (通郵): The CCP-Held Areas and the Nationalist Post Office 
The Directorate circumvented the problem of the occupied zones during WWII by using foreign 
postal directors and general affairs offices.  During the Civil War with the Communists the 
Directorate was also at the forefront of negotiations to reopen “postal connections” to re-
integrate and maintain the territorial unity of the Chinese nation-state.  During the War of 
Resistance Against Japan, the Directorate had made a series of ad hoc mail exchange agreements 
with the various governments of the Communist base areas thereby recognizing de facto 
territorial division.
177
  One of the important questions for the Directorate as it recovered the post 
offices in the former Japanese occupied zones was future postal arrangements with Communist-
held areas.  The Directorate, as with most of the public, assumed the Nationalists would win the 
Civil War and began pursuing their usual policy of maintaining postal connections between the 
two sides by relying on their reputation as a “non-political” institution.  The gradual breakdown 
of peace talks and the outbreak of the full-scale war in June 1946, however, created increasing 
chaos for post offices in the warzone.   
During the first year of the Civil War mails continued passing between the two sides with 
heavy censorship by both governments.  Post offices in north and northeast China changed hands 
many times.
178
  In the midst of the see-saw struggle, the Communists captured many members of 
the postal staff and their offices.  Once captured, postal employees were usually sent for “re-
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education” through short courses at special schools designed to convert technical personnel into 
Communist agents.  Once re-educated, the employees were sent back to rejoin the Post Office 
and to begin working for the Communists from the inside of the Post Office.
179
  The Communists 
also stripped the captured post offices of all valuables in case they were retaken by the 
Nationalists.
180
  In reaction to such tactics, the Nationalists ordered a complete communications 
and economic blockade of Communist-held areas in August 1947.  If and when the Communists 
captured postal staff in the future, they could only be re-employed once their “thinking was 
checked to ensure its purity.”181  To avoid such incidents, the Directorate ordered all postal staff 
in areas approached by the Communists to pack up everything of value – stamps, archives, liquid 
funds – and evacuate. 
As the Communists expanded their control over the north and turned the tide of the war 
in mid-1948, the public began protesting the communications blockade.  With public pressure 
mounting, the Directorate petitioned the Ministry of Communications in early January 1949 
arguing that as a “pure service institution” not involved in politics, the Post Office should “meet 
the needs of the public” by reopening postal connections with the Communist-held areas.182  A 
few days later, Jiang Jieshi announced his retirement allowing Acting President Li Zongren to re-
open peace talks.  During the talks, the Executive Yuan ordered that postal connections could be 
experimentally made with the Communists.  In response, the Directorate ordered all Head Post 
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Offices to open negotiations with the local Communist postal representatives.
183
  The first 
connections were made in early February in Jiangsu, Anhui, and Shanghai.  Other connections 
were then made at Beiping, Hebei, Gan-Ning-Qing, Shaanxi, Hubei, and Shanxi.
184
 
In March 1949, the Directorate despatched a Postal Connections Representatives Team 
(通郵代表團) to Beiping to negotiate a broader agreement on mail exchanges with the North 
China Telecommunications Directorate (華北郵電總局), the Communists governing body for 
postal and telecommunications industries.  After several weeks of talks, the two sides produced 
the “Postal Connections Agreement of the North China Telecommunications Directorate and the 
Shanghai Directorate General of Posts” (通郵協定).185  On 27 April, the two negotiating teams 
officially signed the agreement, which allowed mail exchanges along the entire front and 
officially reunified China as a single postal area.
186
  That same day, however, the Executive 
Yuan passed a resolution to break off all postal, communications, and remittance exchanges with 
the Communists.
187
  The National Government’s sudden shift resulted from the collapse of the 
peace talks and the Communists crossing of the Yangzi on April 21.  With the Communists 
approaching Shanghai, the Directorate along with most of the National Government fled to 
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Guangzhou in late May and then crossed the strait into Taiwan in August.  In case the Nationalist 
forces rallied, the Directorate despatched a single employee, Huang Jiade (黃家德), to 
Chongqing in October.  Huang’s duty was to open a small post office and continue printing 
stamps, which he did until 6 January 1950 when he too fled to Taiwan.  With Huang’s flight, the 
Directorate’s 54-year effort to maintain the territorial integrity of the country ended.188 
 
 
Conclusion 
The almost unanimous agreement among scholars that the various states of the late Qing and 
Republican period were weak, if they existed at all, needs to be revised.  The transition from a 
multiethnic empire to a fledgling Republic dominated by warlords and bandits, to a 
revolutionary, but conservative Nationalist state controlling only a handful of provinces did 
mean there was little time for a single state to establish itself, develop its administrative system, 
and create efficient functional laws.  By examining the role of a semi-colonial institution like the 
Chinese Post Office as one of the only state institutions that survived as an administrative whole 
throughout the entire period, however, we can observe some stability in the Chinese state in the 
first half of the twentieth century.   
Postal administrators pursued a series of strategies to insulate, protect, and strengthen the 
institution and the larger state from external disruption and territorial division.  By promoting the 
Post Office as a non-political or impartial institution known as being innovative, efficient, 
service-oriented, and trustworthy, Théophile Piry and Henri Picard-Destelan helped their 
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institution retain administrative autonomy under the Qing and early Republican governments.  
Other central government institutions recognized this special status of the Post Office.  Unable to 
operate outside the small areas controlled by the Beijing or Nanjing governments, other state 
institutions asked the Post Office to act “in the capacity of an agent” for them to utilize the 
routes, offices, and employees of the Post Office to expand their own activities.
189
  Over the 
years, the Post Office sold revenue stamps for the Ministry of Revenue (1913-1928, 1934-1949), 
transmitted telegrams for the Telegraph Administration (1919-1949), conducted census for the 
Ministry of Interior (1919, 1920, 1925, 1934, 1935), delivered legal writs for the Department of 
Legal Administration (1936-1949), sold National Salvation Bonds for the National Military 
Commission, and held funds throughout the country for the National Treasury (1940-1949). 
The greatest challenge to the Post Office came in 1927/28 with the establishment of the 
Nationalist Government in Nanjing.  As it turned out, the Chinese postal staff imbued with a 
non-political corporate identity successfully fought the Nationalists’ attempts to politicize the 
Directorate when various directors general attempted to utilize postal receipts for external 
projects such as funding civil aviation or the creation of a second Directorate.  In the early part of 
the Nanjing decade, then, it was not the foreign Co-Director General nor the postal 
commissioners, but the upper- and lower-level staff who fiercely defended the institutional and 
administrative integrity of the Post Office against the Nationalists.  In 1931/32, the Manchurian 
crisis shifted the National Government toward appointing technocrats like Minister of 
Communications Zhu Jiahua who undertook wide-ranging reforms to strengthen 
communications facilities for the looming war with Japan.  Although there were a few threats to 
the Post Office’s territorial unity prior to the Mukden Incident, the Directorate’s use of foreign 
postal directors, the creation of a unique class of mediating administrative offices, and an 
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implicit power sharing agreement with the Japanese allowed the Post Office to successfully 
preserve much of its territorial unity until the foreign powers abrogated the Unequal Treaties in 
1943.  The Directorate’s wartime accomplishments in maintaining its presence in the occupied 
zones, unmatched by any other Nationalist government institution, should also force scholars to 
re-evaluation the Nationalists wartime policy towards the occupied areas.  Likewise, the smooth 
negotiations to open postal connections between the Nationalists and Communists during the 
Civil War raises new questions about the role of “non-political” state contacts between the two 
belligerents. 
Overall, it is hoped that this chapter will invite scholars to re-evaluate the role of semi-
colonial state institutions like the Post Office, the Maritime Customs Service, and the Salt 
Inspectorate.  Setting aside the anti-imperialist perspective allows us to understand these three 
institutions as unique branches of the Chinese state that not only allowed the government to 
maintain contacts with Manzhouguo and the occupied areas during World War II, but more 
importantly provided stability, constancy, and their good offices to the idea and reality of the 
Chinese government in the broader state-making process.
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Chapter 2 
Stamping Out the Competition: 
The National Postal Monopoly and the Process of State-Making 
 
The imperial edict establishing the modern Chinese postal service did not grant the new 
institution a state monopoly over the mail.  Hart had “neither the authority, the appropriation, nor 
the monopoly which [creating a national postal service] would have carried with it in Western 
countries.”1  Confronting the infant Imperial Post Office were six separate postal services serving 
different constituencies – the government-run postal relay (驛站) and post station (舖) systems 
for all imperial officials, the Wenbaoju (文報局) for overseas Chinese officials, the Minxinju 
(民信局) serving Chinese businesses and private individuals, the Qiaopiju (僑批局) transmitting 
letters and money to and from overseas Chinese, the Municipal Council Local Post Offices 
(工部書信館) handling mail for the foreign settler communities, and the Foreign Post Offices 
(客郵) connecting foreigners in China with their home countries.  The modern Post Office’s 
claim to a “birthright” of an “inviolable” monopoly not only brought it into direct conflict with 
the other postal services, but also other state actors.
2
  In the midst of such clashes, the 
administrators of the modern Post Office were enacting a specific state-making agenda derived, 
designed, and externally-inspired by the model of the state in Western Europe and the Americas.
3
  
The Post Office’s pursuit of a national monopoly thus provides an opportunity to explore the 
nature and processes of state-making as the acquisition of autonomy from and supremacy over  
other postal services, the occupation of the entire geographically-defined territory of China as the 
postal monopolist, and attainment of international recognition as sovereign in postal affairs. 
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Steamed and Pressed: Treaty-Port Local Post Offices and the Imperial Post Office 
In 1843, the British established a consular postal agency to serve the fifty expatriates living in 
the newly-opened treaty port of Shanghai.  The Consulate handled mails between Shanghai and 
Great Britain via Hong Kong.  In the early 1860s, the number of resident foreigners living in 
Shanghai rapidly increased.  In response, the British-controlled Hong Kong Post established a 
Packet Agency (領事代辦郵務) in Shanghai staffed by regular postal employees to reduce the 
heavy burden on the consular staff.  The foreign residents of Shanghai were asked to contribute 
2,500 pounds a year to the agency.  Shortly thereafter, the Municipal Council began complaining 
of poor, but expensive service.  In mid-1863, the Shanghai Municipal Council decided to 
establish its own Local Post Office.  Over the next 35 years, the Local Post Office system served 
the expatriate community by handling mails between the open treaty ports in China.   
 Between the early 1860s and the early 1890s, the Shanghai Municipal Local Post Office 
gradually opened branches in most of the treaty ports.  By 1888, there were Local Post Offices in 
Shantou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Wenzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai, Qufu, Dagu, Tianjin, Beijing, and 
Niuzhuang along the eastern seaboard and offices at Zhejiang, Jiujiang, Nanjing, Wuhu, Hankou, 
and Yichang on the Yangzi River with another established at Chongqing in the early 1890s.
4
  
The Local Post operated according to a subscriber system with expatriate firms paying a flat rate 
of 55 taels and individuals paying 48 taels per year; by the 1880s the subscriber rate had dropped 
to thirty taels.  Starting in 1865, non-subscribers could also send mail through the system by 
paying a rate of 4 candareens (about 50 cash) per ounce using the first stamps issued in Chinese 
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history.
5
  By 1870s, the Local Post Office system was handling around 170,000 letters per year, 
by the 1880s around 500,000, and by the early 1890s the figure reached 850,000 annually.
6
   
In its early years, the Local Post Office system almost always ran a deficit.  The majority 
of the debt came from subscribers posting mail free for their Chinese friends.  The Local Post 
Offices eliminated their debts and increased profits in two ways that would make them 
vulnerable to the machinations of the Imperial Post Office upon its opening in 1897.  To 
transport their mail, the Local Post Offices relied exclusively on accommodating foreign steamer 
companies who carried their mails for free.  The Local Post Offices also enjoyed the free 
carriage of their mails to outports when the Customs Post (海關撥駟達書信館) opened in 1879.  
As the revenues of the Shanghai Local Post Office started to swell, the outport Municipal 
Councils, Citizen Committees, and some foreign businessmen realized the profits to be had by 
printing and selling postage stamps to speculators and collectors. 
 Stamp collecting emerged simultaneously with the British Post Office’s introduction of 
the first penny postage stamp in 1840.  The first “craze” struck European and American 
collectors in the 1860s, and then “philatelicmania” swept the Far East in 1890s.7  By the 1890s, 
postal officials around the world realized they could sell commemoratives, surcharges, or other 
“rare” stamps to the public at large profits since collectors and speculators would never use the 
stamps.  The desire for rare stamps issued by East Asian post offices even resulted in the death of 
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some collectors.  In 1891, the Hong Kong Post issued a commemorative for the colony’s 50th 
anniversary.  In the rush to purchase the stamp, two people were crushed to death by the mob.
8
   
When the outport expatriate councils realized the profits to be had by manipulating the 
stamp market, they separated themselves from the Shanghai Local Post system and established 
their own independent Local Post Offices in 1893-94.  Citizen Committees or individual 
businessmen established Local Post Offices in Xiamen, Hankou, Jiujiang, Zhenjiang, Wuhu, 
Qufu, Yichang, Fuzhou, Nanjing, and Chongqing .  Each of these post offices then began rapidly 
issuing new stamps.
9
  The Jiujiang LPO, for example, issued 100,000 half cent stamps in 1894, 
but received orders for 150,000 – in less than three months speculators were selling the stamps 
worldwide for 20 times their face value.
10
  As a journalist for the North China Herald wrote, “the 
philatelic craze has been a godsend to the treaty ports, which have derived a nice little revenue 
from the pockets of stamp-collectors in Europe and America.”11  Not to be outdone, the Shanghai 
LPO issued its own commemorative for the foreign settlement’s semi-centennial Jubilee.  On the 
first day of sale, well over 200 foreigners “all pushing, hustling, howling, and some swearing” 
mobbed the stamp sales window.
12
  The Zhenjiang and Wuhu LPOs became notorious for 
manipulating the market by issuing stamps with intentional errors, overprints, and other mistakes 
to increase their value.
13
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The “death-knell” for the Local Post Offices was sounded with the announcement that an 
Imperial Post Office would be opened in February 1897.
14
  Sir Robert Hart considered the “soi-
disant” Local Post Offices to be “an infringement of China’s rights and a violation of a fitting 
and almost universally recognized State monopoly.”15  To force the Local Post Offices to close, 
Hart outfoxed them by “collaring” the interport steamers with an enticing mail carriage contract.  
The Customs Service required all foreign steamer companies to pay for expensive “special 
permits” (關憑單) when loading or offloading cargo after 6 pm or on weekends.  The companies 
frequently complained to Hart about this onerous burden and lobbied him to eliminate them.  
Hart then offered a deal – in exchange for the steamers signing an exclusive carriage contract 
with the Imperial Post Office, he would refund half their special permit fees – “the bait…was 
swallowed.”16  The “Legations in arms,” Hart wrote gloatingly, “irritated by my getting Str. Co’s 
to refuse to carry any but Imperial mails…I have the whiphand however.”17  In mid-January 
1897, the foreign steamer companies notified the Local Post Offices that starting from 2 
February – the official opening of the Imperial Post Office – they would no longer carry LPO 
mail.
18
  “Our Local Post Office,” wrote the Yichang correspondent of the North China Herald, 
“has got its death blow.”19  All the outport Local Post Offices immediately closed, but the 
Shanghai Local Post Office managed to survive a while longer by handling intra-city mail.  In 
November, the Imperial Post Office absorbed the Shanghai LPO. 
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In the brief conflict between the Imperial Post Office and the Municipal Council Local 
Post Office system, Hart relied on a situational tactic designed to undermine his competitors. The 
Local Post Offices were vulnerable because they relied on the free carriage of their mail by 
interport steamers.  Without the steamers, the LPOs could only rely on manipulating the stamp 
market for their profit, but in 1896-1897 the Society for the Suppression of Speculative Stamps 
banned the sale of all LPO stamps.
20
  In the end, the Local Post Offices realized that competition 
with an Imperial Post Office controlling the carriage of mail by modern transportation companies 
would be futile.   
 
“The Yizhan was not Fought, It was Outrivaled”:  
The Imperial Post Office and the End of the Postal Relay System
21
 
The Imperial Postal Relay and Post Station systems constituted a sophisticated communications 
network.  The imperial postal relay system transmitted vital military and government documents 
at high rates of speed by horse and provided lodgings for travelling officials and foreign 
dignitaries.  The Post Station system was staffed by walking couriers who carried the vast 
majority of imperial mail.  By the late nineteenth century, a combination of rising costs, rampant 
corruption, and competition from the Imperial Post Office led late Qing officials across the 
empire to gradually abandon the postal relay and post station systems in favor of the faster 
transmission rates and better efficiency of the Imperial Post Office.  Late Qing officials, 
however, were not solely motivated by better facilities for their mail, but were also enticed by the 
opportunities for peculation offered by a switch to the IPO.   
                                                 
20
 Post Office: A Monthly Journal for Stamp Collectors 5 (1896), 109. 
21
 The quote comes from RWCPO, 1921, 9. 
103 
 
The Board of War administered the Qing dynasty postal relay and post station systems. 
Within the Board, the Bureau of Communications (車駕清吏司) controlled the day-to-day 
operations of the Imperial Despatch Office (會同館), the postal relay system, and the post station 
network.  It also distributed all postal tallies (符驗, 勘合, 火牌).  The privilege to send 
documents by mounted courier was strictly limited by these postal tallies which the Bureau only 
distributed to provincial-level officials, members of the royal family, and high-ranking generals.  
In addition to transmitting important military-related and time-sensitive government documents, 
the postal relay system was primarily concerned with housing foreign dignitaries, traveling 
officials, censors on inspection tours, and candidates in the metropolitan examinations.  
The arteries of the Qing postal relay system were the mounted courier routes extending 
from Beijing throughout the provinces.  From 1421 until the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the 
courier routes remained fairly stable.
22
  Along these arterial routes were some 1,950 courier 
stations during the Guangxu period (1875-1908).  A given postal relay station was the 
responsibility of the local county magistrate, but often directly managed by a Postal Relay 
Master (驛丞).  The Postal Relay Master oversaw a large, varied staff of salaried labor, but the 
majority of employees were horsemen (馬夫) and boatmen (水夫).  An average relay station 
seems to have maintained between 20-50 horses of different grades to be used carefully 
depending on the importance of the mail.  Those near water kept between 5-10 “red” boats 
(紅船) and a lesser number of larger station boats (站船).   
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The Post Station system knit the empire together with its roughly 14,000 offices.  Post 
stations were responsible for handling the day-to-day communications between outlying areas 
and county seats as well as between counties and higher levels of the government.  Almost all 
documents sent from counties to Beijing were transmitted through post stations and carried by 
walking couriers.
23
  Post stations were usually fairly small, rustic buildings of just a few rooms.  
They were established approximately every ten li (about 3 miles) apart, although sometimes as 
distant as 30 li, on the main roads in each county.  A postmaster (舖司) administered the station 
and oversaw a staff of anywhere from three to ten spear-carrying post station soldiers (舖兵) 
who were usually local peasants paid for their services.  At the prefectural or subprefectural level 
the post station administrator (舖長司吏) controlled the operation of the entire system. 
Documents traveling between two county seats started at a “Head Post Station” (總舖) 
usually located outside the main gate of the county government offices.  The Head Post Office 
attached a waybill to each letter with a registration number and blank spaces to affix the name of 
each courier as well as the time when the document reached each station.  The courier would 
sandwich the document between two boards and wrap it with a piece of cloth to protect the letter 
from inclement weather and physical damage.  When he approached the next station, the courier 
used a belled-clapper to announce his arrival.  The postmaster emerged from the station to 
receive the letter, affix the time of arrival, and sign the return receipt.  The courier then took the 
return receipt back to his home office. 
The imperial postal relay and post station systems were expensive to operate.  The Board 
of Revenue allocated the funds to support to the postal relay system out of the land tax while 
local governments shouldered the burden of the post station system.  In the early nineteenth 
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century, the mounted courier system alone cost roughly 2 million taels out of a total revenue 
from land taxes of 83 million.
24
  In the 1880s and 1890s, there was a reduction in allocations to 
the postal relay system, but is cost was never lower than 1.5 million taels annually.
25
  By 1902, 
critics estimated the total cost of the relay and post station systems at 3 million taels a year.
26
 
The traditional postal networks of the Qing dynasty were not only expensive, its critics 
charged, but painfully slow.  Foreign steamers began plying Chinese waters in the 1840s, rapidly 
increasing the speed information could travel around the country.  Railroads and telegraphs were 
soon introduced as well.  Savvy provincial governors and local magistrates living in areas where 
telegraphs had been established began sending their urgent official correspondence over the 
wires while others turned to the Wenbaoju for faster transmission.
27
  In the 1880s and early 
1890s, Zheng Guanying, Kang Youwei, Li Hongzhang, and Liu Kunyi – all leading reformers at 
high-levels of the Qing bureaucracy – began proposing the establishment of a national postal 
service that could utilize such quick means of transport, but supporters of the postal relay system 
proved too strong.  The tipping point for the Qing government was China’s defeat in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95).  After the war, the central government established the modern Post 
Office.  
 The foreign administrators of the Imperial Post Office knew they faced an uphill battle 
against entrenched official interest in the postal relay and post station systems.  Not only was the 
budget for the traditional postal systems in the hands of provincial governors and county 
magistrates – who could spend it as they pleased – but the relay and post station systems also 
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employed roughly 150,000 workers.  Hart’s plan was to win the confidence of government 
officials by developing “along Chinese lines.”28  In practice, the idea was to “gradually close the 
yizhan while we expand.”29   
Starting in the summer of 1898, a small number of reform-minded officials began 
advocating the absorption of the relay system by the newly-established Imperial Post Office.  In 
his famous 10,000 word memorial, Kang Youwei expressed his belief that the national post 
office would enrich the country and improve communications for common people.
30
  Xue 
Fucheng (薛福成) recommended eliminating the relay stations in concert with railroad 
development.  Li Mengchi (李萌池), assistant Grand Secretary of the Board of Appointments, 
simply announced that all future documents sent by his Board would be transmitted via the 
Imperial Post Office – it was simply a matter of “speed.” A few governors, such as Yuan Dahua 
(袁大化) in Xinjiang and Xing Lu (興祿) in Guizhou, understood the significance of the modern 
post office, but advocated a slow elimination of the relay stations to coincide with the penetration 
postal facilities into their provinces.  Frustrated reform-minded journalists simply asked, 
“Besides wasting national funds, what other purpose does [the relay system] serve?”31  Despite 
such official protestations, Empress Dowager Cixi refused to eliminate the time-honored postal 
relay system.  The Imperial Post Office represented faster, cheaper, and more efficient service, 
but who controlled the Imperial Post Office was of grave concern. 
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After the disaster of the Boxer Rebellion, Empress Dowager Cixi began the New Policies 
Reforms.  In 1906, the central government reorganized itself creating new Ministries of Posts 
and Communications (郵傳部), of Foreign Affairs (外務部), and a Department of Customs 
Affairs (稅務處), among others.  The Imperial Post Office followed the Customs Service into the 
new Department of Customs Affairs, but Postal Secretary Piry began “to entertain certain 
forebodings.”32  In 1908 and 1909, the Ministry of Posts and Communications made attempts to 
rent control of the Imperial Post Office away from the foreign-controlled Customs 
Administration.  Both attempts failed, but only delayed what Piry realized was the inevitable.  In 
1910, the new Minister of Posts and Communications Xu Shichang (徐世昌) began a two-
pronged effort to consolidate control over all forms of communications in the country.  He 
battled with the Ministry of War over the postal relay system budget and with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs over Chinese control the Imperial Post Office.
33
  
While the new Ministry of Posts and Communications jockeyed for control of the Post 
Office, many Qing officials simply began abandoning the postal relay system.  The first 
territorial officials to shift their correspondence away from the postal relay system did not 
immediately turn to the Imperial Post Office, but to the Wenbaoju, which will be discussed 
below.  Starting around 1906, the Imperial Post Office began handling all the official 
correspondence of various newly-established ministries based in Beijing, including the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Posts and Communications, of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Commerce (農工商部), and for the Board of Appointments (吏部).34  By late 1910 and early 
1911, a number of provincial governors including Zhao Erfeng (趙爾豊) in Sichuan and Feng 
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Rukui (馮汝揆) in Jiangxi also decided to send all their official despatches through the Post 
Office.
35
  The decision to shift official correspondence to the IPO was not made solely for faster 
transmission, but also because it provided an opportunity for peculation.  In 1911, the Jiangxi 
Provincial Government drew 75,000 taels from the Board of Revenue for the maintenance of the 
postal relay system, but then shifted its correspondence to the Post Office where it only paid 
$12,000 silver dollars or 8,000 taels in postage.
36
 
While territorial and central government officials started shifting to the Post Office, 
Minister Xu began the process that would result in nominal Chinese control of the Imperial Post 
Office.  Some Chinese officials like Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi had always been concerned 
about the foreign control of the Post Office, but not until 1908 when Robert Hart was in semi-
retirement did any Chinese government officials take action.  In late 1908, Minister of Posts and 
Communications Chen Bi (陳璧) attempted to place control of the Post Office under his 
Ministry, but his attempt failed when he became embroiled in a corruption scandal and was 
cashiered.
37
  Other Ministers of Posts and Communications made similar rumblings about taking 
over the Post Office.  When Acting Inspector General Sir Francis Aglen decided to separate the 
Customs and Posts the Ministry seized its chance. 
On 28 May 1911, Officiating Inspector General Aglen and Postal Secretary Piry agreed 
to separate the Posts from the Customs.  In concert with the separation, the new Minister of Posts 
and Communications, Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷), petitioned the throne to move the Imperial Post 
Office into his ministry.
38
  The throne acceded.  The transfer was part of Sheng’s larger “Plan of 
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Centralization of the Administrative Services” that included future plans to extend the postal 
network while the postal relay system was gradually abolished.
39
  Despite coming under the 
administration of the Ministry, newly-named Postmaster General Piry was still invested with 
“plein pouvoir” to direct postal in accordance with his own ideas.40   
With the Post Office under the nominal control of a Chinese ministry, the absorption of 
the postal relay and post station system by the new Directorate General of Posts began to 
progress rapidly.  In August 1911, Minister Sheng orchestrated the transfer of the postal relay 
and post station systems to his ministry to prepare for their abolition.
41
  In September, the 
Ministry established new procedural rules for the postal transmission of official 
correspondence.
42
  In order to ensure a smooth transition, the Directorate worked with the 
Quanyedao (勸業道) – provincial representatives of the Ministry of Posts and Communications – 
to establish postal connections in all locations where there had been a relay station.
43
  The 
handover went smoothly until the outbreak of the Republican Revolution in October 1911.  Once 
the dust settled, the Post Office completed the closure of relay stations on 10 April 1913.
44
 
The Imperial Post Office “outrivaled” the postal relay system.  The deciding issue, 
however, was not business competition, speed of transmission, or greater efficiency, but nominal 
Chinese control over the Imperial Post Office.  Once the Ministry of Posts and Communications 
established jurisdiction over the Imperial Post Office, all concerns about eliminating the 
traditional postal networks disappeared.  Late Qing officials had few qualms about strengthening 
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the state by allowing the more efficient Imperial Post Office to take over all postal business, but 
wanted to ensure the state-making program represented the central government’s own vision.   
 
Mediating the Transition to Modernity: The Wenbaoju and the Chinese Post Office 
The Wenbaoju (文報局) or Bureau for Official Despatches originated in the need for a postal 
system to transmit correspondence between Chinese diplomatic missions abroad and the central 
government.  The original purpose of the Wenbaoju, however, was soon twisted by territorial 
officials within China.  Officials across the empire began establishing domestic Wenbaoju to 
transmit their correspondence by steamer.  These domestic Wenbaoju not only helped provincial 
officials avoid the inefficiencies and delays caused by the postal relay system, but also allowed 
them to continue receiving the outlays for the relay stations even while they closed them down.  
Within a relatively short time, the staff within the Wenbaoju offices without the authorization of 
their superiors registered themselves with the Post Office as a Minxinju or private mail company.  
By registering as a Minxinju firm, the Wenbaoju office staff only had to paid reduced letter rates, 
which allowed them to pocket most of their office budgets and have official despatches 
transmitted faster.  The Wenbaoju thus became a mediating institution for officials between the 
traditional postal relay system and the modern Imperial Post Office.     
To prepare for the arrival of various foreign diplomatic missions, the Qing government 
established the Zongli Yamen to handle foreign relations in 1861.  A number of diplomatic 
problems crises occurred over the next decade, not the least of which was the Margary Affair in 
which the British interpreter Augustus R. Margary was killed in Yunnan Province.  Margary’s 
death led to the signing of the Chefoo Convention (1876) wherein it was agreed that China 
should send diplomats abroad.  The first such diplomat was Guo Songtao (郭嵩燾) who was 
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despatched to London as part of an agreement in the Chefoo Convention that a Chinese 
representative apologize to the British government for Margary’s death.  Guo Songtao was thus 
appointed Minister to England and, two years later, Minister to France.  To handle his official 
despatches and family letters, Guo recommended ordering the China Merchants Steam 
Navigation Company to receive them in Shanghai from foreign steamers.  A certain Major 
Huang Huihe (黃惠和), who had studied for several years in England, was put in charge of 
creating an office to receive and forward Guo’s despatches and letters.  Huang then established 
the first Wenbaoju as an office on the premises of China Merchants.  Initially, the Wenbaoju was 
simply a forwarding agency receiving despatches from abroad and then delivering them to the 
local postal relay station or receiving despatches from Beijing and forwarding them by foreign 
steamer to Qing diplomats.  In 1878, discussions between the Zongli Yamen, the Superintendents 
of Trade, and Chinese representatives abroad led to the creation of a Central Bureau for Official 
Despatches for Diplomatic Missions of the South Seas (南洋出使文報總局) in Shanghai.45  
Since many foreign steamers also stopped in Tianjin, Superintendent of Trade for the Northern 
Ports Li Hongzhang also established a Bureau for Official Despatches for the North Seas 
(北洋文報總局) in Tianjin as well as one in Beijing (京局).46 
 While Li Hongzhang was establishing his Wenbaoju in Tianjin, Fujian Governor Ding 
Richang (丁日昌), something of a communications specialist, opened a domestic Wenbaoju in 
Tainan, Taiwan to strengthen his lines of communications with the island province in 1878.
47
  
The original intention of the Wenbaoju – to serve foreign missions abroad – was thus 
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transformed by Ding Richang.  By 1882, the Governors of Guangdong and Fujian also opened 
domestic Wenbaoju offices in Guangzhou, Shantou, Fuzhou, and Xiamen to improve 
communications with each other and Beijing.
48
  Not long after, other Wenbaoju were also 
established in Hankou and Qiongzhou.  Such offices obviously handled urgent despatches on 
important domestic political and diplomatic questions, but they also continued transmitting mail 
for Chinese diplomats.  To increase the efficiency of such despatches coming from Europe, the 
Qing government also created a Hong Kong Wenbaoju on Shamian Island.  By around 1900, 
then, various central and provincial government officials had started to create a new postal 
network that remained in Chinese hands, but allowed them to transmit their correspondence on 
steamers. 
When the Imperial Post Office opened in 1897, its administrators were not particularly 
concerned about the Wenbaoju since such offices appeared to mostly handle despatches between 
Chinese diplomats and Beijing.  Indeed, Li Hongzhang had closed the Wenbaoju offices in 
Tianjin and Beijing after the opening of the Post Office.
49
  What surprised postal administrators 
in Beijing was that the Wenbaoju in Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Shantou, and Qiongzhou had 
registered themselves with the Post Office as private Minxinju letter firms in 1900.  The 
Wenbaoju that registered as Minxinju enjoyed free carriage of their interport mails starting in 
1900 and for half the normal letter rate after 1905.
50
  The Wenbaoju office managers realized 
that by registering as a Minxinju firm they could transmit their mails on steamers and trains 
through the Post Office, but only pay minimal postage.  In 1909, the budget for the Guangzhou 
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Wenbaoju was 2400 taels, but they only paid the Post Office $154.98 or about 100 taels to 
transmit all their mail for the year; the office staff presumably pocketed the difference.
51
  The 
great benefit of switching to the Post Office, however, was that documents reached Beijing five 
times faster.
52
 
After 1900, the Wenbaoju system developed in two directions.  In the central and 
southern parts of the empire, Wenbaoju usually registered themselves at the Post Office in order 
to received discounted postage rates.  In the North and West, governors used the Wenbaoju to 
replace the expensive relay system, but maintained their own relationships with modern 
transportation companies.  In 1907, the Board of War petitioned the throne to abolish the Zhili 
and Jiangnan Superintendent of Courier Posts (堤塘官) Offices in Beijing and replace them with 
Wenbaoju.
53
  Zhili Governor Yuan Shikai and Liangjiang Governor-General Duanfang (端方) 
had requested the change because the Courier Posts Offices were negligent in handling mail 
matter and frequently lost letters.  The central government approved the creation of these 
Wenbaoju, who then registered themselves with the Post Office as Minxinju.
54
  In Fengtian, Jilin, 
and Heilongjiang, Governor General Zhao Erxun, and then Governor General Xu Shichang, 
began the construction of an entire Wenbaoju network relying on the Chinese Eastern and South 
Manchurian Railways to carry their mail.  In the summer of 1906, Zhao established Wenbaoju 
offices in 13 places in the Three Eastern Provinces.
55
  By 1909, Governor Xu had opened a 
Central Wenbaoju in Harbin, six Wenbao Branches, and three Wenbao Military Horse Stations 
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in Heilongjiang.
56
  By 1910, there were 54 Wenbaoju in Jilin alone.  In concert with opening 
these Wenbaoju, Governor Xu also petitioned the Board of War to abolish the expensive relay 
stations in the Northeast.
57
  Of course, Xu made sure to mention that the entire budget for the 
postal relay system should be used to pay for the Wenbaoju.  Over the next several years, the 
governors of Kulun (Inner Mongolia) and Guangxi made similar requests to abolish their postal 
relay stations in favor of Wenbaoju, which the government granted.
58
 
By 1910, most of the Wenbaoju were little more than forwarding agencies.  Except in 
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, where postal extension lagged, all other Wenbaoju relied on the 
Imperial Post Office to transmit their mail.  Some Wenbaoju transmitted official correspondence 
through the Post Office as regular mail while others preferred registering themselves to enjoy the 
discounted rates.  In most cases, the staff of the Wenbao received a sizeable budget from their 
provincial government, paid a pittance for mailing letters at the Post Office, and pocketed the 
remainder.  The Nanyang Wenbaoju in Shanghai had a yearly budget of 4,000 taels in 1910, but 
only paid the Post Office $600.00 silver dollars or 450 taels in postage – Postal Commissioner 
Erik Tollefsen declared “The Manager must therefore find it quite a lucrative business.”59  In 
May 1911, even the Heilongjiang Wenbaoju signed an agreement with the Harbin IPO for the 
carriage of all its mails to order to enjoy the cheap postage.
60
 
 By May 1911, when the Imperial Post Office came under the nominal Chinese 
administration of the Ministry of Posts and Communications, it had captured almost all 
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Wenbaoju postal business.  Later that year, the Directorate decided to institute a new 
comprehensive policy for handling government correspondence in concert with the abolition of 
the postal relay system.  In future, all government correspondence would pay full tariff rates, 
including all mails sent by the Wenbaoju.
61
 Once the Imperial Government fell in October, most 
of the Wenbaoju ceased to exist, except in Manchuria.  In Manchuria, the Wenbaoju had a larger 
network and access to rail carriage and managed to hold out until 1914.  Having extended the 
postal network in the Northeast, the Directorate then negotiated the surrender of all Wenbaoju 
business in Manchuria in September 1914.
62
 
The Wenbaoju were an important intermediary organization between the postal relay 
system and modern Post Office.  Although the Wenbaoju were started in order to send and 
receive correspondence from Chinese legation officials abroad, they quickly became a way for 
officials within China to shut down the slow and expensive postal relay system and establish a 
modern-style post office.    In the struggle between the Imperial Post Office and the Wenbaoju, 
then, the agency lay with the various governors general who took the initiative to make the 
change, but they did so recognizing the superiority of a modern-style postal system. 
 
Sovereignty, Diplomacy, and Equality: The Surrender of the Foreign Post Offices 
Starting in the 1840s and extending throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, many 
of the colonial powers established post offices in China.
63
  The right to establish such foreign 
post offices was not mentioned in any treaty thus directly violating Chinese sovereignty.  Upon 
his arrival in Guangzhou in 1834, Lord Napier established a free mail service for British 
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merchants that represented the first organized foreign postal office in China – the Portuguese in 
Macao transmitted mail to and from Lisbon, but never had an organized service as such.  Sir 
Henry Pottinger then opened the Hong Kong Post Office on 15 April 1842 after the Opium War.  
Over the next eighty years, the various foreign powers would establish some 269 post offices in 
China.  Since these post offices held no formal right to exist on Chinese soil, they remained 
under the administration of their home postal services leading the Chinese to euphemistically 
refer to them as the “Alien Posts” (客郵). 
 By establishing foreign post offices on Chinese territory, the colonial powers were doing 
nothing new.  It was not unusual for imperialist countries to open post offices either in colonies 
or in semi-colonial empires such as the Ottoman where foreign post offices were established on 
the basis of the capitulations.  In 1718, the Austrians were the first to open a foreign post office 
on Ottoman land.  They were succeeded by the Russians (1799), the French and British (1812), 
the Greeks (1834), the Italians (1869), and the Germans (1870) – by the end of the century there 
were 97 foreign post offices in the Ottoman Empire.  In the 1860s, the Sublime Porte began 
applying political pressure on the foreign post offices and then lodging diplomatic protests when 
the Empire joined the Universal Postal Union in 1874, but both strategies failed.  The Ottoman 
Post Office, like the Chinese a few decades later, then turned to direct business competition 
trying to undercut the economic viability of the foreign post offices.  The Ottoman Post Office 
achieved some success, but the ease of steamer communication with the major cities in the 
empire allowed the foreign post offices to stay open until they were abrogated in the Treaty of 
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Lausanne in 1923.
64
  The British (1859), French (1865), and United States (1867) also had post 
offices in Japan, but they closed when Japan entered the Universal Postal Union in 1878.
65
 
The British were the only country to have postal facilities in the Qing Empire until the 
1860s.  In 1843, British Postmaster General Lord Lowther ordered the opening of packet 
agencies in the treaty ports to improve communications between the expatriate communities and 
London.  These consular packet agencies were opened in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Xiamen, and Fuzhou in 1844 and in Shantou in 1860.
66
  In the early 1860s, the Hong Kong Post 
Office became independent and then took over the administration of the consular packet agencies 
in 1868.
67
  The Hong Kong postmaster general then decided to open a fully-functioning post 
office in Shanghai.  Over the next several decades, the British established new foreign post 
offices in Hankou (1872), Quanzhou (1873), and Tianjin (1883).
68
 
The French, Americans, Japanese, Russians, Germans, and Austro-Hungarians followed 
the British lead in establishing foreign post offices in China.  The opening of foreign post offices 
usually followed the arrival of regular steam communication with China.  The French Post 
Office in Shanghai opened after the Compagnie Messageries Imperiales started regular steam 
service to China in 1862.  President Abraham Lincoln ordered the establishment of a mail 
steamship service to Shanghai on 17 February 1865.  In 1867, the Pacific Mail Steamship 
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Company delivered the first mail to the American Consul in Shanghai, which then established 
the Shanghai Postal Agency under the control of Postmaster General Alexander Randall in 
Washington.  The Shanghai Postal Agency only delivered mail within the International 
Settlement and signed mail agreements with the other foreign powers to deliver its mail to other 
treaty ports.
69
  In 1875 the Japanese Mitsubishi Mail Steamship Company purchased the U.S. 
Pacific Mail line between Yokohama and Shanghai, which allowed the Japanese consulate in 
Shanghai to establish its own foreign post office.  The German Nordeutscher Lloyd Company 
offered steam service to China starting in 1885 and the first German Post Office in China opened 
in 1886.  Russia was the exception in that it relied on rail transport across Siberia for its mails 
and opened its first Post Office in Beijing in 1870 and then followed with offices in Kalgan, 
Urga, Tianjin, and Shanghai.
70
  By 1897, when the Imperial Post Office opened its doors, there 
were a total of 25 foreign post offices in China led by the British with 8, the Japanese with 7, the 
Russians with 5, the French and Germans with 2, and the Americans with 1.
71
 
 In the years prior to the establishment of the Imperial Post Office, the foreign postal 
establishments were a necessary adjunct to the emergence of Western expatriate communities in 
China.  The Qing government did not provide a domestic mail service for its subjects and saw no 
need to provide one for foreigners.  Although the foreign post offices initially handled only 
diplomatic correspondence they quickly morphed into a general postal service for the entire 
foreign community, which in these early years still primarily consisted of foreign representatives 
and the employees of a few business firms.  Over the course of the late nineteenth century as 
                                                 
69
 On the history of the Shanghai Postal Agency, see: Peter L. Koffsky, The Consul General’s Shanghai Postal 
Agency, 1867-1907 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1972). 
70
 S.V. Prigara, The Russian Post in the Empire, Turkey, China and the Post in the Kingdom of Poland, translated by 
David M Skipton (N.p.: Rossica Society of Russian Philately, 1981). 
71
 Yi Weixin, “Luelun wan Qing ‘Keyou’” (The ‘Guest Post’ of the late Qing dynasty), Yiyang shizhuan xuebao 
“Journal of Yiyang Teachers College” 21: 2 (March 2000), 85. 
119 
 
more foreigners settled in the treaty ports and missionaries began moving inland, the foreign post 
offices continued expanding to serve this new customer base.   
The foreign post offices offered a number of services to the foreign public.  In addition to 
bringing mail and newspapers from home, they also transported parcels, money orders, and, in 
the Russian and Japanese offices, offered savings bank facilities.  Since these foreign post offices 
were part of their home administrations, all stamps sold to the public in China were domestic 
stamps overprinted with some indication of their being used in China.  For example, US stamps 
sold in Shanghai were overprinted with “US Postal Agency” or simply “Shanghai” while British 
stamps were overprinted with “British Post Office” and “Chungking” or whichever office sold 
the stamp.  Stamp sales and other business at the foreign post offices were brisk – in no small 
measure due to their popularity with philatelists.  In 1886, the British Post Office in Shanghai 
sold $17,259 silver dollars worth of stamps and earned a net profit for the year of around $6,500.  
British Postmaster Machado of Shanghai estimated that the total profit of all the foreign post 
offices in Shanghai at around $60,000 silver dollars a year.
72
  By 1907, the British Post Office in 
Shanghai alone was selling around $115,000 in stamps per year.
73
  
 When the Imperial Post Office opened in 1897, it held an ambivalent position on the 
foreign post offices.  The Qing government pressured Robert Hart to join the Universal Postal 
Union immediately, but Hart felt “demand for full adhesion to the Union and for haste generally” 
to be premature when the Qing was unwilling to accept full international responsibilities.
74
  Until 
China signaled its readiness to accept those responsibilities by entering the Universal Postal 
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Union, the IPO had to cooperate with the foreign post offices.
75
  That compromise, however, did 
not mean the Imperial Post Office would allow the foreigners an open field.  Hart and the other 
postal administrators started using what in hindsight appears to have been a three-part strategy to 
weaken the foreign post offices.  First, the Imperial Post Office would create a domestic legal 
system restricting the operations of the foreign post offices through the promulgation of internal 
postal regulations and sponsored government laws defining the national postal monopoly; 
second, the Post Office would focus on internal development and expansion in preparation for 
entering the Universal Postal Union; and third, the Imperial Post Office would sign exclusive 
mail carriage contracts with most of the modern transportation companies to limit the territorial 
reach of the foreign post offices.   
The three-part strategy to undermine the viability of the foreign post offices would take 
twenty years to have its effect, but Hart started working on the problem before the IPO even 
opened for business.  Hart saw the interport carriage of mails by foreign steamers as the weak 
point in their network, but also realized the success or failure of the IPO depended signing an 
exclusive contract with those same steamers.  In 1896, Hart wrote to Postal Secretary H. Kopsch, 
who was handling negotiations with the steamer companies, “Take care how you handle this, for, 
if the companies get to thinking we are in their clutches, they may prove hard to deal with, and 
either squeeze us for their consent or refuse consent – in which latter case we would be in a very 
bad fix indeed.”76  As discussed above, Hart made the steamer companies agree that in exchange 
for a refund of half their special permit fees the steamer companies would refuse to carry any 
mail except for the Post Office.  The foreign legations were “in arms,” Hart wrote, but “having 
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established the principle, I shall ease off in practice – we cannot force Govts. to withdraw their 
P.O. and we shall let them live, and carry their mails for them for a consideration.”77  A week 
later, Hart wrote to Postal Secretary Kopsch in one of his patented rhymes:  “The steam 
negotiation has caused some indignation – Legations think that they have been insulted! – but if 
we had shown our hand, we’d have lost what’s ours – command, and that’s the reason they were 
not consulted.”78 A few years later, Hart also worked out a contract with the railroad companies 
giving the IPO a monopoly on rail transport
79
  With these two contracts, Hart had nearly 
monopolized the carriage of mail by modern transport for the Imperial Post Office. 
Postal Secretary Piry also began undermining the competitive edge of the foreign post 
offices by signing postal agreements with their home governments.  In order to compete with the 
Imperial Post Office, many of the foreign post offices made an “energetic move” in 1901 by 
lowering their postage rates hoping thereby to attract Chinese customers.  Piry responded by 
lowering the rates of the Post Office though he understood a rate war might “inflict permanent 
injury” on the Post Office.80  While keeping his rates low, Piry also began signing international 
postal agreements with the foreign powers.  In these agreements, signed with France in 1902, 
Germany in 1906, and Japan in 1910, Piry made sure to insert the clause “It is understood that 
the [foreign] Administration will not apply to mail matter exchanged between its own Offices in 
China taxes lower than those adopted by the Chinese Administration.”81  Piry clause ensured rate 
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wars would not interfere with the continued expansion of his administration, but did not cover 
rates between the foreign post offices and their home countries.  The foreign post offices always 
maintained domestic rates for international mail sent from China in violation of UPU regulations, 
which the Imperial Post Office “for political reasons, consistently protested, and must continue 
to protest, as an infringement of her rights as an independent State.”82 
Despite efforts to restrict the foreign post offices, their number continued to grow after 
1900.  By 1906, the British had 9 post offices in China, the Germans 14, the French 14, the 
Japanese 16, the Russians 5 and the Americans 1 (Table 1).
83
  After 1910, it was the Japanese 
Post Office in China that developed most rapidly – they grew from 16 offices in 1906 to 129 in 
1913 and peaked at 208 in the early 1920s.  The continued expansion of the foreign post offices, 
Postal Secretary van Aalst argued, shows “foreign countries have secret designs of snatching 
Chinese sovereign rights in postal matters.”84  The American Minister to China, Edwin H. 
Conger, could not but agree: “The foreign Post Offices are being established principally for 
political reasons…Their establishment materially interferes with and embarrasses the 
development of the Chinese postal service [and] is an interference with China’s sovereignty.”85  
The Post Office believed the foreign powers continued to increase the number of foreign post 
offices in China for two reasons.  First, the foreign powers tacitly winked at smuggling through 
their post offices.
86
  On 21 December 1918, the North China Herald broke the story that the 
Bank of Japan was financing the importation of opium into China, but “the chief agency in the 
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distribution of morphia in China is the Japanese post office.”87  Second, the foreign powers 
wanted to avoid Chinese censorship on foreign mail matter.   
Table 1: Foreign Post Offices in China, December 1906 
British German French Japanese American Russian 
Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai 
Tianjin Beijing Beijing Beijing  Beijing 
Qufu Tianjin Tianjin Niuzhuang  Tianjin 
Hankou Qufu Qufu Tianjin  Qufu 
Ningbo Ji’nan Chongqing Tangku  Hankou 
Fuzhou Qingdao Hankou Qufu   
Xiamen Yichang Ningbo Chongqing   
Shantou Hankou Fuzhou Shashi   
Guangzhou Nanjing Xiamen Hankou   
 Zhenjiang Guangzhou Nanjing   
 Fuzhou Qiongzhou Suzhou   
 Xiamen Beihai Hangzhou   
 Shantou Longzhou Fuzhou   
 Guangzhou Mengzi Xiamen   
   Shantou 
Guangzhou 
  
 
 
In September 1914, the Directorate General of Posts officially joined the Universal Postal 
Union by adhering to the Union’s 1906 Rome Convention.88  The Directorate intended to protest 
the existence of the foreign post offices at the upcoming Madrid Congress of the UPU scheduled 
for September 1914, but the outbreak of World War I led to its cancellation.  Director General of 
Posts Liu Fucheng (劉符誠) then sent a communication to the Universal Postal Union on 18 
March 1915 indicating that China no longer considered the foreign post offices on its soil to have 
“a legal existence.”  Liu’s case was:    
Article 1 of the Universal Postal Convention lays down this fundamental principle 
– that the Postal Union is composed of the totality of adhering countries (and not 
of postal administrations)….There can therefore be no warrant…without violation 
of the principle laid down by Article 1 of the convention, for offices maintained 
by Union countries in other Union countries….China [also] protests against the 
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maintenance, by the majority of the foreign post offices operating upon its 
territory, of tariffs lower than those fixed by Article 5 of the Rome convention.
89
 
 
China recognized it was an inopportune time to negotiate the elimination of the foreign 
post offices during World War I, but wanted to state for the record that continued cooperation 
did not imply legal recognition of their right to exist.  The war did allow the Directorate to close 
down all German Post Offices in April 1917 and Russian Post Offices after the Whites lost the 
civil war.
 90
  As soon as the war ended, the Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign post offices, but French Prime Minister 
Clemenceau refused to allow any discussion of issues not pertaining directly to a peace treaty.
91
    
When the cancelled Madrid Congress finally met in late 1920, Chinese delegates began 
informal negotiations with the American, French, and British governments about their post 
offices in China.
92
  The British Government recommended against raising the issue at the formal 
sessions of the Congress arguing that the elimination of the foreign post offices in China was 
“purely a political question which could not be decided by the Postal Congress.”93  Internally, 
however, the British were prepared to abolish their offices in China on several conditions: (1) 
that all the powers remove their offices simultaneously; and (2) that Britain retained the right to 
reopen its offices should the Chinese Post Office prove inadequate.  British representatives then 
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approached Co-Director General of Posts Destelan to ascertain his attitude toward such 
conditions.  Destelan replied that France had almost the same stipulations, but he also 
recommended securing some guarantee against censorship. When the Chinese delegation spoke 
informally with the Americans, the Americans expressed “high appreciation of the…efficiency 
and excellence of the postal service of the Chinese government…[and] the sympathy of the 
United States with the desire of the Chinese Government that all of the foreign post offices 
should be withdrawn from its territory.”94  With such positive verbal statements, the Chinese 
delegation formally raised the issue of abolition at the Madrid Congress, but the question was 
considered outside the purview of the Union.  If China wanted to abolish the foreign post offices, 
it would have to negotiate directly with the foreign governments involved. 
The opportunity for China to negotiate directly with the foreign powers came at the 
Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments held from November 1921 to February 
1922.  In preparation for the Conference, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially notified the 
American, British, French, and Japanese Consulates in Beijing that the Chinese government 
would be demanding the withdrawal of all foreign post offices in China.
95
  A month before the 
conference began, the Beijing Government passed the Postal Law granting the Chinese Post 
Office a state monopoly in order to bolster the government’s position.96   
At the Conference, Minister to the United States Alfred Sze (施肇基), the head of the 
Chinese delegation, presented the Chinese case for abolition.  He argued that China possessed an 
efficient and trustworthy postal service covering the entire country that legally held a postal 
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monopoly; that the existence of foreign post offices deprived the Chinese Post Office of its 
rightful revenue; and that the foreign post offices are not expressly mentioned in any treaty and 
are therefore a violation of Chinese sovereignty.  Sze described the strategy of the foreign post 
offices as to “skim the cream of the postal business” by situating themselves in the busiest cities 
and using postage rates so low they violated UPU regulations.  The Chinese delegation also 
repeated the North China Herald story that the foreign post offices were used to smuggle 
significant amounts of illegal drugs and other contraband into China.  Finally, Sze stressed the 
Powers’ previously sympathetic statements on abolition.97  After allowing Mr. Sze to respond to 
a few questions, the Sub-Committee moved to draft a statement on the abolition of the foreign 
post offices.  While there was general agreement on the conditions, the Japanese Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Masanao Hanihara warned he could not commit his government to an 
immediate abolition of the offices concerned.  Setting aside the Japanese concerns, the sub-
committee then drafted a formal statement on the abolition of all foreign post offices in China, 
but placed the date of withdrawal eleven months in the future to allow time for a special 
conference between the Chinese and Japanese governments.  The full text of the “Resolution 
Regarding Foreign Postal Agencies in China,” adopted by the Washington Conference on 1 
February 1922, stated: 
A. Recognizing the justice of the desire expressed by the Chinese Government to  
secure the abolition of foreign postal agencies in China, save or except in leased 
territories or as otherwise specifically provided by treaty, it is resolved: 
1. The four Powers having such postal agencies agree to their abandonment subject to 
the following conditions: 
a. That an efficient Chinese postal service is maintained; 
b. That an assurance is given by the Chinese Government that they contemplate 
no change in the present postal administration so far as the status of the 
foreign Co-Director General is concerned. 
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2. To enable China and the Powers concerned to make the necessary dispositions, this 
arrangement shall come into force and effect not later than January 1, 1923.
98
 
 
The resolution on the withdrawal of the foreign post offices in China was a great diplomatic 
victory for the Chinese Post Office, but the important question of Japan’s “special” stipulations 
remained to be negotiated.   
In August 1922, Chinese and Japanese delegations met in Beijing at the Ministry of 
Communications building for the Sino-Japanese Postal Conference (中日郵政會議).  The 
conference delegates had two main items on their agenda: (1) a series of technical postal 
agreements that would ensure an efficient service for Japanese mails in China; and (2) the status 
of Japanese post offices in the South Manchurian Railway Zone.
99
  After several weeks of 
intensive negotiations, the two sides resolved the technical questions in four agreements on the 
exchange of correspondence, money orders, parcels, and insured letters.
100
  During the 
negotiations, however, the Japanese delegation continued inserting clauses stipulating that any 
and all postal agreements reached at the conference did not include Japanese post offices in the 
South Manchurian Railway Zone.
101
  As the conference moved towards a discussion of the 
railway zone issue, the Japanese suddenly and adamantly refused to discuss the issue at all.
102
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The conference then ground to a halt.  The two sides decided to refer the discussion of the 
railway zone issue to their respective foreign ministries.
103
 
The question of the status of the Japanese Post Offices in the South Manchuria Railway 
Zone was never resolved.  There were some discussions of the issue, but the two sides 
continually differed on the interpretation of a phrase in a secret treaty signed between China and 
Russia in 1896 – a treaty whose rights passed to Japan in the Portsmouth Treaty ending the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905.
104
  In the secret treaty, the Qing government granted Russia the 
“absolute and exclusive right of administration in the territories attached to the railway.”  While 
the Chinese side admitted the existence of this treaty, they contended that no “special” right had 
been granted to establish post offices while the Japanese side argued that the “right of 
administration” implicitly included services like post offices.  At loggerheads, the two sides 
decided on a provisional settlement to maintain the “status quo” of the Japanese post offices in 
the railway zone as originally agreed upon in the 1910 postal treaty between China and Japan.
105
  
From 1922 until the Mukden Incident in September 1931, then, Japan continued to maintain 
some 95 post offices in the railway zone.
106
 
The  treaty powers all closed their post offices in China in accordance with the 
Washington Conference resolution.
107
  Since its establishment, the Imperial Post Office had 
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taken as its mission the creation of a national postal monopoly, but in so doing understood that it 
would be necessary to demonstrate its supremacy in domestic postal affairs and independence 
from foreign interference.  At the conclusion of a twenty-five year struggle with the foreign post 
offices, the international community recognized China as the sole possessor of internal 
sovereignty over its postal affairs.  In achieving this recognition, the Post Office helped the 
Chinese government take another step towards regaining its national sovereignty. 
 
“They Will Die Hard”: The Minxinju and the Post Office108 
In the mid-Qing period, small shops in Beijing and other important communications centers 
began carrying letters, small parcels, and sycee for the general public who were forbidden access 
to the Imperial Postal Relay system.  The public referred to such private letter shops as Minxinju 
(民信局).  Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Minxinju network(s) grew in size 
spreading itself across parts of the empire.  The strength of the Minxinju business model was a 
sophisticated combination of a high-level of personalized customer services, rapid transmission 
and delivery, and a flexible set of inter-firm relationships allowing interconnection between their 
networks.  These strengths coupled with their concentration in the Yangzi Valley and along the 
coast, made the Minxinju a strong competitor for postal business in these lucrative areas. 
Most popular and academic histories date the founding of the Minxinju to the Yongle 
(1402-1424) period in the Ming dynasty.  High officials travelling throughout the empire, such 
accounts continue, had in their retinues a laofuzi (老父子) who acted as both advisor and 
correspondence secretary – laofuzi was the official name of the more well-known muyou (tent 
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friend)(幕友) or private secretaries hired by officials to assist with correspondence.109  Sending 
letters between high officials, these Ningbo and Shaoxing-born secretaries gradually formed 
small private letter companies in alliance with merchants from their hometowns.
110
  While the 
story appears a likely explanation for the rise of the Minxinju, and the crucial role Ningbo 
merchants played in the industry, it rests not on historical evidence, but on the speculation of 
Deputy Postal Commissioner H. Kirkhope who authored the official history of the Chinese Post 
Office published in the Working Report for 1921.
111
  There were private messengers who carried 
mail throughout the entire imperial period, but the origins of the Minxinju industry was in the 
mid-Qing.   
 The Minxinju emerged in the latter half of the prosperous eighteenth century along with 
Shanxi banks and Shanghai exchange shops.
112
  These three institutions, all established within a 
few decades of each other, grew together to serve as the main communications, remittance, and 
banking networks throughout the nineteenth century.  The first use of the name Minxinju appears 
in Beijing only in 1751.
113
  In that year, the Guangtai (廣泰) Minxinju was established and was 
quickly followed by three others.
114
  Each of these Minxinju handled letters, remitted money, and 
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transported small parcels.  Shanghai “copper shops” or banks (錢莊) also first appeared in the 
Qianlong period and rapidly spread throughout the Jiangnan region.
115
  These “banks,” originally 
local shops that sold goods and exchanged small amounts of currency, gradually came to 
specialize in handling southern inter-regional financial transactions through drafts.  Shanxi “draft 
banks” (票號) first appeared in the 1820s and focused on handling large financial transactions 
for Shanxi merchants and the imperial government.
116
  None of these industries was particularly 
“traditional.” Indeed, they barely antedated the arrival of significant numbers of Westerners in 
the mid-nineteenth century, but foreign observers like Kirkhope projected them backwards in 
time as part of “immemorial” Chinese economic life.  
The origins, development, and relationships of the Minxinju, Shanghai exchange shops, 
and Shanxi banks share many similarities.  Each seems to have emerged from small local shops 
selling goods and gradually transformed themselves into bona-fide empire-wide business 
networks.  Each industry was dominated by a specific group of regional merchants – Ningbo and 
Shaoxing men in the Shanghai banks, Shanxi men in the Shanxi banks, and Ningbo merchants in 
the Minxinju industry.  One suspects, though the lack of financial and business records makes 
such conclusions tentative, that each of these industries started out by handling financial 
transactions, remittances, and letters and only gradually began focusing on one of these 
specialties.  Shanxi banks were known to have carried letters for merchants just as Minxinju 
remitted currency, Shanghai banks borrowed large sums from Shanxi banks, and Shanxi or other 
local banks often sent the business correspondence and even remittances through the 
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Minxinju.
117
  One scholar goes so far to claim the appearance of the Minxinju was one of the 
“objective conditions” that allowed the Shanxi banks to emerge.118  Whichever came first, the 
relationship between the Minxinju and these Shanxi and Shanghai banks was “intimate.”119  Over 
time the Minxinju left the remittance of larger sums to the banks and focused its efforts on petty 
remittances and letter carriage.  Shanghai banks focused on medium-sized transactions for 
private merchants and the Shanxi banks specialized in very large remittances for the largest 
merchant houses and the government.  The network structure of these three industries also shared 
many similarities – the main offices of each network were usually situated within a specific 
region in the empire, had branches in the larger ports and provincial capitals, and agencies in the 
smaller provincial capitals and larger market towns.   
Although founded in the mid-eighteenth century, the Minxinju network did not began 
rapidly growing until the mid-nineteenth with the arrival of steamships producing the so-called 
“steamer Minju” (輪船信局) who then spread quickly to all major provincial capitals, many 
county seats, and some townships.
120
  The rapid growth of the Minxinju industry came in the 
wake of foreign steamers, but their organizational model, customer services, and 
communications network were vital in taking advantage of the steamships to develop their 
industry.  A typical Minxinju office in the late nineteenth century was a rather small affair with a 
couple of office staff and a few letter carriers.  The manager (東家) was often the owner, but 
occasionally might be hired by several investing partners (股東).  Aside from the manager, who 
often could operate his own shop in small locates, there might be a few shop assistants in the 
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larger firms.  Such assistants included book keepers (帳司), shop keepers (管櫃), letter receivers 
(收信物), porters (挑貨), and deliverymen/couriers (腳夫/送信員/覽信員).121  The absolutely 
largest Minxinju only had a staff of 10-15 office workers and couriers, but a more typical large 
firm seems to have had about 4-5 office staff with at least that many couriers.
122
  At branch 
offices in smaller cities such as Qufu, there might be an owner, book keeper, and two couriers.
123
  
At agencies, small general stores having an informal contract with a branch Minxinju, the staff 
was often only a single person who was usually an agent for numerous Minxinju from other 
ports.
124
  The salaries paid to office staff and couriers varied widely with couriers making around 
24 taels or less, shop assistants around 36 taels, and managers of good-sized firms earning 80 
taels.
125
  A typical large firm had a working capital of about 5,000-6,000 taels with an expected 
yearly profit of around 2,000.
126
  Mid-sized Minxinju, by contrast, might only earn several 
hundred taels a year while the smallest agencies barely made ends meet.
127
 
Office procedures of Minxinju firms show great concern for customer service.  Letters for 
outbound mail were almost always collected from businesses and done so late in the evening 
when the day’s business transactions were completed.  The clerks then registered the letters – 
even ordinary letters were considered registered – and then stamped the name of their Minxinju 
on the cover.
128
  The same procedure was also followed for collecting parcels and remittances.  
The Minxinju provided full insurance free of charge for any losses either through accident or 
robbery.  The late collection, free registration, and guarantee of any losses were all services that 
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made the Minxinju very popular with business customers.  Once enough mail, remittances, and 
parcels had been collected, a courier from a single firm would be despatched carrying the mail of 
all the local Minxinju.  On his journey, he could often be distinguished by his mail satchel which 
usually had something like “paper horse” (鈔馬) stenciled upon it.129  For routes along small 
rivers and canals, Minxinju firms sent their couriers on hired post-boats (信劃子/民信班船) 
whom they paid a set fee per trip.
130
  Upon reaching his destination, the courier would hand the 
mail to his firm where couriers from other firms could collect it.  In the case of steamer 
Minxinju, the courier would give the mail to the comprador who was paid for handling the mail 
until its arrival at its next port of call where it was collected by another courier. 
The cost of letter postage was based on local conditions, the distance to be covered, the 
speed of transmission, and the reputation of the Minxinju.  Payment for letters and parcels could 
be made in three ways: the sender paid the entire amount, the sender and receiver each paid half, 
or the receiver paid the entire amount.  The despatching office stamped letters with “wine money 
paid” (酒資已給) when postage was fully prepaid or “wine money as per tariff” (酒資照例) 
when the receiver needed to pay the courier.
131
  Less important customers paid for each 
transaction while larger concerns paid on account per month or quarter.
132
  Over short distances 
by steamer such as between Ningbo and Shanghai, Minxinju firms charged 40 cash (about 3 
cents), between Qufu to Shanghai the charge was 80 cash, and Yichang to Chongqing 48 cash.  
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The highest charge in the 1880s and early 1890s was between 400-600 cash for letters from 
coastal ports to inland, land-locked provinces.
133
  The Minxinju offered express services 
(火燒信/羽毛信) to the general public, but they were mostly used by market speculators who 
needed up-to-date information on fluctuations in pricing throughout the country.
134
  
The Minxinju also offered other important services.  After letters, the Minxinju mostly 
carried remittances.  On remittances, where the Minxinju seem to have earned the majority of 
their profits, they charged anywhere from a few tenths of a percent to their more important 
customers to 3% for petty remittances.
135
  It is impossible to determine the total amount remitted 
by the Minxinju firms, but the figure was reported in the millions of taels per year.
136
  Aside 
from letters and remittances, the Minxinju also specialized in transporting parcels.  Minxinju 
firms charged the same postage rates on small parcels as for letters, but if parcels were deemed 
“heavy” they were required to pay double rates.  The Minxinju would carry almost any kind of 
parcel – in one instance a Customs employee stopped a Minxinju boat near Wuhu and the courier 
was found to be transporting 110 letters, 7 bundles of newspapers, 22 small parcels, 90 pounds of 
cotton fabric, 7 pieces of woolen cloth, and 9 bags of sundries.
137
  Finally, the Minxinju also 
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collected subscriptions for and delivered newspapers, escorted travelers and carried their 
baggage, and even acted as small exchange shops.
138
 
By the late nineteenth century, Minxinju firms had created a series of overlapping, but 
interlocking networks that covered most of the important trading centers throughout the Qing 
empire.  It is impossible to determine the total number of Minxinju in the late nineteenth century 
– estimates range from around 300 to over 1,000 – but even if we had the total number of shops 
it would still be a distorted figure.  The total number of Minxinju is rather insignificant because 
of the way they structured their networks – with head offices, branches, and agencies.  Instead, 
we might estimate the total number of independent firms to be around 50 with the remainder 
being either branches or agencies.  Those fifty also maintained informal contractual relationships 
with each other.  To take one example, the Huwanchang Minxinju mentioned earlier as being 
established in Beijing in the late eighteenth century, and still surviving into the 1930s, also had 
offices in Tianjin, Chengdu, Chongqing, Shashi, Yichang, Wanxian, Hankou, Jiujiang, Nanjing, 
Shanghai, Fuzhou, and Ningbo, and thus throughout most of China.  Similarly, the Quantaisheng 
(全太盛) and Senchangcheng (森昌成) Minxinju had offices, branches, or agencies in most of 
the major cities.  When these three Minxinju combined their networks they could reach virtually 
every important city and county seat in the empire.  The total number of Minxinju, then, is less 
significant than the organization and extent of their network(s). 
The late nineteenth century Minxinju network had three important communication hubs: 
Shanghai-Ningbo, Hankou, and Beijing-Fengtian.  The Shanghai-Ningbo network was the most 
important.  It reached down the coast to Guangzhou, up the coast to Tianjin, and penetrated into 
the heart of the empire by following the Yangzi to Hankou.  The Shanghai-Ningbo Minxinju thus 
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handled communications for Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Henan.  
The Shanghai-Ningbo network connected with the western network at Hankou, but with the 
Beijing-Fengtian network either through Tianjin on steamer or from Jiujiang north along the 
Grand Canal to Beijing.  From Hankou, western-oriented Minxinju handled mail up the river to 
Yichang, Wanxian, Shashi, Chongqing, and on to Chengdu.  It also branched south to Changsha 
and on to peripheral southern provinces such as Guizhou and Yunnan and north to Shaanxi and 
Gansu.  The Beijing-Fengtian network encompassed as far south as Qufu in Shandong, but 
primarily handled communications with Shanxi, Hebei, Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.  These 
trunk networks radiating out from Shanghai, Beijing, and Hankou were supplemented with 
smaller, localized networks penetrating deeper into provinces.   
The Minxinju network(s) worked effectively because the separate firms maintained 
various kinds of informal interrelationships with each other, but also with their branches and 
agencies.  Without internal business documents it is impossible to define the exact relationship 
between separate firms or even between a firm and its branches and agencies, but external 
studies provide us with a partial picture.  A Head Office (總局/總號) at Shanghai, for example, 
always had a number of branches (分局/分號).  Each branch might be run either by a business 
associate from the same hometown as the Head Office owner or a blood relative, but might also 
be a local man hired for the job.  This kind of personal network explains the influence of Ningbo 
men in the Minxinju industry in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian.  After a Head Office-Branch 
agreement was made, the Head Office gave the local man a seal for stamping his letters.
139
  
Then, once a year or sometimes quarterly, the branch offices would hand over their profit to the 
Head Office who then paid the branch managers a set fee.   
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Branches had an identical relationship with agencies (代理店), but agencies do not seem 
to have had any financial relationship with Head Offices.  According to the Customs 
Commissioner of Jiujiang, when a Minxinju wanted to open a new agency at an inland area, the 
Minxinju branches jointly selected a common representative in the new town.  The agent gave 
the various branches a surety bond and was then granted provisional status.  While under 
provisional status, the agent paid the various branches a fixed sum debited against his first year’s 
gross income.  Once the agent demonstrated his trustworthiness, he became a formal agent 
assuming the risk of loss and retaining any local profits.
140
  In most cases, a single local agent 
probably represented between 5 and 10 different branches.  The inland Minxinju throughout 
Anhui were all individual representatives of the 17 Wuhu branches of Shanghai-based 
Minxinju.
141
  In some cases, agencies appear to have remitted their yearly profits back to their 
branch managers who then pooled the money and divided it evenly among the agencies - the 
yearly profit for such an agency was said to be around $100 silver dollars.
142
   
The individual Minxinju head offices worked together to form their own “postal 
union.”143  Whenever a Minxinju needed to forward a letter where it had no branch or agency, it 
handed the letter to another network.  Historians have presumed that these head offices had 
contracts with each other, but no such contracts have yet been found.
144
  One might speculate 
that inter-firm contracts did not exist.  Minxinju may have carried mail for each other free of 
charge assuming that such obligations would balance out over time.  Or, Minxinju may have 
used their methods of charging postage to ensure both networks received half the fee.  When a 
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Minxinju received a letter that would have to be passed to another Minxinju network, the first 
might have charged half the postage up front and had the end recipient pay the second half of the 
postage to the second Minxinju network.  Both networks thereby received half the postage 
without having formal contracts or needing to settle accounts.  Another Minxinju practice 
suggests this might have been the case.  As noted above, Minxinju firms in the same city shared 
couriers, each taking their turn over given routes.  Dividing such labor costs shows the flexibility 
of Minxinju firms and their inter-relationships suggesting that cost and labor savings may have 
outweighed the value of formal inter-firm contracts.   
By the time the Qing government authorized the establishment of an Imperial Post Office 
in 1896, the Minxinju had already created a flourishing industry.  The industry started slowly in 
the late eighteenth century and then underwent a period of rapid growth once steamers began 
plying Chinese waters.  As Minxinju appeared in the larger treaty ports they began establishing 
branches in the smaller coastal and river towns, and those branches signed agency contracts with 
smaller inland shops – through contractual relations they were “knit together as a systematic and 
comprehensive body, providing the public with a most satisfactory service and supplying a 
national want.”145   
 
“The Velvet Glove”: The Imperial Post Office and the Minxinju, 1896-1911146 
When the Guangxu Emperor sanctioned the establishment of the Imperial Post Office in March 
1896, Robert Hart and the other foreign postal administrators knew the Minxinju posed the 
greatest challenge to the success of the Post Office.  The Guangxu Emperor, however, had 
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admonished Hart not to interfere with the livelihood of the Minxinju.  To abide by the emperor’s 
wishes, but to begin the process of undermining the Minxinju, Hart invited the Minxinju to 
register with the Post Office and carry each others’ mail while the Post Office built up its own 
network.  Hart’s policy encountered resistance from the Minxinju and the Qing government, both 
of whom resisted his attempts to dictate terms to the Minxinju.  After several failed efforts to 
charge for the IPO carriage of Minxinju mails, Théophile Piry changed tactics to undermine the 
Minxinju through competition.  
During 1896, Hart laid out his basic policy towards the Minxinju.  In April he ordered 
that Minxinju could operate freely in places without IPO establishments; in places with IPO 
establishments, the Minxinju “must” register themselves with the Post Office and hand over their 
mails in clubbed packages (總包) to the IPO for delivery at yet to be determined “Coast postage” 
rates; and, when the IPO received mail for places where it has no offices, it would hand them to 
the Minxinju for delivery.
147
  In his second circular on Minxinju policy, Hart contradicted 
himself by “inviting” Minxinju to registering themselves at the Post Office.  In registering 
themselves, the Minxinju would be required to provide their name, date of establishment, name 
of owner and partners, their location, the location of all their branches, the frequency they 
despatched mail, and their rates of postage.
148
  In late 1896, the postal commissioners attempted 
to force the Minxinju to register in accordance with Hart’s first circular.  Hart admonished them, 
“the Imperial Post is not established to either compete, hurt, or kill, but to work with the long-
existing private agencies and to do this in such a way as shall both support and utilize them in the 
interests of themselves, the public, and the government” and that “their best policy will be 
                                                 
147
 Inspector General’s Circulars, Postal Series, No. 7, I.G. Robert Hart, 9 April 1896 in SHAC137.2023-1. 
148
 Inspector General’s Circulars, Circular No. 733, Postal Circular 13, I.G. Robert Hart, 17 July 1896 in 
SHAC137.2023-1. 
141 
 
reciprocity and friendliness.”149  This policy to “affiliate them as agents” of the IPO led some 
300 Minxinju to register with the Post Office in 1897.
150
 
After the first group of Minxinju registered themselves with the Post Office, Hart began 
to apply pressure.  Upon securing a monopoly on the steamer carriage of mail for the Imperial 
Post Office, Hart ordered that only Minxinju who registered themselves and sent their mail 
through the Post Office would be allowed steamer carriage.  They would pay the full letter rate 
on the gross weight of their clubbed packages – or $1.28 per pound.  Any Minxinju found to be 
“smuggling” mail on steamers would be required to pay treble IPO letter rates as a fine.151  The 
Minxinju protested to various officials about this treatment – Hart not only forbid them use of the 
steamers, but charged them more than their own postage rates for the privilege.
 152
  Hart, they 
argued, had disobeyed the Imperial Will.  The protests proved effective and the Qing government 
forced Hart to lower the rates on Minxinju clubbed packages.  Sometime in 1897, the Imperial 
Government ordered Hart to lower all carriage charges for Minxinju packages to half the normal 
letter rate or 64 cents per pound.  Minxinju owners again protested this new rate forcing the 
government to lower rates to an astonishing ten cents per pound, which was lower than the 
Minxinju could transport their own mail.
153
   
The Qing government’s decision to grant such low rates forced Hart to adopt a two-
pronged strategy.  For the time being, the Post Office would acquiesce to the Imperial Will, but 
slowly try to raise rates; second, the Post Office would develop itself so that the Minxinju would 
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eventually “be absorbed” by the Imperial institution.154  The Imperial Government repeatedly 
stymied the first half of the Post Office’s strategy.  In 1899, Postal Secretary Jules van Aalst 
petitioned the government to raise rates on the Minxinju back to the half rate of mid-1897, 
which, after a year, would be raised to full letter rates.
155
  The government seemed to agree with 
van Aalst’s plans for he announced the new rates effective as of 1 April 1900. 156  Before the new 
rates could come into effect, however, van Aalst was forced to withdraw them and the Post 
Office returned to the 10 cent rate.
157
  The Minxinju had presumably again protested the rates 
and found a sympathetic audience at higher levels of government.  In March 1902, Hart again 
tried to raise rates.  With the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hart’s immediate 
superiors, he raised rates to 30 cents per pound, and stated rates would then be annually 
increased by 10 cents until the total charge reached 90 cents.
158
  Minxinju from the Yangzi ports, 
Tianjin, and Fuzhou joined together to protest the new rates.
159
  And, once again, someone 
higher in the government – it is not clear who from postal documents – nullified Hart’s new 
rates.  This time the Imperial Government sent a message – all Minxinju mails passing between 
Treaty Ports would be carried free of charge.
160
  
In 1902, Postal Secretary Théophile Piry decided to focus on an aggressive plan to 
increase business, introduce new services, and extend postal routes – all designed, he wrote, to 
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“kill competition.”161  Less than three weeks after Hart withdrew his higher rates on the 
Minxinju, Piry lowered IPO letter rates from 4 cents to 1 cent.
162
  In September, Piry decided to 
take the battle to the Minxinju’s home territory by introducing Inland Agencies (鋪商/代辦所) – 
local shops who would sign contracts with the Post Office for a commission on the sale of 
stamps.
163
  By the end of 1902, 153 Inland Agencies had been opened contributing greatly to the 
increase in the total number of IPO establishments from 176 in 1901 to 446 in 1902.
164
  “There 
are certain typical advantages to be found in the new system of inland agencies,” Piry wrote, 
“They are cheap, easy to install, require no special staff, [and] work somewhat after the Chinese 
idea.”165  The combination of rapid, but cheap postal extension and reducing IPO postage rates 
by 75% produced a “sudden and extraordinary increase” in letters sent through the Post Office – 
from 9.6 million in 1901 to 18.5 million in 1902.
166
   
Not content with his first successes, Piry continued adding new services and pushing 
postal extension.  The Post Office had introduced registration and remittance services in 1897, a 
parcel post in 1898, and urban box offices in 1899, but Piry understood that new services would 
have to directly target the Minxinju.  One of the keys to Minxinju success was their practice of 
collecting mail late at night and then transmitting it.  Merchants who needed information as soon 
as possible, Piry wrote, “will support the Native establishments, which alone can afford them this 
convenience.”  To compete with the Minxinju, Piry introduced a “late posting” (逾辦公時刻) 
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system in December 1904.
167
  Minxinju would be allowed to hand their clubbed packages to 
postal employees at steamer wharfs and train stations just prior to departure and the Post Office 
would hand over the packages as soon as the steamer or train reached its destination.  For such 
fast service, the Minxinju would pay full letter rates.  On the same day he announced the late 
posting system, Piry also issued new anti-smuggling regulations.  In addition to treble the letter 
rates on all smuggled mails confiscated, Minxinju firms would also pay fines of 10 taels for a 
first offense, 25 for a second, and 50 for a third – after a fourth offense, the Minxinju would 
forfeit their registration.
168
  Increased seizures temporarily forced more Minxinju mail into the 
Post Office – 9 million letters in 1905 – but as soon as the restrictive measures were relaxed in 
the slightest, the Minxinju immediately went back to smuggling.
169
  Piry also continued to push 
postal extension.  In 1903, he opened another 456 new Inland Agencies, added another 318 in 
1904, and reached a total of 1,189 in 1905.  Such agencies would form the backbone of the Post 
Office until the late 1910s when even smaller agencies were introduced.   The number of articles 
handled by the Post Office also rose to 42.5 million in 1903 and 66 million in 1904.
170
   
In early 1905, Piry looked back on the relationship between the Post Office and the 
Minxinju.  He recognized that the private establishments could “neither be suppressed, 
transformed, nor replaced at a stroke.”  Instead, the Post office had undertaken “a most 
considerate policy” of carrying their mails between Treaty Ports for free, only charging half rates 
to steam-served places, and allowed them to “affiliate as agents.”  Despite the Post Office’s 
success in registering the Minxinju, it was still experiencing difficulty in forcing them to pay for 
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their clubbed mails carried by the IPO.  Those rates, Piry warned, would “forcibly require 
adjustment before long.”171   
Piry began raising the question of increased rates on Minxinju mail in mid-1905.   The 
Minxinju responded by jointly petitioning the Liangjiang Viceroy Zhou Fu, Huguang Governor 
Zhang Zhidong, and Inspector General Hart.  Their argument, which had worked before, was that 
the Guangxu Emperor had guaranteed the Post Office would not “struggle with” the Minxinju.  
Despite the Emperor’s orders, the development of the Post Office had already eliminated more 
than half their business.  The few firms still “holding out” sacrificed everything – worked 
continually, picked up customers’ mail at all hours, hurried overland to deliver it – all to gain the 
confidence of their customers.  Even so, many couriers “returned with an empty hand.”172  Piry 
responded that unless the Minxinju start paying at least half the letter rate on mails between 
Treaty Ports, the Post Office would refuse to recognize them and deprive them entirely of 
steamer transport.
173
  Nothing was resolved in June 1905, but a year later when the Post Office 
came under nominal Chinese administration, the newly appointed Superintendent of the Customs 
Administration Tieliang (鐵良) allowed Hart to rates on the Minxinju. 
On 20 October 1906, Hart announced the new higher rates on the carriage of Minxinju 
clubbed packages.  Hart felt vindicated, the new rates were “an important step reaffirming the 
principle stated in the fundamental rules approved by the Throne in 1896…that Native posting 
establishments shall pay for the carriage of their packages.”174  In November, Piry formally 
announced the new rates: Minxinju would pay half the letter rate on all clubbed mails handed 
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over to the Post Office during normal business hours and full letter rates for the “late posting” 
system; Minxinju would also pay full letter rates on all overland courier routes.
175
  
In concert with the new postage rates on clubbed packages, Piry also required all 
unregistered Minxinju to present themselves for registration purposes.  In 1904, Piry had 
“invited” all inland Minxinju to register themselves with the Post Office, but few firms 
appeared.
176
  Recognizing that the foreignness of Post Office may be hindering the prosecution 
of the Minxinju, Piry turned to Superintendent of Customs Tieliang who issued an order 
resolving the “evil matter” of unregistered Minxinju – all Postal Commissioners would arrange 
with local territorial officials to force the firms to register within three months.
177
  A year later, 
Piry regretfully noted that this new requirement “failed to produce the far-reaching effects 
anticipated.”178  In some postal districts, the Minxinju registered, but then continued with their 
smuggling.  In others, the Minxinju simply ignored the new orders.  The problem, Piry and the 
foreign postmasters realized, was that local officials did not have well-defined laws allowing 
them to close down private businesses for violating postal policy. 
In 1907, Piry resigned himself to a long, drawn-out battle with the Minxinju and decided 
to reinvigorate his campaign to undercut them through competition.  “The competition of these 
hongs has,” Piry wrote, “not been an unmixed evil.”  The introduction of new services and postal 
development “are calculated to bring about the absorption of the native letter hongs far more 
rapidly than any repressive measures are likely to do.”179   That year he opened 707 new postal 
establishments – the highest number on record for a single year – bringing the total to 2,803.  
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Those establishments handled 167 million articles of mail matter that year versus the 6.5 million 
sent by the Minxinju through the Post Office.  To directly target the merchants and bankers, who 
provided the Minxinju with the majority of their business, Piry added new services.  In February 
1907, he created a two-class system of Inland Agencies to service mid-sized towns and smaller 
villages.
180
  A month later, Piry also added “fast day-and-night couriers” (晝夜兼程快班) on 
important Minxinju routes effectively doubling the speed of mail over those lines.
181
  Finally, he 
introduced an experimental “express delivery service” (快遞) in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Hankou, Kaifeng, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou – all centers of Minxinju activity – to speed the 
delivery of mail to customers once it reached their city.
182
 
Despite Piry’s best efforts, there was almost no decline in Minxinju activity between 
1906 and 1911.  There had been a decline of clubbed packages posted in 1907 when the full 
effects of the new postage rates had been felt, from 7.8 in 1906 to 6.3 million letters in 1907, but 
in 1908 and 1909 the Minxinju still posted over 8 million letters each year.  The overall numbers 
of Minxinju registered at the Post Office had not declined, but had increased.  In 1897, the Post 
Office had registered some 300 Minxinju and in 1908 there were around 330 registered firms.
183
  
Some Minxinju had weathered competition from the Post Office by turning to other businesses 
such as selling lottery tickets or manipulating Customs regulations by reusing Lijin Tax 
Authority certificates, but in general the firms seemed as strong as ever.
184
   
In December 1910, Piry ordered the postmasters in the Jiangnan region to undertake 
studies of the Minxinju, their services, lines of communication, and other particulars in order to 
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ascertain how they were able to survive postal competition.
185
  What Piry discovered pleased 
him.  Even though the Minxinju continued to send roughly the same number of clubbed packages 
through the Post Office, competition was having some effect.  Most of the Minxinju in Suzhou, 
Nanjing, Ningbo, and Hangzhou were earning the majority of their income from other sources – 
remittances, transporting silk, sub-letting their shops to other firms, or selling newspapers, opium 
pills, and shoes.
186
  Some shops had been forced to close while others had formed partnerships to 
keep both firms open.  In many cases, former Minxinju couriers had left their firms to become 
private messengers or Xinke (信客).   
There were probably a number of different types of private messengers throughout late 
imperial China who carried letters for a fee, but Xinke only seem to have appeared at the very 
end of the nineteenth century or beginning of the twentieth.  Xinke likely emerged from two 
sources – former Minxinju couriers earning a living on their own and independents who filled in 
the gaps within the Minxinju postal network.  An individual Xinke primarily handled letters 
between his home village and another nearby place.  He was educated enough to write letters for 
his customers and was familiar with everyone in the nearby areas so that he almost never needed 
an address to deliver a letter.  A Xinke could also transmit oral messages and carry small parcels.  
Instead of charging postage, the Xinke simply made rounds at the end of each year asking 
families to pay a small fee.
187
  While the Xinke did not appear a threat to the Post Office, their 
rather sudden appearance and rapid growth soon alerted Piry to this growing problem. 
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The Revival of the Minxinju, 1911-1928 
When the Imperial Post Office separated from the Customs Administration and moved to the 
Ministry of Posts and Communications in May 1911, Piry took the opportunity to raise rates 
again on the Minxinju.  In September, Piry announced that henceforth all Minxinju would pay 
full tariff rates on their clubbed packages.
188
  The Minxinju were outraged and began printing 
posters and hanging them in public places.  The posters were filled with inflammatory, anti-
foreign invective against Piry and the foreign postmasters.  “The Postal Staff are Revolutionists,” 
such posters began, “Everyone is allowed to Kill the Revolutionists.”  The posters called on all 
Chinese to unify against foreign domination of the country, particularly against foreign pressure 
on the lowly Minxinju.  The Guangxu Emperor had promised not to interfere in the livelihood of 
the Minxinju owners, but the recent increase in postage rates “is designed to drive the Minxinju 
people to their death.”  The posters then enumerate the various illegal activities of postal officials 
– intentional delays in delivering clubbed packages, fines pocketed by postal officials, and the 
bribing of Minxinju employees to rat on their brethren.  These problems can be resolved, the 
writer argued, by allowing the Minxinju access to steamer and train transportation and by 
removing the foreigners from the Post Office.  It then calls on all Minxinju to stop handing their 
mail to the Post Office, but to smuggle all of it “as an act of loyalty to the Emperor.”189  
Handwritten on the copy of a poster sent to Piry were also the following remarks:  
The evil-doers from without are causing trouble within and are eating the flesh of 
the people…These animal-like people are waiting to be killed by the [Republican] 
Revolutionaries who have now captured Hubei.  They soothe the people and kill 
those found guilty…When they come and kill these animal-like people, the Minju 
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may hope for better days… If the revolutionaries were to kill the rebels [the 
foreigners in the Post Office] no questions would be asked. 
 
In the text, the Minxinju continually stress their loyalty to the Emperor and his high officials, but 
blamed the corrupting influence of foreigners for causing the decline in their business.  The 
handwritten notes, however, reference the events that would lead to the overthrow of the Qing 
dynasty.  When the dynasty did fall, the Minxinju grasped this new opportunity. 
With the establishment of the Republic, the Minxinju’s new tactic was to declare that the 
downfall of the Qing dynasty freed them from the clutches of the Imperial Post Office.  In April 
1912, the foreign postmaster of Zhenjiang caught a Minxinju courier smuggling mail matter.  
The Minxinju owner arrived at the Post Office and declared that he could “do as he pleased” in a 
Republic.  The owner returned in the afternoon with a statement by the Zhenjiang Minxinju 
Association (民信局同業):  
Our industry humbly endured the Manchu Qing’s cruel government for more than 
ten years…we had hopeless lives…It is comforting to know that Providence gave 
rise to the Republic…The present Post Office is a Republican Post Office…and 
the Minxinju should therefore enjoy the richness of Republican freedom….We 
were quite unaware that the Post Office could arbitrarily apply fines and…use the 
Manchu Qing’s oppressive, murderous schemes in a Republic....Hereafter we will 
rely on our freedom to deliver the mail.
190
 
 
The Zhenjiang Minxinju were not acting on their own.  Several days later, the Nanjing 
District Postmaster caught another Minxinju smuggling near Wuhu.  After confiscating the 
mails, the postmaster received a wire from the Minxinju’s Head Office in Shanghai declaring 
“Qing regulations are no longer in force!”191  A month later, Shanghai Minxinju were caught 
smuggling mail matter through Zhenjiang once again.  This time the Minxinju owners threatened 
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to kill postal employees and destroy the Post Office if such harassment continued.
192
  The matter 
was ultimately resolved without further incident, but the Minxinju had started to act collectively 
and more forcefully in their struggle to protect their livelihoods.   
The source of the Minxinju’s new strength was the organization of modern trade 
associations.  The associations, including the Shanghai Letter Trade Guild or Shanghai Letter 
Trade Association (上海信業公所/上海信業聯合會) and the National Minxinju Letter Trade 
Guild (全國民信局信業公所), had petitioned the newly established Beijing Government 
demanding freedom to carry their mails.
193
  The Beijing Government’s response was a verbal 
promise made by Premier Tang Shaoyi to the Shanghai Trade Association that he would alleviate 
foreign pressure on the firms.
194
  In his report on the year’s postal activities, Piry blithely 
acknowledged a “recrudescence” of Minxinju activity.195   
When the application of full letter rates produced no appreciable results, and the 
Minxinju began active and aggressive smuggling, Piry’s fight against the Minxinju lost 
momentum.  There was a notable decrease in the number of clubbed packages handed over by 
the Minxinju – from a pre-1911 average of about 7-8 million letters to a post-1912 average of 
around 3 million – but none of the postmasters saw this as a true decline in Minxinju activities 
(Table 2, at end of chapter).  Piry struggled to find a new policy approach.  In November 1913, 
he canvassed the postmasters in the most important Minxinju centers on possible new 
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regulations.
196
  The responses were lukewarm – the postmasters could only suggest the Minxinju 
might be forced to open departments within Post Offices, be amalgamated with the Post Office, 
or be forcibly closed.
197
  W.W. Ritchie, the Hankou postmaster, expressed the problem best: “I 
am quite aware that the opinion is held that a compulsory closing of the hongs…will bring about 
a sort of postal Utopia, in which the C.P.O. will be a great monopolist…The reasoning is, I fear, 
false… the Chinese public find in our agile competitors something that we have not yet given 
them.”198  Until the Post Office could discover this Minxinju advantage or find territorial 
officials willing to close them down, the Post Office would have to learn to live with them.
199
  
Piry retired in May 1915 leaving Minxinju policy adrift.  The new Associate Director General 
Henri Picard-Destelan briefly tried to revive competition with the Minxinju by introducing a new 
rural delivery scheme, but when that proved ineffective, he too simply maintained the status 
quo.
200
 
Recognizing the weakness of the Post Office and the warlord states, the Minxinju 
industry revived.  During this period, the number of registered firms rose from 330 in 1908 to 
445 in 1918 and continued rising to 567 in 1924.
201
  The Post Office, however, was more 
concerned with the increase in unregistered firms smuggling mail.  In Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the 
two most important centers of Minxinju activity, the Post Office saw a rapid shift in Minxinju 
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activity towards smuggling.  The Nanjing Head Office accepted 593,000 Minxinju letters in 
1911, but only 86,000 in 1913.
202
  In Hangzhou, the 13 registered firms were suddenly joined by 
28 new unregistered Minxinju.
203
  In Ningbo, the local postmaster reported the Minxinju 
“league” was now doing four times the business of the Post Office.204  In Zhejiang, the number 
of unregistered Minxinju had skyrocketed.  In addition to the 24 registered firms, there were now 
an additional 238 unregistered companies.
205
 
To slow Minxinju growth, the Post Office continued trying to make seizures.  Efforts at 
suppressing the smuggling trade, however, were entirely ineffective – the Post Office only seized 
between 3,000 to 6,000 letters per year out of several millions.
206
  When seizures were made, the 
Minxinju turned to their trade associations or external business groups to apply pressure.  In 
addition to their own trade associations, the Minxinju also used local Chambers of Commerce, 
managers of modern banks, and sojourner organizations to apply pressure on the Post Office.
207
  
If private pressure did not work, the Minxinju were not adverse to taking their case public by 
having sympathetic editorials published in local newspapers.
208
   
The number of Xinke also rapidly increased in the period between 1911-1928.  In 1909, 
the Shanghai Postal Commissioner had permitted 9 Xinke to carry mails by steamer between 
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Ningbo and the city; by 1916, there were more than 230 Xinke in Zhejiang province – 180 
between Shanghai and Ningbo and 50 between Shanghai and Shaoxing.
209
  When the Post Office 
tried to interfere with the Xinke, they either protested to their local native place associations or 
tried to form companies so they could register as Minxinju.
210
 
The Directorate’s rudderless Minxinju policy appeared to find a new direction in the 
early 1920s.  On 21 October 1921, President Xu Shichang promulgated the long-awaited Postal 
Law giving a monopoly on all postal affairs to the state institution.
211
  As discussed above, the 
Beijing government issued the postal law in 1921 in preparation for the Washington Conference 
where the government would negotiate the abolition of the Foreign Post Offices, but many postal 
commissioners felt it was a prime opportunity to prosecute the Minxinju.  Postal commissioners 
started trying to close down Minxinju firms, force them to pay fines, and pressured the 
unregistered companies to present themselves at the Post Office.
212
  The Minxinju’s business 
continuously “hindered” the expansion of the Post Office, wrote Minister of Communications Ye 
Gongchuo, in his petition to the State Council requesting permission to establish a Committee on 
the Unification of Postal Rights (統一郵權委員會) in March 1922.  The State Council approved 
the committee in April, which was to discuss the consolidation of all postal activity under the 
Chinese Post Office.
213
  Sensing a tightening legal grip, the Minxinju quickly petitioned the 
Ministry of Communications numerous times through the Jiangsu and Shanghai Chambers of 
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Commerce, the Ningbo and Shaoxing Native Place Associations in Shanghai, and their own 
National Minxinju Letter Trade Association, asking the Ministry to grant them a “grace period” 
of fifteen years.  The Ministry recognized the Post Office’s right to a national monopoly under 
the new Postal Law, but also believed that “due consideration” should also be given to the 
livelihood of the Minxinju.  The Ministry then ordered the Director of Postal Affairs (郵政司) to 
verbally instruct the Directorate to “adopt a lenient attitude” towards the Minxinju for the time 
being.
214
  Minxinju policy continued to drift until 1928. 
 
The Iron Grip: The Minxinju, Chinese Post Office, and Nationalist Government, 1928-1935 
In the midst of the Northern Expedition (1926-28), postal commissioners were convinced the 
Minxinju were experiencing a second spurt of growth.  The reigning political chaos, the 
application of censorship on Post Office mails, and the declining efficiency in the Post Office as 
a result of numerous labor troubles, the commissioners argued, were giving the Minxinju too 
much breathing room.
215
  The Directorate warned its commissioners that any firm stance against 
the Minxinju during the Northern Expedition would be most inopportune – the Nationalists 
might favor Jiangnan-based Chinese companies over a foreign-administered Post Office.
216
   
After the Nationalists took over the Post Office in June 1928, there was surprisingly little 
delay in outlawing the Minxinju.  The new Nationalist-appointed Director General of Posts Liu 
Shufan (劉書蕃) directed Postal Commissioners Lin Zhuowu (林卓午) and Xie Weilin (謝為霖) 
to present the case against the Minxinju at the National Communications Conference in mid-
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August 1928.  At the conference, Lin and Xie outlined the legal prohibitions, both national and 
international, against the private carriage of mails.  Instead of prosecuting the Minxinju, the 
Beijing Governments had shown the “state’s compassion” by adopting a “lenient” policy, but the 
lawless Minxinju continued smuggling mail.  The Minxinju must now register themselves and 
prepare to close their doors by the end of 1930.
217
  The Conference adopted Lin and Xie’s 
recommendations, but with two provisos: (1) the public should not be inconvenienced by the 
closure of the Minxinju; and (2) the Post Office should take appropriate measures to make sure 
the employees of the Minxinju can find a new livelihood.  The Post Office and Minxinju had 
until the end of 1930 to make the necessary preparations.
218
 
The Minxinju were shocked by the Conference’s resolution.  They began flooding the 
various offices of the National Government with petitions pleading for greater sympathy for their 
livelihood, a delay in the implementation of the resolution, or for its cancellation.
219
  They also 
used various legalistic arguments to try to convince the Nationalists to allow them to remain 
open such as claiming they had become part of the state postal system upon registration.
220
  
Eventually either enough pressure was brought to bear, or enough donations were made, that the 
Nationalists agreed to a short delay.  The Minxinju would receive a short respite, but they would 
have to apply for a license from the Post Office to continue operations and submit themselves to 
new postal regulations governing Minxinju activities.
221
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In September 1930, the Directorate promulgated the Provisional Method on Minju 
Registered Licenses (暫行民局掛號領照辦法) that governed Minxinju activities.222  All 
Minxinju would have to present themselves at the Post Office by the end of 1930 to be officially 
licensed.  Any Minxinju not licensed would be immediately closed.  Thereafter, each licensed 
Minxinju would have to reapply for their license each year.  All Minxinju mail, no matter for 
urban or rural delivery, would have to be clubbed and sent through the Post Office at full letter 
rates.  While many Minxinju presented themselves for registration, they also continued flooding 
the Ministry and Directorate with protest petitions.
 223
  In most cases, however, the Minxinju 
simply refused to register.  When the Directorate called for reports from all postal districts in 
1933 on Minxinju activity, the totals reported were 775 Minxinju (including some Qiaopiju in 
Guangdong) then doing business, but an additional 200 remained unregistered.
224
  Despite 
continued Minxinju activity and agitation, the National Government decided in December 1933 
that all Minxinju must cease business on 31 December 1934.
225
  
In preparation for the closure of all Minxinju firms, the Post Office took steps to extend 
its network into rural areas.  The Directorate opened 650 new Rural Box Offices, 60 Town Box 
Offices, 2403 Rural Stations, 431 Stamp-Sales Agencies, and introduced and new-style Town 
Agencies in late 1934 and early 1935.
226
  New rural courier lines were opened and others 
extended a total of 15,000 kilometers.  The Post Office also began delivering mail for free to all 
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places without postal establishments.
227
  In urban areas, the Post Office added more public mail 
and pillar boxes, increased the number of daily deliveries, and extended office hours.  In addition 
to postal extension, the Directorate also hired additional inspectors to ensure all Minxinju 
closed.
228
  By early 1935, all Minxinju had closed.
229
 
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the political landscape in 
China was transformed  by the application of externally-derived ideas of state sovereignty.  The 
late Qing, Beiyang, Warlord, and Nationalist States shared certain fundamental state-making 
goals – building a modern army, extending the tax administration – but differed in their 
perception of the value of strong, pro-active administrative state institutions like the Post Office.  
The Imperial/Chinese Post Office’s struggle to attain a postal monopoly not only reveals some 
fundamental distinctions in the state-making agendas of these different governments, but also the 
ability of a strong administrative institution to pull a state towards a higher degree of stateness. 
The Qing government that established the modern Post Office had an essentially pre-
modern level of stateness.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the Qing state lacked the 
authority and power to dislodge the local elites who had in many ways taken control of state 
functions in rural society during the Taiping Rebellion.  The veneer of modernization on the east 
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coast Treaty Ports covered an imperial order that was ill-prepared to make the transition to a 
modern, Western-state nation-state.  The Qing government recognized the need for some 
“reform,” but usually responded simply by grafting modern bureaucratic institutions like the 
Zongli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) onto its pre-existing state structure.  The Imperial 
Post Office, like the Zongli Yamen, was simply attached to the old state system.  The Qing 
government refused to take the necessary steps – eliminating the postal relay and post station 
systems or amalgamating the Wenbaoju with the Imperial Post Office – despite the 
fragmentation of authority, bureaucratic inefficiency, and financial wastefulness such a decision 
represented.  Instead, the Qing state left it to the Imperial Post Office to “defeat” the other postal 
services.  The Post Office, as a modern, administrative institution bent on securing a postal 
monopoly, undertook the task.  Once the Post Office had proven itself capable of taking over 
postal affairs of the entire empire, and the Post Office came under nominal Chinese 
administration, the Qing state ordered the abolition of the relay and post station systems, which 
occurred just prior to the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution.  The Wenbaoju, too, was gradually 
absorbed by the Post Office as it demonstrated its superiority through faster transmission and 
greater efficiency. 
The Beiyang and Warlord Governments who established themselves in the aftermath of 
the Republican Revolution were unquestionably weak states.  At its strongest, the Beiyang 
Government of Yuan Shikai could not extend its control over much of the former Qing empire.  
When Yuan fell and the country descended into the chaos of the warlord era, the weakness of the 
state was everywhere evident.  The constant changeover in Beijing at the presidential level, but 
also in the ministries, trickled down to the lowest territorial officials who were afraid to exert 
many forms of state power given that their clique or local regime may be overthrown at any 
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moment.  It was in precisely such a situation where the Chinese Post Office demonstrated its 
continuing value to the emergence of the modern Chinese nation-state by helping hold it together 
and increasing its level of stateness.  The administrative integrity and bureaucratic efficiency of 
the Post Office was internationally recognized when China joined the Universal Postal Union in 
1914.  The international recognition of China’s equality, at least postally, gave the Beijing state 
the strength to challenge the presence of the Foreign Post Offices at the Paris Peace Conference 
following World War I.   While the four great powers rejected any discussion of the issue, the 
outpouring of nationalist sentiment in the May Fourth Movement gave the Beijing state the 
added momentum to continue pressing for an international resolution on the abolition of the 
Foreign Post Offices.  At the Washington Conference in 1922, the Chinese delegation based their 
case on the internationally-recognized sovereignty of the Chinese Post Office, its efficiency and 
trustworthiness, and its retention of administrative integrity despite the ravages of the warlord 
years.  The foreign powers agreed and withdrew the Foreign Post Offices on 1 January 1923. 
Until the establishment of the National Government in 1927, none of the previous 
Chinese states were willing to clash with powerful social groups over the issue of a national 
postal monopoly.  The Qing, Beiyang, and Warlord states were all too weak to attack a wealthy 
and socially-influential group of merchants like the owners of the Minxinju.  Given the states’ 
weakness, the foreign administrators of the Post Office took it upon themselves to try to 
undermine the economic viability of the Minxinju through competition.  When the Post Office 
attempted to charge the Minxinju for carrying their mails, the Qing state caved to social pressure 
demonstrating its lack of autonomy.  As the Post Office continued expanding, and the Qing 
undertook its own intra-governmental reforms during the New Policies era, the reorganized Qing 
government felt strong enough to demand the payment of half rates and then, in mid-1911, the 
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application of full rates.  Just as the Qing government was starting to strengthen itself, it was 
toppled by Republican forces.  As the Beiyang and Warlord states emerged, they proved entirely 
too weak to even enforce their own laws against the Minxinju.  Postal expansion continued, but 
the Post Office could not solve the problem of the Minxinju on their own.  With the 
establishment of the National Government, the situation changed quickly.  While the Nationalists 
had based their ideology on anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism, they also understood the key 
to a successful program of state-making was the elevation of the national above the 
parochial/provincial.  Bearing this in mind, it becomes easy to understand the Nationalists quick 
decision against the Minxinju.  The Minxinju had not declined in power – they had actually 
increased their strength since 1911 – but the overall Nationalist goal of strengthening state power 
outweighed the sectional interests of social groups.  In the battle between the Post Office and the 
Minxinju, then, it was not the strong institution that undermined a private postal network, but a 
strengthening state that valued the expansion of its authority over the economic interests of a 
small group of merchants. 
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Table 2: Minxinju Clubbed Packages Sent Through the Post Office 
Year Number of Clubbed 
Packages
230
 
Total Number of Letters in 
Clubbed Packages 
1901 -- 7,300,000 
1902 -- 8,000,000 
1903 -- 7,267,500 
1904 -- 8,304,125 
1905 -- 8,896,000 
1906 262,902 7,892,000 
1907 246,977 6,389,374 
1908 241,562 8,042,000 
1909 466,800 8,411,600 
1910 441,400 7,409,600 
1911 368,230 5,913,100 
1912 204,120 2,749,600 
1913 248,800 4,796,100 
1914 145,933 3,124,279 
1915 155,496 3,366,227 
1916 155,417 2,624,301 
1917 161,464 2,730,244 
1918 156,668 2,559,314 
1919 163,812 2,903,352 
1920 190,350 3,017,463 
1921 175,850 3,383,550 
1922 166,019 3,435,011 
1923 187,264 4,454,510 
1924 169,500 3,352,730 
1925 165,150 3,389,720 
1926 151,890 3,691,940 
1927 120,831 2,802,780 
1928 137,967 3,551,110 
1929 143,660 3,769,300 
Jan-June 1930 77,280 1,760,610 
July 1930-June 1931 152,820 4,090,650 
July 1931-June 1932 142,700 3,927,700 
July 1932-June 1933 142,300 3,713,700 
July 1933-June 1934 143,400 3,978,800 
                                                 
230
 Postal statistics from 1901 to 1917 include clubbed packages, and the letters inside them, both “received” and 
“posted,” which is an indication of how many times the Post Office handled clubbed packages, but not the actual 
number brought to the Post Office by Minxinju for mailing.  In 1917, the Post Office began only calculating the 
number of items “posted” to accurately reflect the number of clubbed packages brought for mailing.  The Post 
Office, in the RWCPO 1917, then backdated their new statistical method to 1914. 
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Chapter 3 
“The Potentialities of the Institution”:  
The Post Office, Business Services, and the Interventionist State
1
 
 
The official representative of capitalist society – the State – will ultimately have to undertake the 
direction of production.  This necessity for conversion into State–property is felt first in the great 
institutions for intercourse and communication – the Post Office, the telegraphs, the railways.   
          – Friedrich Engels 
 
The Post Office giveth wings to the extension of commerce. 
– Pennant  
 
 
Following the Taiping invasion of the Yangzi delta (1860-61) and Anglo-French occupation of 
Beijing at the end of the Second Opium War (1858-1860), various provincial viceroys such as 
Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang launched numerous state-run self-strengthening (自強) projects 
aimed at modernizing China’s military to subdue domestic rebels and fend off foreign invaders.  
After a series of international crises in the early 1870s, self-strengtheners came to believe that 
Western armaments alone failed to strengthen the empire.  Coupled with this new awareness was 
the emergence of a discourse on “commercial warfare” (商戰) produced by former compradors 
like Zheng Guanying (鄭觀應) (1842-1922) and government advisors such as Xue Fucheng 
(薛福成) (1838-1894).2  In their view, “wealth and power” could only be secured by a 
combination of military modernization and industrial development.   With a depleted imperial 
treasury, self-strengtheners like Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷) (1844-1916) 
pioneered the “government supervision and merchant management” (官督商辦) system of 
industrial development by creating enterprises such as the China Merchants Steam Navigation 
                                                 
1
 RWCPO, 1921, 12. 
2
 Guo Wu, Zheng Guanying: Merchant Reformer of Late Qing China and His Influence on Economics, Politics, and 
Society (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2010).  Although Xue Fucheng is frequently mentioned in discussions of late 
nineteenth century reform, there is no definitive work on his life in English.  For a general introduction, see: Helen 
Hsieh Chien, trans., The European Diary of Hsieh Fucheng: Envoy Extraordinary of Imperial China (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1993). 
  164 
 
Company (1872), the Kaiping Coal Mines (1877), and the Imperial Telegraph Administration 
(1882).
3
  In this ad hoc system, private investors provided the necessary capital, but control 
remained in the hands of government bureaucrats.
4
  Although some of these new industries 
turned a profit, irregular administration and shaky financial practices by their bureaucratic 
managers eventually led merchant investors to shy away from them.  The Qing defeat in the 
Sino-French War (1884-85) laid bare the doubtful utility of many of these early government-
sponsored military and industrial enterprises. 
In the midst of the Sino-French War (1884-1885), the Qing government despatched the 
Self-Strengthening advocate Liu Mingchuan (劉明傳) (1836-1896) to Taiwan to defend the 
island against the French Asiatic Squadron.
5
  Having succeeded in halting the French invasion, 
the Court appointed Liu as the first governor of Taiwan under whose administration the island 
became an independent province in 1887.  During his gubernatorial tenure (1885-91) Liu 
initiated a series of wide-ranging reforms to modernize the island, including laying railway 
tracks, linking Taiwan to the mainland by telegraph, installing lights in Taibei, building modern 
roads, opening new schools, and inaugurating a postal service.  Liu’s Taiwan Post 
(台灣郵政總局), opened in 1888, was the first modern-style Post Office serving the general 
                                                 
3
 There are numerous studies of the government supervision and merchant operation system, but the first of note was 
Albert Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univeresity Press, 1958); for a broad overview, see: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindai shi yanjiu 
suo, ed., Qingji ziqiang yundong yantaohui lunwenji “Proceedings of the Conference on the Self-Strengthening 
Movement in Late Ch’ing China, 1860-1894,” 2 vols. (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindai shi yanjiu suo, 1988); 
for a more recent interpretation, see: David Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China’s Modernization in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
4
 The predecessor to this policy, and the model upon which it was based, was the “official transport and merchant 
sale” approach used in the state salt monopoly.  Madeleine Zelin, The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial 
Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 140-160. 
5
 For biographical information on Liu, see: Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, 2 vols (1943, 
reprint: SMC Publishing, 1991), I: 526-28.  For a broad overview of Liu’s reforms, see: Samuel C. Chu, “Liu Ming-
ch’uan and Modernization of Taiwan,” Journal of Asian Studies 23: 1 (November 1963): 37-53; on the 
traditionalistic reforms underlying Liu’s self-strengthening program, see: William M. Speidel, “The Administrative 
and Fiscal Reforms of Liu Ming-ch’uan in Taiwan, 1884-1891: Foundation for Self-Strengthening,” Journal of 
Asian Studies 35: 3 (May 1976): 441-459. 
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public run by the Qing government.
6
  The opening of a government-run postal service went little 
remarked at the time, but was perhaps Liu’s most radical departure from standard self-
strengthening programs. 
The French defeat of the Qing not only stimulated Liu Mingchuan’s reforms on Taiwan, 
but also a thorough reevaluation of the self-strengthening movement.  Some self-strengtheners 
continued in the old vein by initiating a broad program of naval construction while others like 
Zhang Zhidong (張之洞) (1837-1909) tried to revive the interest of private capital through an 
“official and merchant joint management” (官商合辦) system of industrial enterprise.  
Reformers, government scholars, and intellectuals, however, also began to attach greater 
important to political questions than to scientific and technological knowledge.  From the early 
1890s onward, reformers started talking more about political reform, particularly the introduction 
of a Western-style parliamentary system, as essential to strengthening the empire.
7
  None of 
these reforms had been enacted, however, when China was devastatingly defeated by Japan in 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). 
Almost all historians agree that China’s defeat by Japan sent shockwaves throughout the 
empire.  To historians focusing on the self-strengthening movement, the Qing loss represented 
the failure of the bureaucratic capitalist model of industrial development exemplified by the 
official supervision and merchant management system.
8
  These historians tend to see the state’s 
                                                 
6
 You Yu, “Zhonghua youzheng shi: Taiwan xinshi youzheng, Haiguan shiban youwu” (History of the Chinese 
postal service: The new-style post office on Taiwan, Customs experimental post office), Youzheng yanjiu “Postal 
Research Quarterly” 49 (September 1993), 33-38; Cao Qian, Zhonghua youzheng shi Taiwan bian: Zhonghua 
minguo jianguo qishi nian jinian (History of the Chinese postal service, Taiwan: Commemorating the 70
th
 
anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China) (Taibei: Jiaotong bu youzheng zongju, 1981), 81-126. 
7
 Lloyd Eastman, “Political Reformism in China Before the Sino-Japanese War,” Journal of Asian Studies 27: 4 
(August 1968): 695-710; Peter Zarrow, “Constitutionalism and the Imagination of the State: Official Views of 
Political Reform in the Late Qing,” in Zarrow, ed., Creating Chinese Modernity: Knowledge and Everyday Life, 
1900-1940 (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 51-82. 
8
 e.g. John L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967); Thomas L. Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860-
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role in the self-strengthening movement as positively hindering industrialization or having little 
impact at all.
9
  While most scholars agree that the industrialization projects bolstered the power 
of the viceroys and the central government, they often overlook that the state purposefully 
allowed industrial enterprises to be run as ad hoc provincial initiatives.  From the state’s view, it 
was necessary to keep the self-strengtheners in competition with each other to forestall the 
combination of too much military, civil, and financial power under one of the viceroys.  The self-
strengthening movement “failed,” then, not because of the individual failures of the 
industrialization projects – many were quite successful – but because the Qing state refused to 
restructure itself in order to create bureaucracies capable of planning, financing, and directing a 
comprehensive imperial modernization program.    
Historians of late Qing politics use China’s loss to Japan as the beginning of a narrative 
emphasizing increasingly strident calls for central government political reform, particularly by 
Kang Youwei (康有為) (1858-1927) and his coterie.  The reformist movement culminated in the 
Hundred Days Reforms (1898) in which the Guangxu Emperor and various reformists laid out a 
sweeping plan for government modernization.
10
  While these studies agree on the failure of the 
1898 episode, most argue that after the disaster of the Boxer Rebellion and the Western 
occupation of Beijing in 1900 even “conservatives” within the central government admitted the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1895 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978).   A more recent revisionist approach emphasizes simple Japanese numerical 
superiority and strategic advantages for its victory.  Allen Fung, “Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army 
in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95,” Modern Asian Studies 30: 4 (1996): 1007-1031. 
9
 Historians emphasizing the negative impact of state involvement in industrial enterprises include Feuerwerker, 
China’s Early Industrialization and Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late 
Ch’ing China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); on the state having limited impact, see: Dwight 
Perkins, “Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of 
Economic History 27: 7 (1967): 478-92. 
10
 Luke Kwong, A Mosaic of the Hundred Days: Personalities, Politics, and Ideas of 1898 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984); Peter Zarrow and Rebecca E. Karl, eds., Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and 
Cultural Change in Late Qing China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); on 1898 and the New Policies, 
see: Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge: Council on East 
Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1993); Roger R. Thompson, “The Lessons of Defeat: Transforming the 
Qing State after the Boxer War,” Modern Asian Studies 37: 4 (2003): 769-773. 
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need for radical political change.  In the immediate post-Boxer period, the Empress Dowager 
Cixi launched the New Policies reforms (1901-1911) that restructured the state as a modern-style 
centralizing ministerial government.
11
    
Between the “failure” of the self-strengthening movement in 1895 and the Hundred Days 
Reforms of 1898, the Guangxu Emperor launched a little-known reform movement with 
initiatives in education, industrial development, government administration, and military 
reorganization.
 12
  Although the Court enacted a number of reforms, its most radical departure 
was the creation of the Imperial Post Office (大清郵政).  Instead of a joint official-merchant 
enterprise run by one of the provincial viceroys, the Post Office would run by the central 
government and offer a variety of services to the general public.  As such, the Imperial Post 
Office represents a more expansive and aggressive view of the role of central government 
bureaucracies as agents of positive political, social, and economic change.  The creation of the 
Post Office not only rapidly expanded the size of the central government, but also put the 
government into direct competition with the private sector in communications, transportation, 
and financial services. 
In order to understand these momentous changes within the Qing government, this 
chapter begins by reviewing the debate over the establishment of a postal service designed to 
serve the public.  In the debate, scholars and government officials brought together two on-going 
discussions – on the nature of relations between the state and civil society and between the 
government and capitalism – that helped rationalize the creation of the Post Office.  Once 
                                                 
11
 Julia C. Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927-1940 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), 20-27; Richard Horowitz, “Breaking the Bonds of Precedent: The 1905-06 Government 
Reform Commission and the Remaking of the Qing Central State,” Modern Asian Studies 37: 4 (2003): 775-797. 
12
 Lü Xiaobo, “Court-Sponsored Reforms, 1895-1898,” in China, 1895-1912: State-Sponsored Reforms and China’s 
Late-Qing Revolution, Selected Essays from Zhongguo Jindai Shi, edited and translated by Douglas R. Reynolds, 
49-66 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
  168 
 
created, the Post Office began offering a series of wide-ranging services in communications, 
banking, and transportation that put the central government into business.  Instead of focusing on 
the competition between the government and private enterprise – much of that having been 
discussed in Chapter 2 – the second section of this chapter examines the government’s rationale 
for offering such a wide variety of “public services” through the Post Office.  The Post Office 
usually justified its provision of public services as compensating for some of the inefficiencies 
inherent in capitalist development. 
 
“Wouldn’t this be Shocking to See and Hear?”: The Post Office and the State13 
In the midst of the self-strengthening movement, various private subjects, merchant-compradors, 
lower-level officials, provincial viceroys, and foreign Customs administrators began promoting 
the establishment of a modern postal service.
14
  The arguments made in favor of, and against, the 
postal service dovetailed with the broader on-going debates about the state’s role in the economy 
and civil society.  Two approaches dominated discussions surrounding the establishment of a 
postal service: a practical one made by Customs administrators concerned primarily with how to 
organize, fund, and operate a national service; second, a broader discussion among Chinese 
officialdom on the underlying rationale for creating a state institution purposefully designed to 
serve the public, but that would compete with private business.  
Although Customs Inspector General Robert Hart always claimed his 1861 proposal was 
the earliest suggestion to create a modern postal service in China, such a radical departure 
                                                 
13
 The quote comes from a conservative discussing the creation of a Western-style post office in China.  Shao 
Zhitang, Huangchao jingshi wen tongbian (1901, rpt. Wenhai chubanshe, 1980), 3749. 
14
 In her work on the late nineteenth century Post Office, Ying-wan Cheng outlined the major proposals for the 
introduction of a modern postal service arguing that it was Robert Hart and other Customs officials who took the 
lead in its promotion.  Cheng treats the introduction of the Post Office as just another “modern” institution adopted 
from the West while I aim to situate its creation within the broader discussions on the nature of the state and its 
relationship to civil society in the late Qing.     
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actually came first from Prime Minister Hong Ren’gan (洪仁玕) (1822-1864) of the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom.  In 1859, Hong recommended setting up public mail boxes (郵亭) 
throughout the Taiping Kingdom to assist commoners in communication.
15
  Despite the 
occasional reference to modern postal services in the 1860s, serious discussions did not begin 
until the mid-1870s.
16
  In 1876, Robert Hart attempted to incorporate a modern postal service 
into the Chefoo Convention resolving the Margery Affair, but British representative Sir Thomas 
Wade ignored Hart’s request.  Although Hart failed, Li Hongzhang did approve the opening of 
the so-called Customs Post (海關撥駟達書信館) in 1878.  In 1885, Ningbo Customs 
Commissioner Henry Kopsch wrote to Hart admitting that unless Chinese territorial officials 
supported the establishment of a modern postal service it would never be created.  Fortunately 
for Kopsch, he had a well-known advocate of a modern postal service in his office.  Back in 
1876, Li Gui (李圭) (1842-1903), a writer in the Ningbo Customs Office, had been invited by 
Customs Commissioner Gustav Detring to attend the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition and 
write about China’s involvement.  In his resulting travelogue, Li wrote positively about the 
American postal service recommending its adoption in China.  The key to the success of Western 
postal services, Li argued, was that it combined public and private (合公私) mail services unlike 
the separation between the official postal relay system (驛站) and private Minxinju (民信局) 
letter firms.  The union of public and private interests, wrote Li, “enriches the state and benefits 
                                                 
15
 Hong Ren’gan, Zizheng xinbian (A new treatise for aid in administration) (1859, rpt. Taibei: Tailian guofeng 
chubanshe, 1969).  Hong’s radical reforms are discussed in detail in So Kwan-wai, Eugene P. Boardman, and Ch’iu 
P’ing, “Hung Jen-kan, Taiping Prime Minister, 1859-1864,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 20: 1/2 (June 1957): 
262-294. 
16
 The British-owned Shenbao (Shanghai times) newspaper occasionally carried articles on modern postal services, 
e.g. 6 June 1872 and 27 February 1874.  In 1877/78, Shenbao published three additional articles on the post office: 
14 August 1877, 4 & 11 September 1878. 
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the people” (裕國便民).17  Li’s travelogue was well-known to self-strengtheners.  Li Hongzhang 
wrote a preface to Li’s book and Guo Songtao and Kang Youwei were avid readers.18  In 1885, 
Kopsch decided to use Li Gui to push the idea of a modern postal service.  Kopsch asked Li to 
petition Ningbo and Shaoxing Circuit Intendant Xue Fucheng, who had himself advocated a 
modern post office in the late 1870s, with Kopsch’s plans.19  Xue and Kopsch discussed the 
issue.  After their discussion, Xue secured the approval of Min-Zhe Viceroy Yang Changjun 
(楊昌濬), the Governor of Zhejiang Liu Bingzhang (劉秉璋), and Zhili Viceroy Li Hongzhang 
before forwarding the petition to Liangguang Viceroy and Superintendent of the Southern Ports 
Zeng Guoquan (曾國荃), who then forwarded it to the Zongli Yamen.20  Although nothing 
immediately came of Li Gui’s proposal, it was significant that a growing number of high 
officials had either tacitly or assertively approved of his petition.   In 1892 and 1893, with the 
assistance of various Chinese officials, Hart repeatedly petitioned the Zongli Yamen on the 
establishment of a national post.  Hart’s unrealistic plans, including hiring 300 new foreigners to 
staff post offices, failed to convince the Yamen.
21
  Embittered, Hart wrote, “The Yamen is 
‘backing and filling’ in the Postal matter in an aggravating but thoroughly Yamen-esque way.”22   
                                                 
17
 Li Gui, Huan you diqiu xin lu (A new account of a trip around the world) (1877), juan 2: 26. 
18
 Charles Desnoyers, trans., A Journey to the East: Li Gui’s A New Account of a Trip Around the Globe (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 3-4. 
19
 Xue’s reformist writings lead to a position as advisor to Li Hongzhang.  For Xue’s writings on a modern postal 
service, see: Xue Fucheng, Yong’an wenbian (Essays by Xue Fucheng) (1888, reprint: Wenhai chubanshe, 1973), 
118.  While serving as an envoy to several European countries in the early 1890s, Xue also wrote several short 
pieces on Western postal services.  Chen Zhongyi, ed., Huangchao jingshi wen san bian (Essays on statecraft of the 
dynasty, third collection) (Shanghai: Shanghai shuju, 1901), juan 55, 2. 
20
 Various petitions from Kopsch to Hart, Feb.-Oct. 1885 reprinted in: Zhongguo jindai jingji shi ziliao congkan 
bianji wenyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo haiguan yu youzheng (The Chinese customs administration and the postal service) 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 29-37. 
21
 On Hart’s 1892 plan, see: Stanley F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: WM. Mullan & Son, 1950), 
630-31. 
22
 Robert Hart, The I.G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907, edited by John K. 
Fairbank, et al (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), II: 920. 
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Hart’s problem, and the problem of all of the Customs proposals, was that they failed to 
address fundamental questions raised by the creation of a modern postal system.  How much 
should the state interfere with society and the economy?  Would competition with private 
merchants undermine the Confucian rationale of the state?  What were the implications of 
mixing the public and private realms?  Should the state abolish a time honored institution like the 
postal relay system and how would those workers survive?  Li Gui had hinted at some of the 
answers to these questions in his popular 1877 travelogue and they had begun to spread among 
Chinese officialdom.   
In late Qing China, the postal relay system carried official documents and the private 
Minxinju firms transmitted letters for the public.  How, reformers asked, could the state compete 
with private merchants while remaining within the bounds of traditional ideas of state action?  
Although the late imperial state maintained several monopolies – on salt, copper, and porcelain – 
the idea of a state institution engaged primarily in profit-producing services was profoundly 
disturbing to many officials.  As one conservative wrote, “It’s simply unheard of that the state 
would transmit letters for the people.”  Another asked “why should the government establish a 
post office to compete with the public?”23  At the heart of these concerns was a traditional notion 
of the proper division between public and private activities.  Throughout most of the imperial 
era, Confucian scholars and officials viewed the notion of “public,” as in public-mindedness, as a 
feature of the state that existed in opposition to the private self-interest of the “petty man” 
(小人).  In discussions about the introduction a modern postal service, Chinese officials began 
creating a new interpretation of the relationship between the “state” (官, lit. “official”) or 
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 Qi Rushan, Qi Rushan suibi (The random jottings of Qi Rushan) (Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe, 1953), 
34-35. 
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“public” (公) and “private” (私) realms.24  In the late nineteenth century a variety of new 
discourses on the relationship between public and private, state and civil society emerged, but the 
one utilized by postal promoters focused on rationalizing the state’s pursuit of self-interest in a 
“commercial war” against the West as a public good.25  Zheng Guanying and Xue Fucheng – 
both advocates of the “commercial war” approach – were joined by Chen Chi (陳熾) (1855-
1899) and Hu Yufen (胡燏棻) (1840-1906) in promoting a modern postal service.  These four 
reformers lamenting the continuing division between “public” good (公) and “private” interest 
(私).  For the Qing dynasty to strengthen itself, they argued, the state had to lead the way by 
blending public good and private interest.
26
   Official documents (公文) and private letters 
(私信), Chen Chi argued, should be transmitted together (一律通傳).  Hu Yufen preferred to 
describe the Post Office as “a body of the public and private” (公私一體).  Kang Youwei, too, 
wrote of “public and private, documents and letters” (公私文信) being intermingled by the 
state.
27
 
By creating a post office, these officials argued, the “public” government would be 
intervening in the economy to offer communications, transportation, and financial services that 
would put the state in competition with the private Minxinju firms.  Reacting to such discussions, 
                                                 
24
 Although officials used “public” in a variety of ways, and scholars have vigorously debated this term in other 
contexts, among the group of officials discussed herein “public” meant the realm of state activity. 
25
 Chi Kong Lai, “Merchant Discourse on Self-Interest in Modern China,” in Zarrow, ed., Creating Chinese 
Modernity, 99-116. 
26
 Chen Chi worked in the Board of Revenue, Board of Punishments, and later held a mid-level position in the 
Grand Secretariat.  In 1893, he wrote a preface to Zheng Guanying’s  Warning Words in a Prosperous Age 
advocating reform as well as his own Concerning Practical Matters (庸書) (1893).  In 1895, Chen was a leading 
organizer of Kang Youwei’s Society for the Study of Self-Strengthening.  Hu Yufen (jinshi, 1874) served in Li 
Hongzhang’s private secretariat before being appointed Judicial Commissioner of Guangxi and then Prefect of 
Shuntian (Beijing).  In his later years, Hu was a military advisor to Yuan Shikai. 
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 Zheng Guanying’s essay in Chen, Huangchao jingshi wen sanbian, II: 268-69; Chen Chi, Yongshu (Concerning 
practical matters) (1893, rpt. Tailian guofeng chubanshe, 1970); Hu Yufen’s essay in Liu Jinzao, Qingchao xu 
wenxian tongkao (Qing dynasty documents collection, continued) (1935, rpt. Xinxing shuju, 1959), 11225. 
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some “militant conservatives” such as Shandong Governor Li Bingheng (李秉衡) objected to a  
modern post office because it was just another Western-style institution, others simply felt it was 
undignified for the government to run a business or questioned whether the state could compete 
effectively.
28
  Even Robert Hart recognized the “proper desire on the part of Chinese officials not 
to engage in a business competition with the people.”29  The reformers objected to the private 
Minxinju firms because they were unreliable, expensive, and only served remunerative routes 
while leaving most of the population without access to communications facilities.  The benefit of 
a state-run post office, Hu Yufen wrote, was that it could create a “web incorporating 
everywhere within reach.”30  The reformers admitted that a state-run postal service would be 
motivated by profit, but such a motive would be tempered by the public interest of serving the 
entire population.  In so doing, numerous Chinese reformers echoed Li Gui by claiming the Post 
Office would “enrich the state and benefit the people” (裕國便民). 
The creation of a modern postal service might benefit state, society, and the economy, 
conservatives retorted, but what of the official postal relay system and its employees.  Although 
almost everyone admitted the relay system was horribly corrupt and exceedingly expensive, 
conservatives defended local control by territorial officials over relay budgets, the system’s 
ability to house traveling officials, and the livelihood of its workers.
31
  Instead of arguing for 
continued local control of relay system budgets, which would sound too self-interested, the 
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conservatives produced the specter of Li Zicheng (李自成) (1606-1645).  Li Zicheng was a 
postal worker in the late Ming.  When the Ming government decided to reduce by one-third the 
size of the relay system in Shaanxi, Li and his comrades rebelled.  The laid off postal workers 
helped destroy the dynasty.
32
  The threat of tens of thousands of unemployed relay station 
workers rebelling against a weak government rightfully gave late Qing conservatives pause.  In 
response, the reformers concocted a series of unusual organizational plans to blend the relay 
system with the modern postal service.  A writer for the Shenbao newspaper suggested the 
employees of the relay system should be hired en masse by the modern post office.
33
  Chen Chi 
and Zheng Guanying both thought the modern postal service should simply be an extension of 
the relay system.
34
  The relay system should continue to house traveling officials, Luo Yulin 
argued, but give up all mail transmission to the modern service.
35
  Wang Yisan felt the relay 
system should continue to carry mail in rural areas and the modern Post Office, with its use of 
steamers, could take over mail duties in the cities and along the coasts and rivers.
36
 
In December 1895, acting Viceroy of Liangjiang Zhang Zhidong petitioned the 
government to establish a post office.
37
  Zhang’s petition brought together the practical approach 
of the Customs administrators and the rhetoric of the reformers.  Inspector General of Customs 
Robert Hart was behind Zhang’s petition.  In August 1895, Hart had a conversation with Weng 
Tonghe (翁同龢) (1830-1904) and Li Hongzao (李鴻藻) (1820-1897), both on the Grand 
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Council, who lectured Hart on the impracticality of unfunded proposals.
38
  Believing Zhang 
Zhidong – now the most influential reformer because Li Hongzhang signed the ignominious 
Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the Sino-Japanese War – might be able to push the postal idea, 
Hart despatched Henry Kopsch to meet with Zhang in Nanjing in September.  Zhang thought the 
postal service should be run by provincial governors like a self-strengthening project, but he was 
told that Li Hongzhang had approved a plan to run the postal service through the Customs to 
keep expenses low.  Hart committed the Customs to covering the initial costs and suggested the 
central government would only need to provide 40,000 taels a year in the future, which Zhang 
thought was more than reasonable.
39
  On 27 December, Zhang petitioned the throne requesting 
official sanction for the creation of a postal service.  Hart and Zhang may have colluded in 
crafting the memorial, but the Post Office only came to fruition because the Guangxu Emperor 
had already begun a small, but significant post-war reform program. 
In May and July 1895, the Guangxu Emperor issued two edicts launching his reform 
movement.  While the first edict focused on increasing efficiency in previous self-strengthening 
projects and eliminating corruption, the second one known as “Measures Appropriate to the 
Times” called for an expansion of railroads, currency and tax reforms, the opening of new 
educational institutions, military stockpiling, and the creation of a postal administration.
40
  Many 
of these reforms had been recommended to the throne in Kang Youwei’s famous 10,000 word 
memorial in which he chastised the Court for failing to remodel the state, and establish a modern 
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postal service.
41
  Particularly important to the Emperor, and Zhang Zhidong, was to foster 
economic growth in preparation for a new “commercial war” with the foreign powers.  The 
Treaty of Shimonoseki gave Japan, and the Western Powers, the right to manufacture on Chinese 
soil.  In addition to creating almost 200 new schools, launching tens of new publishing concerns, 
authorizing several new textile mills, and starting several new railroads, the Qing government 
also initiated new official supervision and merchant management projects such as the Imperial 
Bank of China, the Hanyang Iron Works, the Daye Iron Mines in 1896.  The reformers rationale 
for creating a post office – that it would be profitable for the state – fit squarely into this new era.  
As Zhang wrote in his memorial, “For a small investment [postal] profits are tremendous…it will 
enrich the country and benefit the people.”42 
The establishment of the Imperial Post Office in 1896 represented a new 
conceptualization of the state as a vehicle for intervening in society and the economy.  Although 
the modern postal service approved by the Guangxu Emperor contained numerous compromises 
reflecting the interests of the reformers and the conservatives, its establishment proclaimed the 
emergence of a more aggressive central state driving its own reforms.  Its organization displayed 
increasing confidence in the efficiencies of large scale state-run institutions.  Its organizational 
structure – a single head with almost unrestricted control over its operations – was unusual in the 
late Qing when diffuse power-sharing was common among Board presidents, but would become 
the standard model in 1905/06 when the Qing state reorganized itself as a ministerial 
government.  Its funding was also somewhat unusual in that the cash-strapped central 
government decided to have the Customs administration pay for it.  As it turned out, the Customs 
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outlay was only about 100,000 taels per year in the first four years of operation.
43
  The relative 
cheapness of the Imperial Post Office stands in sharp contrast to the government’s decision to 
retain the postal relay system.  To assuage conservatives, the Court left control of the yearly 
budget for the relay system of some three million taels to local officials, which also ensured that 
tens of thousands of relay workers remained employed.  Although the Post Office was supposed 
to “unobtrusively” project state power, the Post Office suddenly and aggressively made its 
presence felt in the social and economic life of the empire, particularly as it began to challenge 
the relay system and Minxinju firms for control of the mail trade.
44
  In the end, supporters of the 
Imperial Post Office hailed the “potentialities of the institution” as fostering a new understanding 
of the relationship between the state and civil society, public and private that not only would 
“enrich the state,” but also “benefit the people.”  
 
Mail Matters: The Post Office’s Letter Network 
When the Imperial Post Office opened in February 1897 there was very little business and most 
of its early customers came simply to purchase stamps for their collections.
45
  “The public 
itself…looked askance…at this new institution styling itself the ‘Imperial Post.’”46  From 
scattered statistics, it appears foreigners patronized the Post Office more than Chinese in 1897 
and 1898.
47
  Chinese entering the Imperial Post Office found it a disorienting experience.  Since 
Inspector General of Posts Robert Hart based the organization of the postal service on the 
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Customs system, all Head Post Offices were in Customs Houses – hardly a place frequented by 
most Chinese – or in obscure locations.  In order to save money, Hart planted early post offices 
on back streets or on the outskirts of cities rather than in business districts.
48
  Once a person 
entered the Post Office they found most of its technical terminology were neologisms concocted 
by foreigners and whose meanings were unclear.  In the official postal regulations issued in 
1896, a letter was known as a “sealed letter” (封口信) rather than the more common “letter” (信 
or 書信), postcards were known as “open letter cards” (明信片), commercial papers as “trade 
registers” (貿易冊) and printed matter as “cut blocks and prints” (刊印).  Dictionaries in the late 
1890s were of no help either.  Most did not include relevant postal terms or produced torturous 
translations such as “letters transmitted by the state letter office” (由國家信館寄來之信) for the 
noun “mail” or “to go to the letter office with a letter in the fingertips” (拈封信去信館) for the 
verb “to post [a letter].”49  For those brave enough to get past the unusual terminology, their 
“hearts trembled in fear” when the postal clerks used a Western-style scale to weigh the letters.50  
The private Minxinju letter firms did not weigh letters so the new procedure was confusing.  
Chinese customers had a particularly difficult time understanding the relationship between 
Western ounces, in which all letters were weighed, and their own weight standard of the mace 
(錢).51  Many Chinese were suspicious that Western scales were purposefully inaccurate because 
the cost difference between something weighing 2.5 mace (1/2 oz) was 2 cents while something 
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weighing 3 mace was 4 cents.
52
  The Imperial Post Office also had a confusing three-tier postage 
system contingent upon the geographical destination of a letter: coastal (岸資), inland (內資), 
and international (外資), which made no sense to customers since post offices along inland 
waterways were considered “coastal,” but only if the letters were carried by steamer.  If a 
customer made it this far, the clerk sold them the appropriate postage stamp, which again, most 
Chinese had never seen before – one dictionary translated stamp as “the head of a public person 
for gluing on a letter (貼信之公仔頭).  Handed the stamp, many customers expressed “strong 
repugnance” at the idea of licking its adhesive back – eventually the Post Office had to introduce 
glue pots.
53
  Once the disgusting stamp was licked, postal clerks found that Chinese as often as 
not put the stamp on the back of the horizontal envelope, which was a problem the Post Office 
was still struggling with in the 1930s.
54
  The letters were then either handed to the clerk or, if the 
customer dared, placed in a public mailbox, which were the focus of considerable curiosity and 
rampant rumors when they first appeared.
55
  Suffice it to say, the “far from confidence-inspiring”  
Chinese name of the Post Office was frequently “uttered in derision” in its early years.56 
As a business enterprise, the Post Office up to 1901 was a failure.  Its network of 176 
offices was smaller than the private Minxinju system, its rates were considerably higher at four 
cents per letter, and it was largely confined to coastal areas and Treaty Ports.  Within ten years, 
however, the development of the Post Office as a business concern was considered by one 
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European to be “one of the romances of modern industrial development.”57  The author of that 
romance was a Frenchman named Théophile Piry who became postal secretary in 1901.  By 
creating an efficient, highly-organized network of post offices and post roads, with a monopoly 
on modern forms of transportation, Piry and his well-trained postal staff would turn the Post 
Office into one of the most successful state institutions.  Within a short time, the Post Office 
provided a quicker means of communications, a better transportation system, and cheaper 
financial services than those offered by its private competitors. 
At the heart of Piry’s success was his belief that providing mail services to the entire 
public was the primary mission of the Post Office.  In order to fulfill that mission, Piry gambled 
in 1902 by cutting postage rates on standard letters to a “purely nominal” rate of one cent, which 
was 75% cheaper than most postage charged by the Minxinju.
58
  He also simultaneously began a 
period of rapid expansion by utilizing Inland Box Office Agencies (鋪商, later 代辦所).  Such 
agencies were pre-existing local businesses that agreed to collect mail and sell stamps for a 
monthly stipend and percentage of stamp sales.
59
 Although Piry’s methods increased deficits by 
almost fifty percent over the next several years, both the size of the network and amount of 
business conducted more than doubled as well.
60
  Key to the growth of the Post Office was its 
nominal postage rate that remained, from 1902 to the 1940s, the cheapest in the world of any 
country of note.  By 1910, the Imperial Post Office could transmit a letter for three cents over 33 
days and 4,400 miles from Beijing to Urumqi. 
Along with physical expansion, Hart and Piry also engaged in a variety of internal and 
external campaigns to improve postal work, educate the public about the post office, and 
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advertise its services.  Hart and Piry both sent out morale-boosting circulars to all postal 
commissioners emphasizing efficiency, zeal, tact, and scrupulous honesty when dealing with the 
public.  To improve the public perception of the Post Office, they also touted the qualities of 
speed, regularity, and security as the three essential prerequisites of postal work.
61
  Postal 
administrators and other government officials made a concerted effort to facilitate the public’s 
understanding of postal communications, its terminology, and procedures by authoring 
dictionaries of postal terms, publishing letter writing manuals, and issuing lists of locations with 
Post Offices in Chinese.
62
  The Post Office also undertook, as discussed in Chapter 6, a wide 
variety of advertising campaigns, including planting positive stories in newspapers, selling very 
cheap provincial postal maps, publishing presentation-quality postal atlases, and giving out free 
calendars. 
Starting in 1904, Postal Secretary Théophile Piry also sought to spread “postal culture” 
by methodically expanding the postal network and introducing new services for business 
customers.
63
  He raised the domestic postage rate to 2 cents per letter, and made the domestic 
tariff uniform, to help fund the expansion program.
64
  With the additional funds, Piry opened 
between 500-1,000 new offices per year.  When all large urban areas had been provided with 
service by 1907, Piry focused on expanding into smaller cities, towns, and rural areas.  Between 
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the larger Head and Branch Offices, Piry inaugurated fast day-and-night couriers and along many 
routes opened Town (城邑信櫃) and Rural Box Offices (村鎮信櫃) in 1908-09.65  These Box 
Offices were subordinate to contracted Postal Agencies and established wherever the size of the 
local population did not warrant an agency.  By using box offices to extend the postal network, 
Piry increased the number of offices from 2,803 in 1907 to 5,357 by 1910. 
With the expansion of the postal network, Piry also started adding new services to 
facilitate business development.  Since 1897, the Post Office had offered registered mail 
(掛號郵件), a form of tracking, to provide security for special mail matter at the rate of ten cents 
per letter.  In 1906, Piry introduced a ten-cent express delivery (快遞郵件) service for business 
customers to ensure their mail matter was immediately sorted and delivered upon arrival at its 
destination.
66
  Express delivery proved a very popular service with customers conducting time-
sensitive business.  Finally, Piry created an insured letter (保險郵件) service in 1912 to protect 
small valuable items.
67
  These special add-on services proved moderately successful, which 
helped increase the total amount of mail matter being sent through the mail.  Between 1904 and 
1911, the amount of mail matter rose from 21 million items to 116 million.   
One of the increasingly popular types of mail matter among business customers, urban 
residents, and foreigners during this period was the postcard.  Having appeared in Europe in the 
late 1860s, the postcard was an immediate success.  By the early twentieth century, Germans 
were sending more than 1.1 billion postcards per year, Americans more than 800 million, and the 
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British more than 700 million.
68
  In China, the foreign-run Local Post Offices of the Treaty Port 
Municipal Councils (工商書信館) introduced postcards to China in the early 1870s.69  In 
October 1897, the Imperial Post Office started selling its own postcards for a nominal fee.
70
  In 
the late 1890s commercially-produced picture postcards (明信華片) began spreading throughout 
the West and China.
71
  Postcards could then be sent anywhere in China for one cent between 
1897 and 1919.  The Post Office in large urban centers such as Shanghai usually collected and 
delivered mail between six and ten times daily.  A postcard dropped in a mailbox at 10:00 am 
was sure to reach its recipient in the early afternoon.  For an additional cost, customers could 
also purchase “reply postcards” (雙明信片), which consisted of two parts allowing the recipient 
to tear off one half of the postcard and mail it back to the sender for free.  While postcards never 
reached the same heights of popularity as in the West, they proved increasingly popular after 
1910 when Piry raised the letter rate to three cents.
72
   From an average of less than a million a 
year, postcards jumped dramatically to three million in 1911 and continued to rise to 35 million 
by 1919.
73
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As business developed, Postal Secretary Piry realized postal districts would have to be 
reorganized to facilitate routing, sorting, and administrative control.  As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the postal districts and route systems had been based upon the Customs network.  Customs 
districts, organized around trading ports, paid no attention to either provincial borders or 
traditional road networks.  By 1903, there were some 33 separate postal districts.  The smallest 
districts, Simao in Yunnan, Qiongzhou in Guangdong, and Longzhou in Guangxi, all had less 
than ten post offices as late as 1909.
74
  More populous provinces such as Jiangsu were divided 
into four separate postal districts that overlapped parts of other provinces.
75
  Understanding this 
to be an inefficient system, Piry began the process of re-organizing districts in 1909 to make 
every province its own postal district.
76
  By 1913, Piry had completed the reorganization by 
shifting Head Offices to provincial capitals.
77
  In concert with the district reorganization, Piry 
also restructured the administrative relationship between offices.  After 1913, a postal 
commissioner (郵務長) in each Head Office administered an entire postal district (郵界, later 
郵區), which was divided into a number of sub-districts supervised by a sub-district postmaster 
in a First-Class Post Office (一等郵局).  Within each sub-district was a certain number of 
Second-Class offices in mid-sized cities and Third-Class Offices in smaller cities.
78
  Each of the 
lower offices was overseen by a Clerk, Assistant, Postal Officer, or Postal Student (郵務生) of 
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requisite rank.  Beneath these major establishments were the postal agencies, town and rural box 
offices, and, starting in 1918, rural stations (村鎮郵站). 
In 1918, Henri Picard-Destelan, head of the Post Office since 1915, launched a new rural 
expansion program to spread the postal network.  Seeking to expand into rural areas and to more 
remote villages, Destelan installed rural stations at places along postal routes.  As couriers 
approached a village designated as a rural station, they would ring a bell to announce their arrival 
and then deliver and collect mail, sell stamps, and perform any other additional services required.  
As travelling Post Offices, Destelan wrote, the rural station system is “the most economical 
method of bringing into touch with the outside world those remote places far off the beaten track 
where…the arrival of the mail is an event and the postman always a welcome visitor.”79  Within 
three years, Destelan had established 17,053 rural stations in addition to the 18,406 other post 
offices.  The growth was so quick that the number of offices in Shandong alone in 1920 was 
more than the entire postal network in 1910.  Destelan declared, “rural delivery is the most 
momentous and significant of all recent public efforts to promote the general welfare.”80  
Destelan did not ignore urban areas either.  To increase the use and convenience of urban postal 
facilities, Destelan introduced Stamp Selling Agencies (代售郵票處) in 1922.  These agencies 
were designed to replace the more expensive Town Box Offices and were situated in the vicinity 
of public mailboxes.
81
   
With more than 35,000 post offices by 1921, Destelan saw profits rise rapidly.  Having 
shown its first small profit in 1915, the Post Office averaged around a four million tael profit per 
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year in the early 1920s.
82
  While the Post Office’s profit margins were relatively small compared 
to the Customs or railway administrations, the very fact that it produced profits at all was 
significant.  The vast majority of postal administrations around the world usually had deficits.  
The source of profits at the Chinese Post Office stemmed primarily from a roughly 40% increase 
in the amount of mail matter handled between 1920 and 1925 from 400 to 565 million articles.  
As business at the Post Office increased, Destelan used the additional profits to pay off 
outstanding debts, improved internal equipment, purchased land for additional offices, and built 
new imposing head post office buildings in Shanghai, Beijing, Ji’nan, Kaifeng, Mukden, 
Urumqi, and Hangzhou. 
By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Post Office was encountering numerous challenges 
that checked postal development, but that did not fundamentally alter either the network or the 
Post Office’s overriding mission.  The chaos of the Northern Expedition (1926-1928) in which 
the Nationalists and Communists militarily unified the country, caused great disruption to the 
Post Office by interfering with postal routes, restricting the remittance of funds, and destroying 
some offices.  Immediately after the Northern Expedition, the Nationalists took over 
administration of the Post Office.  Their policies of using postal revenues to subsidize the 
development of the airline industry in 1929 and the decision to create a separate Directorate 
General of Postal Remittance and Savings Banks in 1930 weakened the economic foundations of 
the Post Office.  Shortly thereafter, the Directorate also lost control over the Manchurian postal 
districts, which contributed greatly to already mounting deficits.  With all-time high deficits of 
5.6 million in 1932 and 6.4 million in 1933 postal expansion came to a standstill.   
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In response to the economic crisis in the Post Office, the Minister of Communications 
Zhu Jiahua (朱家驊) and Director General of Posts Guo Xinsong (郭心崧) instituted a policy of 
strict retrenchment coupled with rapid rural expansion.
83
  The rural expansion program of 1934-
36 completed the postal network.  The rural expansion program of the mid-1930s was made up 
of three parts: a concerted effort to extend service into frontier provinces, the creation of a new-
style establishment, and the inauguration of rural free delivery.  To provide service to frontier 
provinces, the Post Office abandoned the principle that rural extension should only take place 
where it would prove profitable.
84
  Starting from an office or agency, postal inspectors 
established three or four circuits in different directions of about 15-20 miles, which could be 
covered by a courier in a single day.  An individual courier would then travel one such circuit 
each day under the assumption that each circuit would be travelled every three or four days.  
Along these new routes, the Post Office would hang public notices introducing the post office 
and its functions.
85
  Wherever conditions required, the postal inspector could also plant one of 
the recently introduced Box Office D establishments.  Local businessmen or village leaders 
could contract with the Post Office to open a Box Office D in a village used by the local area as a 
periodic market.  The box holder would then promise to take mail matter from and delivery it to 
a local post office or agency whenever market day was held.  The villages from the surrounding 
area could then conduct their postal business at the same time as their other trading.  To advertise 
such services “picturesque posters” were hung in the market village.86  Finally, the rural free 
delivery system literally brought the entire population into the postal network.  Prior to 1935, the 
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Post Office relied on either the private Minxinju letter firms to deliver mail to isolated areas or 
could despatch special couriers, but in each case the recipient had to pay a fee.  Under the new 
system, the Post Office would despatch couriers to any location free of charge no matter how 
isolated the location.
87
  The rural extension program was a great success.  In 1935, the 
Directorate opened 5,106 new offices and another 18,413 the following year.  Even the most 
isolated provinces such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Shaanxi now had sufficient postal service.  
Yunnan, for example, had 682 establishments transmitting 5.8 million articles of mail matter 
over 13,873 miles of postal routes in the mid-1930s.  Postal coverage in more populous districts 
was even more impressive.  In Zhejiang there were 4,615 post offices transmitting 55.2 million 
articles of mail matter over 18,600 miles of routes.
88
  At its greatest pre-war size, the Chinese 
Post Office had a total of 72,690 post offices handling 881 million items of mail matter over a 
network of 400,000 miles of routes.   
 
“Newspapers are Beneficial to the State”89  
State Subsidies to Private Businesses through Postal Rate-Making 
In 1937, former Minister of Communications Zhu Jiahua described the Post Office’s mission as 
to play “a leading part in the cultural development and political advancement of remote 
regions…by carrying to the interior the printed page from the capital and business centres.”90  To 
play this vital part, the Post Office subsidized various categories of mail matter, including 
newspapers, printed matter, commercial papers, and samples.  Unlike private companies who 
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would only carry such material for a profit, the state through the Post Office decided to accept 
postal deficits in exchange for serving the entire public.  Indeed, the Post Office absorbed 
significant deficits from all categories of subsidized mail, but in exchange played an active part 
in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country. 
 The Post Office subsidized newspapers, magazines, and books – the focus of this section 
– but also several lesser-known categories.  In 1897, Inspector General of Posts Robert Hart 
created the broad categories of printed matter (印書) and commercial papers (貿易冊).  Printed 
matter included magazines and books, but also such things as pamphlets, sheets of music, page 
proofs, engravings, photographs, material for the blind, plans, maps, and mail-order catalogues.
91
  
Commercial papers was a broad category generally for business customers and included such 
material as accounting ledgers, bank books and cheques, property deeds, bills of lading and 
manifests, insurance documents, various invoices and waybills, student exercise books, and all 
laws passed by government.  In 1899 and 1911, the Post Office introduced new subsidized 
categories known as “samples” (貨樣) and “unaddressed trade circulars (不註姓名之商務傳單).  
Samples included all manner of items that companies could send to customers, but also flowers 
for florists, specimens for scientists, and blocks for printers.
92
  Unaddressed trade circulars, by 
contrast, were daily, weekly, or semi-monthly advertising flyers from places like Shanghai sent 
to the outports for distribution by local companies.
93
  The postage rates on these four categories 
fluctuated slightly before 1911, but the next year the new Republican state decided to grant a 
long-term subsidy by only charging a nominal rate of 1 cent per 100 grams, 2.5 cents for 100-
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250 grams, and so on.
94
  These remarkably cheap postage rates remained in effect until 1940.  
The greatest benefactors of government largess through subsidized mail rates, however, were 
newspaper, magazine, and book publishers. 
Postal rate-makers took at as axiomatic that the government should underwrite the 
dissemination of “information in the public interest,” both timely such newspapers and 
magazines and timeless such as books.  The underlying purpose was to use postal rate-making 
policy and the physical postal network as conduits for the spread of education and culture.  “For 
when cheap and speedy…facilities supplement and quicken the present mode of mail 
communications with the far interior, they will start the circulation of ideas among every larger 
groups of men, even as learning of all kinds increases with the means of disseminating it.”95   
State subsidies to newspapers, magazines, and books not only highlights the state’s desire 
to foster economic growth, particularly among printers and publishers, but also its willingness to 
effectively pay to spread what the state believed was educational and cultural content.  These 
subsidies not only provide a window on the new-style interventionist state, but also complicate 
our understanding of state censorship in the late Qing and throughout the Republic.  Over the last 
fifteen years, historians of China have paid considerable attention to the development of the 
newspaper and publishing industries.  There have been studies of individual foreign- and 
Chinese-owned newspapers, the development of journalism as a profession, the creation of a 
public sphere/middle realm through the circulation of newspapers, the mechanics of publishing, 
and numerous works on the relationship between the government and newspaper industry.
96
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These studies generally agree that the various governments ruling China from the late Qing 
through the Republican era had an adversarial relationship with the press.  True enough, as we 
will see in Chapter 5 on postal censorship.  With very few exceptions, however, do these 
newspaper historians even mention state subsidies of the newspaper, magazine, and book 
industries.  Without such state subsidies, it is impossible that published material would have 
circulated so widely throughout China.  Although state subsidies of newspapers, magazines, and 
books originated with the foreign administrators of the Post Office, the central or warlord 
governments would reassert the value of the circulation of public information through postal 
subsidies several times in the Republican era.  The relationship between the newspaper, 
magazine, and book industries and the central government, then, was far more ambiguous than 
previously portrayed.  The government did indeed censor information, but also paid for it to 
circulate at the lowest postage rates in the world. 
In the early years of the Post Office, rate-makers adjusted subsidies to newspapers and 
other printed matter trying to strike a balance between the spread of newspapers, magazines, and 
books while limiting their own financial losses.  When the Post Office opened in 1897, the 
postage rate on a single letter rate weighing ½ oz was four cents while Chinese-language 
newspapers of any weight passed for one cent, foreign-language newspapers for two cents, and 
magazines for two cents.
97
  Within a year, the Inspectorate realized the financial burden 
associated with an unlimited weight limit for newspapers and introduced a weighted scale.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Print and Politics: Shibao and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996) ; Stephen R. MacKinnon, “Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period,”  Modern China 
23: 1 (January 1997): 3-32; Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai’s 
News Media, 1872-1912 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); Christopher A. Reed, Gutenberg 
in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); Lee-hsia Hsu 
Ting, Government Control of the Press in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, 1974); and 
Rudolf Wagner, “The Early Chinese Newspapers and the Chinese Public Sphere,” European Journal of East Asian 
Studies 1: 1 (2001): 1-33. 
97
 Inspector General’s Circulars, Postal Series, No. 7, I. G. Robert Hart, 9 April 1896 in SHAC137.2023-1. 
  192 
 
Under the new system, newspapers and magazines would pay ½ cent on two ounces, one cent 
between 2-4 oz, and one cent for every three ounces thereafter.
98
  This rate lasted until 1904 
when the Post Office abandoned the graduated weight system in favor of a flat rate of ½ cent per 
two ounces for local delivery and one cent per two ounces for all other places.  Printed matter, 
however, retained its graduated scale.
99
 
 As the newspaper industry started to develop, in no small measure due to the cheap 
postage rates, Postal Secretary Piry decided to introduce a newspaper registration system 1905.  
The new system would not only increase the speed of newspaper handling by allowing 
publishers to pay quarterly, but also granted additional concessions to established Chinese-
language publications with a wide readership.  Under the new system, all subscription 
publications of domestic origin issued from a “known establishment” could register themselves 
at the Post Office.
100
  Only newspapers that registered themselves at the Post Office – that is, all 
“legitimate publications” not associated with the anti-Manchu movement – would be entitled to 
the subsidized preferential rates.
101
  The Post Office designed three different categories of 
newspaper: Class A was for those newspapers with a small readership and paid full tariff rates; 
the Class B category or so-called “Special Marks” newspapers (立卷之報紙) was primarily for 
foreign-language publications that paid postage in a lump sum quarterly at estimated weights; 
and, Class 3, or “Newspapers in Bulk Under Contract” (掛號按照總包特別優益寄送之報紙) 
was for Chinese-language newspapers sent in bulk for an estimated quarterly payment of 2/10ths 
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of a cent per newspaper.
102
  By 1910 the generous subsidies to newspapers and printed matter 
resulted in some 29 million newspapers, magazines, and books being delivered by the Post 
Office.  This represented an almost doubling of such matter since 1907 when 16 million issues 
were despatched.  This growth, Postal Secretary Piry wrote, “denotes a striking movement in the 
intellectual and educational development of this wonderful country.”103 
The rapid growth in the number of newspapers and printed matter handled by the Post 
Office was beginning to cost the Post Office dearly.  In 1910, Postal Secretary Piry decided to 
create light (輕件) and heavy (重件) mail categories.104  The purpose of these two categories was 
to limit the financial losses attendant on the subsidies to newspapers and magazines by allowing 
Piry to renegotiate his carriage contracts with steamship and railway companies.  Prior to 1910, 
the Post Office paid its contract carriers the same for transporting light letters as heavy bulk 
newspapers.  To reduce the resulting financial loss, Piry renegotiated carriage contracts to make 
it cheaper to transport heavy mails by allowing them to be transported slower than light mails. 
 The already exceptionally low postage rates did not satisfying newspaper editors, 
magazine publishers, or booksellers.  Despite the low rates and simplified posting procedure, 
newspaper publishers petitioned the newly-established National Parliament in 1910 “praying for 
further reductions in newspaper rates.”105  The Post Office turned down their request, but faced 
new pressure from advertisers and book publishers who demanded rates similar to newspapers.  
In late 1910, Piry used the new light and heavy mail categories to grant advertisers a reduction in 
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rates for unaddressed trade circulars, which irritated the book publishers.
106
  If profit-hungry 
advertisers could have their rates lowered, book publishers wanted the same preferential 
treatment.  Book publishers like the Director of the Commercial Press (商務印書館) argued that 
unless they received the same low rates as newspapers and advertisements, the Post Office was 
“an obstacle in the way of educated Young China.”107  Postal administrators parried such 
demands, but publishers would soon politicize the rate-making process by circumventing the 
Post Office and appealing directly to the central government. 
 On the eve of the 1911 Revolution, postal rate-makers had built a system for the cheap, 
fast, and reliable transmission of subsidized printed matter throughout the country.  The postal 
framework for handling subsidized mail included a newspaper registration system, categories for 
light and heavy mail, and a statistical method for tracking how many newspapers, magazines, 
and books were transmitted.  Despite many obstacles, including one of the largest postal 
networks in the world and a lack of sufficient modern transportation facilities, postal rate-makers 
intentionally subsidized newspapers, magazines, and books to make their postage rates “lighter 
than in any country in the world.”108  
 
“The Greater the Number of Newspapers, the Stronger the Nation”109 
“Everything possible is being done by the Post Office,” wrote Postal Secretary Piry,  “to help 
[the] spreading of literature among the masses in all parts of the Empire.”110  Prior to the 1911 
Revolution, postal rate-making was entirely an internal process.  The separation of the Post 
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Office from the Customs Service in May 1911 and Piry’s decision to join the Ministry of Posts 
and Communications, gave the authority to set postage rates to the central government.   
In the immediate aftermath of the 1911 Revolution, newspaper publishers circumvented 
the Post Office by approaching Sun Zhongshan, the provisional president, directly.  In March 
1912, the Shanghai Newspaper Association (上海日報公會) formally petitioned Sun arguing for 
a rate reduction because they contributed to the 1911 Revolution and were fostering a 
cooperative relationship between Sun’s provisional government and Yuan Shikai.  
Understanding the importance of newspapers, Sun would probably have granted the reduction, 
but he surrendered the presidency to Yuan Shikai before making his decision.  Sun did, however, 
telegraph the petition to Yuan recommending its acceptance on the grounds that “newspapers 
represent public opinion.”111  As a man later known for his contentious relationship with the 
press – he had an estimated 24 journalists executed and 60 imprisoned during his four-year 
tenure as president – Yuan Shikai hardly seems a likely supporter of subsidized rates for the 
press.  Unsettled conditions throughout the country and Yuan’s tenuous hold on power, however, 
probably led him to believe a favorable press was essential for the immediate future.  On 26 
March, Yuan granted a one-half reduction on all newspaper rates.
112
   
Fearing an angry torrent of petitions from booksellers and magazine editors, Postal 
Secretary Piry immediately granted them a fifty percent reduction as well.
113
  Under the new 
tariff schedule, postage on registered newspapers dropped from one cent per 50 grams to ½ cent, 
on bulk newspapers to 1/10 of a cent, and on printed matter, books, and commercial papers to 
one cent.  The effect of the new rates was immediate.  “The extension of newspaper business 
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was,” Piry wrote at the end of 1912, “one of the features of the year.” 114  By the end of 1912, 
more than 400 newspapers had registered at the Post Office; the number despatched rose from 
32.4 to 37.1 million in 1912 and in 1913, once the full effects of the reduction had been felt, rose 
to 52.2 million (Table 3, at the end of this section).   
 By the early 1920s, the Post Office faced a number of new financial commitments.  In 
April 1922, Shanghai postal workers struck and won a 20% pay increase for their co-workers 
across the country.  That same year, the Directorate also granted raises to upper-level staff and 
introduced an expensive pension system.
115
 Contract carriers, particularly the railroads, were also 
asking for increased remuneration since the amount of heavy mail matter had increased 
dramatically to 91 million articles by 1921.  Meanwhile, postage rates on newspapers, 
magazines, and books had remained the same for a decade.   
To compensate some of these financial losses and fund its new commitments, the postal 
rate-makers petitioned the Ministry of Communications in August for a small rate increase of 
one cent on domestic letters, ½ cent on postcards, and a doubling of all newspaper rates only to 
non-steam-served places in the Ji[lin]-Hei[longjiang], Gansu, Shaanxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan 
postal districts.
116
  In early October, the Ministry of Communications publically announced the 
new rate increase to be effective as of 1 November.   
The announcement of this minor rate increase set off a major political firestorm that 
threatened to engulf the Post Office.  Over the next two months, newspaper editors, magazine 
publishers, book sellers, educational institutions, religious groups, and commercial associations 
filled the press with protests against the rate increase.  During the newspaper campaign, the 
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Shanghai-based Republican Daily (民國日報) published 96 different articles on the rate increase.  
Newspapers in all the major cities, including Shanghai’s Shenbao (申報), Tianjin’s Dagong bao 
(大公報), and the Japanese-owned, Shenyang-based Shengjing Shibao (盛京時報), did 
likewise.
117
  The frenzy whipped up by the newspapers ultimately led to the intervention of 
warlords from across the country.  Zhang Zuolin of the Three Eastern Provinces, He Fenglin of 
Shanghai, Chen Jiongming of Guangdong, Zhao Hengti of Hunan, Lu Yongxiang of Zhejiang, 
and Liu Xiang of Sichuan all separately demanded the Post Office cancel the increased 
newspaper rates.  When the Directorate did not immediately obey their instructions, some of the 
warlords took action to restore the original tariff by placing soldiers in post offices to enforce the 
old rates.  In Sichuan matters looked grim.  The Provincial Assembly began taking steps to 
assume full control of all post offices to run them as a provincial concern.  Zhejiang authorities 
starting making similar noises.  As the protests and pressure mounted, the Directorate petitioned 
the Ministry to rescind the rate increase because the situation had become “critical for the 
maintenance of the Post Office as a national service.”118  The Ministry cancelled the rate increase 
on 1 January 1923.
119
   
The Post Office was shocked that its minor rate increase resulted in such outrage, 
particularly since the protests had been “more or less of a political character.”120  Looking back, 
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postal administrators felt their purpose in raising rates had been “misconstrued.”121  Interpreting 
this misunderstanding as their own failure to prepare the public for the rate increase, postal rate-
makers decided that in future they would provide cost accounting data to quell any possible 
furor.  In response, postal administrators began making a number of alterations to their statistical 
gathering methods to more accurately reflect both the real numbers of newspapers, magazines, 
and books being sent through the Post Office and the financial costs of transporting them.
122
  
Henceforth, the Post Office would prepare itself with cost accounting figures and publically 
explain the reasons for any rate increases.  Before the Post Office tried to raise rates, however, 
the newspapers associations were again on the offensive. 
In early 1928, the newly-established Nationalist Ministry of Communications convened a 
National Communications Conference to discuss future developments.  The Shanghai 
Newspaper Association saw the establishment of the Nationalist government as an opportunity to 
ask for lower rates.  The Association submitted a petition to the Conference calling the current 
three-class system of newspaper postage “unscientific” and requesting all newspapers only be 
charged bulk rates.
123
  Postal administrators at the conference did want to talk about rates, but 
about doubling them to recover some of the losses on transportation.
124
  Shortly after the 
conference, continued agitation by various newspaper associations led the hapless State Council 
to approve a uniform system of charges on newspapers, but the Ministry of Communications 
refused to consider such a course.
125
  Frustrated, the newspaper associations started claiming the 
Post Office was making a profit out of them despite the industry being “engaged chiefly in the 
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dissemination of educational propaganda.”126  In late December, Director General of Posts Liu 
Shufan (劉書蕃) placated the publishers by granting a modest postage reduction on “special 
marks” newspapers.127  Despite this small victory, the various newspaper, magazine, and 
bookseller associations quickly mastered the revolutionary anti-imperialist lingo of the 
Nationalist Party arguing that any class-based postage system was a “remnant of the poison of 
imperialism.”128 
 In the early 1930s, rising postal deficits once again forced postal rate-makers to seek a 
modest postage increase on printed matter.  Inflation from the Great Depression, large postal 
subsidies to the airlines, the loss of the Manchurian districts, and the flooding of the Yangzi in 
the summer of 1932 all contributed to the Post Office’s financial crisis.  New contracts signed 
with common carriers in the late 1920s and early 1930s also played their part in growing postal 
deficits as did a record 280 million newspapers, magazines, and books sent through the mail in 
1932.  By the early 1930s, the Post Office was averaging a 60,000 yuan yearly loss on “special 
marks” newspapers and about 475,000 on bulk newspapers.129   
To offset some of the mounting debt, the Post Office announced a postage increase on 
magazine and book rates on 1 May 1932.  The new rates were not an across-the-board increase, 
but created a tariff system based on types of transport with those carried partially or wholly by 
courier to border provinces charged double or triple rates.
130
  Upon the public announcement of 
the new tariff rates another wave of public protest broke out.  It was a repeat performance of 
1922, but with the Shanghai Booksellers’ Association (上海書業公會) taking the lead in 
whipping up public indignation.  The newspapers, always ready to help another subsidized 
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industry, gave their columns over to the protesters.  The Shanghai Booksellers’ Association also 
used its connections to encourage similar associations in Hangzhou, Beiping, Hankou, 
Nanchang, Wuhu and other cities to flood the Post Office and Ministry of Communications with 
letters.  They sent letters to everyone from the Ministry of Communications to Yuan President 
Yu Youren to Jiang Jieshi himself.  In newspaper columns, and petitions to government officials, 
the message was the same – the book industry was vital to the educational and cultural 
development in isolated parts of the country and any rate increase was a hindrance to that 
development.
131
  The heavy lobbying effort succeeded, and the Ministry of Communications and 
Post Office cancelled all rate increases.
132
  Within a year, the Post Office was losing 10 million 
annually to subvent the publishing industry with such cheap postage.  “Any increase in this low 
rate is to be deplored,” a prominent editor wrote, “The handling of books, magazines, and 
newspapers must…be one of the Post Office’s chief concerns, for thereby it does an amount of 
cultural work the full worth of which is not easy to estimate.”133 
 The politicization of the rate-making process kept the Post Office from attempting any 
more postage increases after 1932.  New increases were internally discussed, but each time the 
Ministry demurred.
134
  By the mid-1930s, Chinese rates on newspapers, printed matter, and 
books were, in the words of Minister of Communications Zhu Jiahua, “lower than those of any 
other country of note.”  A single kilo of newspapers transmitted across Hong Kong cost 37 cents 
Chinese while the same kilo could travel across the entire mainland for a single cent.
135
  Even the 
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very heavily subsidized second-class mail rates in the United States were considerably more 
expensive than China’s comparable bulk rate for newspapers.  In 1935, one pound of second-
class newspapers in the United States cost two cents US currency while the same pound sent by 
bulk across China only cost only ½ cent US.
136
  Clearly, the political authorities of the 
Republican era were and remained committed to public subsidies for the press. 
 
Table 3: Newspapers and other Printed Matter Sent through the Mail 
 
Year 
Newspapers  
Printed 
Matter 
 
Books 
 
Unaddressed 
Trade 
Circulars 
 
Commercial 
Papers 
Class A 
(Ordinary) 
Class B 
(Special 
Marks) 
Class C 
(Bulk) 
1907 15,932,850   
1908 26,401,031   
1909 28,657,400   
1910 28,581,300 -- -- 
1911
137
 32,470,900 -- -- 
1912 37,163,500 -- -- 
1913 52,524,800 -- -- 
1914 42,139,300 -- -- 
1915 39,224,600 -- -- 
1916 47,373,040 -- 123,200 
1917
138
 53,606,960 ---- 224,805 
1918 58,789,470 -- 286,800 
1919 67,896,680 -- 499,450 
1920 80,528,000 -- 625,400 
1921 91,130,940 -- 1,315,590 
1922 43,024,700 29,764,400 28,398,600 4,374,930 1,395,900 
1923 45,375,525 35,344,801 37,124,840 5,295,784 1,078,627 
1924 50,409,074 46,890,300 40,162,682 6,534,800 1,472,290 
1925 60,032,004 47,633,719 44,802,948 3,658,414 2,314,387 
1926 72,573,172 48,450,168 43,292,193 3,141,526 2,462,899 
1927 77,038,988 37,504,300 41,947,313 3,548,836 2,287,899 
                                                 
136
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Table 3: Continued 
1928 82,918,300 41,492,300 51,442,400 3,996,000 2,930,500 
1929 107,284,940 49,876,890 63,596,810 7,897,360 3,413,920 
Jan-June 
1930 
55,119,300 23,494,000 34,342,600 1,367,300 2,040,000 
July 1930– 
June 1931 
113,141,900 49,941,400 71,824,300 8,988,700 4,322,200 
July 1931– 
June 1932 
129,828,300 56,659,000 73,115,400 3,401,500 4,138,700 
July 1932– 
June 1933 
125,065,800 55,593,700 72,557,100 3,333,100 3,046,000 
July 1933– 
June 1934 
140,287,500 56,380,300 87,525,100 4,121,500 4,139,600 
July 1934– 
June 1935 
144,310,100 47,176,400 98,332,100 5,212,800 4,852,100 
July 1935– 
June 1936 
52,497,600 114,401,000 42,047,900 101,008,300 10,449,200 4,647,400 6,520,400 
July 1936– 
June 1937 
55,771,000 138,466,9600 40,907,000 126,050,300 11,793,600 59,754,400 10,496,700 
July 1937– 
June 1938 
38,762,400 74,110,900 11,716,400 60,311,900 6,421,200 1,401,700 4,664,700 
July 1938– 
Dec 1938 
15,247,600 30,167,200 3,249,900 30,549,900 3,936,900 440,000 2,425,100 
1939 26,379,310 60,484,300 316,800 60,128,070 3742200 3,362,600 5,658,000 
1940 52,504,000 78,007,100 1,369,500 85,384,600 5,205,800 1,523,000 8,343,500 
1941 67,599,100 64,882,500 720,100 72,592,000 5,304,500 312,400 8,067,100 
1942 62,534,500 67,691,700 86,800 55,472,300 2,804,200 294,200 6,873,100 
1943 47,453,988 77,175,916 170,537 32,089,434 1,827,023 182,872 3,473,405 
 
 
 
Serving the People: State Interventions in the Economy through the Post Office 
Advocates of self-strengthening often couched their ideas in traditional economic terminology.
139
  
Such use of traditional terminology, however, was a cover for late Qing reformers who were 
talking about with new conceptualizations of the state in the economy, the idea of capitalism, 
national and international markets, and the unequal distribution of resources and wealth 
throughout empire.  Modern industrial enterprises disrupted traditional economic macro-regions 
as self-strengtheners re-prioritized the use of financial resources to build the infrastructure of a 
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national economy.
140
  The physical infrastructure of this new national economy was the 
steamship, railroad, and telegraph networks, but a lack of funding and inefficient management 
kept these three industries from becoming truly national in scope.
141
  In the late 1880s and early 
1890s, a small, but influential group of government reformers began supporting the idea of 
broader state intervention in the economy through the creation of a national postal network that 
would unify traditional and modern transportation networks.  Although many were concerned 
about the implications of this intervention, others viewed the state as the only institution that 
could paternalistically and altruistically build a national economy.   
The Post Office successfully fulfilled its primary goal by creating a national 
communications network, but its supporters had always maintained that the Post Office’s broader 
mission was to use the power of the state to assist economic development by providing basic 
financial and transportation services to the entire population.  Those services were initially 
limited to money orders and parcel post, but as the Post Office gained public and government 
confidence its administrators expanded into postal savings and life insurance.  Central to the 
whole thought process behind the Post Office’s role in the economy was an idea that only found 
its literal expression in a neologism of the late 1940s – the “postalization” (郵政化) of the 
economy.
142
  What this writer, and many before him, meant was to use the unique strengths of 
the Post Office – its entire network of offices, routes, and employees – to carry out numerous 
economic tasks seen as vital to the maintenance of a national economy.   
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The Chinese Post Office’s provision of economic and transportation services to the public 
rarely produced the tortured debates that were a predominant feature of political discussions in 
Western countries over the state’s role in economic life. Particularly in the United States, 
contentious political debates preceded the introduction of the parcel post, postal savings banks, 
rural free delivery, and a variety of other postal innovations.
143
  Although the Chinese Post 
Office encountered strong resistance from the Minxinju and Qiaopiju, as discussed in Chapters 2 
and 7, the structure of both the broader state and the Post Office as autocratic institutions 
governing by fiat kept political debates over postal intervention in the economy to a minimum. 
The following discussion, then, is not primarily concerned with political conflicts over state 
invention in the economy, or its relative success or failure, but is focused the underlying 
rationale for such services.  By concentrating on the Post Office’s government’s wide variety of 
economic services we can better understand how the state re-conceptualized its role in the life of 
the nation as it faced numerous domestic and international challenges throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
Money Orders and Parcel Post 
Although the state could and did fund individual industrial enterprises, the creation of a national 
economy required a system for remitting money and transporting goods throughout the entire 
empire.  If the transmission of letters was profoundly shocking to conservative officials, the 
decision of the Post Office to transport parcels and remit money signified a dramatic new state 
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intervention in the economy.  The decision to offer money orders (匯票) and a parcel post (包裹) 
service shows a late imperial state willing to depart from its traditional scope of action by 
competing with, and complementing, the private market to build something larger – a national 
communications, transportation, and financial market structured by the state through the Post 
Office.
144
 
The most well-known and significant financial and transportation institutions in the late 
Qing, the Shanxi draft banks (票號), the Shanghai or “native banks” (錢莊), and the Minxinju 
private letter firms, all engaged in the remittance business.
145
  The Minxinju also carried parcels.  
Although conducting an extensive business, such institutions had several fatal flaws from the 
perspective of government reformers and postal administrators.  Motivated solely by profit, the 
scope of their business was concentrated in certain remunerative regions – the Shanxi banks in 
the north, Shanghai banks in the south, and the Minxinju in the Jiangnan region – and therefore 
did not constitute a national network.  Second, such businesses focused on providing credit and 
financial services to large-scale traders or other firms leaving small traders, petty urbanites, and 
peasants either without access to necessary economic services or charged exorbitant prices.  In 
both cases, state administrators viewed the Post Office’s provision of money order and parcel 
post services as a way to solve these problems.  By offering money order and parcel post 
services, the Post Office would not only be fostering economic growth across the entire country, 
but would also correct some of the unevenness of economic opportunity.  That is, the 
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ambiguously defined goal of the Post Office was to be a “market perfecting” state institution by 
narrowing geographic price disparities, reducing transaction costs for individuals and firms, and 
assuming debt to provide services to the entire population.  “The Remittance Order of the 
Imperial Post Office,” Postal Secretary Piry wrote in 1904, “is one of the means by which…the 
public [will be] freed from risk and capricious exactions.”146 
The Post Office began offering money order and parcel post services in 1898.
147
  Each 
was necessary for the other: remittances without parcel post would have found customers, but 
interregional trade would have suffered as merchants would have been left without a convenient 
means to distribute their products.  Parcel post without a money order service would have been 
even less feasible since it was virtually impossible or prohibitively expensive for private banks to 
remit necessary funds to more isolated areas.  The Post Office’s contribution was not only to 
offer both of these services, but also to link them together with its extensive network of couriers 
and contract carriers, both modern and traditional, to create a sustainable economic system for 
small to medium transactions between coastal areas and the hinterland. 
Both the money order and parcel post services competed with existing banking and 
transportation companies, but the Post Office’s services were not meant to force private 
competitors out of business.  Indeed, the Post Office relied heavily on contracts with private 
transportation firms and individual carters, muleteers, and boatmen to transport parcels around 
the country.  These private firms may have suffered some loss of business from postal 
competition, but they also gained a regular customer in the Post Office who paid more than 
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amply for their services.
148
  The Post Office also put strict limits on the size and weight of 
parcels in order to leave the transport of larger quantities to private companies.
149
  Even as the 
railroad and steamship networks grew, thus reducing the need for a parcel post weight limit, the 
Post Office was careful to maintain its strict limits.  For money orders, the Post Office’s explicit 
rationale was to transmit small sums “as a bank would not consider worth its while to remit,” but 
it was not to “supersede these banks where they are installed or replace them where they do not 
exist.”150  In recognition of this desire, the Post Office initially kept the total amount remittable 
by an individual in a single day to one hundred dollars Mex.  When money orders doubled in 
1906, the postal administrators felt this business was growing too fast and lowered its limits.
151
  
Even with postal restrictions, some traditional banks did abandon their remittance services.
152
 
 With the rapid growth of the Post Office and its reputation for probity and efficiency, 
both the money order and parcel post services became popular with the public.
153
  In 1901, the 
first year the Post Office kept such statistics, they delivered only 126,000 parcels, but the number 
rose rapidly to 512,000 by 1907 with an average weight of 6 pounds.
154
  The money order 
business, between 1904 and 1907, also grew at an astonishing annual rate of 64% reaching a 
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value of 3.4 million Mex.
155
  Inland traders found the parcel post such a cost effective medium – 
the Post Office usually lost money by carrying parcels – they began to treat it “in the light of a 
common carrier” upon which they relied completely to replenish their merchandise.156 Although 
the Post Office intended its parcel post business to serve private individuals and petty merchants 
such as the hair net merchant in Shandong, the Dr. Williams Medicine Company selling anti-
opium pills in Wanxian, or the Shanghai printer who sent 1766 pounds of books to Chengdu over 
three days in 1910, many of its most frequent users were shops selling sundries or tea, silk, and 
cotton merchants.
157
  As one postmaster wrote, “The silk merchants seem to prefer to send their 
parcels by the I.P.O., as they find the Post Office safer, less troublesome, quicker, and, above all, 
cheaper than the cargo-boats.”158   
 The money order and parcel post business both grew rapidly after the 1911 Revolution.  
With terrible business conditions for local merchants, constant bandit attacks on private bank 
couriers, and soldiers commandeering draft animals and other conveyances, the public began to 
look at the Post Office as one of the only safe means of sending money and parcels.
159
  The 
success of the money order and parcel post services, Postmaster General Piry wrote in 1913, is 
due “to the confidence which the public now repose in the Service.”160  Public confidence was 
high as evinced by the rates of growth for both services.  Between 1912 and 1913, the number of 
parcels despatched by the Post Office rose by 63% and continued to grow throughout the decade 
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by around 20%.
161
  The growth was also due, in no small measure, to a tariff reduction in 1915 
that gave favorable rates to parcels for local delivery, reduced charges on all domestic parcels, 
and increased the weight limit.
162
  Postal money orders, too, had the “absolute confidence” of the 
public.
163
  From 1914 to 1923, money order business grew at an annual rate of 20%.
164
  By 1923, 
the Post Office was selling more than 3 million money orders per year with a value around 100 
million Mex.  The onset of the warlord years was actually a great boon to the Post Office, wrote 
its new head H. Picard-Destelan, because “confidence in the security of the Post Office as a 
transmitting medium…manifested in an increased money order and parcel post business.”165  
The success of the parcel post and money order services allowed the Post Office to venture into 
more unusual services. 
 
The Postal Savings Bank 
In 1919, Co-Director General Destelan decided to finally establish a Postal Savings Bank 
(郵政儲金股).  Postal savings banks had appeared in Europe in the late nineteenth century as a 
way to pool the resources of small savers to help finance public debt.
166
  The first discussions of 
a postal savings system in China occurred within the Ministry of Posts and Communications in 
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1907 and again in 1909.
167
  In 1910, it was decided to send a small delegation to Austria to study 
the advantages of postal savings.  In 1913, the Ministry of Communications established a 
Prepatory Committee for Postal Savings, but the chaos of the late Yuan Shikai period and the on-
set of the warlord era put the plan on hold.  In 1916, the newly appointed Minister of 
Communications Cao Rulin (曹汝霖) revived discussions of postal savings, but was unable to 
promulgate the necessary regulations until 1919.
168
 
There were several primary ideas behind the establishment of a postal savings system.
169
  
In his speech opening the Postal Savings Bank, the Acting Minister of Communications Zeng 
Yujuan (曾毓雋) deplored the lavish spending of petty urbanites and celebrated the postal 
savings bank as a “remedy for social ills” by encouraging “the habit of savings among the 
people” to restore among the population “the habits of simplicity and thrift.”170  The postal 
savings bank system was perfect, its own administrators argued, for “encouraging thrift” among 
the poorer classes by offering conservative, risk-adverse savers a method for investing their 
money at a decent 4.2% interest rate in a wholly “reliable institution” with offices around the 
country.
171
  Indeed, unlike the native banks, the Post Office guaranteed the “absolute security” of 
all deposits.
172
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The postal savings system was not wholly created for the altruistic goal of encouraging 
thrift.  Postal administrators also understood that the deposits from postal savings accounts could 
be pooled to “promote the free movement of capital” by utilizing them to purchase government 
bonds, make investments, and “develop popular industries and constructive government 
enterprises.”173  The Postal Savings Bank, wrote Minister of Communications Wang Boqun 
(王伯群)  in 1930, “interweaves the economic interests of the people with those of the 
Government, thus increasing loyalty to the Government.”174  That is, the Postal Bank invested its 
depositors in the legitimacy and solvency of the central government by holding public debt.  The 
Bank used accumulated deposits to invest in a wide range of government bond issues, private 
real estate, and loans to the foreign municipal councils in China.
175
  
As with the other business services offered by the Post Office, the Postal Savings Bank 
was not intended to compete directly with private banks.
176
  Native and foreign banks, as with 
private transport or remitting firms, could not or would not establish offices in small 
communities because of the cost and inconvenience.  The Post Office, by contrast, had a national 
network and “the confidence of the public” as “a State enterprise.”177  To limit competition with 
private banks while encouraging savings among the previously untapped market of small 
depositors, the bank’s passbook (存簿儲金) accounts had a limit of 2,000 yuan.  For the very 
smallest depositors, the Postal Savings Bank offered a system of postage savings stamps and 
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cards (儲金郵票) for those working towards saving a single dollar.178  To induce savings, the 
Post Office offered an iron-clad guarantee of deposits and an interest rate of 4.2%, which was 
raised to 5% in 1920.
179
 
 The Postal Bank achieved only modest success.  It grew quickly from 81 offices in 1919 
to 358 by 1923, but then slowly declined back to 288 by 1930.  The number of total savings 
accounts only reached 71,000 by 1929 with a total of 11.4 million in deposits.
180
  The Savings 
Bank did attract its targeted public, at least in cities and towns, where government employees 
(24%), merchants (19%), and students (12%) held the most accounts while peasants and workers 
only made up 3% of depositors.
181
  Within those categories, women and minors made up 25% of 
all depositors.  The Postal Savings Bank regulations did, however, keep the institution from 
competing directly with private banks.  More than 90% of all its accounts held less than $500 
and 38% less than $10.
182
  While the administrators of the Postal Savings Bank would have liked 
more business, its low numbers of accounts and deposits did not signal the failure of the bank, 
but was the result of an intentional policy not to compete aggressively with private banks. 
 
Expansion and Diversification in Postal Services, 1927-1949 
In the late 1920s a combination of factors temporarily stagnated the expansion of the Post Office 
and its business services.  Devastating warlord conflicts in 1924-25 followed by the launching of 
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the Northern Expedition, disrupted the economy in general and the postal network in particular.  
All postal business services either stagnated or expanded slowly.  At the end of the Northern 
Expedition, the Nationalists took over the Post Office and making significant internal 
administrative changes, including appointing a new Chinese head of the service.  For a period 
thereafter, the situation inside the Post Office was unsettled as the new postal administrators 
made even more changes to personnel, working rules, and operating procedures.  With a return to 
normalcy in 1929, the newly-appointed Director General of Posts Liu Shufan determined that the 
foreign heads of the Post Office had been too conservative in offering business services and 
expanding the network.  In response, Liu and the next several directors general, rapidly 
diversified the types of money order, parcel post, savings accounts, and other services offered to 
the public.  The newest innovation, begun in 1935, would be the sale of life insurance through 
the Post Office.   
The parcel post service suffered heavily during the Northern Expedition and continued to 
be unsettled thereafter.  From a high of 6 million parcels despatched in 1926, the number 
dropped to 5.5 million in 1927, but rebounded to 6.8 million by 1929.  After 1929, the continued 
outbreak of civil wars between the National Government and its rebellious generals kept 
business conditions unstable just as the effects of the Great Depression started to be felt.  Only 
when the Post Office negotiated an end to the onerous interport customs duty on parcels, raised 
the weight limit to 30 kilos, and began actively encouraging the use of the service, did the 
number of parcels despatched exceed 6.5 million.
183
  In 1935, Director General Guo Xinsong 
(郭心崧) also created a small packet (輕便包裹) system for parcels weighing less than 1 kilo.184   
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The benefit of the small packet system was that such parcels would travel with light mail matter 
at the fastest transmission rates possible.  In concert with the introduction of the small packet 
system, Director General Guo also ordered all commissioners to undertake an examination of 
local business conditions to promote inland trade and the use of the parcel post.  The idea was to 
encourage inland merchants who previously focused exclusively on local trade to begin selling 
their merchandise across the country through mail-order catalogs.  To promote the expansion of 
inland trade, the Post Office also published a guide on local products to inform coastal merchants 
of possible inland suppliers.
185
  “In this way,” Director Guo wrote, “the Post Office may bring 
about the much needed commercial and financial intercourse between the urban and rural 
districts, thereby contributing to the promotion of commerce and industry with resultant 
improvements in the Nation’s financial structure, as well as an increase in our native 
products.”186  Finally, the Post Office also experimentally introduced a home delivery service for 
parcels – all others having to be called for at the Post Office – in Shanghai for a nominal 
charge.
187
  The various new innovations succeeded admirably and the Post Office saw an 
increase of 30%, or almost 2 million parcels, by the summer of 1937.
188
 
 In the early 1930s, the most drastic changes to postal business services came with the 
establishment of a separate Directorate General of Postal Remittance and Savings Bank (D.G. of 
P.R. & S.B.) (郵政儲金匯業總局).189  As mentioned in Chapter 1, Director General of Posts Liu 
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Shufan left China in the wake of the 1928 Shanghai postal workers strike to undertake studies of 
postal savings systems around the world.  At the end of his tour, Liu returned and convinced 
Minister of Communications Wang Boqun, a relation through marriage, to create a separate 
Directorate.
190
  Liu’s own rationale for creating a separate Directorate was to rapidly expand 
postal savings facilities, but he also shifted the remittance business to the new Directorate.  As all 
upper-staff knew, Liu’s decision to have the new Directorate take over the remittance business 
was designed to cover the bank’s deficits.191  Although the new Directorate had offices in 
Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hankou, normal post offices continued to conduct the vast majority of 
savings and remittance services.  The new Directorate, however, had the administrative authority 
to expand older services and introduce new ones. 
 Liu Shufan’s first act as Director General of the P.R. & S.B. was to begin expanding 
savings facilities.  From 288 offices offering savings accounts in 1929, the numbers rose to 476 
in 1930 and 1,395 by 1940.   In 1931, Liu also orchestrated the passage of a new Postal Savings 
Law by the Legislative Yuan permitting the D.G. of P.R. & S.B. to offer cheque savings 
(支票儲金), fixed savings (定期儲金), and transfer savings (劃撥儲金), in addition to its regular 
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passbook savings accounts.  Transfer savings accounts allowed depositors to transfer their funds 
to any postal bank throughout the country.  Fixed savings, or certificates of deposit, required a 
minimum deposit of 50 yuan and returned the collect the principal and interest after six 
months.
192
  In the mid-1930s, the Bank also introduced a children’s savings (兒童儲金) system 
for “inculcating the habit of thrift and encouraging savings among children.”193  Under this 
system, primary and middle-school children could deposit up to 20 yuan a month at any postal 
savings bank office.  To encourage the children, the Post Office also started selling miniature 
pillar boxes as savings banks.
194
  During the War of Resistance, the fixed savings system in 
particular saw numerous special issues as the government sought to encourage the public to 
invest in the state as it battled Japan.
195
 
 Coupled with the growth of postal savings services were money orders.  As the D.G. of 
P.R. & S.B. expanded, it also began diversifying the types of remittance services offered to the 
public in order to cater to both business users and rural remitters.  In 1931, the Legislative Yuan 
passed a new Remittance Law allowing the Directorate to offer agents’ petty postal orders 
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(小額匯票), telegraphic money orders (電報匯票), and air-mail remittances.196 Although the 
petty remittance system for sending money orders between postal agencies started immediately, 
the telegraphic money order system did not begin until 1933.  In 1935, the D.G. of P.R. & S.B. 
also started offering high-value money orders (高額匯票) for customers wanting to remit up to 
10,000 yuan at a time.  Finally, during the World War II, the Directorate introduced true postal 
orders (定額匯票), which were certificates payable to the bearer in values of 5, 10, or 20 yuan, 
as well as Postal Gift Certificates (郵政禮卷).197  The new types of money orders and their 
continued spread around the country proved a great success.  The total amount remitted through 
the Post Office reached its pre-war peak in 1936 with 14,033 remitting offices handling money 
orders valued at 266 million yuan. 
 
Post Office Simple Life Insurance 
The most innovative new public service offered by the D.G. of P.R. & S.B. in the mid-1930s was 
simple life insurance (簡易人壽保險).  As with many other services, the Chinese Post Office’s 
sale of simple life insurance was inspired by broad trends in postal development in other 
countries.  The British Post Office first started selling life insurance in 1864, but it failed to 
attract many customers and was terminated in 1928.  The Japanese postal life insurance scheme, 
however, proved very successful after its introduction in 1916.
198
  As soon as the D.G. of P.R. & 
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S.B. was established in 1930, Director General Liu Shufan established an Insurance Department 
(保險處) to plan for its introduction.199  The department produced numerous drafts of simple life 
insurance laws, but plans were put on hold as the postal economy declined in the early 1930s.
200
  
A Simple Life Insurance Discussion Committee, however, continued meeting and studying 
Japan’s postal insurance system.201  Postal administrators and other government officials also 
continued to promote the idea in the press.
202
  In early 1935, Minister of Communications Zhu 
Jiahua, in the midst of a broader program of postal reform and business expansion, revived the 
idea of postal life insurance.  He pushed its regulations through the Legislative Yuan in 
December 1935 and policies went on sale in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hankou later that month. 
The Post Office’s provision of simple life insurance was intended to protect the productive 
output of peasants and the lower classes in urban centers.  As with postal savings accounts, the 
administrators of the postal life insurance program saw it primarily as a method for encouraging 
the habits of thrift and thinking about long-term family economics.  As Minister of Zhu put it, 
postal life insurance would be run as a “State enterprise, and as such its object is not to make 
profit, but merely to extend the benefits of insurance to workers and people of small means.”203  
Or, as another advocate put it, postal life insurance would “safeguard the stability of the lifestyle 
of the middle and lower-classes.”204  As with other postal services, the Post Office could offer 
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insurance at unprofitable rates because its pre-existing network and staff of highly-trained 
workers kept overhead costs to an absolute minimum. 
 In the case of simple life insurance, it was not intended to compete with private insurers, 
but to complement them.  During preparations for selling simple life insurance, the D.G. of P.R. 
& S.B. undertook a study of the private insurance industry.  Their research demonstrated that the 
rudimentary state of the insurance industry in China meant that the cheapest private policies were 
for 1,000 yuan or more.
205
  Postal administrators then intentionally crafted their regulations to fill 
the gap left open by private insurance carriers, particularly to offer insurance to poor and 
working-class people whose injury and mortality rates far outstripped the general population.  To 
fill this gap, postal administrators put strict limits on the value of their policies – customers could 
only purchase one policy valued between 50-500 yuan – and would sell policies without making 
the customer have an expensive health check-up.
206
   
The simple life insurance scheme benefitted from the pre-existing postal network and 
reputation of the service for probity, but had little opportunity to develop because of the outbreak 
of the war.  In its first year of operation, 33 post offices sold 10,000 simple life insurance 
policies.  By March 1936, the business had expanded to 285 offices in the seven postal districts 
of Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan with sales starting in 
Guangdong and Fujian later that year.
207
  In September 1937, insurance policies also went on 
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sale in Henan, Shandong, and Shanxi.
208
  By the late fall of 1937, postal life insurance had 
achieved moderate success with sales of 42,000 policies through 304 offices.  As the war 
expanded, the D.G. of P.R. & S.B. continued selling postal insurance throughout Free China – 
adding Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi to the sales area in 1939.  The life insurance 
program showed a small profit in 1940.
209
  When the war reached a stalemate in 1942/43, the 
D.G. or P.R. & S.B. quickly expanded the simple life insurance business, including hiring full-
time insurance salesmen.
210
  From 347 offices in 1942, postal life insurance could be purchased 
at 1,653 offices by the end of 1943.  The Directorate also encouraged sales competitions among 
its staff, raised the insurance limit, and began an old-age insurance program for those over 60.
211
  
By the termination of the war, simple life insurance was being offered at 1,900 post offices with 
sales of 230,000 policies valued at 6 million yuan.  Although achieving some success, the simple 
life insurance service never reached its target market of urban workers and peasants.  Instead, 
46% of simple life insurance policy holders were government employees, 22.5% were business 
people, and only 9% were workers in 1945.
212
  Facing massive deficits brought on by 
hyperinflation in the late 1940s, the Post Office abolished the simple life insurance program in 
1948. 
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Conclusion 
In the Maoist era, the state played the central role in planning and directing almost all economic 
life.  Prior to the communist period, the National Government under Jiang Jieshi, working from 
Sun Zhongshan’s agenda for economic growth, had also created a number of state-run planning 
agencies to direct industrial development.  Both the Nationalists and Communist had their own 
reasons for using the state to direct and shape the economy, but were nonetheless building upon 
the idea of state intervention in the economy first pioneered in the late Qing.   
As with many non-Western countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the Qing and Republican governments believed that the structure of the state itself had to be 
transformed in order to secure national wealth and power.  To reach these goals, government 
administrators began to shift their ideas about the role of the state in society and the economy.  
Government bureaucrats not only wanted to create a strong, centralizing state, but also one 
capable of transforming society and the economy.   
The Imperial Post Office was one of the most representative institutions of the new trend 
of thinking in which the state could affect positive social and economic change.  In creating a 
national communications, transportation, and financial network, the Post Office fundamentally 
altered the relationship between the state and its subjects.  No longer would the state be solely 
represented by a country magistrate presiding over public affairs in a Yamen, but would now by 
couriers donning a cloth vest with “Great Qing Post Office” stenciled on it.  This shift 
represented a change from a small, stable state viewing its essential functions as presiding over 
an agricultural empire to a centralizing state intervening in many realms of public life to create a 
modern nation-state. 
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The heavy capital investment necessary for building nation-wide communications, 
transportation, and financial networks across one of the largest countries in the world made it one 
of the economic areas in which the state could effectively and productively intervene.  To 
construct these networks, the Post Office methodically built up its offices, ranging from 
monumental edifices in Shanghai to humble rural stations in Xinjiang, and linked its own courier 
network to contracted traditional and modern forms of transportation to create a national 
communications and transportation system.  Through this basic system, the Post Office then 
offered a bevy of public services catering to all segments of society.   
Quantifying the Post Office’s direct contributions to economic growth is impossible, but 
its most important role was as an “extramarket” force mitigating some of the negative effects of 
capitalist development.  Since “natural” capitalist economies will result in an inefficient 
allocation of resources, the state can play a role in creating a system in which resources are better 
distributed – if not equally – throughout the overall economy.  The Post Office helped 
redistribute resources and fostered a competitive level of economic activity over a large 
geographic area.  By disciplining economic opportunity by offering letter carriage, parcel post, 
money orders, etc., across the country to prices below private firms to encourage 
entrepreneurship, thrift, and the creation of a more equal and integrated economy.  The second 
manner in which the Post Office “corrected” the market was by carefully designing its services 
to only fill in gaps left in the economy by private companies.  Except in the case of letter mail, 
which the Post Office always viewed as its monopoly, postal administrators tailored services so 
they did not compete aggressively with private companies.  Instead, postal administrators saw 
their role, particularly in transportation and financial services, as offering economic services – 
money orders, petty savings accounts – ignored by private capitalists.  Small banks, remitting 
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firms, and transport companies could still operate their smaller networks and connect themselves 
to the Post Office.  The Post Office thus viewed itself as enhancing the market rather than 
monopolizing it.  More significant than completing the national network was spreading 
economic opportunities to those without the financial wherewithal to purchase private services.   
By almost any measure, the Chinese Post Office succeeded in achieving its goals.  Although 
there will always be disparity between the ambition and capacities of the state, the Post Office 
achieved remarkable progress in creating national communications, transportation, and financial 
networks.  But, the Post Office also suffered from its own success.  As seen in the example of 
state subsidies to the publishing industry, postal administrators initially acted autonomously in 
postal rate-making policy.  As newspapers, magazines, and books began being distributed in 
greater numbers – thus politically and economically strengthening editors, publishers, and 
booksellers – private economic actors then circumvented the Post Office to politicize the rate-
making process.  In successfully lobby for lowering postage rates, newspaper editors, magazine 
publishers, and booksellers ironically weakened the autonomy of the state.  What we see in this 
example, then, is how successful state intervention led over time to diminished state autonomy 
over time. 
While this chapter was not intended to be a broader history of the expansion of state 
power in the late Qing and throughout the Republic, studying the origins of the Post Office, the 
construction of its network, and the provision of numerous public services clearly demonstrates 
the potentialities of the institution for aggressively intervening in society and the economy.   If 
the Post Office as an institution lost some of its autonomy over time, its efforts still strengthened 
the overall state and economy by sacrificing its own institutional interests to guard the public 
interest. 
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Chapter 4 
Instrument of Trade and Industry: 
Mail Carriage Contracts and the Creation of an Information Infrastructure 
 
The communications and transportation revolutions happened almost simultaneously in China.  
Within a fifty year period from 1890 to 1940 there was an unprecedented expansion in printing 
and publishing, the introduction of communications technologies like the post office, telegraphs, 
telephones, and radio, and rapid development in transportation with the growth of steamships, 
railroads, modern roads, automobiles, and airlines.  These communications and transportation 
industries and routes reinforced each other; they were complementary institutions working 
together to revolutionize the sense of space, time, and speed in Chinese society.  The 
transportation and communications revolutions forged in these decades by government 
bureaucrats, foreigners, businessmen, and ordinary Chinese profoundly altered existing patterns 
of life.  The movement and circulation of information, people, and goods at incredible speeds, in 
great volumes, and at regular intervals all contributed to reshaping the country and laying the 
foundation for the modern Chinese nation-state.  
The cataclysmic event in China that set the train in motion, figuratively speaking, was the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.  Losing that war occasioned a “great awakening” for Chinese 
reformers and modernizers.
1
  The pace of the Chinese communications and transportation 
revolutions increased rapidly, the changes became more abrupt, and its mission seemed vital – 
nothing less, its proponents argued, than the salvation of the country.  In the years immediately 
following the Sino-Japanese War, previously hesitant government officials, merchants, and 
foreigners began sponsoring, financing, and constructing new railroads, extending the telegraph 
                                                 
1
 Leo Of-fan Lee and Andrew J. Nathan, “The Beginnings of Mass Culture: Journalism and Fiction in the Late 
Ch’ing and Beyond,” in Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, edited by David Johnson, Andrew Nathan, and 
Evelyn Rawski, 360-395 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 361. 
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network, opening new-style newspapers, and, most importantly, established the modern post 
office in 1896.   
Over the next fifty years, the Post Office stood at the intersection of the communications 
and transportation revolutions in China.  It is easy to overlook the significance of the Post Office 
in an age of the Internet, but to the history of communications and transportation development in 
China there was no more revolutionary organization.  All old and new types of transportation and 
communications, information and media converged within the Post Office.  In bringing together 
the communications and transportation systems, the Post Office revolutionized the informational 
environment of China.  The Post Office held the power and authority to carry mail, reorganize 
the transportation system through the creation of postal routes, assist in the growth of modern 
transportation firms through mail contracts, and spread information through subsidies to 
newspapers, magazines, and books. 
In late imperial China, access to the communications system was limited.  High imperial 
officials could send their mail through the postal relay system (驛站), county magistrates through 
the post-station network (鋪), and merchants either through the Minxinju (民信局) or other types 
of letter networks, but the average imperial subject never sent mail at all.  Once the Post Office 
opened its doors to the general public, ensured the inviolability of the mail, and offered service to 
every province in the country, the amount of letter mails expanded rapidly (Table 4, at end of 
this section).  “Regularity, speed, and security,” wrote Secretary Piry, “are the essential 
requirements of a properly worked postal connection.”2  In 1902, the Post Office transmitted 
18.5 million letters, in 1922 the figure reached 298 million, and in 1943 there were 566 million 
letters sent through the mail.  While these figures are small relative to the overall Chinese 
                                                 
2
 Postal Secretary’s Circulars, No. 77, Postal Secretary T. Piry, 16 May 1903 in SHAC137.2023-1. 
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population, we should not overlook the momentous impact the sudden and transformative effect 
such letters had on private individuals, the dissemination of information, and the growth of 
business.   
Modern transportation industries developed their own networks independently, but the 
Post Office ensured the rapid, regular, and reliable transmission of mail through stipulations in 
mail carriage contracts.  Contract stipulations such as when mails could be collected, how they 
should be handled, how fast they should be transmitted, where they should be housed, and where 
they should be delivered all conditioned contract carriers to a routine bureaucratic procedure 
defined by the Post Office.  The Post Office was run as a business enterprise so it rarely gave 
direct subsidies to transportation companies – except in the case of the airlines – but it did 
provide a large volume of steady business vital to their survival.  Through its routing of mail, the 
Post Office also worked with the transportation companies, other government agencies, and large 
corporations to help solidify a new transportation network of hubs and spokes. That network, and 
its reorganization of space, was dominated by railroads in the northern provinces, steamers along 
the coasts and up the Yangzi, steam launches on southern inland waterways, buses on 
macadamized roads across the country, and airplanes flying over it all.  Within this new system, 
Shanghai became the most important center for transportation and communications by bringing 
together the coastwise trade from North and South and the inland networks through the Yangzi.  
Nanjing and Wuhan also played significant roles as railroads hubs of the Tianjin-Pukou and the 
Beijing-Wuhan-Guangzhou railroads.  When modern transportation systems failed to serve a 
given province or border area, the Post Office took the lead in filling gaps by relying on 
traditional forms of transportation such as camel caravans, mule carts, wheelbarrows, and pole 
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carriers.
3
  The rapid growth in postal routes – both traversed by modern and traditional transport 
firms as well as postal couriers – is impressive.  From 27,000 miles of post roads in 1902, the 
network expanded to 161,600 miles by 1917, and reached 354,096 miles by 1936.
4
 
The communications and transportation system I have been briefly describing served as 
the new information infrastructure for the modern Chinese nation-state.
5
  The infrastructure 
transformed patterns of communication and ways of thinking by exposing Chinese to new ideas 
through letters, newspapers, magazines, and other types of information.  That information not 
only flowed at great speeds, but also in larger volumes and with greater regularity.  Intellectual 
debates that might have taken years in late imperial China could now happened within weeks.  
Knowledge of market prices and business information previously protected by a select few was 
now openly published in newspapers around the country.  Travelers who might have spent their 
leisure time visiting local temples now thought little of traveling long-distances for pleasure on 
railroads or steamers.  It was a new nation linked ever closer through communications and 
transportation.   
 The history of the communications and transportation revolutions in China has yet to be 
written.  It is not my purpose in this chapter to do so.  Instead, I will focus on how the Post 
Office facilitated the creation of the information infrastructure in the early twentieth century.  
The Post Office’s provision of mail carriage contracts to modern transportation companies 
                                                 
3
 The Post Office preferred to use modern transportation firms, but the slow extension of their networks forced the 
Directorate to use all manner of other conveyances.  Local economic conditions and the sheer number of different 
kinds of traditional firms make it impossible to draw significant conclusions about the economic impact of mail 
contracts on their companies, but we can say that roughly half of all postal payments to contract carriers went to 
them. 
4
 Postal Secretary’s Report on the year 1902, 7 April 1903 in SHAC137.5277; RWCPO, 1917, 7; RWCPO, 1936/37, 
xxx. 
5
 The phrase “information infrastructure” comes from Richard R. John, “Recasting the Information Infrastructure for 
the Industrial Age,” in A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from 
Colonial Times to the Present, edited by Alfred D. Chandler and James W. Cortada, 55-106 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
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played the central role in linking the various communications systems together.  Through these 
contracts, the Post Office, as a branch of the state, served as a primary financial contributor to the 
development of the modern transportation industry in China.  The airline industry, in particular, 
benefited not only through mail contracts, but also received direct subsidies from the Post Office.  
Over this information infrastructure, the Chinese Post Office, aided by common carriers, 
circulated letters, newspapers, parcels, and other mail matter at the lowest postage rates in the 
world.  Through the creation of this new, modern information infrastructure and the cheap 
postage rates, the Post Office contributed greatly to the process of state formation and nation-
building. 
 
Table 4: Growth in the Chinese Post Office (in five-year intervals) 
Year Offices
6
 Total Distance 
of Routes (in 
miles) 
Letters (in 
millions) 
Newspapers, 
Magazines, 
Books, and 
other printed 
matter (in 
millions) 
1902 446 27,000
7
 18.5 -- 
1907 2,803 71,581 167.0 
1912 6,816 133,000 137.1 54.3 
1917 13,993 173,366 170.8 53.8 
1922 38,585 254,266 289.0 101.2 
1927 42,994 267,601 376.8 156.5 
1932 45,261 314,499 439.1 256.3 
1936/7 68,151 354,096 355.9 196.0 
1943 70,891 371,604 566.5 162.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Includes Town and Rural Box Offices and Stations 
7
 Not counting steamer or railway routes 
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Transport(N)ation:  
The Post Office, Mail Carriage Contracts, and the Modern Transportation Industry 
The Post Office considered itself “an instrument of trade and industry,” but a particular kind of 
instrument.
8
  In addition to facilitating business through the circulation of mail, parcels, and 
advertisements, the Post Office held as its mission to “expedite mail transmission” by any means 
available.  “Full advantage has been taken of every means of transport used in China, and 
wherever acceleration or increased efficiency has been possible, it has been effected.”9  The 
desire to increase the speed, efficiency, and volume of mails transmitted brought the Post Office 
into a series of contractual relationships with the modern transportation industry.   
Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Post Office 
became an important early source of income for steamships, railroads, motor coaches, and 
airlines (Table A.1 in Appendix).
10
  Whenever a railroad or steamship started operating a new 
line, the Post Office was their first customer.  This financial relationship between government 
and business, called the “Associative State” by some scholars, created a viable government-
business relationship in which both parties benefited greatly.
11
  The Post Office transmitted their 
mail faster, increased the volume of mail sent by modern conveyance, and economized by 
eliminating their own courier lines or contracts with expensive traditional transportation firms.  
In return, the modern transportation companies received lucrative government contracts that 
                                                 
8
 RWCPO, 1921, 12. 
9
 RWCPO, 1911, 11. 
10
 Tables 2-8 are located at the end of the text. 
11
 For a discussion of President Hoover’s Associative State and its relationship to mail contracts, see: F. Robert van 
der Linden, Airlines and Air Mail: The Post Office and the Birth of the Commercial Aviation Industry (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 2002). 
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sustained their businesses, often accepted remuneration in excess of costs, and occasionally, as in 
the case of the airlines, were granted direct government subsidies.
12
  
The Post Office also exerted its power to structure the modern transportation industry 
through the designation of postal routes, mail schedules, and working procedures.  The 
coordination of mail schedules with the arrival and departure of steamers, railroads, coaches, and 
airplanes necessitated a sophisticated system of state-business cooperation.  That cooperation, in 
turn, was shaped by the relative benefits offered by different types of modern conveyances, the 
geographic areas their networks covered, their speed of travel, the volume of mail they could 
handle, and their demands for remuneration.      
All things being equal, the provision of these mail contracts was not controversial.  The 
government contracted with modern transport companies whenever possible to speed the mails 
and conserve funds.
13
  The companies were pleased with the business eagerly signing contracts 
because the Post Office represented a steady revenue stream.
14
  And, the public was always 
happy to receive their mail faster.  The contracts, however, did sometimes occasion intensive 
competition between the steamship companies, political maneuvering within the government 
over railroads and airlines, resistance by postal commissioners to using motor coaches, and 
public agitation by postal workers over the direct subsidies to the airlines.  This competition, 
maneuvering, resistance, and agitation, served as interventions in the day-to-day relationships 
between the Post Office and the various companies.  Indeed, it was often these external 
                                                 
12
 Unfortunately, I will not delve into the financial records of the modern transportation companies to determine the 
precise impact of mail carriage contracts on their economic well-being, but if evidence from other countries is any 
indication mail contracts were one of their financial cornerstones.  For a general overview of the importance of mail 
contracts to the development of American transportation, see: Wayne E. Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the 
Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). 
13
 RWCPO, 1904, xlix. 
14
 For example, see the rate wars between steamship companies discussed below. 
  231 
 
interventions that reshaped the Post Office’s relationships with the modern transportation 
industry. 
The Post Office played the central role in extending the transportation network, speeding 
the mails, and increasing the volume and circulation of information knitting the country together 
ever tighter in the process of nation-building.  The postal network grew along with the expansion 
of routes traversed by modern transportation companies and the amount of mail carried.  In 1910, 
the Post Office handled 355 million pieces of mail, traversed a network of 117,300 miles of 
which railways and steamship lines together constituted 13,700 miles.  Just twenty-seven years 
later, on the eve of World War II, the Post Office transmitted 881.6 million pieces of mail over a 
network of 363,400 miles within which there were 40,000 miles of steamer and boat lines, 7,200 
miles of railroads, 34,000 miles of motor coach routes, and 11,200 miles covered by the airlines.  
The size of the network and volume of mail handled brought the country together, but so did the 
speeds attained by the Post Office.  To give just one example: in the late Qing the imperial postal 
relay system took 82 days to reach Xinjiang from Beijing, by 1910 the Post Office had cut that 
time to 33 days, and in 1934 it took airmail less than a single day to reach Ürümqi.  It was 
through the Post Office that these large-scale transportation systems were brought together to 
create an entirely new infrastructure for circulating information throughout the country. 
 
Smoke on the Water: Political and Business Competition in Steamer Mail Contracts  
The Tianjin treaty settlement (1858-1860) ending the Second Opium War provided for the 
introduction of foreign consular mails between Beijing and the other treaty ports.  Until 1863, the 
Zongli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) handled and delivered the legation mail, but in that 
year the Yamen found it convenient to pass the duty onto the Imperial Maritime Customs 
Service.  In 1876, Inspector General of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service Sir Robert Hart 
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used the start offered by the carriage of legation mail to create a modern postal service by 
opening what became known as the Customs Post (海關撥駟達書信館).15  As Inspector 
General, Hart was well aware of the importance of steam navigation to his postal project.  
Foreign steamers had been plying the Chinese coast since the 1840s and inland waterways since 
the 1860s and Hart’s Customs Service interacted with them daily.  For his new Customs Post, 
Hart secured the agreement of Li Hongzhang to have the China Merchants Steam Navigation 
Company (輪船招商局) carry mail free of charge.16  The successful and speedy transmission of 
legation mails by steamship pleased Hart, but China Merchants and the other steamer companies 
also carried mails for the Local Post Offices (書信館) of the Treaty Port Municipal Councils, the 
national post offices or “Alien Posts” (客郵) of the various imperialist powers operating on 
Chinese soil, the Minxinju, and the Government Despatch Offices (文報局).17  As Hart 
continued planning for the creation of a modern postal service for China he undoubtedly gave 
great consideration to the political and economic question of how to secure a monopoly on the 
steamer carriage of mails. 
 Within months of the edict establishing the Imperial Post Office in March 1896, Hart 
with “prescient perspicacity” used his position as inspector general to make a unique contract 
with the steamship companies to secure a monopoly on mail carriage for the Imperial Post 
Office.
18
   The Customs Service had a rule dictating that cargo could only be loaded and 
unloaded between 6 am and 6 pm on weekdays.  Steamer companies could purchase “special 
                                                 
15
 Postal No. 576, Inspector General to the Ningbo Commissioner, 17 March 1886 in SHAC137-5277. 
16
 Ying-wan Cheng, Postal Communication in China and Its Modernization, 1860-1896 (Cambridge, MA: East Asia 
Research Center, 1970), 72.  Li Hongzhang founded the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company in 1873 as a 
joint-stock company, but it was also an agency of the government.  On the history of the firm, see: Albert 
Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 96-188.   
17
 Each of these separate postal services is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
18
 RWCPO, 1921, 8. 
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permits” (關憑單) to bypass the rule paying 10 taels per half night, 20 per night, 20 for a 
holiday, and 40 for a holiday night.  The companies eventually found these “special permits” 
onerously expensive and lobbied Hart to eliminate them.  Instead, Hart agreed to refund half the 
special permit fees for any steamer company willing to carry IPO mails – the steamship 
companies agreed immediately.
19
  As it worked out, even a single ship carrying IPO mails 
provided the return of half of all special permit fees for the company’s whole fleet.  Mail-
carrying steamer companies thus gained a great advantage over their competitors by having their 
fees reduced for minimal work.  In addition to the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, 
Hart also signed such contracts with Butterfield & Swire’s China Navigation Company 
(太古輪船公司) and Jardine, Matheson’s Indo-China Steam Navigation Company 
(怡和輪船公司).20  By 1901, eight other companies also agreed to carry IPO mails.21   
The steamship companies benefited financially from Hart’s contract, but the Post Office 
also gained a competitive advantage in its pursuit of a national postal monopoly.  “The 
Legations,” wrote Hart, “are awfully riled at my ‘collaring’ the interport steamers as I did – 
Gérard calls it a coup d’état.”22  The “collaring” of the steamer companies was in having them 
refuse to carry mail for any other postal service in return for the refunds.  “We must either show 
our teeth or die,” wrote Hart’s Postal Secretary Jules van Aalst, “better that THEY die than 
                                                 
19
 Inspector General’s Circulars, Circular No. 754, Postal No. 20, Sir Robert Hart, 9 December 1896 in 
SHAC137.2023-1. 
20
 In 1872, John Samuel Swire, head of Butterfield and Swire in Shanghai, founded the China Navigation Company, 
which still exists.  William Keswich, a partner of Jardine, Matheson & Co., established the Indo-China Steam 
Navigation Company in 1881. 
21
 The other companies were: Hoong On Company, the McBain steamers, the Douglas Steamship Company, 
Siemssen & Co., Jebsen & Co., Arnhold, Karberg & Co., Melchers & Co, and the steamers of A.R. Marty.   Postal 
Secretary’s Circulars, No. 50, Postal Secretary J.A. van Aalst, 23 July 1901 in SHAC137.2023-1. 
22
 The Gérard referred to is M. Auguste Gérard, the French Envoy to China.  Robert Hart, The I.G. in Peking: 
Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907, edited by John K. Fairbank, et al (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 1116. 
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we.”23  The refund of half the special permit fees in exchange for the exclusive right to transmit 
mails by steamers was just one of the ways the Post Office tried to kill its competition to achieve 
a postal monopoly. 
The contract had an immediate effect on the Local Post Offices of the various treaty port 
Municipal Councils.  Since the 1860s, the LPOs had relied almost exclusively on the carriage of 
their mails by steamer.  In February 1897 all the outport Local Post Offices closed their doors 
when the steamer companies refused to carry their mail.  A monopoly on steamer-carried mail 
also hamstrung the so-called “steamer Minju” (輪船民局) who, though using steamships at least 
since 1882, were now forced to “club” their mails and transmit them through the Post Office or 
risk being caught smuggling mail.
24
  It is not clear whether the Despatch Offices continued to 
transmit a few government covers by steamer after 1897, but by 1900 they were sending all their 
mail through the Post Office. 
The Post Office also challenged the foreign post offices operating on Chinese soil 
through the use of steamers.  The foreign post offices have “free elbows at Treaty Ports,” Hart 
complained, since his contract could not prohibit foreign steamship companies from carrying 
mail for their national governments.
25
  Since the foreign post offices in China were technically 
part of their home services the steamers continued carrying their mail.  Instead of using its 
steamer monopoly, Postal Secretary Piry introduced a tariff schedule with “steam-served” 
(汽機運送處所) places at half the postage rate of “non-steam-served” (非汽機運送處所) places 
                                                 
23
 Letter from Postal Secretary Jules A. van Aalst to Inspector General Sir Robert Hart, 29 June 1901 in 
SHAC137.1802-1. 
24
 Ningbo Despatch to I.G. No. 88, 2 August 1882 in SHAC679.14907. 
25
 Remarks, Postal Secretary Piry, 3 June 1904 in SHAC137.1866. 
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to try to financial undercut the foreign post offices.
26
  The “steam-served” tariff schedule failed 
within six months when it proved too complicated for calculating postage, but it demonstrates 
the Post Office’s continued efforts to use steamship transport to undercut its competitors.   
 Hart’s contract with the steamer companies started to cause problems for the Post Office 
with the separation of the Customs and Posts in May 1911.  While the two administrations were 
conjoined, a refund of half the special permit fees had no financial impact on the Post Office.  
After May 1911, the Post Office had to shoulder the entire cost of the refunds – the Customs still 
provided the discount, but the Post Office had to pay the Customs for the steamer carriage of 
mails.  The Post Office had become “barnacled” with “sacred but unpractical precedents.”27  The 
amounts “refunded” to the steamer companies were $106,210 in 1909 and $95,193 in 1910, but 
the Post Office paid the Customs $92,572 in 1911, $86,110 in 1912, and $123,721 in 1913 at a 
time when the Service was running deficits.
28
  Neither the Post Office nor the Customs had any 
idea what rates they were actually paying since no real relationship could be established between 
the refunded fees and the amount of mail carried, but the financial burden on the Post Office felt 
heavy after 1911.
29
   
For the steamer companies, the value of Hart’s contract also started to decline in the 
1910s.  In the early years, the companies were “much overpaid” since postal development was 
slow and they carried few mails for a significant decrease in their special permit fees.
30
  After 
1911, the situation reversed.  The original contract did not stipulate a limit on the amount of 
mails carried – “the various steamer companies will receive, carry, and deliver all mail matter 
                                                 
26
 Postal Secretary’s Memo: I.P.O. Tariff Rate for Domestic Letters, Postal Secretary Théophile Piry, undated;  
Chinese Imperial Post, Notification No. 40: Tariff of Postage.  In force as of 1 April 1904 and Chinese Imperial 
Post, Notification No. 41: Tariff of Postage.  In force as of 1 September 1904 in SHAC137.1866. 
27
 Circular No. 466, Co-Director General Destelan, 28 December 1918 in SHAC137.2023-4. 
28
 S.O. No. 239, Postal Commissioner Destelan to Shanghai Postal Commissioner Rousse, 21 April 1914 in 
SHAC137.2183. 
29
 Circular No. 466, Co-Director General Destelan, 28 December 1918 in SHAC137.2023-4. 
30
 Ibid. 
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sent to their steamers.”31  By the mid-1910s, the Post Office was sending an increasing number 
of heavy mails to the steamer companies leading them to believe they were underpaid.  As the 
head of the Post Office, H. Picard-Destelan wrote, “It was a good bargain for them then, but 
within ten years the advantage of the bargain was to the Posts.”32  In 1918, the most powerful 
foreign steamer companies requested an immediate revision of the contract.  
 In December 1918, the Post Office and the steamer companies worked out a new 
remuneration system styled “steamer subsidies” (輪船津貼).33  Under the new contract, the Post 
Office and steamer companies decided to experiment with a space-based system of 
remuneration.  The Post Office would pay $15 per 40 cubic feet in special mail rooms provided 
by the companies.  Any mails exceeding the space of a mail room would pay a weight-based 2-4 
cents per kilo depending on the length of the journey.
34
  In the last year under the old system the 
Post Office paid $128,172 for the carriage of 290,000 kilos or 44 cents per kilo.  With the new 
contract, the steamer companies transported 1,059,369 kilos of mail for $217,605 or 20 cents per 
kilo in 1919 and carried 1,394,834 kilos for $258,845 or 18.5 cents per kilo in 1920.
35
  Although 
the rate per kilo clearly fluctuated, both the Post Office and steamer companies benefited from 
their new space-based system of remuneration.  The Post Office sent a greater number of 
smaller, but heavy mails in the space provided such as parcels while the steamer companies 
received a greater amount of total remuneration for a predetermined space on their ships.
36
  The 
new system proved satisfactory for both sides until the late 1920s (Table A.2 in Appendix). 
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 Emphasis added.  Inspector General’s Circulars, Circular No. 754, Postal No. 20, Sir Robert Hart, 9 December 
1896 in SHAC137.2023-1. 
32
 RWCPO, 1921, 8. 
33
 RWCPO, 1919 (Chinese version), 523. 
34
 Circular No. 466, Co-Director General Destelan, 28 December 1918 in SHAC137.2023-4. 
35
 The weights carried can be found in RWCPO, 1918-1920 and the payments in Zhang, Zhongguo youzheng, III: 
169. 
36
 Under the new system, the Combine continued to dominate the steamer mail carriage trade.  In 1919, Butterfield 
& Swire’s China Navigation Company had 22 ships that carried mails with an aggregate total of 206,451 square feet 
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Despite the mutually beneficial contract for the coast and lower Yangzi, the Upper 
Yangzi had always posed a challenge for the Post Office.  The larger steamship companies 
feared the force of the current through the Three Gorges, the lack of suitable anchorages, and the 
intricacy of navigation because of the changeable channel west of Yichang.  It was not until the 
British-operated Sichuan Railway Steam Navigation Company’s small, easily maneuverable 
Shuhun made the journey in 1914 that any steamer had successfully navigated the Gorges 
without being towed.
37
  Instead of steamers, the Post Office usually relied on their own fleet of 
low-draught steam launches (汽船) on the upper river for most of the period up to the late 1920s.  
By the late 1920s, the larger steamship companies had built small steamers modeled on the 
Shuhun and started carrying mail.  While the space-based system of remuneration worked well 
for other parts of the country, it was a decided disadvantage for the smaller steamers working the 
upper river because of their limited capacity; however, the Post Office desperately wanted steam 
service to the area.  After a series of negotiations, the Post Office and steamship companies 
decided on a seasonally-adjusted weight-based system of remuneration.  Standard contract rates 
                                                                                                                                                             
and was paid $86,310, the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company had 16 ships with an aggregate total of 
147,777 square feet and was paid $61,740, and Jardine, Matheson’s Indo-China Steam Navigation Company had 11 
ships with an aggregate total of 113,021 square feet and was paid $47,250.  1919 nian 2 yue 15 ri youzheng zongju 
zongbao Tieshilan banbu de tongyu di 136 hao (Postal instruction no. 136, Co-Director General Destelan, 15 
February 1919) in Qiu, Tianjin youzheng shiliao, III: 398-413. 
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Kiang River,” International Marine Engineering 24, Part 1 (June 1919): 395-98.  
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for mails from Yichang to Chongqing in 1929 were $40 per ton during the high water season, 
which lasted from April to October.
38
  Under this new system, a host of foreign-owned steamers 
started working on the upper reaches of the Yangzi.  Their presence riled the Sichuan warlord 
Liu Xiang (劉湘) (1888-1938) and an ardent nationalist Lu Zuofu (盧作孚) (1894-1952).39 
After militarily consolidating control over Chongqing and its surrounding environs, Liu 
Xiang aggressively challenged foreign shipping on the Upper Yangzi.  Stymied in his attempts to 
force the local Chinese firms to amalgamate in order to reduce cut-throat competition, Liu 
changed tactics by reducing the advantages enjoyed by foreign steamers and threw his 
administrative and financial support behind Lu Zuofu’s Minsheng Industrial Company Ltd 
(民生事業股份有限公司) to compete with the foreign steamers on the Upper Yangzi.40  Starting 
a single small steamer, Lu’s Minsheng Company began to work the route between Chongqing 
and his hometown of Hechuan.  In 1929, Liu Xiang appointed Lu as head of the Upper Yangzi 
Navigation Bureau with authority to search competitor’s ships. Over the next several years, Liu 
Xiang gradually reduced the advantages held by foreign steamers by using confrontational 
tactics, granted Minsheng monopoly contracts on important routes, and constantly funneled 
business to the Chinese firm.  On Lu’s side, he used tight budgeting and fiscal discipline to rapid 
expand his control over the local shipping.  By 1931, Lu had a fleet of 13 steamers of 2,153 tons.  
Just four years later, the Minsheng had more than 40 ships and dominated Chinese shipping on 
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the Upper Yangzi.
41
  With this sizable fleet, Lu decided to challenge the foreign steamship 
companies for control of the Upper Yangzi.  To break the foreign control over mail contracts on 
this route, Lu offered to carry the mail at $34 per ton against the standard $40.  The Post Office 
gladly accepted Lu’s offer. The foreign companies were forced to drop their rates to $36 per ton 
on the Yichang-Chongqing run.
42
  Still not satisfied, Lu’s Minsheng Company made a new bid in 
late 1936 at $33 per ton during the high water season and $42 during low water.   
The foreign steamer companies balked at Lu’s constant efforts to undercut their 
profitability.  They responded by trying to collectively negotiate with the Post Office as a “pool.”  
Assuming the Post Office was reliant on their steamers, the “pool” offered the Post Office rates 
of $40 for the first ton and $55 for each additional ton at high water.
 43
  The Directorate warned 
that any attempted formation of such a monopolistic “pool” forced the Post Office to keep a 
“meticulous” eye on the foreign steamer companies.44  Feeling threatened, representatives from 
Butterfield & Swire and Jardine, Matheson approached Postal Business Secretary W.W. Ritchie.  
They suggested that the Post Office was being short-sighted since local military authorities could 
commandeer Minsheng steamers while theirs were protected by extraterritoriality.  That said, 
what the foreign companies really wanted, the representatives continued, were light mails like 
letters rather than the heavier parcel mails because of the weight limits on their small steamers.  
If only carrying light mails, the foreign companies were willing to drop their rates to $30 per ton 
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at high water and $45 at low water.
45
  The Post Office agreed to their contract terms, but relied 
almost entirely on Lu’s Minsheng Company because it would carry heavy parcel mails. 
Lu’s Minsheng Company thus brought about the  “disintegration of the ‘pool’” and an end to the 
foreign domination of steamer service on the Upper Yangzi.
46
  Henceforth, and throughout all of 
World War II, the Minsheng Industrial Company carried the bulk of postal mails.  For example, 
in the fourth quarter of 1938, Minsheng carried 217,025 kilos while the formerly dominant 
Butterfield & Swire’s China Navigation Company carried only 61,735.47  During the War, the 
Directorate signed a serious of favorable contracts with a number of steamer companies at 
Minsheng’s low rates.48  Rates of remuneration for the steamer carriage of mails rose during the 
war, but only in tandem with inflation.
49
 
From 1897 to 1949, the Chinese Post Office utilized every available steamer route for the 
carriage of mails and helped expand the steamer network to every navigable waterway in the 
country (Table A.3 in Appendix).  Steamers were particularly valued for linking northern and 
southern coastal ports with far inland places up the Yangzi.  Without the steamer carriage of 
mails, and their ability to move heavy matter such as newspapers and magazines, the integration 
of western China with the coastal region would have taken much longer.  In Ba Jin’s novel 
Family, the Jue brothers eagerly gather every month to pour over the most recent revolutionary 
                                                 
45
 Letter from Butterfield & Swire representative Lock to Business Department Secretary Ritchie, 15 May 1937 in 
SHAC137.2527-5. 
46
 S/O No. 135, Chu Chang Sing, signing for Director General, to Hankou Postal Director Greenfield, 20 May 1937 
in SHAC137.2527-5. 
47
 List Showing weight of mails for/from Upriver Ports distributed by Post Office to various shipping companies for  
the 4
th
 quarter 1938, dated 25 January 1939 in SHAC137.2527-5. 
48
 In 1937, the Directorate signed contracts with the Minsheng Industrial Company, San Pei, Societe Francaise Du 
Haut Yang-tze, Societa di Navigazione Fluviale Italo-Cinese, Jardine, Matheson’s Indo-China Steam Navigation 
Company, and Butterfield & Swire’s China Navigation Company all at $33 per ton during high water and $42 
during low water.  SHAC137.2527-1. 
49
 The Post Office agreed to 25%, 50%, and 125% increases because of inflation between September 1938 and May 
1941.  Shanghai youzheng guanliju cheng di 12007/22099 hao, di 12202/22294 hao, and di 13529/22621 hao, 
Shanghai youzheng guanliju juzhang Zhapeilin (Shanghai head post office despatch nos. 12007/22099, 
12202/22294, and 13529/22621, Postal Director Chapelain), 30 September 1938, 15 February 1939, and 29 May 
1941 in SHAC137.2527-1. 
  241 
 
magazines like New Youth and New Tide bringing news of the latest campaigns among May 
Fourth intellectuals.  It was steamers under contract that carried these magazines to Sichuan 
allowing them to circulate in the far interior.  Just as significant, the steamers also facilitated the 
growth of business between western provinces like Sichuan and the east coast.  In 1915, 234,000 
parcels left Sichuan weighing 645,500 kilos, in 1922 those numbers were 359,400 packages 
weighing 2.4 million kilos; after steamers started working the Upper River, the numbers of 
parcels stayed approximately the same at 356,900 parcels, but their total weight more than 
doubled to 5.2 million kilos in 1936.
50
   
 
Compartmentalized: Railroad Mail Contracts and the Problem of Space 
Postal officials from around the world felt it a grave responsibility to “speed” the mails to their 
destination.  In many industrialized countries, this responsibility led to increased costs for the 
carriage of mail by railroads – in effect, the state directly subsidized them.  For example, in 1838 
the United States Congress passed a law requiring the US Post Office to use railways as long as 
their cost was no more than 25 percent over stage coaches for the same routes.
51
  In China, 
however, the railroads represented a significant decrease in transportation costs for the Post 
Office at roughly 1/5
th
 the price of steamers.  In China, the problem with transmitting mail by 
railway was one of space – the limited space covered by rail networks and the limited space 
available in their cars.   
 In 1897, upon the opening of the Imperial Post Office, Tianjin Postal Commissioner 
Gustav Detring signed contracts with two government-owned railways that would shape the next 
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fifty years of Post Office-railway relations.  Detring agreed to pay monthly lump sums of $2,000 
yuan to the Tianjin-Dagu and $10,065 to the Tianjin-Beijing lines.
52
  The lump sum payments 
were not officially for the carriage of mail, but for renting space within a train car.  On railroads 
accustomed to carrying coal and other heavy material, the weight of the mail was 
inconsequential, but space on rail cars was at a premium.  This early decision to base payments 
on rented space shaped how the Post Office conceptualized the transport of mail on the railways.   
In 1903 the Imperial Post Office negotiated some basic principles for contractual relations with 
the railroads.  Through the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務部) – foreigners 
owned most operative lines – postal administrators agreed with eight rules governing the 
transmission of mail by the railways.
53
  Only the Imperial Post Office would be allowed to 
transmit mail on the contracted lines, which was significant in the Post Office’s battle to gain a 
state postal monopoly.  On their part, the railroads guaranteed the provision of “special and 
suitable compartments” in a single car – called “mail compartments” (郵件車廂) – where postal 
employees could store and sort mail en route.  Any sums to be paid by the Post Office to the 
railroads would be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
54
  The basis for all future contractual 
relations between the Post Office and railways, then, was in determining the remuneration for the 
space provided, but the space was often very limited.  The Chinese government-owned lines 
agreed to carry any mail matter for free that could fit into the small compartments while the 
foreign-owned lines asked for minimal remuneration.
55
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Although space was limited, the Post Office utilized every railroad line available.  Postal 
Secretary Théophile Piry, in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Post Office, wrote  
“Railways are still in their infancy in China, but lines already open are used to their full 
extent.”56  By the end of 1903, the Post Office was sending mails along almost the entire 1512 
miles of completed rail lines.
57
  Whenever a new line was even partially opened, the Post Office 
would immediately sign a contract for a “mail compartment.”   For example, the Post Office 
made a verbal agreement with the director of the Jiujiang-Nanchang line when as little as 40 
miles were in operation.
58
  During the initial wave of intensive railroad construction up to 1911, 
the Post Office utilized 98% of the available track.
59
  From then onward, the Post Office utilized 
more than 95% of all available rail lines, except when the Japanese occupied the Northeast in the 
early 1930s and the eastern half of the country during World War II (Table A.4 in Appendix).
60
 
Even though it utilized almost the entire rail network, the Post Office was frustrated by 
two problems in its relationship with the railroads.  First, the free or inexpensive “mail 
compartments” were very small.  A standard mail compartment seems to have been around 18 
cubic meters and each train only had one mail compartment.
61
  Because of the severely limited 
space, wrote Piry, “the [Post Office] restricted its demands more than was generally desirable for 
the healthy development of postal communications.”62  In 1914, the Beijing-Mukden and 
Tianjin-Pukou railways did start supplying entire cars to the Post Office, known as Bureaux 
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Ambulants (火車行動郵局), for the carriage and sorting of mail in transit, but other railways did 
not follow suit because they would have to shoulder the entire cost of the railcar.
63
  
The second problem, one outside the Post Office’s control, was the general stagnation in 
railroad construction.  Foreigners who had built the early railroads restricted most of their 
activities to North China and Manchuria, where relatively flat geography allowed them to build 
faster, but they often failed to link their separate networks together.  In May 1911, the Qing 
government nationalized many railroads and slowly began the process of integrating the 
networks, but a lack of funding, the 1911 Revolution, and warlord conflicts stalled their efforts.  
In 1913, Minister of Railways Ye Gongchuo (葉恭綽) – a rail expert and future Minister of 
Communications – made an effort to forge a national rail system out of the disparate lines built 
by national, local, and foreign governments, but his efforts produced meager results.
64
   
 The lack of space on trains and the stagnation in railroad construction eventually had a 
negative effect on postal finances.  Without the benefits of railroads, the Post Office had to rely 
heavily on their own couriers or sign contracts with traditional style transportation companies.  
In North China, camel caravans, carters, muleteers, pole-carriers, and backpackers filled in the 
gaps in the rail network, but their rates were high.  While railroads could move goods in the 
1920s for 1-1½ cents per ton kilometer, carters and muleteers cost ten times as much while pole-
carriers and backpackers cost 20-30 times as much.
65
  Whenever a new rail line opened, it 
allowed the Post Office to eliminate more expensive courier routes or void their contracts with 
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traditional companies.
66
  But, rail lines were also frequently interrupted by natural disasters or 
military conflicts forcing the Post Office to rely on expensive “specially hired couriers.”67  The 
Post Office’s frustration with the railroads finally came to a head in the early 1920s. 
Co-Director General Destelan, the head of the Post Office since Piry’s retirement in 
1915, wanted to revise the regulations on rail transport to solve the problem of space restrictions.   
In 1921 the Beijing Government had promulgated a new Postal Law (郵政法) stipulating that all 
railways in China were obliged to carry the mails.
68
  In late 1922, the Directorate announced an 
increase in the postage rate to help pay for increased remuneration rates demanded by the 
railroads.  The public vehemently opposed the postage increase forcing the government to return 
to the original tariff rate, but the railroads continued asking for increased remuneration.
69
  In 
April 1923, the central government intervened in the dispute between the railways and the Post 
Office by convening the Railway Traffic Conference (鐵路運輸會議) to negotiate mail carriage 
rates, among other things.  It was finally agreed that the Post Office would pay the railways one 
cent per square meter per kilometer in exchange for the railroads increasing the space available 
for mail.
70
  The new space-distance system of remuneration solved the problem of space on 
government lines, but the foreign-owned lines resisted these low rates.  While Chinese 
government-owned railways paid the one cent rate, foreign-owned railways demanded more.  
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The Chinese Eastern Railway received 1.49 cents per square meter per kilometer during 1922-
25, 2.98 cents during 1925-28, and 3.75 cents during 1932-35.
71
 
Under the new contract between the Post Office and railroads the amount of mail 
transmitted by rail increased rapidly.  The percentage of railroad vis-à-vis other types of contract 
carriers rose from a low of 5.65% in 1920 to 14.29% in 1923, and then, in the first full year 
under the new system, the railroads carried 26.73% of all mail by contractors in 1924.  Tracking 
the growth through remuneration to railroads shows payments of $140,235 in 1922, $259,000 in 
1923, and under the new agreement, payments almost trebled to $763,185 in 1924 (Table A.5 in 
Appendix).  Until the establishment of the airlines in 1930, and the loss of Manchurian railroads 
in 1932, the railways transported roughly 25% of all mails by modern transportation companies.   
After the establishment of the National Government in 1927, Chinese railroad managers began 
demanding increased rates.  Their hope was that the avowedly anti-imperialist Nationalist 
government would correct the imbalances in the rates of remuneration between government and 
foreign-owned railroads.  In early 1928, the Ministry of Communications convened a National 
Communications Conference.  At the Conference, Beiping-Hankou Railway Director Huang 
Shiqian (黃士謙) complained that postal payments to the railroads were too low.  He suggested 
the rate of remuneration should be raised to 1.5-2 cents per square meter per kilometer.
72
   
The Post Office was sympathetic to suggestions for greater remuneration to government 
railroads, but a series of postal crises kept rates from rising.  Declining postal revenues stemming 
mostly from the disruption of service during the Northern Expedition was the immediate cause 
for the Post Office’s refusal to increase rates.  Postal finances improved slightly in 1928, but 
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another successful strike for increased wages by postal workers that fall, and the loss of income 
from Manchuria in 1932 kept postal finances from recovering.  A policy of postal retrenchment 
and business expansion in the early 1930s did improve revenues significantly, but by then the 
Post Office was concentrating its efforts on expanding airmail and providing direct subsidies to 
the airlines.   
The Nationalists had planned to aggressive expand the rail network in the late 1920s, but 
other priorities pushed expansion into the mid-1930s.  In 1936, the National Government started 
an aggressive “new era” in railroad construction under a five-year plan directed by Minister of 
Railways Chang Kia-ngau.
73
  The new work began well with several significant projects 
completed.  Needing additional funds to continue various planned lines, the Ministry of 
Railroads and the Directorate General of Posts agreed to a slight increase in transport charges to 
1.25 cents per kilo.
74
  The Japanese takeover of the railroads in the eastern half of the country in 
late 1937 and early 1938, however, quickly offset this slight increase.   
By spring 1945 there were only 718 miles of railways in operating in Free China.
75
  
During the war, the Post Office used trains whenever possible, but most of the Directorate’s 
efforts went towards improving airmail service and developing a system of service-owned trucks 
to carry heavy mails, discussed below.  When the war ended and the National Government 
recovered the railroads in late 1945, the Post Office was desperate to use them because its 
business had expanded so rapidly.  Recognizing the Post Office’s weakness, the railways 
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demanded an outlandish increase in remuneration.  On 1 January 1946, the Ministry of 
Communications caved to the Ministry of Railroads by signing a contract paying the railroads 50 
cents per kilometer – more than 400 times the 1.25 cent allowance in effect since 1937.76  The 
railroads were also savvy enough to insert a clause in the contract stipulating that each time 
postage rates rose remuneration to the railways would increase proportionally, which ensured 
their costs were covered during the hyperinflation of the late 1940s. 
 
Rocky Roads: Motor Coaches, Mail Contracts, and Resistance by Postal Commissioners  
The first “modern” roads in China did not open until the late 1910s.  A few warlords like 
Shanxi’s “Model Governor” Yan Xishan did begin intra-provincial road construction projects 
during this period, but by 1921 there were only about 100 miles of modern roads in all of 
China.
77
  The lack of modern roads limited the use of motor coaches – a hybrid bus and truck – 
for carrying mail.  The few roads that did exist were treated like the private property of the 
builders, mostly provincial governments, and their use franchised out to a companies.  Despite 
such difficulties, the Post Office was eager to sign contracts with the motor coach companies 
because their vehicles could quicken mail transport from rail stations or steamer ports to their 
destination or, in places such as Shanxi, provide the only form of quick, modern transport of 
mails between cities and towns. 
As publically- or privately-owned motor coach companies began operations with the 
expansion of the road network in the early 1920s, the Directorate had postmasters negotiate 
                                                 
76
 Jiaotongbu, youzheng zongju, Youzheng dashiji, 437. 
77
 Julius Morgan Clements, China: Automotive Conditions and the Good Roads Movement (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1922). 
  249 
 
contracts in accordance with local conditions.
78
  The predominant feature of these early contracts 
was the disparity in rates of remuneration.  In some places, the bus companies might receive 15 
dollars per 40 kilos over a specific distance while in others 10 cents per bag of mail was the 
norm.
79
  The disparity continued to worsen over the 1920s with the Directorate paying only 1/5 
of a cent per kilo for every 100 li in some districts while in other places it was two cents.  The 
savvy postal commissioner of the Ji-Hei district convinced the motor coach companies to carry 
up to 600 kilos for free.
80
  While the Directorate benefited from some of these contracts, the time 
spent checking archives for different rates, calculating payments in different amounts, and 
dealing with the paperwork stemming from such an unorganized system proved frustrating. 
The wide disparity in the mail contracts for motor coach companies carriage was also 
partially an effect of a mini road-building boom begun in the late 1920s.  A few years earlier, the 
National Good Roads Construction Association had started educational and publicity work in 
China to promote modern roads and automobiles.
81
  In 1928, the Nationalist Ministry of 
Communications convened its National Communications Conference.  In addition to all the other 
topics discussed, conference delegates considered postal remuneration rates to motor coach 
companies and the establishment of a National Highway Planning Commission.
82
  After the 
Commission was established, it held its own Highway Conference in February 1929 where a 
                                                 
78
 The first negotiations for the carriage of mail by motor bus took place in 1919.  In preparation for such 
negotiations, the Beijing Government passed the “Regulations on the Business of Long-Distance Motor Bus 
Companies” (長途汽車公司營業規則) in August 1918, which required “mails to be carried by all buses in transit.”  
SHAC137.8979. 
79
 1919 nian 4 yue 27 ri Zhangjiakou yideng ju juzhang Gao Bengong cheng Zhili youwuzhang di 188 hao han 
(Memo No. 188, Zhangjiakou First-Class Postmaster Gao Bengong to Zhili Postmaster, 27 April 1919) in Qiu Runxi 
et al. ed., Tianjin youzheng shiliao (Historical materials on the postal service of Tianjin) Six volumes (Beijing: 
Beijing hangkong hangtian daxue chubanshe, 1992), III: 393-94; Agreement made this 1
st
 day of February 1921 
between Mr. J.A. Greenfield, Postal Commissioner, acting as Agent for the Co-Director General of Posts of the one 
part and Mr. Chang Tsun-hsu, Manager of the Yan Fu Chuan Motor Bus Company in SHAC137.2182-4. 
80
 Circular Memo No. 131, Director General Liu Shufan and Officiating Co-Director General Shields, 28 January 
1929 in SHAC137.288-3. 
81
 Clements, China: Automotive Conditions. 
82
 Guomin zhengfu jiaotong bu mishu chu, ed., Quanguo jiaotong huiyi huibian (Collection on the National 
Communications Conference) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1928); RWCPO, 1928, 3. 
  250 
 
plan for a national system of 12 major inter-provincial highways stretching across the entire 
country was outlined.  Under this plan, the road network quickly expanded to 22,000 miles in 
1929, 29,000 in 1930, and 41,000 in 1931 (Table A.6 in Appendix).
83
  
The rapid growth of the road system required a re-evaluation of Directorate policy on 
carriage contracts for motor coach companies.  The newly-appointed Nationalist Director 
General of Posts Liu Shufan circulated draft regulations on the carriage of mails by coaches 
asking postal commissioners for their input.
84
  The salient features of the Liu’s draft regulations 
were the application of uniform maximum charges on the carriage of mails, that all bus 
companies were obliged to carry mails under contract, and that light mails must be carried for 
free.
85
  After receiving the input from postal commissioners the Ministry of Communications and 
the Directorate promulgated the “Regulations on the Transmission of Mails by Long-Distance 
Motor Coaches” in December 1929.86   
Under these new regulations, the government dictated that all publically- and privately-
owned motor coach companies were obligated to carry mail.  The companies had to carry Class 
A and B newspapers and other light mails for free.  For heavy mails and parcels, the Directorate 
would remunerate the companies at the rate of one cent per kilo for each 100 li (33 miles).  For 
carrying heavy mails to outlying areas, the coach companies could negotiate for higher rates, but 
they were not to exceed twice the normal rate.  Realizing that postal commissioners might 
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overburden the companies with light mails, the regulations set the ratio of mails delivered to the 
companies at 20% of light and 80% of heavy mails. 
 With the new regulations in place, the Directorate began rapidly expanding its 
relationship with the motor coach industry.  Prior to 1929, the Post Office had contracts with 
motor coach companies on an average of about 1,200 miles of routes.  After the passage of the 
new regulations, motor coach routes more than trebled to 11,543 miles.  By 1932, there were 
roughly 44,000 miles of modern roads, and 5,900 coaches, with the Post Office using about 39% 
or 17,200 miles for the carriage of mails.
87
  In 1936, there were 70,000 miles of roads with the 
Post Office using 48% or 34,000 miles of them.   
Although the Directorate was eager to take “every advantage” of bus transport, it is 
surprising the Post Office utilized less than 50% of modern roads.  Granted, motor coach 
companies did not operate on every single road, but it appears that resistance by postal 
commissioners to the high cost of motor coach transport is the underlying reason.  With postal 
finances suffering in the early 1930s, local postmasters hesitated to use motor coach lines.  In a 
study conducted on the relative costs of transportation for 5000 kilos of mail over 200 miles, 
buses proved the second most expensive mode of transportation.  Trains could carry the 5000 
kilos for $9 yuan, steamers for $63.75, buses for $290, and carters for $750.
88
   
Although postal commissioners wanted to use motor coaches to fill in the gaps left by 
other modern transportation systems, they would only deliver light mails to the companies, who 
were required by the regulation to carry them for free.  The 1929 regulations dictated that bus 
companies would only have to carry 20% of light versus 80% of heavy mails, but in actual 
practice commissioners saddled the companies with a great number of light mails.  In Shandong 
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and Shanxi the ratio was 90% light to 10% heavy mails while in Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui, 
Zhejiang, Hebei, and Hunan the ratios were 50-50 or worse.
89
  As a result of such practices many 
bus companies complained to the Post Office that they only received one yuan a month for 
carrying mails.   
In 1935, the Directorate circularized the postal commissioners suggesting various 
revisions to the regulations on motor coaches.  The Directorate suggested the possibility of 
lowering the rates for heavy mail and parcels, the application of uniform charges on all mail, or 
simply making minimum monthly payments to the companies in lieu of calculating rates.
90
  The 
money saving measures suggested by the Directorate – the lowering of uniform rates on heavy 
mails – was offset by suggestions that would cost more money such as minimum payments.  The 
postal commissioners reacted negatively to the Directorate’s suggestions.  To help the coach 
companies, the Directorate started remunerating the motor coach companies at a rate of two 
cents per kilo per 100 li on parcels, but still made them carry light mails for free.
91
 
During the War of Resistance motor coaches continued to carry some mails, but with the 
dire economic climate, the failure of many of the companies, and loss of access to modern 
transportation networks on the east coast, the Directorate looked to other options.  One of those 
options was the use of military vehicles for the carriage of mails.  Starting in 1940, the Military 
Affairs Commission required all military vehicles to carry light mails free of charge.
92
  Another 
option was requiring all state- and publically-owned vehicles to carry light and heavy mails at a 
rate of one cent per kilogram per 100 li, but the Post Office was restricted to sending each 
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company 200 kilos a day.
93
  The final option, and the one used most extensively during the war, 
was using postally-owned vehicles.  The Post Office had owned its own trucks for intra-urban 
transportation since 1917, but it was not until the opening of the Chongqing to Chengdu highway 
in 1936 that the Directorate purchased 10 trucks to serve that route.  By 1937, the Directorate 
had 40 trucks on the highways, but after losing access to eastern railways and steamer lines 
Director General Guo Xinsong shifted tactics and decided to invest in trucks.  At the end of 1938 
the Post Office had purchased 230 trucks, owned a total of 370 in 1940, and had a wartime high 
of 437 in 1942.
94
  
 The Post Office’s relationship with the motor coach companies was rocky.  The 
Directorate’s lack of a comprehensive rate policy until 1929 and the commissioners’ active 
resistance thereafter did not make things easy.  The light mails carried by motor coach 
companies, however, greatly increased the speed that letters and newspapers reached many 
people.  Steamers and railroads could carry large amounts of mail over their routes, but their 
networks did not extend to many places.  The road network, on the other hand, spider-webbed 
across the country reaching places otherwise reliant on walking postal couriers.  While steamers 
and railroads might only carry mails on their routes once a day, motor coaches often made two or 
three trips per day over their routes.  The increase in speed represented by the motor coach 
companies helped bring family greetings, news, and business information to individuals farther 
away from other modern transportation networks thus linking them with the growing sense of 
belonging to the nation. 
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Turbulence:  
Political Rivalries, Airmail Subsidies, and the National Postal Workers Strike of 1932 
The inauguration of airmail service, the Directorate declared, launched a “new epoch in postal 
progress.”95  The new epoch was a turbulent one.  The relationship between the Post Office and 
the airlines was unique in that it became entangled in the development of the airline industry 
itself.  The National Government decided to become directly involved in fostering the airline 
industry and so, to use Carter Goodrich’s phrase, engaged in “developmental construction.”96  
That is, the National Government created either wholly-owned or heavily subsidized joint-
venture aviation companies ahead of demand hoping to decrease the financial risk to private 
investors.  To assist the airlines, the National Government not only gave them generous airmail 
contracts, but also ordered the Post Office to directly subsidize them.  In no other transportation 
industry did the Post Office play such an instrumental role. 
 The first efforts to establish viable airlines between 1919 and 1925 were all abortive.  
After a few experimental flights around the country by various foreigners, the Beijing 
government started plans to create an extensive air network across the country.  The Beijing 
Aeronautical Department (北京航空署), under the directorship of General Ding Jin (丁錦), 
oversaw those plans and the first flights between Beijing and Ji’nan in 1919 and 1920.97  In April 
1921, the Directorate General of Posts signed an airmail contract with the Aeronautical 
Department for the carriage of mail over their routes.  The Department would carry all airmail 
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free of charge, but would retain four-fifths of the revenue on the sale of all airmail stamps.  
Given then current airmail stamp rates, the Post Office was remunerating the airline at 
approximately $7.50 per kilo per 3,000 li (930 miles) on light mails and $3.50 per kilo on heavy 
mails.
98
  The Post Office abandoned the new service shortly thereafter because of irregular 
service.  In the late summer, the Aeronautical Department started regular flights between Beijing 
and Beidaihe, a coastal resort town frequented by many Chinese and Western officials escaping 
from the Beijing heat.  Until 1925, when warlord conflicts halted flights, the Department 
operated a successful airmail service between Beijing and Beidaihe for about a month each 
summer.
99
  A few warlords attempted to operate airmail services in the mid-1920s, but all were 
abandoned because of a poor equipment, lack of trained pilots, and local military conflicts.
100
   
No airmail flights existed between 1925 and 1929. 
 Government officials in Beijing, and then Nanjing after 1927, continued discussing the 
possible creation of a national airline.  In late 1928 and early 1929, Minister of Railroads Sun Ke 
(孫科), son of Nationalist Party founder Sun Zhongshan, was in talks with several American 
airline companies.  Hearing rumors of these talks, the Directorate General of Posts prudently 
circularizing all postal commissioners on principles to be maintained during future contractual 
talks for airmail service.  Lin Shi (林實), the acting head of the Post Office, ordered that all 
future airline contracts should follow the outline of the one signed with the Aeronautical 
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Department in 1921.  Every effort, however, should be made to lower the remuneration for the 
carriage of mails, Lin instructed.
101
    
In May 1929, Nationalist Minister of Communications Wang Boqun (王伯群) 
established the Aeronautical Administration of the Shanghai-Chengdu Airline 
(滬蓉航空線管理處).  Wang established the new airline company to compete with the soon to 
be established China National Aviation Corporation over the Shanghai-Nanjing route.
102
  The 
Post Office, under Wang’s administration, immediately signed a contract with the Shanghai-
Chengdu Administration, which agreed to carry light and heavy mails at $3.75 and $1.50 per kilo 
over 1,500 kilometers, respectively.  Routes between 1,500-3,000 kilometers would receive 
double remuneration.
103
  During the negotiations, the Directorate had succeeded in securing a 
very favorable contract paying the Administration roughly half what it gave for airmail carriage 
in the early 1920s.  Undoubtedly, one of the factors in Wang’s agreement to such favorable rates 
is his having “borrowed” 520,000 yuan from the Post Office to establish the airline.104 
 The Directorate General of Posts looked forward to signing similarly favorable contracts 
with several new airlines under discussion, but events outside the Post Office’s control would 
quickly reshape airmail contracts and the entire airline industry.  While the Post office was 
negotiating with the Ministry of Communications about the airmail contract for the Shanghai-
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Chengdu line, Minister of Railways Sun Ke was in the last stages of negotiations with Aviation 
Exploration Incorporated (航空發展公司), a subsidiary of Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor 
Company, concerning the establishment of a new airline to be called China National Aviation 
Corporation (中國航空公司) or CNAC.  Sun Ke, like his father, believed modern transportation 
to be absolutely essential to the economic development of China.  While Sun Zhongshan dreamt 
about a dense network of railroads crisscrossing China, Sun Ke believed airlines could also solve 
many of China’s economic ills.  He was so eager to create an airline that he exceeded his 
authority as minister of railways by signing an airmail contract with Curtiss.   
During the negotiations to create CNAC, Curtiss representatives had demanded a steady 
source of income for the airline until passenger traffic increased.  As in the United States, an 
airmail contract with the Post Office proved the simplest solution.  In his excitement about the 
new airline, Sun ultimately signed an airmail contract wholly favorable to the Americans.  The 
contract, signed on 20 April 1929 between Sun Ke and Curtiss representative Major William B. 
Robertson, was a “brilliant coup” for the Americans.105  In addition to owning the exclusive 
rights to sell airplanes to CNAC, the Americans would be allowed to establish an independent 
corporation to operate CNAC, a liability shield to protect Curtiss-Wright’s assets.  This 
independent company, incorporated in the United States as China Airways Federal, Inc., USA 
(中國飛運公司) in August 1929, would fly CNAC airplanes and possess an airmail monopoly 
on three routes: (1) Shanghai to Hankou via Nanjing; (2) Nanjing to Beijing via Xuzhou, Ji’nan, 
and Tianjin; and (3) Hankou to Guangzhou via Changsha, plus a monopoly on all future mail 
routes emanating from any of the above named cities.  Sun Ke’s CNAC, for he was immediately 
named president of the airline, was responsible for constructing airfields at all the named cities 
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and at intervals of no more than 100 miles between them.  Immediate operating funds were 
secured through a very generous airmail contract signed the same day the airline was created.
106
  
For each mile flown, Sun Ke guaranteed $1.50 gold American dollars for small planes with a 
carrying capacity up to 800 lbs and $2.25 gold dollars per mile for planes with a carrying 
capacity between 800-2000 lbs.  The Americans promised to fly a minimum of 3,000 miles per 
day.  To pay these costs, Sun Ke agreed to give the American operating company all airmail 
revenues and, since airmail revenue would not reach such sums in the foreseeable future, 
promissory notes from the Ministry of Finance for the difference in eight-year government bonds 
with an “unconditionally guaranteed” eight percent interest rate.107   
 The public announcement of the airmail contract between Sun Ke and Aviation 
Exploration set off a firestorm of protest.  Minister of Communications Wang Boqun “feeling 
that being ignored has caused him a great loss of face” refused to recognize the validity of the 
contract since Sun Ke, as minister of railways, had no authority to sign it.
108
  Wang immediately 
began working behind the scenes to embarrass Sun Ke by ordering that no airmail actually be 
delivered to CNAC once it started operations in October.  By December 1929, both the 
Ministries of Finance and Communications refused all payments to the airline.
109
  Wang also 
forwarded protest letters about the airmail contract to the company and then had them published 
in the Communications Gazette to spur public protest.
110
  While Wang maneuvered politically, 
the Directorate General of Posts also lodged a strongly-worded protest with the National 
Government describing the disastrous financial results the airmail contract would have on the 
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Post Office.  The Directorate showed that actual losses to the Post Office resulting from the 
airmail service would amount to 3,679,000 yuan per year when the Post Office only showed 
profits of around 1,000,000 a year.
111
   
The Directorate’s measured private response was quickly outdone by the postal workers’ 
public protests.  Once the airmail contract became public on 27 April, leaders in the Shanghai 
Postal Workers’ Union (上海郵務工會) and Shanghai Postal Employees’ Association 
(上海郵務職公會) joined forces to agitate against it.  On 16 October, the Union and Association 
organized the Shanghai Postal Personnel Committee to Oppose the Sino-American Airmail 
Contract (上海郵務同人反對中美航空合同委員會).  Shortly thereafter, the National Postal 
Workers’ Union Prepatory Committee (全國郵務工會籌辦委員會) ordered all postal unions 
across the country to organize similar committees.
112
  Liu Chenghan (劉承漢), known as the 
“Postal Legal Specialist,” represented the Employees’ Association on the anti-airmail contract 
committee.  Under the committee’s name, he authored a pamphlet outlining the postal workers’ 
problems with the contract: (1) the airmail contract violated standing international airmail 
regulations by allowing a foreign company to operate an airmail service without being subject to 
the host country’s laws; (2) the astronomical deficits created by the airmail contract turned the 
Post Office solely into an instrument for paying an American company; (3) the decision to grant 
monopolies on all future routes prohibited private Chinese companies from securing airmail 
contracts; and (4) allowing Americans to operate airfields and hangers was a threat to national 
security.
113
  Unbeknownst to Sun Ke, the airmail contract did violate international airmail 
agreements.  In March 1919, under the auspices of the Paris Peace Conference, an Aeronautical 
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Commission agreed on the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, which 
gave all contracting parties “complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its 
territory.”114  Although Wellington Koo signed the Convention as part of the Paris Peace 
Treaties, the treaties were never ratified by the Beijing government because of the outbreak of 
the May Fourth Movement.  Since China was not a convention member, any airline seeking to 
operate within Chinese airspace had to sign a separate treaty – Sun Ke and the Americans had 
overlooked this requirement.  With public pressure and legal troubles mounting, and having been 
outmaneuvered by Wang Boqun, Sun Ke folded.  On 5 December 1929, Sun Ke resigned as 
president of the China National Aviation Corporation.   
The National Government immediately appointed Wang Boqun as president of CNAC 
and he moved to nullify the contract.  Having been insulted by the original American negotiating 
team and having bested Sun in their political rivalry Wang convened a meeting of the Board of 
Directors of CNAC on 16 January 1930.  He also invited representatives of the Ministries of 
Communications, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Military Affairs to build consensus within the 
government.  The meeting outlined various reasons for canceling the contract, including huge 
deficits to the Post Office, threats to national defense, American domination of the most lucrative 
airmail routes, and the lack of tax revenues from the airline.
115
  After the meeting, Wang and the 
board of directors petitioned the National Government recommending the cancellation of the 
airmail contract, which it did at the end of January.   
 Wang Boqun wanted a new airmail contract.  He declined, however, to work with any of 
the other original negotiating team sent by Curtiss-Wright.  Eventually, Max A. Polin and W. 
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Langhorne Bond traveled to China to start negotiations.  Bond, who recognized the “situation 
had been badly bungled,” advocated a “cordial” relationship with Wang Boqun.116  After 
extensive negotiations, a series of contracts were signed on 8 July 1930 creating a new airline.
117
  
Under the new contract, the old CNAC merged with China Airways Federal and the Shanghai-
Chengdu Line of the Ministry of Communication to form a new China National Aviation 
Corporation.  Whereas the Americans originally controlled 60% of the stock of CNAC, the new 
company’s stock was divided between the Ministry of Communications with 55% and the 
Americans with the remainder.  The Minister of Communications would almost always be the 
president of the company and many high-ranking postal officials sat on the board.
118
  The 
company kept its monopoly on the Shanghai-Chengdu, Nanjing-Beijing, and Shanghai-
Guangzhou routes and received, in the new airmail contract, all actual revenues from the sale of 
airmail stamps.
119
  To ensure a reasonable revenue, the Directorate issued a new circular on 
airmail procedures introducing an “airmail zone” (飛航區域) system.  In this system, the Post 
Office charged customers fifteen cents per twenty grams per 1,000 kilometers for airmail.
120
  The 
new contract had been modeled on a similar one recently signed with the Eurasia Aviation 
Corporation. 
 In the middle of 1928, the German airline company Deutsche Lufthansa (德國漢沙公司) 
despatched Wilhelm Schmidt to China to establish an international airmail route between China 
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and Germany.
121
  Political instability in the late 1920s kept Schmidt from securing a contract, but 
plans and negotiations started moving forward in September 1929 with several meetings between 
Schmidt and representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Communications.  On 21 
February 1930, Lufthansa and the Ministry of Communications agreed to the creation of the 
Eurasia Aviation Corporation (歐亞郵運股份有限公司).122  Under the contract, Eurasia would 
be a Sino-foreign joint venture with the Chinese owning two-thirds of the stock as well as 
holding two-thirds of the board positions.
123
  The airline received a monopoly on three routes: (1) 
Shanghai to Manzhouli via Nanjing, Tianjin, and Beijing; Shanghai to Urga via Nanjing, Tianjin, 
Beijing, and Pailingmiao; Shanghai/Nanjing to Soviet Russia via Zhengzhou, Xi’an, Lanzhou, 
Hami (Kumul), and Dihua (Ürümqi).  As it turned out, Eurasia would never make an air 
connection between China and Germany, but it did rapidly expand air services to western China.  
By the end of 1931, CNAC and Eurasia flew a combined 2,709 kilometers of airmail routes; by 
1932, the that distance had extended to 4,746 kilometers (Table A.7 in Appendix).
124
 
 Changes in the rates of remuneration for airmail carriage occasioned little dispute after 
mid-1930.  The airmail contracts signed between the Directorate, CNAC, and Eurasia in 1930 
guaranteed the payment of all receipts from the sale of airmail stamps to the airlines (Table A.8 
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in Appendix).
125
  This style of remuneration, however, only lasted a year until the Directorate 
and airlines agreed to a standard fee based on weight-distance.  Starting from mid-1931, the Post 
Office paid the airlines of $7.50 (Mex.) per kilo per airmail zone of 1,000 kilometers.
126
  
Apparently, this new rate was still considered too low by the airlines for on 1 February 1933, the 
Post Office raised the rate to $12.50 (Mex.) per kilo per 1,000 kilometers while also raising the 
airmail postage rate, to help pay for the increase, from $0.15 to $0.25.
127
 
 While remuneration to the airlines was generally kept private, the public nature of state 
subsidies to the airlines provoked intense criticism by postal workers.  In 1929, the Ministry 
ordered the Directorate to pay yearly subsidies to “aviation enterprises.”  Initially, subsidies only 
went to the Shanghai-Chengdu Line, which was given $630,721.44 spread over late 1929 and 
early 1930.  CNAC, the frequent target of criticism, wrote Minister of Communications Zhu 
Jiahua, is “not receiving from the Government anything in the nature of a subsidy.”128  Zhu was 
lying.  CNAC received two million Mex. between 1930 and 1935.  In 1933, when the American 
side of CNAC sold its interest to Pan-American Airlines, the contract between Pan-American 
and CNAC expressly stipulated a monthly subsidy of $3,500 from the Post Office to their 
Shanghai-Beiping line.
129
  During the early 1930s, Eurasia also received subsidies totaling three 
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million Mex.
130
  The Director General of Posts put it bluntly in 1934, “all the established 
[air]lines carry…mails and are running at a financial loss covered by annual subsidies of the 
Ministry of Communications.”131   
Table 5: Postal Subsidies to Aviation Enterprises
132
 
1929 $630,721.44 
January-June 1930 No information available 
July 1930-June 1931 No information available 
July 1931-June 1932 $1,222,451.56 
July 1932-June 1933 $572,834.00 
July 1933-June 1934 $745,901.93 
July 1934-June 1935 $1,368,690.45 
July 1935-June 1936 $1,609,253.96 
July 1936-June 1937 $1,408,380.35 
July 1937-June 1938 $529,193.72 
July 1938-December 1938 No information available 
1939 $273,893.33 
1940 $537,289.30 
1941 $8,599.46 
 
In a different context, Zhu Jiahua admitted the subsidies, but claimed they were “probably the 
lowest in the world” at an average of $0.30 yuan per mile in 1933 compared to the United States 
government’s subsidies to its airlines of between US$2.00-2.50 per mile, which was roughly the 
equivalent of $7.00-8.50 yuan.
133
  Zhu’s efforts to either deny or defend the subsidies on the 
grounds of their cheapness were clearly at attempt to justify them to the tens of thousands of 
postal workers around the country. 
 Postal subsidies to the airlines started during the most difficult financial times the 
Directorate General of Posts had ever faced.  Rising costs and over-extension in the mid-1920s 
led to stringent service economy, but the savings effected were lost almost immediately because 
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of the suspensions of service and occupation of many postal districts by the National 
Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition (1926-1928).  Just as the political situation 
began to settle in mid-1928, China started experiencing the effects of the Great Depression.  In 
the fall of 1931, postal finances received another blow when all revenue from the Northeast was 
lost following the Mukden Incident.  At this very moment, when the Post Office showed a deficit 
of 5.9 million for July 1931-June 1932 and 4.2 million for July 1932-June 1933, the Ministry 
ordered the Post Office to continue paying subsidies to the airlines. 
 Postal workers, considered aristocrats of the labor movement, understood the long-term 
financial implications of such subsidies on their livelihoods – they would soon be eating out of a 
“begging bowl.”134  After a successful strike by Shanghai postal workers for increased wages in 
1925, their union underwent deradicalization during the anti-communist White Terror of 1927 
and a “yellowing” when pro-Nationalist labor leaders took it over during the Party Purification 
Campaigns of 1928-1930.  Despite the deradicalization, Shanghai postal workers struck again in 
1928 defying state law forbidding strikes by government workers.  Having achieved another 
small “victory” in 1928, the postal workers movement began focusing on the general postal 
economy understanding its health as essential to their livelihoods.   
In 1930, Director General of Posts Liu Shufan decided to move the savings bank and 
domestic remittance businesses to a new Directorate General of Postal Remittance and Savings 
Banks (D.G. of P.R. & S.B.).  It was clear to postal workers that Liu was siphoning off some of 
the most lucrative postal businesses for his new Directorate.  In response, they launched the so-
called “protect the postal foundation” movement (鞏固郵基運動), which initially coincided with 
renewed demands for increased compensation to offset the inflationary effects of the Great 
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Depression.  The Ministry and Directorate refused all requests for additional compensation to the 
workers, but continued to pay the airline subsidies.  By May 1932, the protect the postal 
foundation movement reached a crescendo when its organizing committee issued four demands 
to the Ministry of Communications: (1) abolish the D.G. of P.R. & S.B.; (2) cease the payment 
of all airline subsidies; (3) protect the postal personnel system; and (4) use postal income only to 
support the Post Office.  The organizing committee despatched representatives to Nanjing, but 
they were rebuffed by Ministry officials.  On 22 May 1932, the Shanghai Postal Workers’ Union 
and Shanghai Postal Employees’ Association both declared a strike.  In the days following, 
postal workers struck in dozens of cities.
135
 
 The postal workers’ strike lasted five days and paralyzed communications throughout the 
country.  The magnitude of the strike and the unusual demands by the workers called for a strong 
response by the government.  Qian Chunqi, the new director general of posts, and Long Dawen, 
postal secretary in the Ministry of Communications, were both immediately fired and detained 
for “instigating” the strike.  To negotiate with the workers, the government assembled a team of 
government and civic leaders, including Minister of Industry Chen Gongbo, Mayor of Shanghai 
Wu Tiecheng, business leader Yu Xiaqing, newspaper editor Shi Liangcai, chair of the Shanghai 
Merchants’ Association Wang Xiaolai, leader of the Green Gang Du Yuesheng, and banking 
leaders Zhang Jia’ao (Chang Kia-ngau) and Ling Hongxun.  After several sessions, the 
government negotiating team accepted the workers’ demands “in principle” and agreed to the 
formation of a special Postal Economic System Research Committee to conduct more intensive 
research into postal economics.  Chen Gongbo and Wu Tiecheng promised to submit the 
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committee’s findings to the government for ratification.  The strike ended on 27 May.  Shortly 
thereafter, Minister of Communications Chen Mingshu (陳銘樞) was also cashiered not only for 
contributing to the strike, the immediate cause, but also for embarrassing Jiang Jieshi with his 
valiant defense of Shanghai as the overall commander of the 19
th
 Route Army during the 
Shanghai War of January 1932.  After the 1932 strike, the airline issue faded from national 
attention and ceased to be a source of agitation for postal workers.
136
   
The most significant developments in postal relations with the airlines over the next 
several years were the inauguration of a new airline, continued adjustments in remuneration 
payments, and the elimination of the airmail zone system.  Few of CNAC’s flights were to South 
China leading Chen Jitang (陳濟棠) and the Southwest Political Council – rivals of the National 
Government – to work with local merchants to create the Southwest Aviation Corporation in 
1933.  Southwest’s plans were to inaugurate five routes linking the southern provinces.  The 
Directorate signed an airmail contract with the company in May 1934.  Southwest Aviation 
representatives indicated they did not expect significant income from airmail allowing the 
Directorate to sign an advantageous contract with the firm.  The new rates of remuneration to 
Southwest were $21 national currency per kilo for one flight zone, $38 for two, $56 for three, 
and $73 for four zones.
137
   
Shortly after signing the contract with Southwest, the Directorate unified remuneration 
schedules with the other airlines and continued pushing for lower payments.  Director General 
                                                 
136
 Postal subsidies continued to elicit some complaints by postal workers, but had none of the virulence of 1932.  
For examples of post-1932 complaints about subsidies, see: Zheng Mengke, “Youzheng jingji zhi weiji ji qi bujiu 
banfa” (The crisis in the postal economy and its remedy) Jiangxi yougong (Jiangxi postal workers) 1: 1 (November 
1932): 5-8; “‘Zongwei cizhi’ yundong zhi yulun yiban” (Some public opinion on the ‘General Committee 
resignation’ movement) Shanghai yougong (Shanghai postal workers) 7: 3-4 (October 20, 1934): 9-15; Zhonghua 
yougong (The Chinese postal worker) 2: 1-3 (1936), 7. 
137
 Letter to Director General of Posts Huang Naishu, 5 October 1933; “Provisional Air Mail Agreement between 
Guangdong Postal District Head Office and Southwestern Aviation Corporation” as attachment to S/O No. 345, 
Director General of Posts Tang Baoshu to Guangzhou Postal Commissioner E. Nordstrom, 7 May 1934 in 
SHAC137.6067. 
  268 
 
Guo Xinsong ordered the promulgation of the “Regulations for Handling Airmail,” applicable to 
all airlines with mail contracts, requiring them to agree to the same low rates as Southwest.
138
  
Two years later, with CNAC showing its first profits, the Directorate engaged in a year-long 
negotiation to effectively lower airmail carriage fees by eliminating the airmail zone system.  
Under the new system, the entire country would constitute a single airmail zone and each airline 
would receive $20.50 national currency per each kilo regardless of distance.
139
  This rate 
remained in effect until late in the War of Resistance when the inflationary spiral started to push 
airmail postage and rates of remuneration to the airlines higher and higher.
140
 
 
Conclusion 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China underwent a series of profound 
revolutions.  The revolutions that immediately come to mind, Republicanism in 1911, 
Nationalism in 1927, and Communism in 1949, while significant political eruptions pale in 
comparison to long-term revolutionary processes that survived and continue to survive changes 
in government.  The creation of a modern state, the construction of a nation of citizens, the 
dissemination of new forms of information, and the effects of modern transportation all wrought 
more profound changes than any revolutionary ideology. 
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The Post Office stood at the epicenter of the communications and transportation 
revolutions that rocked China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Prior to the 
widespread use of the commercialized telegraph, transportation and communications were 
strictly the same thing.  The Chinese word jiaotong (交通), which can be translated as both 
communications and transportation, expresses these overlapping meanings.  The significance of 
this definitional overlap is that communications only travelled as fast as the mode of 
transportation conveying it.  Even after the advent of the telegraph, radio, and other electric 
forms of communication, most information reached its destination in Republican China at the 
speed of the Post Office.  The Post Office used its power to coordinate and create a jiaotong 
infrastructure by fusing together the different transportation systems – steamships, railroads, 
motor coaches, and airlines – with its own courier routes to create a network consisting of some 
360,000 miles linking together virtually every village across the country.
141
  The postal network 
also reshaped the experience of physical space and time by controlling the flow and speed of 
goods and information. 
The Post Office played this fundamental role in this transportation revolution by entering 
into contractual relations with the transportation companies.  Through mail contracts or direct 
subsidies, the Post Office provided needed income to the young industries thereby creating 
facilities for transmitting information cheaply, reliably, and on a regular basis throughout the 
country and to the world.
142
  The relationships between the Post Office and modern 
transportation industries, however, was not without its problems.  Although the Post Office 
would have preferred business relationships built strictly on an economic foundation, external 
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considerations or outside interventions often foiled the Post Office’s plans.  Hart’s need to 
establish a postal monopoly, the problem of space in mail compartments, postal commissioners’ 
resistance to motor coaches, and workers’ agitation over airmail subsidies were just some of the 
factors influencing the smooth working of contractual relations between the Post Office and 
modern transportation industry.   
As a result of the Post Office’s information infrastructure, the Chinese nation had never 
before been so closely connected.  Nanjing officials woke up to newspapers from across the 
country, anarchists in Guangzhou opened letters in Esperanto from abroad, students in Yichang 
got the latest textbooks from Shanghai, Beijing businessmen unwrapped parcels of silk from 
Chengdu, Wuhan housewives read the latest scandal-filled tabloids, missionaries received moral-
improving religious tracts, Chengdu merchants skimmed middle-brow pictorial magazines, and 
educated peasants read the latest practical-minded agricultural manuals – all at miraculous 
speeds through modern transportation networks coordinated by the Post Office.  Not to be 
overlooked either, the Post Office’s information infrastructure linked China to the wider world – 
missionary tracts were delivered to Gansu from churches in the Middle East, Chinese studying at 
Harvard sent the Lampoon to friends in Fujian, and San Francisco’s most respected Chinese-
language newspaper Chung Sai Yat Po reprinted the latest political news from China when they 
received their copy of Shenbao from Shanghai.  The Post Office also fostered the spread of 
“universalized education” to far inland areas to incorporate residents in those areas into the 
nation.
143
  In 1934, the Post Office introduced several new services whereby local post offices 
would sell subscriptions to coastal newspapers and magazines across the country to make them 
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“available to the most distant purchaser.”144  The Post Office also published several book 
catalogs of titles purchasable at any post office in the country.
145
  In the first catalogue of books 
available for sale at the Post Office, there were 5,300 individual titles and 8,000 in the second 
edition thus making the Post Office the largest “bookstore” in the entire country.146  These 
unusual services, wrote Minister of Communications Zhu Jiahua, were “in the interest of culture 
and popular education in the frontier provinces.”147 
On any given day, the publications flowing through postal channels represented ideas old 
and new, foreign and domestic melded into a cultural milieu accessible to any and all at 
discounted prices postage rates.
148
  The millions of periodicals, representing political, social, 
economic persuasions of all types undoubtedly facilitated the creation of numerous reading 
publics in Republican China – publics that engaged in heated debates, expressed public 
sympathy for others, criticized their government, and discussed the latest world events – but that 
did so with a sense of themselves as a single nation of citizens of the Chinese Republic.  As 
Minister Zhu Jiahua wrote of the effects of the Post Office in 1937, “A community of feeling has 
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developed between one province and another which was unknown a decade earlier, while the 
National Government has gained in prestige both at home and abroad.”149 
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Chapter 5 
Policing the Public Sphere: 
State Censorship and the Chinese Post Office 
 
At the center of nation-building are often shared discourses ranging over topics such as ethnic 
identity, customs, racial purity, and citizenship all oriented towards defining who belongs to the 
nation.  In the modern world, these discourses are expressed within the realm between the state 
and civil society known as the public sphere.
1
  Scholars often overemphasize the public’s role in 
creating and shaping the public sphere thus obscuring the state’s own vital contributions to its 
development.
2
  As Habermas later wrote, “The structural transformation of the public sphere is 
embedded in the transformation of state and economy.”3  As the Chinese state structurally 
transformed itself into a modern, centralizing state in the late nineteenth century, it began to 
redefine legitimate public speech and carry out new forms of censorship within the burgeoning 
public sphere.
4
  In this chapter, we shall consider how fundamental changes in the late Qing, 
warlord, and Republican-era states, but also state responses to new forms of media, contributed 
to the creation and institutionalization of censorship through the Post Office. 
Censorship encompasses a number of state or public acts placing limits on personal or 
group expression on moral, political, religious, or other grounds.  In the historiography of 
modern China, scholars have broadened the notion of censorship to include the murder, torture, 
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or arrest of journalists and writers, the co-optation or bribing of editors, the burning of books or 
movies by the public, and the closure of newspapers and/or the destruction of their presses.  
More prevalent than violent forms were versions of institutionalized, administrative censorship 
encompassing prepublication inspection, banned book lists, the expurgation of written material, 
and postal censorship of all forms of printed and private mail matter.    
Scholars of late Qing and Republican China such as Lin Yutang and Lee-hsia Hsu Ting 
portray late Qing and Republican censorship as heavy and light, continual and sporadic revealing 
an underlying ambiguity about the definition of censorship and the ability of the state to carry it 
out effectively.
5
  Later scholars such as Lloyd E. Eastman argued, “the hand of the censor 
reached…all publications that diverged ideologically from, or were critical of, the leadership in 
Nanjing,” but also admitted that Nationalist censorship was “relatively light-handed and 
sporadic.”6  Stephen R. MacKinnon, echoing Eastman, states that with the rise of revolutionary 
nationalists came “heavy-handed censorship,” but it “was inconsistent and highly idiosyncratic.”7  
The general view of the idiosyncratic nature of censorship in the Republican era is an effect of 
the types of sources previously available to scholars.  The secretive nature of censoring 
institutions and the lack of relevant primary sources has forced historians to rely on evidence 
from censored authors or editors who naturally decried the injustice of state censorship.  With 
newly available archival evidence from censoring institutions like the Post Office, we are able to 
now see that censorship of the written word during the late Qing and Republican era was both 
light-handed and consistent. 
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In studying state censorship two questions constantly arise – what forms of expression 
does the state deem outside the realm of legitimate public discourse and how does it carry out its 
censorship?  The ever-shifting answers to these questions reveal fundamental changes in the 
nature of the state, its interaction with the public sphere, the organization of the bureaucracy, and 
state views on the boundaries of acceptable public utterance.  From the late Qing to the National 
Government’s evacuation to Taiwan, state-sponsored censorship was transformed from a general 
desire to maintain social stability by ridding the country of rebel elements through violent, 
uninstitutionalized and unsystematic means to more ideologically-informed checks on seditious, 
subversive, and traitorous elements through the placement of institutional controls on the 
circulation of information in the Post Office.   
The shift from violent acts of suppression to institutional controls on circulation followed 
changing government definitions of seditious discourse and the advent of modern bureaucratic 
institutions able to control their dissemination.  Beneath both were fundamental transformations 
in the governing ideology of the Chinese state itself.  In late imperial China, the paternalistic, 
Confucianist state usually viewed only anti-dynastic utterances as aberrations to be met with 
violent suppression.  Over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, civil society began 
expressing itself more ideologically and forcefully in the public sphere through the development 
of anti-Manchu rhetoric in privately-owned, modern-style newspapers.  Such modern forms of 
media were generally immune to individual acts of violence, but also became increasingly 
dependent on a state-controlled postal network for dissemination.  This dependence provided the 
late Qing and early Republican governments with an expedient institutional means to control the 
spread of anti-Manchu sentiment or other illegitimate public discourses.  By the 1920s and 
1930s, under the National Government, violent suppression of seditious elements still took place 
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on a very small scale, but the centralized, bureaucratic nature of the central state meant that most 
censored publications simply lost their postal privileges. 
Studying postal censorship offers a number of advantages vis-à-vis other censorship 
organs.  First, it was the only institution to perform censoring functions from the late Qing 
through the Republican period allowing us to see both important breaks and long-term 
continuities in government policies and practices.  Second, as a “national” rather than “central 
government” institution, the Post Office after 1911 was the only administrative entity carrying 
out censorship in territories outside the control of the Beijing or Nanjing governments.  Third, as 
a institution specializing in the delivery of mail matter, only the Post Office had the ability to 
refuse postal transmission to both Chinese- and foreign-language books and periodicals 
published in the various international settlements and concessions that were otherwise immune 
from Chinese laws because of extraterritoriality.  Finally, the adherence of the Post Office to the 
conventions of the Universal Postal Union gave the Chinese government the internationally-
recognized right to censor publications published abroad before they entered the country. 
Postal censorship was not unique to China.  Shortly after most European countries 
introduced modern postal services, and introduced the idea of a state postal monopoly, they 
began using this new institution for espionage and censorship purposes.  In the seventeenth 
century, the British “Secret Office,” the French Cabinet Noir, and the Hapsburg Geheime 
Kabinets-Kanzlei all started secretly opening mails and prohibiting the circulation of opposition 
newspapers.
8
  In the nineteenth century, many non-European countries established post offices as 
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part of their modernization programs that carried out censorship.
9
  In the United States, postal 
censorship exploded after the Civil War with the passage of several legislative acts limiting the 
circulation of mails on the grounds of libel, obscenity, and espionage.
10
  Postal censorship itself 
was thus not particular to China, but the forces producing it and the forms it took were unique. 
 
The Origins of Postal Censorship in the Qing Empire 
Following the Japanese defeat of Qing forces in 1895, reformers and revolutionaries both at 
home and abroad began extensive anti-Manchu propaganda activities through newspapers and 
magazines.  Fleeing abroad, many of the leading figures of the failed Hundred Days Reforms 
(1898) like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao formed transnational reformist or revolutionary anti-
Manchu organizations that published newspapers such as Liang’s Yokohama-based Journal of 
Pure Criticism (清議報) (1898-1901).  Domestically, young intellectuals like Zhang Binglin, 
Zou Rong, and Cai Yuanpei became increasingly radicalized and turned to more extreme, anti-
Manchu rhetoric in their publications.
11
  To counter the influence of the newspapers, and stop 
their circulation, the Qing government approached the Post Office in 1901 asking that mail be 
censored to “detect conspirators and break up riotous combinations.”12   
The Qing government’s first request for postal censorship implied the inadequacy of old 
methods of suppression to deal with newer media forms like newspapers and transnational 
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revolutionary organizations.  Inspector General of Posts Robert Hart sympathetically recognized 
the Post Office’s responsibility to uphold government, but, also abhorred the prospect of 
censorship fearing it would undermine public trust and politicize the Post Office.  Ultimately, 
Hart denied the government’s request on the grounds that the Post Office was a “peculiar 
institution” owing a special duty to the public to maintain the “absolute inviolability” of the 
mails.
13
  The ability to refuse such a request was based on Hart’s unique position as both a Qing 
government official and British citizen who considered the most powerful foreigner in China.
14
 
Despite Hart’s best efforts, postal censorship was thrust upon him in 1903 during the 
famous Mixed Court trial in Shanghai’s International Settlement against the revolutionary 
journal Subao (蘇報).15  In May 1903, Chen Fan (陳範), owner of the Subao, hired the radically-
inclined Zhang Shizhao (章士釗) to edit the newspaper.  Zhang immediately published a series 
of articles filled with anti-Manchu invective.  Affronted by the boldness of Zhang’s articles, 
Qing officials pressured Settlement authorities to close the Subao offices and arrest Zhang 
Binglin, Zou Rong, and several other contributors.  The newspaper offices were shuttered on 7 
July 1903.  By late July, while trial preparations were underway, former members of the Subao’s 
editorial staff including Zhang Shizhao himself, who had avoided arrest through personal 
connections, launched the China National Gazette (國民日日報).  To give the newspaper 
additional protection, Lu Hesheng (盧和生), the publisher, tried to outfox the Qing authorities by 
having the paper fronted by a foreigner named A. Somoll to give it extraterritorial privilege.  
Somoll also registered the Gazette with the British Consulate so it had the support of the most 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Richard S. Horowitz, “Politics, Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs: The Qing Restoration and the Ascent 
of Robert Hart,” Modern Asian Studies 40: 3 (2006): 549-581. 
15
 For an overview of the Subao case, see: John Lust, “The Su-pao Case: An Episode in the Early Chinese 
Nationalist Movement,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 27: 2 (1964): 408-429. 
  279 
 
powerful foreign nation in the Settlement.  Upon hearing of the “shameless audacity” of the 
publisher, Liangjiang Governor-General Wei Guangtao (魏光燾) ordered the Imperial Post 
Office to refuse transmission to the National Gazette.
16
  Hart reluctantly agreed on 7 October.
17
  
The economic impact of the postal ban, its ultimate purpose being to deprive the publisher of 
circulation revenue, forced the newspaper to close in December.   
British diplomatic pressure seems to have been partially responsible for Hart’s decision.  
During the negotiations leading up to the Subao trial, Wei Guangtao had cancelled the Mixed 
Court trial sending the fate of the arrested men into the hands of the foreign diplomatic body.  
During July and August, British and Italian diplomats alone fought Qing attempts to extradite 
Zhang and the others.  It appears that British diplomatic officials pressured Hart to permit the 
censorship of the China National Gazette to ease tensions with the Beijing government and move 
an intransigent Wei Guangtao.  Whatever the reason, Hart’s decision set an important precedent 
influencing Chinese censorship for the next fifty years.   
The trial against the Subao resulted in the imprisonment of Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong 
and involved complicated questions of international law, the status of the International 
Settlement, and the composition of the Mixed Court, but the long-term effects of the case were 
decidedly murky.  Most significantly, the case established the precedent of foreign jurisdiction in 
purely Chinese cases taking place within the territory of the International Settlement.  At the 
same time, however, it established a legal precedent – a powerful symbol to a legalistic-inclined 
postal staff – for postal censorship against Chinese-language publications, but also against those 
published in the Settlement, registered with a foreign consulate, and owned by foreigners.  
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Postal Censorship in the Late Qing, 1903-1911 
As part of its structural transformation to a ministerial-style government in 1905-06 during the 
New Policies Reforms, the Qing government began promulgating a series of new laws defining 
illegal speech and sedition thus laying a new legal foundation for censorship.  Under such laws, 
the Qing government forbid any form of libel, slander, or false accusation from appearing in 
print.
18
   The newly-established Police Bureau (巡警部) also issued its own definition of 
seditious utterance as slandering the court, absurdly criticizing dynastic policies, disturbing the 
peace, or undermining social customs.
19
  To enforce such regulations, the Qing government 
required all publishers, including foreigners, to register themselves and their works with the local 
police and the Bureau for Registering Publications.  In January 1908, under the new Press Law, 
all reporters also had to apply for licenses, register with the authorities, and submit their proofs to 
the local police for prepublication censorship.
20
  Pressure by the newspapers, however, forced the 
government not to enforce many of the censorship, registration, or licensing provisions.
21
   
If the Qing government was too weak to enforce its own censorship regulations, the Post 
Office was strong enough to force registration.  In late December 1908, the Post Office 
introduced a three-tiered newspaper classification system providing lower rates for registered 
publications.
22
  To officially register with the Post Office, editors had to obey the existing Qing 
law requiring a newspaper license.  Once licensed and registered, any newspaper reported to the 
Post Office by the competent local authorities as containing seditious content or infringing on 
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press laws could to be handed over to the government.
23
  Newspapers published abroad, too, 
came under the jurisdiction of postal censorship during this period.  The Imperial Post Office, 
although not a full-fledged member until 1914, strictly adhered to all conventions of the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU), the governing body of international postal relations.  At the 1906 
Rome Congress, the delegates resolved to forbid the transmission of any articles between 
member states whose circulation was prohibited in the country of destination.
24
  
By linking the 1906 Rome convention of the UPU with the Post Office’s newspaper 
registration requirements, the Qing government acquired an institutional means to suppress 
domestic and overseas newspapers.  The Qing government immediately capitalized on these new 
avenues by requesting a postal ban on the Bright China Daily (光華日報) out of Rangoon.25  
Over the next year the Qing requested the Post Office detain two other overseas newspapers 
associated with Sun Zhongshan’s Revolutionary Alliance.26   
While the Qing state still violently suppressed some reformist and revolutionary authors 
prior to 1911, censorship slowly shifted away from such acts towards institutional constraints on 
circulation.  Protests by newspaper publishers and editors forced the Qing to abandon many of 
the legal provisions of their publication laws, but vigorously enforced postal regulations, and the 
accompanying economic benefits derived from registration at the Post Office, were enough to 
secure the compliance of most publishers.
27
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Postal Censorship under Yuan Shikai, 1912-1916 
During Yuan Shikai’s presidency (1912-1916), postal censorship both through and, for the first 
time, in the Post Office became a common and distinctive feature of the political landscape.  
Upon assuming the presidency, Yuan’s Beijing government enacted a whole host of new press 
and publication laws.  Many of the laws retained the licensing and registration requirements of 
the late Qing, but Yuan also redefined sedition.
28
  Under Yuan’s government, all publications 
advocating a change in the form of government, disturbing the peace, impairing public morals, or 
revealing state secrets were considered seditious.   
The primary target of these laws were the publications of Sun Zhongshan’s Nationalist 
Party and the associated pro-Nationalist southern governors.  In the summer of 1913 many 
southern governors launched the Second Revolution to oust Yuan Shikai by declaring 
independence from Beijing.  Yuan’s superior forces dealt quickly with the military issue.  Sun 
and many of his followers, however, fled to Japan where they began intense propaganda efforts 
to undermine Yuan’s rule.  To counter such propaganda, Yuan ordered the Ministry of 
Communications to instruct the Post Office to censor all Nationalist Party material coming 
through the Post Office, permit outside censors in Post Offices in places under martial law, and 
hand over all seditious printed matter to local officials.
29
  Yuan also banned Chinese 
Revolutionary Party leaders Sun Zhongshan, Dai Jitao, Chen Qimei, Tian Tong, and Ju Zheng 
from using the mail at all.
30
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To strengthen postal censorship Yuan also ordered the Directorate General of Posts to 
promulgate more well-defined rules.  The Directorate distributed the resulting “Regulations for 
the Censorship and Detention of Seditious Mail Matter” to all postmasters on 2 March 1915.  
The Regulations, consisting of eight articles, governed the censorship of mail matter until 1928 
though its basic principles remained in effect until 1949.  Five of the articles describe the duties 
of the various post offices in censorship matters: to assist in keeping seditious publications out of 
the mail, to detain previously banned periodicals, to permit mail censorship in places under 
martial law, to enforce postal regulations on the packaging of printed matter to facilitate 
inspection, and to keep the activities of censors confidential.
31
  The Directorate’s regulations thus 
continued to recognize the legal right of the government to censor mail, but postal administrators 
also sought to protect the reputation of the Post Office.  Postal regulations required outside 
censors to physically mark all inspected mail, minimize delays to sorting, and avoid opening any 
foreign mail or sealed bags in transit.
32
    
To protect its reputation as a public service institution, the Post Office absolutely refused 
to define seditious mail matter.  The legal right to determine what constituted seditious mail 
matter came from two external sources.  First, all executive central, provincial, or county 
officials could define for their territorial area what was considered seditious content.  After 
making such a determination, an official requested the Ministry of Interior to inform the Ministry 
of Communications of the objectionable publication.  The Ministry of Communications then 
ordered the Post Office to ban the periodical after which the Directorate circularized all 
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postmasters to detain the offending matter.
33
  Yuan Shikai’s government thus created a regular 
bureaucratic process for suppressing seditious mail matter.  In that process, the Ministry of 
Communications played the pivotal role between local officials and the Post Office.  The second 
external source for determining what seditious printed matter was came from censors placed in 
post offices.  After December 1912, any territorial official with the legal right to declare martial 
law, or any military unit with the proper authority, could place censors in local post offices to 
inspect and detain seditious private mail matter.
34
   
The censors placed in post offices during Yuan Shikai’s presidency, according to internal 
postal documents, performed their duties dismally.  While foreign postmasters resented the 
inconvenience censors posed to the smooth working of their offices, they also expected the 
censors would conscientiously fulfill their duty.  Instead, foreign postmasters frequently 
complained of the dilatory manner in which the censors behaved.
35
  According to Shanghai 
Postal Commissioner J. M. C. Rousse, the censor placed at the Shanghai Head Office in the 
International Settlement only came to the office three times a week for half an hour each visit.
36
  
Rousse literally asked the censor to more thoroughly inspect the mail, but the censor flatly 
refused stating “his instructions were not to open too many letters.”  In October 1915 that censor 
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kept only six private letters and one newspaper out of roughly 2.8 million items of mail matter 
originating in Shanghai that month.
37
 
While censors placed in post offices resoundingly failed at their duties, postal bans 
proved more effective.  With the debate over the 21 Demands, the increasing propaganda 
activities of Sun Zhongshan’s Chinese Revolutionary Party, and Yuan Shikai’s preparations for 
declaring a monarchy, 1915 was a particularly busy year for banning periodicals through the Post 
Office.  Even in this year of heavy censorship, however, the government only banned 115 titles 
out of roughly 42 million pieces of printed matter posted for circulation.
38
  Of the material 
banned there were 46 newspapers and magazines, 62 pamphlets or circulars, and seven books. 
The most common targets of Yuan’s postal bans during 1915 were seditious newspapers 
and pamphlets associated with Sun’s Chinese Revolutionary Party in Japan and his associates in 
China.  The newspapers were not censored for publishing specific articles, but for their anti-
Yuan editorial line.
39
  Another common target of postal censorship were anti-Yuan pamphlets 
either written anonymously or pseudonymously.  In early January 1915, the Ministry of 
Communications banned an anonymous pamphlet entitled An Evening’s Talk with Zhao Bingjun 
(趙秉鈞一夕話).  A former premier of the Beijing Government, Zhao had been implicated in the 
assassination of Nationalist parliamentary leader Song Jiaoren and was himself poisoned in early 
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1914 presumably to keep him quiet.
40
  The title of the pamphlet suggests a fictional confession 
implicating Yuan in Song’s assassination.  The same month, the government also banned a 
pseudonymously written pamphlet entitled The Will of Qiu Pizhen (邱丕振遺書).41  Qiu, a 
former member of the Revolutionary Alliance, was assassinated in 1914 and considered a martyr 
of the anti-Yuan movement.  The fictional text presumably contained a virulent attack on Yuan 
and his dictatorial regime.   
Censorship under Yuan Shikai has long been considered particularly harsh, especially in 
light of his assassination or imprisonment of several famous political figures.  The emphasis on 
the violent aspects of Yuan’s censorship has overshadowed the considerable extent to which his 
government began using legal means to silence its critics.  New, more stringent media laws 
coupled with detailed postal regulations on censorship created a sophisticated legal network for 
defining and banning seditious publications.  Orders to suppress publications were made through 
regular bureaucratic channels rather than coming personally from the president.  Within these 
legal parameters, Yuan used postal censorship not indiscriminately or ideologically, but carefully 
against those he and other officials deemed political radicals seditiously advocating the 
overthrow of his regime, attacking him personally, or criticizing sensitive policies like the 21 
Demands.  Despite the legal framework, postal censorship under Yuan Shikai was still relatively 
light.  Out of roughly 150 million newspaper issues and articles of printed matter sent through 
the Post Office between 1912 and 1916, Yuan and other officials probably censored roughly 100 
different titles each year, which is the same number banned by censors in the United States 
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during the same period.
42
  Most revealing about censorship under Yuan Shikai were the number 
of publications not censored – none of the often scandal-filled mosquito papers, none of the 
radical publications like New Youth (新青年), none of the commercial papers like Shenbao 
(申報), and none of the Western- or Japanese-language newspapers criticizing the central 
government.   
 
Postal Censorship under the Warlords, 1916-1927 
After Yuan Shikai’s death in early 1916, the warlord period was epitomized by a weak, nominal, 
purely juridical central government whose “president” was usually the particular warlord 
controlling Beijing at the moment.  Unlike during Yuan’s era, there was little continuity in 
government policies or high officials.  The succession of revolving presidents and cabinets who 
held little control over most of the country has led many commentators and historians since Lin 
Yutang to argue that all types of censorship between 1916 and 1927 declined in comparison to 
the Yuan era.  Lin argued that as the central government grew weak, the press grew strong.
43
  
Lee-hsia Hsu Ting echoed Lin’s conclusion arguing that the instability of the Beijing 
governments and the “warlord’s stupidity” allowed new ideologies and radical publications to 
emerge in large numbers.
44
   
The history of postal censorship during the warlord period, however, complicates the 
overall impression that the weakness of the Beijing governments limited their use of censorship.  
Instead, the warlords expanded the use of censorship, but keep it from the public.  The key to 
censorship under the warlords was the Ministry of Communications.  No matter which warlord 
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controlled Beijing, he allowed all other warlords to send orders through the Beijing Ministry of 
Communications to suppress seditious publications through the Post Office.  Fearing negative 
public reaction most warlords also kept their censorship orders confidential.  The warlords 
understood that public announcements of postal bans opened the government to criticism and 
negative publicity.
45
  Collectively, the usual administrative arrangement with the Ministry, the 
use of secret censorship orders, and the introduction of several innovative practices allowed the 
warlords to increase the amount of censorship. 
The centerpiece of warlord postal censorship was an increase in the number of censors 
installed in post offices.  To maintain social stability, the warlords used these censors to halt the 
transmission of specific issues of newspapers or magazines rather than prohibit the circulation of 
the entire publication, as Yuan had done.  With considerably larger numbers, the censors also 
worked much more efficiently.  In August 1923, for example, there were twelve censors from 
three different institutions working in the Beijing Head Post Office.  Unlike previous censors, 
these tended to attend to office duties more consistently.  Whereas the Shanghai censors only 
detained a few letters and newspapers in 1915, the Beijing censors took 12,000 newspaper issues 
in August 1923 alone.
46
  Placing censors in Post Offices also spread during the warlord era from 
cities like Shanghai and Beijing to smaller provincial capitals such as Taiyuan and Kunming.    
The most important innovation in postal censorship during warlord years was the 
introduction of temporary postal bans on newspapers for specific articles rather than their general 
editorial policy.  Publishers only discovered this kind of censorship after they received numerous 
complaints from their subscribers, but the publishers remained ignorant of whether their material 
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was censored or lost in the mail.  Previously, all postal bans were permanent, but once the 
warlord regimes started targeting foreign and commercial newspapers and magazines they 
introduced the temporary ban to economically punish the newspapers with the loss of advertising 
and subscriber revenues.  Such bans were not widespread during the warlord years, but 
established the precedent that the Nationalists would exploit in the near future.  In September 
1924, for example, the Tianjin Court of Martial Law placed temporary postal bans on the 
Chinese edition of the British-owned Peking and Tientsin Times (京津泰晤士報), the 
commercial newspaper L’Impartial (大公報), and the Japanese-owned, Chinese-language 
Tianjin Daily News (天津日日新聞), all for publishing seditious articles.47  The bans occasioned 
no public protest by the editors and were quietly lifted two months later. 
In contrast to Yuan, who placed postal bans on a wide range of regime opponents, the 
various warlord administrations focused most of the effort on the growing communist 
movement.  With the rise of the Chinese Communist Party as a legitimate player in early 1920s 
politics, many warlords sought to limit their influence, especially over workers.  In the early 
1920s, post offices from around the country frequently notified the Directorate of the receipt of 
communist material passing through the mails, but usually the censors themselves simply 
confiscated such materials.
48
  In the months following the famous February 4-7
th
 strike along the 
Beijing-Wuhan railway, crushed by Wu Peifu and his warlord forces, various police and railroad 
authorities requested heavy censorship of all mail and printed matter coming to and from the 
railroad workers.
49
  In June, the Police Department of the Railroad asked the postmaster at 
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Changxindian (長辛店), Hubei, the site of a successful railroad workers’ strike in late August 
1922 and one of the centers of the 1923 strike, to detain all copies of three communist 
publications: Record of the Beijing-Hankou Bloodshed (京漢流血記), The Guide (向導報), and 
Workers’ Weekly (工人週刊).50  Similar requests continued unabated throughout the summer of 
1923.
51
  In early 1924 the assault on communist publications continued with bans against the 
Socialist Youth League’s organ Chinese Youth (中國青年) and the Young Workers’ Monthly 
(青年工人月刊).52 
Postal censorship did not decline during the warlord years, but the various warlords kept 
their censorship practices more confidential while simultaneously increasing the number of items 
inspected, confiscated, and banned.  It appears, then, that the warlord era has been seen as a 
period of lax censorship because they used more sophisticated tactics than Yuan Shikai – buying 
off editors rather than killing them, using postal censorship rather than smashing presses – and 
not because they censored less material.  Within an overall increase in the amount of material 
censored, the warlord administrations also introduced a number of innovative practices 
transforming postal censorship itself.  First, the warlord controlling Beijing allowed his fellow 
militarists to utilize the Ministry of Communications to transmit censorship orders to the Post 
Office.  Within the Post Office, warlords placed significantly greater numbers of censors who 
worked efficiently.  Rather than target specific titles, censors usually simply confiscated 
individual issues.  The warlord era also saw the introduction of temporary postal bans as a form 
of economic punishment of commercial and foreign-language publications.   
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Postal Censorship of Chinese-Language Publications in the Nanjing Decade, 1927-1937 
As the Nanjing decade began all forms of censorship reached, according to Edgar Snow, “an all-
time severity” but the system itself was “completely chaotic.”53  Supporting Snow were 
numerous articles and essays on censorship by writers like Lu Xun.  In the fall of 1927 
Nationalist censors confiscated several issues of Lun Xun’s Brief Discourses (語絲) magazine 
for articles criticizing the White Terror against the Communists.  Lu responded by attacking the 
educational level of the censors: “they fuck up what should and shouldn’t be censored.” 54   Snow 
and Lu might bitterly complain about being censored, but the Nationalists knew who they 
wanted to censor, created new laws defining seditious speech, and utilized postal bans very 
effectively. 
The effectiveness of Nationalist censorship stemmed from its re-organization of 
censoring bureaucracies and the promulgation of new media laws and regulations.  During most 
of the Nanjing Decade, the Propaganda Bureau (宣傳部) of the Central Executive Committee of 
the Nationalist Party determined what could be censored.  Censorship laws issued between 1927 
and 1937, usually authored by the Propaganda Bureau, carefully defined what constituted 
seditious discourse, who could order postal bans, what organizations could place censors in post 
offices, and the Directorate’s role in enforcing censorship.  Overall, Nationalist practices 
represent the final step from violent, nonideological to nonviolent, ideological censorship as 
represented by how the government conducted its policing of the public sphere.   
The types of material censored through the Post Office during the Nanjing decade can be 
divided into two main categories, each having its own form of punishment, and each 
predominant in a specific time period.  First, as the primary party office for policing ideological 
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correctness, the Propaganda Bureau specifically targeted the political enemies of the Nationalist 
Party on the left and, infrequently noted, on the right during the period between 1927 and 1930.  
These ideological works, often advocating the overthrow of the National Government, were 
completely banned from the Post Office.  Having swept its ideological enemies from the public 
sphere by 1930, the Nationalists utilized temporary postal bans on Chinese- and foreign-
language commercial publications, designed to economically punish them for specific criticisms 
of government policy, in the period between 1930 and 1937.  Overall, postal censorship under 
the Nationalist regime was not only “more ideological,” but also more effective.55  The basis of 
that effectiveness started with broadly-written censorship laws. 
From January 1928 to the end of 1930, the National Government and Post Office 
promulgated a series of new laws and regulations governing the content of publications.  In 
January 1928, the Directorate General of Posts, not yet under Nationalist control, but in 
cooperation with the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party (CEC), issued new 
postal censorship regulations.
56
  Under the new regulations, the Ministries of War and the 
Interior as well as all provincial-level civilian and military authorities could independently define 
what constituted mail matter of a seditious nature.  For the first time, the Nationalist Ministry of 
Interior also sent the Directorate regulations on decency standards, which allowed the 
government to suppress mail matter that “teaches lasciviousness and putrid vulgarity,” especially 
mosquito newspapers.
57
  Finally, on 16 September 1929, the CEC promulgated the “Regulations 
Regarding Censorship of Mail Matter at Principal Cities and Towns throughout the Country,” 
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which made the Propaganda Bureau of the CEC the most powerful censorship organ in the 
country.
58
  The Propaganda Bureau not only ordered postal bans, but also appointed a Chief 
Censor in every province to oversee censorship within post offices. 
During the Nanjing decade, the central government implicitly acknowledged the 
Nationalist Party only controlled a small number of provinces.  Like the Ministry of 
Communications under the warlords, the National Government, through the Ministries of Interior 
and Communications, permitted local power holders to place censors in their local post offices.  
Officially such censors were under the direction of the Propaganda Bureau, but in practice any 
central or local government, quasi-government, educational, or military institution could install 
censors in post offices.  Occasionally, such an ad hoc administrative situation caused conflict 
between local Party Branch officials and local government offices, but in general both sides 
cooperated.
59
  The institutions most eager to censor mail were military units, both in garrison and 
in the field, who sought to protect their soldiers from propaganda.
60
  Schools also evinced deep 
concern about the reading matter received by their students often appointing censors to weed out 
seditious printed matter, especially during periods of student unrest.
61
  In important mail centers 
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such as Shanghai, the Nationalists appointed as many as forty censors representing different parts 
of the government in the Head Post Office.
62
    
The Propaganda Bureau focused its attention on censoring the Nationalist Party’s 
ideological enemies, which included Communists and anarchists on the far left, the Third Party 
and Reorganization Clique on the left, and the fascist-inclined Chinese Youth Party on the far 
right.  Approximately ninety percent of all material subject to postal bans represented ideological 
opponents of the National Government.
63
  When censoring its ideological enemies, the 
Propaganda Bureau’s typical procedure was to distribute lists of offending publications along 
with their “reactionary status” (反動情形), explaining why they received a postal ban, and the 
publisher’s location, if known, to the Post Office.64  At other times, the Ministry of 
Communications simply forwarded orders to the Post Office from local officials to stop the 
transmission of specific titles, which sometimes contained an explanation for the suppression.
65
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Out of the ninety percent of the material banned for ideological reasons roughly seventy-
five percent consisted of communist writings.  Among the communist publications banned were 
official mouthpieces like The Bolshevik (布爾什維克) and Red Flag (紅旗), but also 
“communistic” publications such as Moluo (摩洛) and the Masses Daily (群眾日報).66  The 
government also banned many pamphlets printed by the Communists within China or abroad 
such as Resolutions of the Fourth Representatives Congress of the Red Workers International.
67
  
The government even prohibited CCP works such as the Textbook on Latinized New Chinese 
Language (拉丁化新中國文字課本) from postal transmission.68  Along with publications 
written or published directly by the CCP, the government also banned many books promoting 
proletarian or communistic literature including fictional works and magazines as disparate as 
literary sensationalist Liu Na’ou’s Trolley Bus (無軌列車) to magazines like the Esperanto-titled 
Oazo (Oasis 幻州).69  To avoid detection and the blanket postal bans on all CCP writings, the 
Communists often tried to disguise the covers before attempting to send them through the mail.
70
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After the communists, the Propaganda Bureau targeted the anarchists and Youth Party 
most frequently.  Anarchist publications ranging from newspapers like The Orient (東方) to 
pamphlets like Anarchism and Practical Questions (無政府主義與實際問題) to books such as 
The Evening of the Squall (暴風雨前夕) constituted about ten percent of the total number of 
periodicals forbidden from the post.
 71
  The Chinese Youth Party, in the “mainstream” of the 
global fascist movement, was a threat to the National Government from the right.
72
  Between 
1928 and 1930, the Government banned many of the Youth Party’s publications such as 
Awakened Lion (醒獅), Thunder (雷風), and Masses (群報) to control their propaganda 
activities, particularly among students.
73
  Finally, a few publications of the Reorganization 
Faction within the Nationalist Party, led by Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, were occasionally 
prohibited postal circulation such as Revolutionary Commentary (革命評論) and Vanguard of 
the Masses (民眾先鋒).74  
The Propaganda Bureau kept some statistics on the number of publications banned, but 
they are far from complete.  Zhang Jinglu provides the most complete list of publications banned 
during the Nanjing decade, but many of the lists he provides are either incomplete, contain the 
same publication multiple times, or drastically underestimate the numbers suppressed.  Zhang 
notes that between 1929 and 1936 the National Government banned 676 books in the social 
sciences with the majority, 366, being suppressed between 1929 and 1931.
75
  Elsewhere, Zhang 
                                                 
71
 Zhejiang sheng zhengfu minzhengting xunling di 1755 hao, minzhengting tingzhang Zhu Jiahua, February 1929 
(Zhejiang provincial government, civil governor’s office, order no. 1755, Governor Zhu Jiahua), Zhejiang sheng 
zhengfu gongbao 525 (11 February 1929): 5. 
72
 Marilyn A. Levine, “Zeng Qi and the Frozen Revolution,” in Roger B. Jeans, ed., Roads Not Taken: The Struggle 
of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992): 225-240. 
73
 Circular Memo No. 269, Officiating D. G. Lin Shi, 12 August 1929 in SHAC137.6272-2.   
74
 “Zhongyang chajin fandong kanwu mingce” (Name list of reactionary publications banned by the CEC) in 
SHAC137.6272-2. 
75
 Zhang Jinglu, ed., Zhongguo xiandai chuban shiliao (Historical materials on modern publishing in China) 4 Vols. 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1954), II: 205-254. 
  297 
 
lists another 228 books banned in 1931, but not included in the previous figures while Li Mo 
counts only 285 “reactionary” publications banned between 1929 and 1931.76  Suffice it to say, it 
is virtually impossible to determine the total number of works suppressed during the Nanjing 
decade by counting individual titles.  Instead, the statistics provided by each of the various types 
of censorship organs give a more accurate picture of the overall percentage of titles experiencing 
some form of censorship.  
The most comprehensive statistics on material censored during the early Nationalist 
period appear in the Central Party Affairs Monthly (中央黨務月刊).77  The Monthly published 
brief reports on the activities of the Propaganda Bureau from July 1929 to April 1931, which was 
the busiest censorship period during the whole decade.  The statistics produced by the 
Propaganda Bureau reveal several interesting features of the Nationalists’ censorship practices.  
First and foremost, the total number of publications experiencing some kind of censorship during 
these twenty months totaled 2,877, or 1.5%, out of a total of 193,329 issues inspected – a far 
greater number than shown by Zhang.  The total percentage of publications censored ranged 
from a low of 0.84% in January 1930 to a high of 2.79% in March 1930, but the reports do not 
indicate the reason for this significant difference.  Second, among the publications censored the 
majority were simple confiscations (扣留) rather than suppressions (查禁).  That is, the censors 
only removed a single issue of the publication rather than suppressing the entire title.  
Frequently, the figures used by other scholars have been the number of publications 
“suppressed” thereby underestimating the total number of publications being censored.  For 
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example, even the Propaganda Bureau itself, when issuing other kinds of public reports, only 
gave the figures for publications suppressed.
78
   
After the National Government cleared the public sphere of publications by its 
ideological enemies – at least as much as it was able – it focused its attention in the period 
between 1930 and 1937 on policing commercial newspapers and magazines that criticized the 
government or Nationalist Party.  When publishers or journalists pushed beyond acceptable 
limits of criticism – many criticisms were allowed to circulate – the National Government placed 
temporary postal bans on them.  The period of a postal ban ranged from one day to several 
months depending on what message the government was trying to send and the recalcitrance of 
the editors.  In contrast to bans on ideological newspapers, magazines, and books, the National 
Government usually gave more explicit reasons for suspending the postal privileges of 
commercial newspapers.  The commercial publishers, in response to the postal bans, generally 
acquiesced to government demands apologizing, printing retractions, or firing the offending 
writers. 
The government usually suspended the postal privileges of commercial newspapers 
because of specific criticisms or editorials against the government at important political 
moments.
79
  During the Bandit Suppression Campaigns in Jiangxi, newspapers criticizing 
government military policy lost their mail privileges.  In late June and early July 1932, the 
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popular Shenbao, edited by Shi Liangcai, published editorials suggesting the extermination 
campaigns were only exacerbating the problem of communism rather than reducing it.  For these 
remarks, the Shanghai Garrison Headquarters ordered a stop to Shenbao’s use of the mails 
sometime in July.  Nervous about the financial health of his newspaper, Shi dispatched a number 
of representatives to meet with Jiang Jieshi and other Nationalist leaders.  After Shi agreed to 
alter his editorial policy and fire several of his writers, the government lifted the postal ban.
80
   
Following the establishment of Manzhouguo in 1932, any positive mention of its 
Emperor or suggestions to normalize relations brought about a postal ban.  On 31 May 1934, the 
Propaganda Bureau suspended the postal privileges of the Nationalist Party’s own North China 
Press (華北日報) for advocating the opening of railway services between north China and 
Manzhouguo.
81
  On 13 August 1934, the Tianjin-based newspaper Social Welfare (益世報) also 
received a postal ban for an editorial published on 10 August concerning the military situation in 
the north implicitly criticizing the Nationalist military authorities.
82
  Jiang Jieshi himself 
telegraphed the order banning Social Welfare for spreading “utterly groundless” views harboring 
a “malicious intent” to stir up tension between the Central Government and the Beiping Political 
Readjustment Committee (平政整會).83  Jiang lifted the ban on 16 October 1934 when Liu 
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Huoxuan, the general manager, agreed to hire a pro-Japanese editor named Zhu Zhenxin.
84
   On 
3 December 1935, the Beiping-Tianjin Garrison Headquarters placed a postal ban on the Tianjin-
based Dagong bao (L’Impartial 大公報) for an editorial attacking Song Zheyuan’s negotiations 
with the Japanese in north China.  In this case, the ban was simply a warning and lifted only nine 
days later.
85
   
The Central Government also banned commercial newspapers for relatively minor 
incidents.  On 20 August 1934 the China Times (時事新報) and Beiping Morning News 
(北平晨報) both published a joint telegram from several military authorities, which the News 
Censoring Offices at Shanghai and Beiping believed to be fabricated.  On 7 September Jiang 
Jieshi ordered postal bans placed on both newspapers for their “unscrupulousness” in printing the 
questionable telegram.
86
  To skirt the ban the publisher of the China Times made an agreement 
with the China Press (大陸報) to hide copies of his newspaper inside the Press.87  The censors 
discovered the deceit and the Press was also prohibited from using the Post Office.
88
 
The Government’s imposition of a postal ban usually achieved the desired result – 
retraction of the offending article, apology to the government, firing the journalist, the 
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appointment of new editors – usually rendering it unnecessary to restrict newspapers a second 
time.  Most commercial newspapers like the Beiping Morning News, the China Times, or 
Shenbao only experienced a single postal ban.  In a few rare occasions, the Government had to 
punish a commercial newspaper more than once to make them more tractable.  The only known 
exception to the low number of postal bans is the Dagong bao, which was banned six times 
between 1924 and 1939.
89
  The Dagong bao probably survived its many brushes with the 
government because of its wide popularity and, after 1926, the intimate relationship between its 
editor Zhang Jiluan (張季鸞) and Jiang Jieshi.90  Overall, postal bans declined on Chinese-
language publications over the course of the Nanjing decade as a result of the government’s 
effectiveness and the Post Office’s efficiency. 
 
Postal Censorship of Foreign Media in the Nanjing Decade 
There were a few postal bans on foreign-language publications prior to the Nanjing decade, but 
the practice only began in earnest with the establishment of an ideological anti-imperialist Party-
State.  The purpose of postal bans on foreign-language media was not to excise offending 
statements, but to economically, and politically, punish them for printing news or opinions 
objectionable to central or local authorities.  Bans on foreign-language media not only involved 
complicated questions about extraterritoriality and the role of foreigners in the Post Office, but 
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also occasioned considerable public discussion on the nature of the Nationalist regime’s style of 
censorship and foreigners as participants in the Chinese public sphere.
91
  Unlike Chinese editors 
who feared reprisal, Western journalists and publishers felt no compunction about criticizing the 
National Government for its “heavy-handed” censorship.  Beneath that anger, however, was a 
begrudging acknowledgement that the Nationalists had learned well how to legally muzzle the 
foreign press.  
China’s entrance into the Universal Postal Union in 1914 and the “Resolution Regarding 
Foreign Postal Agencies” crafted at the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation in 1922 
laid the groundwork for the censorship of foreign-language media.  The conventions of the 
Universal Postal Union forbid the transmission between countries of any publication prohibited 
in the country of destination.  The British colonial government in India, for example, utilized this 
provision when it requested the Chinese Post Office refuse transmission to several “seditious” 
Chinese and Indian newspapers from entering India and the Straights Settlements in the 1910s 
and 1920s.
92
  The conventions of the Union also outlawed the establishment of post offices by a 
foreign government within the territory of another member country, which gave the Directorate a 
legal basis for attacking the Foreign Post Offices in China, as discussed in Chapter 2.  Once the 
Chinese and foreign powers signed the “Resolution Regarding Foreign Postal Agencies” in late 
1922, all foreign mail matter was forced into the Chinese Post Office where it could be censored. 
Nationalist attempts to suppress foreign criticism of their efforts to unify the country 
began during the Northern Expedition.  This first ban occasioned widespread discussion among 
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the foreign press and severe censure of the foreign postal commissioner involved.  On 29 July 
1927 Jiang Jieshi ordered Generals Yang Hu (楊虎) and Chen Qun (陳群) of the Political 
Training Headquarters of the Second Route Army to order the Post Office to refuse postal 
transmission to the British settler community’s North China Daily News for publishing stories 
“prejudicing our military plans.”93  Shanghai Postal Commissioner C. H. Shields, a British 
citizen himself, feared the ban would negatively impact the prestige of the Post Office, but felt 
duty bound to carry out the orders of the Nationalist military authorities.
94
  Since it was only a 
suspension of postal privileges, the publishers of the Daily News and North China Herald, the 
weekly condensed version of the News, continued to publish their newspaper within the 
Shanghai International Settlement.  The editors wrote several articles viciously attacking both the 
Post Office and Commissioner Shields.  Despite the legality of the postal ban, the editors 
claimed it was “personal and informal.”  The British community in Shanghai, they wrote, was 
astonished Shields failed in his moral obligation to the Treaty Powers by choosing to serve 
“Nationalist prejudice.”95  A letter to the editor even questioned Shields’ “manliness” for bowing 
to his Chinese employers while another claimed the Nationalist authorities had “prostituted” the 
foreign-controlled Post Office.
96
   
Other foreign newspapers like the Beijing and Tianjin Times publicly supported the Daily 
News claiming all postal bans were illegal, especially when based on “trumped-up” charges.  
Demonstrating their lack of understanding of the sophistication of the Nationalists’ postal ban, 
the Times claimed the postal authorities had no jurisdiction over a British-controlled paper 
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published in the Settlement.
97
  Of course, the Nationalists were not interfering in the publication 
of the Daily News, just its circulation.  Finally, on 12 September 1927 the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs lifted the ban on the North China Daily News.
98
  The editor admitted the ban “[gave] the 
circulation department no little inconvenience in getting the newspaper out of Shanghai.”99 
On 23 January 1929, the Propaganda Bureau order a postal ban on the North China Star 
(華北明星).  The North China Star, published in Tianjin by Dr. Charles James Fox, was refused 
postal transmission for “rumormongering detrimental to the Party-State,” but the offending 
article was not named.
100
  Much of the public discourse following the ban resembled the Daily 
News case.  In his editorials, Fox argued that as an American institution his newspaper enjoyed 
extraterritorial protection making the ban an illegal confiscation of his property.
101
  A week after 
the initiation of the ban, Fox attacked the government for violating three “fundamental 
principles”:  first, a postal ban without a hearing “violates the most elemental principles of 
justice”; second, the Star enjoys extraterritorial rights making the ban a violation of the “Comity 
of Nations”; third, the ban violates the freedom of the press.102  After the ban dragged on for 
several weeks, Fox and his brother, Albert W. Fox of the Washington Post, solicited assistance 
from Senator William E. Borah to pressure the Chinese government.  The powerful Idaho senator 
repeated Fox’s argument that the ban was a “flagrant violation” and demanded a hearing.103  
Also supporting Fox, the China Press of Shanghai claimed postal bans were “along the line of 
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Russian methods and perhaps Turkish…not in accord with the practice of most Western nations 
nor Japan.”104 
Reuter’s News Agency discovered the offending article in the North China Star – it was a 
despatch written by D. C. Bess, Beijing correspondent of the United Press, published on 17 
December 1928 and quoting Beijing rumors that Jiang Jieshi was about to be ousted.
105
  Chinese 
readers of the North China Star and other newspapers, while regretting the severity of the postal 
ban, blamed the “prejudice and ignorance” of foreign journalists for giving currency to 
“fantastic” rumors.106  The publication of similar “false information” was also the cause of a two-
day ban on the British-owed, Hankou-based Central China Post in May 1930.
107
 
As with the Daily News, the postal ban fulfilled its purpose leading Fox to admit that he 
had been “knocked on the head” and his newspaper had lost a “considerable part of…[its] 
circulation.”108  Apparently worried about the effect the postal ban was having on congressional 
members in Washington, the Chinese Legation announced the lifting of the ban on March 21
st
 
noting the intervention of both the American Legation in Beijing and Dr. C. T. Wang, Fox’s 
personal friend, as vital to the restoration of the newspaper’s postal privileges.109 
Two weeks after the ban was lifted from the North China Star, the Propaganda Bureau 
suspended the postal privileges of the North China Daily News and Herald for a second time on 
11 April 1929.  The internal order banning the newspaper refused it postal transmission for three 
articles damaging to the Party and government: an article on 26 November 1928 written by T. K. 
Chen calling the government “scoundrels,” a letter stating all foreigners should flee Nanjing, 
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and, most importantly, an article in late March in which George Sokolsky “vilified” the Party 
and told “wantonly absurd” lies about the Third National Congress of the Nationalist Party.110  
This time the postal ban was only part of the attack by the government on the Daily News.  On 
18 April Ye Chucang (葉楚傖), chief of the Propaganda Bureau, introduced resolutions to the 
Standing Committee of the CEC to deport Sokolsky, Hallett Abend of the New York Times, and 
Charles Dailey of the Chicago Tribune for making ridiculous statements in their columns and 
creating “baseless sensations…detrimental to the interests of the Chinese nation.”111  The 
American-owned China Weekly Review supported the government’s decision, “There is a world 
of difference between freedom of the press and license.  No sovereign country would put up for a 
minute with the constant attacks and pin-pricking attitude of a foreign newspaper.”112  The China 
Critic, a Chinese-owned, English-language magazine, declared that the decision to deport 
Sokolsky and ban the newspaper had been received with the “greatest satisfaction.”113  
Having been banned a second time, the editors of the North China Daily News launched a 
more aggressive campaign against the National Government and their perceived enemies.  The 
postal ban on a British-owned newspaper was probably not the work of “autocratic despots” in 
Nanjing alone, the British settler newspapers speculated, but part of a larger cabal against them 
by the Chinese government and pro-Nationalist American journalists from Missouri.
114
  The 
Beijing and Tianjin Times noted the appointment of “the dean of American newspapermen in the 
Orient” Thomas F. Millard from Missouri as “Publicity Advisor” to the National Government 
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shortly before the order to deport the three journalists.
115
  Millard, who had been deported by the 
British from South Africa during the Boer War, seemed to be taking his revenge.  The Beijing 
and Tianjin Times also commented upon the “violently anti-British attitude” in Missouri native J. 
B. Powell’s China Weekly Review.  Powell, argued the Daily News, “has for some time past been 
virtually a Nationalist organ” exploiting every piece of information “detrimental to British and 
other foreign interests.”116  There was in fact a “Missouri News Monopoly” according to Edgar 
Snow, one of its members, made up of several dozen journalists educated at the University of 
Missouri including Agnes Smedley and the famous newspaperman-cum-promoter Carl Crow.
117
  
There was also long-standing enmity between the British North China Daily News, who 
derisively called the Missourians “Corn Cobbers,” and two American papers, the Millard-edited 
China Press and Powell-edited China Weekly Review, but no evidence exists for a larger 
cabal.
118
  The cabal theme, however, died hard.  In 1943, Hallett Abend of the New York Times 
wrote of a decade-long “well-organized cabal” against him by the National Government and its 
Propaganda Bureau, “a sort of Gestapo for control of the mind.”119  Ironically, when the U.S. 
government censored Abend’s articles in the Saturday Evening Post he made no public 
complaint about the censorship.
120
 
A new wrinkle appeared in early May when the Nationalist News Agency reported that 
the editor of the Daily News issued a verbal statement to the Chinese government of his “change 
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of policy.”121  This was a face-saving measure by the Chinese government used time-and-again 
when censoring Chinese-language publications.  When the postal ban had lasted long enough, 
but the editors were still recalcitrant, the government would simply announce the editors had 
apologized and were going to change their editorial line.  The Daily News publicly denied any 
change in policy not wanting to appear apologetic to the Nationalists.  This stubborn refusal to 
accept the government’s claim extended the postal ban by two months.  Only on 15 August was 
the postal ban finally lifted.
122
  A similar exchange took place in 1931 concerning Hallett Abend 
of the New York Times.  After two years of mutual recrimination between Abend and the 
government, back channel negotiations led Abend to write a letter of “regret” for the 
“misunderstanding” leading to his loss of press privileges in China.  With this letter in hand, 
Foreign Minister C. T. Wang announced Abend’s “sincere regrets on behalf of himself and the 
New York Times for unfair and false news reports concerning China.”  Furious, Abend threatened 
Reuters, who had published Wang’s letter in full, with a lawsuit and cajoled other newspapers to 
print “corrections” of Wang’s statement.  In response, the National Government announced that 
each side had their own interpretation of the meaning of Abend’s letter.123   
Japanese newspapers, too, were subject to Nationalist postal bans.  During the Northern 
Expedition, labor organizers succeeded in establishing postal workers’ unions in most important 
Head Post Offices.  After the Ji’nan Incident, in which the Japanese clashed with Nationalist 
forces marching towards Beijing, postal workers’ unions across the country surreptitiously 
applied anti-Japanese propaganda to mail matter.
124
  Although postal authorities kept a lid on 
such activities, the Beijing Postal Workers’ Union started confiscating and burning the Japanese-
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owned, Beijing-based Shuntian Times (順天時報), which was considered the unofficial voice of 
the Japanese embassy.
125
  The Union’s repeated confiscations forced high-level talks between 
Japanese Acting Minister to China Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵) and Beiping Major He Qigong 
(何其鞏).126  In a circular letter to all foreign ministers in China, the Japanese Minister argued 
that the workers’ actions violated the 1922 Washington Conference resolution that China 
maintain an efficient postal service.
127
  Behind the scenes representatives of the National 
Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mayor He all tried to stop the workers’ actions, as 
did the Beiping Postal Commissioner, to no avail.  The National Government and Nationalist 
Party separately ordered the Beiping Garrison Headquarters and the local Party branch to stop 
the workers, but both institutions felt handcuffed by their sympathy with the workers.  Minister 
of Communications Wang Boqun (王伯群) felt that the workers’ acts were motivated by 
“patriotism.”  To solve the problem, Wang recommended enforcing an official ban on the 
newspaper, which would give the Japanese “no grounds for complaint.”128 
Although nearly forty Japanese publishers printed newspapers and magazines in China in 
the late 1920s, only a few actually lost their postal privileges.  In late December 1929, Jiang 
Jieshi ordered a permanent postal ban on the Shanghai Nichi Nichi Shimbun (上海日日新聞) for 
an “absurd editorial.”129  In response to the publisher’s continued obstinacy, the government 
ordered a termination of all mail and telegraphic privileges for the newspaper’s offices.130  
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the ban on all forms of communications the 
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editor repeatedly expressed repentance and Japanese Consul Uemura in Beiping vouched for the 
content of the newspaper.
131
  With the desired result achieved, the Propaganda Bureau lifted the 
postal ban in late April 1930.
132
  Less than two months later, however, the Shanghai Nichi Nichi 
Shimbun was once again found “publishing false reports with the object of stirring up 
disturbances and agitating the people” and was permanently banned from the post office.133  This 
give-and-take process was repeated in 1931 with the Propaganda Bureau banning any article 
penned by the Japanese News Agency (日本聯合社) after expelling its correspondent from 
Nanjing.  After eight months, the Agency apologized to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
“having published fabricated news in its press despatches.”134 
After the Manchurian Incident on 18 September 1931, the Chinese government placed 
postal bans on a number of publications for carrying positive coverage of the Japanese invasion 
and mid-1932 establishment of Manzhouguo.  Explicitly targeted were Japanese-language and 
Japanese-controlled newspapers in Manchuria.  As tensions rose throughout 1931, the 
Propaganda Bureau banned the Shandong News (山東新報) and the Tianjin Daily (天津日報) 
for publishing “fabricated news reports.”135  After the Japanese occupied the northeastern 
provinces, the Bureau banned seven newspapers – several formerly Chinese-owned, but taken 
over by the Japanese authorities – the Manchuria Nippo (滿洲報) and Taidong Daily (泰東日報) 
out of Dalian, the Taihoku Nippo (大北日報) out of Seattle, and the Northeast Daily (東北日報), 
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Gazette of the Three Eastern Provinces (東三省公報), the Shengjing Times (盛京時報), and the 
Awakening Times (醒時報) all published in Shenyang.136  
In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, Japanese newspapers were not the only ones 
who lost their postal privileges for either implicitly or explicitly supporting Japan’s actions.  On 
23 December 1932 the National Government delivered, said the British-owned North China 
Daily News, “a much-needed chastisement” to American George Bronson Rea’s Far Eastern 
Review.
137
  According to a government spokesperson, Rea had been hired as an adviser to the 
Manzhouguo government and was “actively engaged in malicious propaganda against China.”138  
Rea’s cause was not helped when the Japanese Association in China published a booklet entitled 
Presenting Japan’s Side of the Case consisting entirely of reprints of Rea and H. G. W. 
Woodhead’s newspaper articles celebrating Japan’s efforts to teach China a “lesson” in 
Manchuria.
139
  In April 1934 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also banned the Weekly Graphic, 
edited by Edward Dunn, as a “propaganda publication” for “eulogizing the bogus 
Manzhouguo.”140   
The postal ban occasioning the most public controversy concerned the magazine Oriental 
Affairs and its owner H. G. W. Woodhead, who was the British editor of the China Year Book 
series and a well-known advocate of a hawkish policy towards the National Government.  On 16 
May 1934, the English-language People’s Tribune, a magazine sponsored by Wang Jingwei and 
the Reorganization Clique, demanded a postal ban on Oriental Affairs for “pages of praise of Pu 
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Yi, his ‘Empire,’ his protectors, and his parasites of various nationalities.”141  In addition to 
Woodhead’s articles, the People’s Tribune may also have also been seeking retribution for the 
British ban on its circulation in Southeast Asia in 1927 and early 1934.
142
  Within two weeks, 
Wang Jingwei, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, suspended the postal privileges of Oriental Affairs 
for “slandering the Party and Government and injuring the interests of China.”143   
With the public backing of the North China Daily News, Woodhead immediately 
responded to the ban by launching a public relations campaign against both the Chinese 
government and the People’s Tribune.  Woodhead began the campaign by characterizing the 
Chinese government and Post Office as criminals who illegally “filched” his magazine and 
postage.
144
  He also demanded an opportunity to “vindicate” himself in an extraterritorial British 
Court where the Chinese government would not be able to produce a “tittle” of real evidence of 
his subversive activities in support of Manzhouguo.
145
  Not surprisingly, the Daily News 
championed Woodhead’s cause supporting his demand for a hearing in a British Court.146  The 
People’s Tribune tackled the demand for a trial by clearly and cogently setting out that the ban 
was not an infringement of extraterritorial treaty rights, but simply Chinese laws being applied in 
Chinese territory.
147
  Rather than respect the law, Woodhead and his ilk emptied “vials of wrath” 
on the law-abiding Chinese government.  Tribune editor Tang Leang-li also explained that the 
British colonial authorities in British Malaya and Burma banned his magazine without a trial 
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even though none of his articles were “calculated to bring about the downfall of the British 
Empire.”148   
British and Chinese readers both responded passionately to the ban on Oriental Affairs.  
A British reader, responded to Tang Leang-li, called the Tribune a magazine that “publish[s] 
mere vituperative mudslinging articles that present no facts” while Oriental Affairs was a “sober 
highly-cultured magazine whose every article is crammed with important facts and based on 
logic” – but, the reader lamented, in China “the jingoes control.”149  Chinese readers thought 
Woodhead “supersensitive” to criticisms of his magazine, especially when he saw politics 
through “colored glasses” by supporting the establishment of Manzhouguo.150  A certain “Lady 
Champion” leveled the charge that Woodhead deserved the postal ban because he lived under 
“benign skies” in extraterritorially-protected Shanghai and still engaged in “pernicious 
propaganda inimical to the best interests of the Chinese republic.”151 
The winner of the public debate between Woodhead and supporters of the postal ban 
appears to have been the Chinese readers.  In late September 1934 Woodhead noted that it had 
been three months since the ban was effected against his magazine.
152
  The Chinese government 
had not bent and when Woodhead tried extralegal means to avoid the ban by having the Goldsby 
King Memorial Hospital in Zhenjiang mail out copies of Oriental Affairs, the Post Office 
immediately ordered all offices to take special care to continue detaining the publication.
153
  This 
order of the Post Office, issued on 13 October, was the last word on the Oriental Affairs case. 
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In addition to newspapers and magazines, foreign-language books were occasionally 
banned from circulation through the Post Office.  In 1934 the National Government banned the 
book Ways That Are Dark: The Truth About China by Ralph Townsend for its “seditious 
nature.”154  Townsend’s essentializing work takes every opportunity to criticize the Chinese and 
declares he hopes the “Japs beat hell out of them.”  The Chinese must have been particular 
prescient because Townsend, as a member of the “Japanese Committee on Trade and 
Information,” later pled guilty in U.S. Federal District Court to being an agent of the Japanese 
government.  Other books banned included Agnes Smedley’s China’s Red Army Marches and 
Viktor Yakhontoff’s The Chinese Soviets.  The Chinese Government found both of them 
seditious for their positive portrayal of Chinese communism.
155
  In special cases, the National 
Government banned magazines like Asia for specific articles.  Asia received a postal ban for an 
article entitled “China’s Secret Blood Brothers” implicating the Blue Shirts in the assassinations 
of Secretary General of Academic Sinica Yang Quan (楊銓), Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Tang Youren (唐有壬), and an attempt on the life of Executive Yuan President Wang Jingwei.156 
The vitriolic discourses by Western publishers living in China attacked the Post Office 
and National Government through three main tropes.  First, the foreign-language newspapers 
used discourses portraying the Chinese government as “inscrutable” in their use of obscure and 
secret methods to censor a “free” Western press while attacking the foreign Postal 
Commissioners as lacking in “manliness” for taking orders from their Chinese superiors.  The 
                                                 
154
 Jiaotongbu youzheng zongju mi tongchi di 3 hao, youzheng zongju juzhang Guo Xinsong, 27 October 1934 
(Ministry of Communications, D. G. of Posts, confidential circular memo. no. 3, D. G. Guo Xinsong) in 
SHAC137.9431. 
155
 Jiaotongbu youzheng zongju mi tongchi di 3 hao, 27 October 1934 (Ministry of Communications, D. G. of Posts, 
confidential circular memo. no. 3, D. G. Guo Xinsong) in SHAC137.9431 and Jiaotongbu youzheng zongju mi 
tongchi di 7 hao, youzheng zongju juzhang Guo Xinsong, 15 December 1934 (Ministry of Communications, D. G. 
of Posts, confidential circular memo. no. 7, D. G. Guo Xinsong) in SHAC137.9431. 
156
 Confidential Circular Memo No. 65 (Translation): “Magazine ‘Asia’ to be prohibited postal transmission, 
directing,” 29 March 1936 in SHAC137.2251-18; Wilbur Burton, “China’s Secret Blood Brothers,” Asia (May 
1936): 308-310.  
  315 
 
second trope was a vindictive and anti-imperialist Chinese government bent on using illegal 
means to circumvent and undermine Western treaty rights and who refused to take Western 
newspapers into court for a “fair hearing.”  Third, and infrequently seen, was the trope of 
conspiracy.  In this discourse the Western publishers often imagined darker forces at work 
against their publications – whether it be a sinister cabal between the Chinese government and 
anti-British journalists from Missouri or rival Chinese publications, many of the foreign 
publishers saw bogymen behind the postal bans. 
The Nationalists’ rhetoric of anti-imperialism provided a rationale for censoring foreign-
language publications deemed threatening to Chinese national interests.  The only method for 
censoring foreign-language publications otherwise protected by extraterritorial treaty rights was 
using the Post Office to place institutional controls on their circulation.  The Chinese 
government’s legal use of postal censorship demonstrates an important limitation to the system 
of extraterritorial rights – when a foreign manufactured object past into Chinese territory, 
whether the object was industrial or intellectual in orientation, it became subject to Chinese laws 
despite claims to the contrary.  Overall, the suspension of postal privileges of Western 
newspapers was rare.  Seen from the institutional perspective of the Post Office, the National 
Government targeted the most aggressively critical foreign newspapers so that the others might 
silence themselves. 
 
Wartime Postal Censorship, 1937-1945 
The exigencies of war transformed the relationship between postal and other forms of 
censorship.  In the Nanjing decade, the central and local governments used postal censorship 
primarily as a method for limiting the circulation of seditious publications as defined by the 
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Bureau of Propaganda.  During the War of Resistance, however, the Military Affairs 
Commission became the most powerful government office and had administrative oversight of 
all censorship offices.  Along with elevating the Military Affairs Commission, the National 
Government also revised most of its media-related laws to reflect new wartime conditions.  
Rather than sedition, most of the new laws aimed at detecting “traitorous” information.  
According to Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, Chongqing censors used these regulations to rule over 
publishers with an “iron fist,” but period observers also noted that censorship was still 
sporadic.
157
  Foreign reporters told tales about whole despatches being censored, but statistics 
from the Ministry of Information show that less than one percent of all words despatched by 
foreign journalists were actually deleted.
158
  From the Post Office’s perspective, the wartime 
hierarchy of censorship bureaucracies and regulations was clear; their mission within the system 
was to inspect private mail matter in search of traitorous information.
159
   
In late 1935, as the Japanese continued encroaching in North China, Jiang Jieshi replaced 
the Propaganda Bureau of the Central Executive Committee as the government’s most powerful 
censoring organ with several institutions controlled by his Military Affairs Commission.  As 
Chairman of the Commission, Jiang had the power to appoint all censors to “suppress plots by 
reactionaries, track espionage by the enemy, prevent danger to the nation, halt disturbances of 
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the peace, forestall damage to the national defense, and undermine threats to foreign affairs.”160  
For operational purposes, Jiang delegated actual censoring authority to Chen Lifu’s Bureau of 
Investigations and Statistics (調查統計局).  The Bureau’s duties included establishing Mail 
Censorship Offices (郵件檢查所) in all important cities.161  After the war began, Jiang once 
again reorganized the government offices handling censorship in late 1937.  The newly-
established Ministry of Information (新聞局) headed up by Tanggu Truce signatory General 
Xiong Bin (熊斌) administered the Wartime News Censorship Bureau (戰時新聞檢查局); CC 
Clique leader and newspaperman Pan Gongzhan (潘公展) oversaw the CEC Book and Magazine 
Inspection Committee (中央圖書雜誌審查委員會), and Jin Bin (金斌), the former head of the 
Third Office of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, managed the Special Censorate 
(特檢處).162 With the reorganization of censoring institutions, the National Government and 
Directorate General of Posts also revised their censorship regulations to reflect the new wartime 
realities.  In late October 1937, the Bureau of Investigations and Statistics distributed the 
“Temporary Method for Postal and Telegraph Censorship Offices during the Emergency Period” 
giving local martial law authorities complete control over censors appointed by the Bureau and 
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ordering that copies of all suspicious letters be forwarded for review.
163
  This Method, however, 
was only an expedient measure until such time as more permanent censorship regulations could 
be enacted after an important government reorganization. 
In August 1938, the Military Affairs Commission once again reorganized several special 
branches of the party and government.  This would be the last major restructuring of the 
censorship offices for the duration of the war.  Jiang Jieshi reorganized the Bureau of 
Investigation and Statistics into three separate, but interrelated offices – the Bureau of Statistics 
and Investigation of the Military Affairs Commission (軍事委員會統計調查局), otherwise 
known as the Juntong, under the leadership of General Dai Li and in charge of espionage, code 
breaking, information analysis, and paramilitary operations;
164
 the Bureau of Investigation and 
Statistics of the Central Executive Committee (中央執行委員會調查統計局), known as the 
Zhongtong, headed by Chen Lifu, but under the day-to-day control of Xu Enzeng (徐恩曾) and 
with oversight of all party related activities; and the Special Postal and Telegraph Censorate 
(特種郵電檢查處), the least well known of the three, under Jin Bin and in charge of all mail and 
telegraph censorship in both free and occupied China.
165
   
Shortly after the establishment of the Special Censorate in September 1938, it issued a 
revised version of the 1937 postal censorship regulations as well as issued new ones pertaining to 
the formation of mail censorship offices, both of which outlined the Post Office’s new censoring 
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functions.  Instead of searching for seditious newspapers and magazines, the Post Office was 
tasked with the inspecting private mail for traitorous information.  Traitorous information 
included anything related to enemy espionage, the activities of traitors, attempts to divide efforts 
in the War of Resistance, material threatening the Republic, information undermining national 
defense, rumors designed to upset local peace, and leaks of military or government secrets.
166
   
With these new regulations, the institutions placing censors in post offices expanded as 
the government sought to tighten its control over the flow of vital military information.  The 
Special Censorate controlled the appointment of censors in any place where they had an office, 
but in all other areas, usually rural villages and small towns, local officials could appoint censors 
under the stipulations of the martial law and in concert with the 1938 “Provisional Regulations 
Governing Censorship of Mail and Telegrams by the Party Branches or Civil or Military 
Authorities at Places Where No Censoring Offices are Established.”167  In larger cities, a 
hierarchy of censorship offices existed within similarly ranked post offices.  The staff of such 
offices, none of whom were postal employees, consisted of an office manager, examiners, 
technicians, censors, general clerks, and secretaries. Each staff member had specifically 
enumerated duties such as the technicians who developed methods to open and close mails 
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undetected.  In rural areas, however, local officials usually only appointed one or two censors to 
perform all the necessary duties.  
During the war, the Directorate General of Posts also worked out a number of ad hoc 
agreements with the Japanese military and its allied North China collaborationist regimes to 
maintain administrative authority over most post offices in occupied China, as discussed in 
Chapter 1.
168
  The Japanese and North China regimes were willing to permit the continued 
operation of the Directorate in occupied zones because of the considerable cost and 
administrative expertise necessary to operate an extensive postal service and the difficulty of 
sustaining lines of communication on constantly shifting battlefields.
169
  Prior to the Japanese 
takeover, which was an informal and incremental process only completed in 1944, the Free 
China Directorate appointed foreign postal commissioners to head offices in occupied zones.  It 
was a strategy designed to keep the Japanese and North China regimes from taking control of the 
post offices and to curb their various demands for greater autonomy, especially in the realm of 
postal censorship.   
Most of the censors appointed by the Chongqing, Japanese, and North China 
governments to work in post offices were military rather than civilian.  For example, in Hunan 
between August 1939 and May 1940, fourteen military units such as the Headquarters of the 70
th
 
Army and the Political Department of the 52
nd
 Army installed censors in local post offices.
170
  
These censors were unrelated to the Military Post (軍郵) system run by the Rear Area 
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Mobilization Department of the Military Affairs Commission (軍事委員會後方動務 部) and 
were usually somewhat educated soldiers assigned the duties.
171
  Post Office records of Japanese 
installed as censors shows they were virtually the same type as those appointed by the 
Chongqing authorities – route armies, self-defense units, police departments, and county 
governments.
172
  The Directorate ensured identical rules applied to all censors – Chinese or 
Japanese – working in post offices such as affixing censorship marks on all opened mails, but the 
Post Office did allow Chinese censors behind the frontlines could use secret impressions.
173
 
Little is known about the Chongqing-appointed secret censors working behind enemy 
lines, but the following example seems representative.
174
  In 1937, two officials of the Yunxiao 
County (雲霄縣) government, a place about equidistant between Shantou and Xiamen and in the 
occupied zone, recommended primary school principal Chen Fengqi to the Special Censorate as 
a possible secret postal censor.  Shortly thereafter, the Special Censorate appointed Chen an 
official Mail and Telegraph Censor (郵電檢查員) giving him a special code name, “River 
Swan,” and a censor’s identity card, badge, and seal.  Chen’s superior was Chief of the Special 
Censorate Jin Bin who was replaced by Li Xiaobai (李肖白), code-named “Thunder Shock,” in 
1941.  During the war, the Special Censorate maintained Mail Censorship Offices in Fuzhou and 
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Xiamen to oversee the activities of censors in the surrounding rural counties.  When Japanese 
activities in Xiamen became too threatening, the Mail Censorship Office moved to Zhangzhou 
from where it directly controlled Chen and his activities.  Chen’s main duty was to carry out 
censorship of mail matter written by Japanese, known collaborators, traitors, and other 
objectionable groups.  He worked from 4 p.m. everyday opening letters and inspecting their 
contents in a hidden room inside the post office.  After inspecting the contents of a letter, Chen 
placed his censorship mark, in his case a small “S,” on top of the stamp, which was then 
obliterated by a postal employee with the goal of hiding the mark.  If and when traitorous 
material was found, Chen carefully copied the contents of the letters and forwarded them to the 
Zhangzhou Office for final decision.  If ordered, Chen destroyed the traitorous letter and the 
Zhangzhou Office forwarded its copy to the Special Censorate in Chongqing for filing and 
intelligence purposes.
175
 
Postal employees in occupied areas cooperated fully with censors appointed by the 
Chongqing-based National Government, but used go-slow or obstructionist methods, as much as 
possible without endangering themselves, with censors placed by the Japanese or collaborationist 
governments.  The Japanese censors frequently objected to post office regulations requiring all 
opened letters to be duly marked as censored, especially in places like Nanjing where they 
inspected between 80 and 90 percent of all letters.  In October 1940, the Japanese Gendarmerie 
in Nanjing physically threatened the foreign Jiangsu Postal Director, an effective threat given the 
Japanese arrest and detention of several postal workers in other districts, to keep quiet about their 
activities.
176
  Some of the more rapacious Japanese censors based in small towns harassed 
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postmasters demanding expensive gifts – a scroll signed by Li Hongzhang in one case – as well 
as tobacco, wine money, and luxurious dinners.
177
  Some postal employees, including the well-
known essayist Tang Tao (唐弢), publicly complained about Japanese censorship, but most of 
the staff remained cordial, if appropriately distant.
178
 
The sum total of letters seized by the Chongqing, Japanese, and collaborationist 
governments during eight years of war must have run into the millions, which was still only a 
tiny fraction of the 6.3 billion pieces of mail matter handled by the Post Office over this 
period.
179
  Although no cumulative statistics on mail matter seized have ever been found, each 
Head Office did maintain detailed figures in their seizure memos, which were records of all 
mails confiscated by the censors in local post offices and forwarded to each Head Office at the 
end of every month.  For example, out of 7.5 million letters handled by post offices in occupied 
and unoccupied Anhui in 1942, employees of the Special Censorate and local military units 
confiscated twenty thousand individual letters for various reasons.
180
 
The web of wartime censorship remains difficult to untangle, but several aspects 
demonstrate important changes in the development of postal censorship.  The introduction and 
widespread application of prepublication censorship of newspapers, magazines, and books 
during the war fundamentally altered the role of the post office within the complex, interrelated 
censorship network.  Wartime necessity and the proliferation of different types of censoring 
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institutions pushed the Post Office towards specializing in the inspection of letter mails.  Instead 
of seditious content, postal censors sought “traitorous” information contained within private 
letters, especially as it related to military operations.  As the war progressed, the number of 
institutions who could place censors in post offices also expanded to include thousands of 
military censors.  Not only did the Chongqing government appoint censors during the war, but so 
did the Japanese and North China regimes.  The rather unusual administrative position of the 
Directorate vis-à-vis its offices in occupied China wherein the Directorate maintained actual 
control until late 1943, and nominal control until 1945, forced postal administrators to forge ad 
hoc agreements with the occupation authorities permitting the installation of enemy censors in a 
Chinese government institution, but such arrangements also permitted the Chongqing 
government to place secret censors in offices in the occupied areas.   
 
Postal Censorship during the Civil War, 1945-1949 
After the Japanese surrender the confused state of government affairs, the constant movement of 
troops, and major reforms and administrative adjustments inside the Post Office make it difficult 
to determine the exact nature or general features of older forms of postal censorship.  Starting in 
January 1947, the National Government apparently stopped banning specific publications.  
Instead, all mail, not just suspicious letters or seditious publications, passing into Communist 
areas had to be strictly censored.
181
  By August, when the Communist military forces started 
gaining momentum, the National Government abandoned attempts to censor the mail and 
instituted a total postal blockade of all communist-held areas.
182
  After blockading the north for a 
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solid year, public pressure began to increase on the government.  The Post Office, too, asked the 
central government to re-open postal communications to “meet the needs of the public.”183  
Nationalist and Communist representatives finally met at the North-South Postal Communication 
Conference in Beiping in April 1949 to create a working procedure for the exchange of mails, 
including the elimination of postal censorship.  Continuing reverses on the battlefield, however, 
and the retreat of most Nationalist offices to Guangzhou in mid-1949 forced the Executive Yuan 
to abrogate the conference agreements and reinstitute the blockade, which remained in effect in 
Nationalist held areas on the mainland until January 1950.
184
 
 
Conclusion 
Between 1903 and 1949 the Post Office gradually became the most important censorship 
institution within the government for policing the public sphere.  The advent and spread of 
modern publishing required the late Qing, Beiyang, warlord, and Nationalist governments to 
restructure themselves in order to fully utilize the Post Office to place institutional controls on 
the circulation of seditious or objectionable printed matter.  Starting with the transformation of 
the late imperial state into a ministerial-style government, the New Policies reformers began 
creating the necessary legal mechanisms for defining legitimate speech, established a 
bureaucratic hierarchy within the censorship regime, promulgated postal regulations to carry out 
censorship, and assigned responsibility for policing the public sphere. 
The creation of this rational-legal censorship regime in the late Qing began the long-term 
transition from violent to generally non-violent means of censorship.  From the state’s 
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perspective, violent forms of suppression are best suited to silencing individuals or small 
revolutionary groups.  As the public sphere continued to develop in the late Qing and early 
Republic with the spread of modern media forms like newspapers, magazines, and books, the 
state increasingly relied on the Post Office to censor seditious speech.  In the late Qing and under 
Yuan Shikai, the government targeted radical groups expressly advocating the overthrow of the 
government; however, during the warlord years, the rulers of Beijing structured their 
administrative practices to allow the Ministry of Communications to be used by any local 
militarist to suppress locally-defined sedition.  With the establishment of the Nationalist Party-
State in 1927, the Propaganda Bureau of the Central Executive Committee became the primary 
institution defining legitimate speech.  Not surprisingly, the Bureau used its powers to target 
ideological enemies such as the Communists, anarchists, and the fascistic Youth Party.   
Along with attempts to ban its ideological enemies from the  public sphere, the National 
Government also regularized the use of temporary postal bans against commercial and foreign-
language publications.  Such bans were usually imposed for specific offensive articles.  By 
suspending the postal privileges of offending publishers, the National Government was using 
censorship to economically punish its critics.  Public reactions to such tactics were was split 
between Chinese and foreigners.  While Chinese publishers tended to remain silent for fear of 
further reprisals, foreigners publicly complained about the censorship – even though it was both 
legal and avoided infringing on extraterritorial rights – through discourses describing the 
Nationalist regime as corrupt (inconsistent) and personalist (heavy-handed).  It is these 
discourses, rather than research through the relevant institutions, that have continued to shape 
our perceptions of censorship in the Nanjing decade. 
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During the War of Resistance, the National Government reorganized itself elevating the 
Military Affairs Commission to the most powerful political office in the country.  Under the 
Military Affairs Commission, Jiang Jieshi created a host of new censorship institutions.  Within 
this new censorship regime, the function of the Post Office changed dramatically.  With other 
government institutions conducting prepublication inspections of printed matter – relieving the 
Post Office from censoring newspapers and magazines – censors placed in the Post Office by 
outside institutions focused their work on inspecting private mail matter for “traitorous” 
information.  With the need to inspect hundreds of millions of letters each year, the government 
granted wide-ranging powers to local civilian and military offices to place such censors in post 
offices.   Because of the unusual administrative presence of the Directorate in the occupied 
zones, the Japanese military and North China collaborationist regimes could also place their 
censors in the Post Office.  The Special Censorate, in charge of wartime postal censorship, also 
took advantage of the situation by placing secret censors in post offices in occupied China.  Even 
with an expanded cadre of local censors, however, officials could not begin to inspect the 
billions of articles of mail matter passing through the Post Office during eight years of war.   
The historiographical construct of Chinese censorship in the early twentieth century as 
both heavy and sporadic, this chapter has also shown, derives from a reliance on statements from 
the censored authors.  There were particular moments of “heavy” formal censorship, notably the 
Yuan Shikai era and the first years of Nationalist rule, but the amount of material censored 
remained fairly constant over the entire period as a tiny fraction of the published material 
circulating throughout the country.  Indeed, far more effective than any form of censorship in 
early twentieth-century China was the threat it implied forcing writers and publishers to silence 
or censor themselves.   
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Chapter 6 
Advertising, Publicity, and Uniformed Bodies: 
The Institutional Identity of the Chinese Post Office 
 
In the late Qing and throughout the Republican period the inception and development of new 
state administrative institutions like the Post Office coincided with the emergence of various 
innovative practices broadly related to publicity, or what later came to be called public relations, 
helping to simultaneously create new notions of institution building and state formation.  Prior to 
the late nineteenth century, Chinese views on limited government and state secrecy meant that 
imperial institutions paid little attention to creating institutional identities, publishing extensive 
information on their activities, or advertising their functions and services.  In direct response to 
the growth of a public sphere and as part of larger global and local trends towards “good 
government” – that is, increasing levels of government accountability to its citizenry – we begin 
to detect a subtle but growing sensitivity in China to the values of government transparency and 
the dissemination of information to the public.   
In studies of the Chinese public sphere, scholars have focused exclusively on the 
formation of the public sphere in civil society overlooking the state’s reaction to these 
developments – notwithstanding direct responses to specific local grievances – through its own 
structural reforms and use of innovative practices.
1
  As social groups and elites who agitated for 
political and economic reforms began spreading new types of information, and sought to 
discursively attack the various state regimes, these governments responded with their own 
publicity campaigns through the creation of statistical bureaux, government information offices, 
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government-run news agencies, propaganda or “publicity” offices, the publication of government 
and ministerial gazettes, the hiring of foreign public relations experts, the empanelling of special 
commissions to report on “social problems,” and so on.  Modern notions of government 
openness and transparency materialized, and were partially fostered by, contemporary 
advertising practices, new conceptions of institutional identity, an appreciation of the value of 
public information, and fresh perspectives on the relationship between state-making and public 
opinion.  In other words, the late Qing and Republican states began to understand the value of a 
sophisticated and systematic communications system of public relations to the pursuit of their 
political agenda of establishing viable administrative institutions, and, concomitantly, the 
modern state. 
 Most studies of institution building focus on internal bureaucratization, the socialization 
of institutional members, and the creation of an organizational culture.
2
  These Weberian-
inspired studies have correctly pointed out the importance of centralization, physical control over 
the territory of the state, state autonomy from interest groups, and internationally-recognized 
sovereignty over the areas claimed by the state as vital to the development of a “legitimate” state.  
While some of these studies have noted the importance of relations between government 
institutions, they have largely ignored the interrelationship between a broadly defined publicity- 
and publicly-oriented “media” and institution building as a contributory factor in the creation of 
the modern state. 
As both a new government institution in the late Qing responding to the public sphere 
and an institution finely-attuned to the importance of communications, the modern Chinese Post 
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 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated, edited, and introduced by H. H. Gerth and C. 
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Office provides an excellent avenue to approach the complex relations between the public, state-
sponsored public relations, and institutional identity as they emerged in the twentieth century.
3
  
The Post Office is one of the more peculiar institutions of the modern state in that it requires a 
corporate identity immediately recognizable to the public in order to create consumer confidence 
in the state’s ability to efficiently handle a wide range of customer services while protecting the 
inviolability of the mails.  Considering that modern postal services were all but foreign to the 
vast majority of Chinese, a positive corporate identity and the values it expressed played a 
significant role in the acceptance and development of postal business and the perception of Post 
Office as an effective branch of the state.   
From its inception, the Post Office faced the considerable task of building an institutional 
identity.  Institutional identity consists of three main criteria – a claimed set of central 
characteristics, a claimed distinctiveness from similar organizations, and a claimed temporal 
continuity.
4
  The Post Office’s corporate identity helped it foster a favorable public reputation by 
fulfilling these three criteria.  The ways in which the Post Office “advertised” its corporate 
identity to the public – as well as engaged the public sphere within civil society – included yearly 
institutional reports, direct print advertising, signage, and public announcements as well as a 
whole host of visual and written “media” including corporate ephemera, the use of institutional 
colors, the uniformed bodies of mailmen, the vehicles used by the Post Office, the iconography 
of stamps and slogans of commemorative postmarks, the architectural styles of post offices, and 
postal flags.  
                                                 
3
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guided the following discussion include: Richard S. Tedlow, Keeping the Corporate Image: Public Relations and 
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4
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This chapter will focus specifically on the construction of the Post Office’s corporate 
identity through the yearly Working Reports, advertising, its use of color branding, the uniforms 
worn by postal workers, and behavioral regulations for postal staff.  These various “media” – 
print, color, clothing, and bodies – were just some of the ways the Post Office engaged the 
public.  Overall, the Post Office’s efforts at broadly-defined public relations aimed at fostering a 
public perception of and reputation for the Post Office as modern, competitive, innovative, 
efficient, service-oriented, and trustworthy.  Postal officials created continuous and repeated 
associations between the Post Office and certain symbols, colors, and values to construct this 
unique and enduring corporate identity.  
 
The Background of the Working Reports 
The dual challenges of Western encroachment and internal rebellion in the nineteenth century 
pushed an ever growing segment of Chinese officialdom towards reform.  While the general 
shape of the subsequent reform periods is well known – the Tongzhi Restoration (1862-1874) 
bleeding over into the longer Self-Strengthening Movement (1862-1895) followed by the brief 
Hundred Days’ Reforms (1898) and concluding with the New Policies Reforms (1901-1911) – 
what has often been overlooked in histories of these various efforts was the need for and 
production of information by the government.
5
  As in European history, the advent of 
government reforms coincided with growing appetite for information, or more accurate 
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information, on the condition of the country – its population, its trades, its land, its tax base, and 
so on.  
Historians of Europe remain conflicted over the exact origins of this information 
revolution.  Paul Slack sees the rise of “political arithmetic,” or the reasoned use of figures for 
things related to government, in seventeenth century England as the “pioneering phase” in the 
modern use of information. With a slightly different emphasis, Daniel Headrick argues that 
“information technologies” only “came of age” in the eighteenth century when various 
techniques such as graphs, statistical tables, and encyclopedia were created to manage large 
amounts of information in rather simple forms.  Edward Higgs pushes the rise of the 
“Information State” to the late Victorian period when declining British global hegemony forced 
the government to utilize information for social control.
6
  In the Qing, the demand for 
systematically collected data and statistics went hand-in-hand with broader efforts to modernize 
the empire at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 The last two decades of the Qing dynasty saw an explosion in the collection, production, 
and use of information.  During Court Reforms of 1895-98, the Guangxu Emperor authorized the 
establishment of a central government printing office and other reformers founded at least 62 
others.
7
  During the reform summer of 1898, one historian claims, Kang Youwei’s main activity 
was not carrying out reforms, but “supplying information” collected from abroad and around the 
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country in support of his ideas.
8
  The vast amounts of information Kang presented to the 
Guangxu Emperor was not randomly produced, but carefully selected to advocate needed 
reforms.  That summer the Guangxu Emperor also authorized the publication of new-style 
government newspapers.   
At the beginning of the New Policies Reforms in 1901, Yuan Shikai began publishing the 
first widely-read new-style government gazette to “spread information, enlighten opinions, and 
improve communications.”9  Called the Northern Ocean Official Gazette (北洋官報), Yuan’s 
magazine continued to contain official government news, as the centuries-old dibao 
(Metropolitan Gazette, 邸報) had done, but also disseminated information on foreign news, 
politics, scholarship, contemporary affairs, industry, and other topics.  It became the new “voice 
of the government.”10  It was, as one historian puts it, innovative in “making public” all 
legislation to the citizenry.
11
   
Yuan’s gazette inaugurated what Roswell Britton called a “guanbao vogue” that swept 
the country.
12
  Over the next decade nearly one hundred government gazettes appeared.
13
  
Various explanations can be offered for this “vogue” – government competition with the private 
press, as reformist vehicles for creating a public constituency against government conservatives, 
to coordinate reform efforts, or to inform the citizenry in preparation for constitutional rule.  As 
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the generalist new-style government gazettes proliferated newly-established central government 
ministries also started publishing more narrowly self-interested gazettes on their activities.  In 
1906, the newly-established Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce immediately 
started publishing the Commercial Affairs Official Gazette, the Ministry of Education established 
the Ministry of Education Gazette, and the Ministry of Posts and Communications started issuing 
the Communications Gazette.  What we seen, then, is a gradual shift from general government 
gazettes to ministerial gazettes.
14
   
Coinciding with the appearance of the gazettes, all types of information-gathering and 
disseminating institutions were established such as statistical and information offices, sociology 
departments, a new census bureau, cartographic societies, weather monitoring stations, chambers 
of commerce, news agencies, inspection teams, and public relations offices.  The new emphasis 
on information stemmed from the now prevalent assumption that to govern effectively, the state 
must have better knowledge of the country and its people.  Epitomizing this new need for 
information, He Minhun, the Nationalist Party-appointed mayor of Nanjing in 1927 wrote, “In 
order to improve the lives of the people, build a state, and revive the nation, we must first 
understand social conditions.  In order to understand social conditions we must first conduct 
surveys.”15 
From the early Tongzhi period through the early years of the Republic constitutes the first 
stage in the so-called information revolution in China.  Massive amounts of information were 
assembled and disseminated through all sorts of government, public, and private institutions.  
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New forms of information systems were introduced like statistics, graphs, maps, encyclopedia, 
modern dictionaries, public archives, and photographic series.  The importance and efforts of the 
government to collect all kinds information suggests that information itself became fetishized – 
that simply collecting it was a “public good.”  On an individual basis, each of the information-
packed government gazettes and reports contains qualitative narratives and quantitative statistics 
professing institutional origins, ideology, operational rationale, and identity making them the 
best source to study corporate institutional identity in Republican China. 
 
The Working Reports, Public Information, and Corporate Identity 
From 1904 to 1943, the Post Office published its Reports on the Working of the Chinese Post 
Office (中國郵政事務總論) containing qualitative descriptions and quantitative evidence on the 
general state of the Post Office and its development.
16
  This form of a publicly available report 
on the progress of a state institution probably originated with the Imperial Maritime Customs 
Service when they started issuing a wide range of trade reports in the 1850s.
17
  The annual 
Working Reports were published in a large format (8½” x 11”), on imported heavily bonded 
paper, and printed in English, Chinese, and bilingual editions with high-quality photographs and 
copious statistics, tables, and graphs.  Most significantly, the Inspectorate made the Working 
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Reports available for purchase at all Post Offices indicating their goals of informing and 
influencing the public and governmental perception of the Post Office.  
The Working Reports served several important functions.  As a form of public relations, 
they contained a fairly consistent narrative arch making them a manifestation of institutional 
identity.  They also informed both the public and government of postal progress to demonstrate 
the value of the Post Office as the communications institution holding together the empire/state.  
Finally, they provided government officials and researchers with statistical evidence of the 
growth of the postal network.  In other words, they were a form of publicity designed to provide 
information “in the public interest.”  The Directorate did not publish a catalog of all postal 
happenings or statistics, but purposefully collected, selected, and manipulated both their 
narratives and statistics in order to, among other things, create and shape a manifestly positive 
identity for the Post Office by repeatedly emphasizing the qualities of progress (“extension,” in 
postal terms), competitiveness, efficiency, innovation, and uniqueness.  The Working Reports, to 
borrow Ricour’s apt phrase, were “a synthesis of the heterogeneous” crafting an intelligible story 
of modernization and institutional growth out of the total of postal events.
18
   
 
The Structure of the Working Reports 
The narrative structure of the Working Reports consists of two symbiotic sections plotting the 
development of the Chinese Post Office as a triumphalist march towards modernization and the 
creation of a modern Chinese nation-state.  The discursive structure utilized both qualitative 
narratives describing postal progress and quantitative statistical series verifying, but magnifying, 
the narratives.  Each of these representational forms – narrative and statistics – measured and 
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constructed reality in different ways seeking to convince different reading publics, or the same 
reading publics in different ways, of the value and identity of the Post Office.  The narratives and 
statistics of the Working Reports thus, in Hayden White’s terms, gave an “illusory coherence” to 
postal history and identity.
19
 
 The narratives embodied in the Working Reports are structured to work through 
persuasion.  They engage their reading public by making “rational” arguments demonstrating the 
positive qualities of the Post Office while supporting its conclusions by using the rhetorical 
device of human interest stories.  For example, a discussion of parcel post expansion is supported 
by mention of parcels sent by a German hair-net business in Shandong in 1910 received prepared 
hair from Germany or a rise in money orders as a result of the Chinese Labor Corps operating in 
Europe during World War I.
20
  
Supporting the narratives throughout the Working Reports are numerous “objective” 
quantifiers such as enumerated figures, statistical tables, and illustrative graphs, each functioning 
differently in the narratives.  Enumerated figures reveal fairly straightforward conclusions – 
4,958 letters seized from the Minxinju in 1923 as against 5,425 in 1922; therefore, the Post 
Office is effectively undercutting its main competitor.  Statistical tables, something relatively 
new in Chinese history, condensed large numbers of figures into simple comparative and readily 
comprehensible formats.
21
  The statistical tables in the Working Reports, usually arranged in a 
time series and broken down by postal district, gave “objective” evidence supporting narrative 
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conclusions, allowed geographical patterns to emerge, and helped demonstrate larger conclusions 
that would otherwise have remained inchoate in the narratives.  The final step in the Post 
Office’s use of numbers was to introduce diagrams and graphs in 1917.  The significance of 
diagrams and graphs stems from their transformation of statistics and numbers into visual images 
making them more memorable, accessible, and comprehensible to the public.  
Over the course of the Working Reports, the functional relationship between narratives 
and statistics remained consistent, but their relative percentages reversed.  Up to 1910 about two-
thirds of the Working Reports consisted of sweeping narratives punctuated with examples from 
various districts.  As early as 1906 the narratives start being divided according to region (e.g. 
North China) and topic (e.g. Routes).  In 1913 national narratives give way to more detailed 
accounts by postal district (界) “to show in a clearer manner the work done.”22  The percentage 
of statistical tables also starts to increase.  In 1917 the Directorate split the Reports into three 
parts – an overview with some statistics, district reports, and statistical tables and graphs – that 
“affords a better arrangement and one more convenient for reference.”23  From the late 1910s, 
then, the Reports began shifting away from long narratives in favor of topical reports with 
enumerated figures, shorter district reports, and more statistical tables.  Starting in 1920 the 
Directorate decided to add statistical tables to each district report “to make each district’s 
activities and accomplishments clearer,” but still maintained a separate section on national 
statistics.
24
  In 1930 when the Directorate switched from calendar to fiscal year reports the 
provincial narratives were dropped in favor of more statistics and graphs.  By the mid-1930s the 
Working Reports contained only the briefest of narratives followed entirely by detailed 
information on various aspects of postal development (e.g. Air-Mail Lines) with the remainder of 
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the report, two-thirds, given entirely over to statistical tables, diagrams, and graphs.  The 
growing importance of statistics is also attested to by the Post Office’s publication of several 
volumes of them.
25
   
The prevalence of statistics over narratives by the late 1920s and early 1930s indicates 
several long-term trends.  The gradual stabilization and continued dissemination of the 
Directorate’s narrative of postal history and identity characteristics allowed it to focus more on 
“objective” evidence to reinforce pre-existing popular notions of its identity.  The reliance on 
statistics itself was part of a growing acknowledgement by both the general public and 
government officials on the truth effects of “objective” numbers.  The structure of statistical 
tables as time series, minimally covering several years, also helped overcome the inherent 
weakness of narratives that only evaluated a single year’s progress.  As the Post Office matured 
it became more bureaucratized and impersonal thus reducing the necessity for biographic-like 
narratives to define itself.  Although bureaucratization and institutionalization usually require 
more intense communication between management and labor, or institution and public, the Post 
Office addressed these needs not through the Working Reports, but in other types of publications 
aimed at “informing” their various publics like official and semi-official magazines.26 
 
Narratives in the Working Reports 
The “content” of corporate postal identity in the Working Reports relies on the repeated use of 
thematic elements to emphasize its central characteristics.  Nowhere does the Post Office 
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specifically discuss its identity, but by studying its repeated use of keywords, narrative 
structuring, and rhetorical techniques we can determine a small number of self-defining themes 
related to postal identity consistently recycled in the Working Reports.  The keywords and broad 
themes found time and again are progress, competition, innovation, efficiency, and uniqueness.   
Key to understanding any identity – institutional or otherwise – are self-constructed 
origin narratives.  Twice in the history of the Working Reports, in the first issue in 1904 and on 
the 25
th
 anniversary of the Post Office in 1921, the Post Office published a history of its 
founding and early development.  Both origin narratives in the Working Reports emphasize 
Robert Hart as the founder of the Imperial Post Office.  The text of the 1904 version closely 
follows overviews of postal pre-history written by Hart himself in 1886 and 1896.
27
  The 
narratives argue that the carriage of Legation mails by the newly-established Zongli Yamen in 
the 1860s proved too onerous for that young institution.  The Yamen “found it convenient” to 
transfer these duties to the Imperial Maritime Customs Service.  The duties attendant upon 
handling the Legation mails forced Hart to create Postal Departments (郵務處) in various 
Customs Houses.  The success of the Customs in handling this small amount of mail somehow 
“commended itself” to the Yamen, the narratives argue, as the kernel of a nation-wide system.  
During the negotiations to resolve the famous Margary Affair in 1876, the Yamen authorized 
Hart to inform British Minister Sir Thomas Wade that it was willing to sanction the 
establishment of a national postal service if a postal clause could be inserted into the final 
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version of the Qufu Convention.
28
  An unexplained “conspiracy of silence” by the British, 
however, thwarted Hart’s plans.29  Hart was then buoyed by a promise from Zhili Viceroy Li 
Hongzhang who would “father” the idea of a modern postal service “after it proved a success.”  
Hart then turned over control of the Customs Post, as it was soon to be known, to Tianjin 
Customs Commissioner Gustav Detring, who not only continued the postal experiment, but 
helped found the short lived Sino-Foreign Letter Office (華洋書信館) (1878-1882) for Chinese 
correspondence.
30
  Over the next twenty years Hart continued to recommend the creation of a 
national postal system to the government, but with the Qing unwilling to “undertake national 
responsibilities” his overtures fell on deaf ears.  Finally in 1896, although the narratives 
studiously avoid mentioning why, the Guangxu Emperor issued an Imperial Decree establishing 
the Imperial Post Office “to be organized on Western lines” under the administration of Hart, 
who now became Inspector General of Posts. 
 Hart immediately confronted significant challenges, the narratives contend.  The Qing 
government failed to give him the legal authority, financial support, or state monopoly the task 
necessitated.  Instead, the infant Service was faced with powerfully entrenched bureaucratic 
interests supporting the “immemorial” postal relay system and the commercially-popular 
Minxinju, both of whom “girded up their loins” for the coming competition.  To overcome these 
entrenched interests, Hart with the “pace of the tortoise” and “prescient perspicacity,” slowly 
undermined support for the postal relay system and Minxinju.  By his retirement, Hart had laid 
the foundation of the Imperial Post Office as a successful national institution. 
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 The above narratives on the origin of the Imperial Post Office is significant for postal 
identity in a number of ways.  The narratives make Robert Hart, probably the most well-known 
foreign civil servant in the late Qing, the central character who is represented as a singular 
visionary with the audacity to create a large-scale national institution in the midst of complicated 
processes of industrialization and centralization. Mythologizing and lionizing Hart as an 
“inventor hero,” a narrative trope originating during the English Industrial Revolution, helped 
dramatize institutional developments yet distill them in understandable personal terms.  Postal 
Secretary Théophile Piry (1851-1917) and Co-Director General Henri Picard-Destelan (1878-?), 
who authored the origin narratives, reduced the great complexities of the founding and 
development of the Post Office to the hagiographic figure of a foreign bureaucratic hero who not 
only understood and appreciated the fundamental role of communications in the modern world, 
but who could look beyond the parochial views and corrupt practices of Chinese officials to 
create what China needed, rather than what it wanted.   
The foreign administrators of the Post Office implicitly sought to shape the parameters of 
popular conceptions and historical work on the establishment of the Post Office through their 
origin narratives.
31
  With the postal archives closed, the origin narratives in the Working Reports 
constituted the only authoritative source on the early years of postal history.
32
  Both the popular 
contemporary press and early historical works incorporated wholesale the Post Office’s own 
origin narratives emphasizing Hart’s long-term efforts within the Qing bureaucracy to foster a 
national post.
33
  Hart did lobby for the establishment of a national postal service, but only 
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teleologically was he the “father” of the Post Office.  A significant number of suggestions to 
create a modern postal service came from Qing officials and reformers, as discussed in Chapter 
3.  Nor was mention made in the origin narratives of the suggested possibilities of transforming 
Guo Songtao’s (郭嵩燾) Central Office for Government Despatches (文報總局), established in 
1878, into a national service, or copying the modern postal service created by the Taiwan 
Governor Liu Mingchuan (劉銘傳), or grafting it on to the postal relay system.  Hart was not the 
founder of the Post Office or even the key decision-maker.  Even the Treaty Port press credited 
Zhang Zhidong with the establishment of the Post Office.
34
  From the moment Postal 
Departments appeared in 1878, Hart had delegated almost all authority to a number of Customs 
Commissioners like Detring and Henry Kopsch.  Hart admitted in 1899 that he could no longer 
pay any attention to postal work.
35
  Instead, Postal Secretaries Kopsch, Jules A. van Aalst, and 
Piry would formulate and carry out all important policies.  The postal origin narratives try to 
influence the historical record by crediting Hart to the exclusion of Chinese officials and Postal 
Secretaries.  The narratives simplify and personalize an otherwise complex and impersonal 
process by numerous people, Chinese and foreign, working on the idea of a national post office.  
Complexity and impersonal process, however, are found in the key elements of postal identity – 
progress, competition, innovation, efficiency, and uniqueness. 
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Progress as institutional growth, or “extension” in postal terms, is probably the most 
important and oft-repeated theme of identity highlighted in the Working Reports.  The term used 
in the Chinese-language version of the Reports is the neologism “kuokai” (擴開) meaning both 
“expansion” and “opening” as in post roads, but often used generally to refer to the progressive 
development of the entire Service.  Virtually all Working Reports begin with an overview of the 
year’s activities emphasizing “progress” over the previous year.  The Post Office used two 
common rhetorical techniques to convey this idea.  First, announcements of progress were 
presaged with various obstacles overcome – to suggest, as in the 1921 Report – “adverse 
conditions were only strengthening the Postal fabric.”  Or, “the conditions during the year were 
far from being favorable to postal enterprise and progress,” but there were “advances recorded in 
all directions,” as stated the 1913 Report.  A random sample of “every manner of hampering 
restriction” overcome by the Post Office would include outbreaks of plague, currency 
destabilization, warlord conflicts, natural disasters, and war with Japan.  The 1924 Report put it 
succinctly, “The history of the Chinese Postal Service has ever been a record of advancement in 
face of difficulties, and obstacles successfully overcome.”  The second rhetorical technique was 
to reiterate Hart’s festina lente policy demonstrating the Post Office’s slow, cautious approach to 
expansion – the 1923 Report characterizes the Post Office as “quietly and methodically 
progressing” and others mention the Post Office’s “quiet methods and steady progress” (1910), 
its “peaceful penetration,” (1921), and avoidance of “any tendency to overtax its strength by 
abnormal expansion” (1912).  Only in the 1930s with rising postal deficits is there a new 
emphasis on “a policy of retrenchment,” “radical reforms,” and “strenuous efforts” towards 
progress.  Suffice it to say, anything “significantive of progress” (1902) is noted in the Reports. 
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The theme of progress was central to postal identity not only as a singular positive 
quality, but also as a contributing factor to its competitiveness.  The rhetorical devise used to 
emphasize competitiveness is to mention government and commercial obstacles overcome.  The 
Qing government’s decision to withhold a postal monopoly from the Imperial Post Office forced 
it into competition with the other five existing postal services – the postal relay system, the 
Minxinju, the Qiaopiju, Wenbaoju, and the Foreign Post Offices.  The Post Office often couched 
its policies and decisions in terms of competition with one of these postal services.  Extension of 
routes, for example, was designed to supplant the “antiquated” postal relay system” (1921).  The 
Minxinju were constantly on the “war-path” and when verbal “cajolery” failed the Post Office 
drastically cut its postage rates “as the only way to kill competition.”  “It is through competition 
and long and persevering efforts,” the Report states for 1904, “that the [other postal] systems 
must be gradually superseded.”  The Post Office honed its competitive edge by constantly 
introducing new services: insured parcels and letters to protect business users, a “late-posting” 
system for steamer mails, an “express” service for the speedy delivery of letters, and a system of 
special collectors who made rounds to all large commercial firms past midnight to challenge the 
Minxinju.  The theme of competitiveness portrayed the Post Office as a streamlined, efficient 
institution that used a variety of methods to improve its public services while undermining its 
self-interested or profit-driven competitors. 
A third feature of postal identity was innovation.  Innovations – the creation of new 
services – signified the modern and progressive orientation of the Post Office.  The Post Office 
offered “not a few innovations” resulting in a dizzying array of specialized services tailored to 
different clientele.
36
  Signaling this trope were often self-congratulatory statements stating the 
innovations were “for the benefit of the common people” or “for the convenience of the public.”  
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In addition to the examples mentioned above, a few examples of the more unique innovations 
will suffice.  Upon demand for lower rates by large newspaper concerns in 1904, the Post Office 
introduced a three-class system of newspaper rates offering well-established newspapers with 
large circulation figures financial discounts.
37
  The Working Reports rationalized the decision by 
arguing discount newspaper rates were “for the benefit of inland places where civilization is 
backward and business stagnant.”  For the same reason, the Directorate later began accepting 
magazine subscriptions and selling books through all Post Offices.
38
  In 1922 the Post Office 
adopted internationally-recognized photo identification cards to facilitate banking, overseas 
travel, and other activities requiring identification.
39
  Other innovations included the sale of 
special “judicial stamps” to pay legal fines, a Legal Attest Letter system by which duplicate 
copies of letters could be deposited at Post Offices, and a system for delivering judicial writs.
40
  
In order to facilitate the transmission of facsimile reproductions of drawings and signatures, the 
Directorate experimentally introduced telautograph machines, the precursor to the modern fax, in 
1927.  After World War II, postal innovations rapidly multiplied including Mobile Post Offices, 
Postal Kiosks, 24-hour Post Offices, letter writing services for the illiterate, and Holiday Post 
Offices that never closed.
41
  These innovations often proved financially taxing, but 
considerations of reputation and identity trumped purely economic concerns.  As the Directorate 
put it, “Although the Post Office has economic and other difficulties, it will continually seek 
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improvement and expansion through innovative measures and the promotion of extensive plans 
to serve the public need in order to secure its goodwill.”42   
Innovations in external services were often buttressed by improvements in internal 
working methods, which in the parlance of institutional identity refers to efficiency, scientific 
management, and clear hierarchical organization.  Unlike many institutions that did not publicize 
changes in their internal working rules, the Post Office referred to many of their procedural 
changes and improvements in the Working Reports showing themselves “the pride and model of 
efficiency.”43  Efficiency as a theme of postal identity referred to such varied activities as 
improvements in accounting methods, district reorganization, establishing an inspection system, 
simplifying statistics, creating a Postal Supply Department, standardizing weights, and 
introducing new types of postal forms.  All of these improvements, noted the Working Reports, 
were a “strong coefficient of the various Service undertakings that make for efficiency and 
economy.”44 
Efficiency also referred to the phenomenon of economizing in material used to conduct 
postal business.  Beginning in 1917, and lasting until 1943, the Working Reports carried a special 
section on “Equipment”.  This section was dedicated to discussing both the material purchased 
and items manufactured by the Directorate.  For example, the 1931-1932 Report informs the 
reader that gunny sacks were previously used to despatch mails, but because they were 
“uneconomical” canvas bags were substituted.  Other reports, such as that for 1936-1937, 
provide a laundry list of items issued by the Supply Department: 18 Night watchman’s clocks, 
76,733½ yards of green jeans for making postal uniforms, 103,950 gallons of gasoline 
consumed, and so on.  While such figures seem to simply indicate the activities of the Supply 
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Department, the details and specifics provided suggest a more significant purpose within the 
narrative structure of the Working Reports.  This purpose is to indicate efficiency and economy 
thus proving the Directorate’s conservative financial credentials by displaying exact figures for 
materials used.  As Minister of Communications Wang Boqun declared in 1927, “Service to the 
public requires that the importance of efficiency and economy should be fully emphasized.  The 
public should, therefore, be given the best possible service through the elimination of corrupt and 
wasteful practices.”45 
The last theme of identity found scattered throughout the Working Reports is the Post 
Office’s unique mission – a mission conceptualized not only from the perspective of a 
communications system, but also through individual services rendered.  The Post Office 
envisioned its primary mission to create a national network bringing every city, town, and village 
into contact with each other and the wider world, especially during the centrifugal warlord years.  
As the Directorate wrote in 1921, “It is impossible to conceive to what extent the course of the 
country’s history during the past decade would have varied had not the National Post 
existed….The unifying influence of the National Post is undeniable.”  The result of this mission, 
in the words of Minister of Communications Zhu Jiahua (朱家驊), was that “a community of 
feeling has developed between one province and another.”46  The creation of a nationwide 
network was only the preliminary step to serving the public by transmitting its mail matter.  The 
transmission of mail matter, argued the Working Reports, fulfilled many ancillary goals.  The 
carriage of newspapers, for example, “denotes a striking movement in the intellectual and 
education development of this wonderful country” (1910).  Particularly important was the 
extension of rural delivery to bring “cultural influences of the outer world to isolated groups of 
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folks” (1921) and “foster cultural development” at inland places (1934-1935).  The Post Office 
also perceived its unique mission to provide safe and convenient financial services like money 
orders to the lower classes keeping them free from “risk and capricious exactions” by money 
forwarding agencies like the Minxinju, Shanxi banks, and other money shops.  The Post Office 
started offering savings accounts in 1919 to “encourage thrift” among the populace.47  Thrift and 
financial protection also motivated the introduction of Postal Simple Life Insurance in 1935, 
which was designed to “extend the benefits of life insurance to people of small means.”48   
 The Working Reports served several functions in the formation of a corporate postal 
identity.  First, their incorporation of both qualitative narratives and quantitative statistics 
portrayed the Post Office as an open and informative institution providing wide-ranging and 
important information in the public interest.  Second, they created a particular kind of origin 
story crediting Robert Hart as the sole “inventor” of the modern Chinese postal service in order 
to personalize and simplify a complex and otherwise impersonal bureaucracy.  Third, they 
repeatedly emphasized certain characteristics such as progressiveness (i.e. “extension”), 
competitiveness, innovativeness, efficiency, and uniqueness as the core characteristics of postal 
identity with each being framed within the concept of public service.  The North China Herald 
put it succinctly, “The service is efficient, progressive, and enterprising.”49  The Working 
Reports, however, were only one print medium through which the Post Office distributed its 
identity. 
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Advertising and Publicizing Identity: “Public Information” and the Post Office  
While many late Qing and Republican era government institutions ignored advertising, new-style 
communications systems controlled by the state like the Post Office, the telegraphs, the 
telephones, and radio stations all relied on informational advertising and small promotional items 
to introduce their products to the public.  The types and placement of Post Office advertisements 
highlights the various media practices it used to engage the public sphere.  The Post Office’s 
advertising and promotional efforts show the permeable border between “public information” 
and advertising at their simultaneous inception in China.
50
  While any visual evidence of the Post 
Office –stamps, mail matter, or pillar-boxes – could be considered “advertising,” what concerns 
us here are “formal” advertisements in printed matter or on other printed forms. 
In the early years of the Imperial Post Office administrators focused their attention on 
informational advertising.  Consisting of free advertisements placed in Treaty Port foreign- and 
Chinese-language newspapers, the content of this advertising consisted of things like steamer 
schedules, announcements of scheduled mail arrivals and closures, and descriptions of how to 
use services like registered mail or postal money orders.  This early advertising was specifically 
designed to habituate customers to the postal schedule and provide important information, 
especially for business customers, on the correct procedures for utilizing different services.   
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The Post Office also engaged in a public relations practice called “puffery.”  Puffery 
refers to the publication of articles that appear to be independent news gathered by journalists, 
but which are actually either thinly-disguised advertisements or “puff pieces” written by 
journalists based on Post Office news releases.  To facilitate this practice, the Post Office 
provided free tariff schedules, “Notifications” of new services, and copies of the Working 
Reports to most of the popular and well-established Treaty Port foreign- and Chinese-language 
newspapers.  The Post Office hoped that such information would receive either direct publication 
or positive comment.  Most newspapers did print tariff schedules and postal notifications as 
information “in the public interest” and the number of free advertisements as “news” must have 
run into the thousands.  In the decade between 1919 and 1928, for example, the leading Chinese 
newspaper Shenbao averaged around twenty positive stories per year on the Post Office plus 
freely printing Postal Notifications.
51
  Shenbao covered such topics as the first airmail flights 
between Beijing and Tianjin, the expansion of postal services in various cities, the promulgation 
of new postal regulations, the debut of postal trucks, and positive comparisons of postal income 
and expenditure.  The press also carried positive coverage of postal developments by copying 
almost verbatim from the Working Reports.
52
   
As a supplement to “free” informational advertising, the Post Office engaged in 
promotional campaigns in the form of low-cost postcards and giveaways.  Following the 
example set by the Treaty Port Local Post Offices, the Imperial Post Office printed special pre-
stamped postcards for sale to the public at nominal costs.  The cards carried the English and 
Chinese name of the Post Office, had decorative borders, and were issued in both vertical and 
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horizontal versions for Chinese and foreign writing habits, respectively.
53
  The cheap price of the 
postcards, less than commercial postcards and sold at all Offices and Agencies throughout the 
country, made them quite popular.  The Post Office also distributed free promotional materials.  
Postal calendars for 1906 were printed in Beijing and distributed free of charge throughout the 
city proving a “successful means of advertising” to a “large and interested public…the cheap 
rates and simple methods of the Imperial Post Office.”54  This successful strategy was followed 
again the next year.   
Some of the most popular low-cost promotional items sold by the Post Office serving as 
advertisements were provincial postal route maps and the Postal Atlas.  Post Offices started 
selling loose-leaf provincial postal route maps to the public in the late 1890s.
55
  These route 
maps served as a form of postal advertising, demonstrating the growth and extent of the postal 
network, and were widely purchased by both the public and government.
56
  National route maps 
also came free of charge with every Working Report.  Thousands of Chinese and foreigners 
purchased them as the most accurate maps of local areas.
57
  The Imperial Post Office maps 
proved extremely popular not only because they described the main routes, but also because they 
were constantly updated and enlarged.  Although these route maps were not “placed” as 
advertisements in other media, the Post Office sold them below cost, two copper cash in the 
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1910s, to publicize the extent of the postal net.  Even in such relatively small ports as Yichang 
hundreds of updated maps were often pre-ordered by the public or sold out immediately.
58
  In 
addition to route maps, the Post Office also published a Postal Atlas (清代郵政輿圖) 
periodically starting in 1908.
59
  To publicize the extent of the postal network the Post Office 
gave presentation copies to high officials throughout the empire.
60
  The second edition of the 
Atlas in 1919 was also distributed freely to all military and civilian provincial governors, and the 
heads of the internal affairs, financial, foreign affairs, and legal bureaux in every province.  All 
foreign legations in China and internationally-known geographic research institutions such as the 
Royal Geographic Society and Société de Géographie also received complimentary copies.
61
  
The 1933 and 1936 Atlases sold for a paltry $12, identical to the 1908 price, with government 
officials receiving greater discounts.
62
 
Maps, free announcements, notifications, and copies of the Working Reports were 
supplemented, starting in the early 1920s, with cleverly placed publicity “articles” in various 
types of popular and academic journals serving to shape the public perception of the Post Office 
as a dynamic, modern institution.  These articles, many authored by postal staff, appeared in both 
English and Chinese-language books, magazines, and journals as varied as the West China 
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Missionary News and the Practical Guidebook to Beijing.
63
  From the late 1920s through the 
1940s these types of articles as well as items planted in guidebooks, directories, and yearbooks 
multiplied rapidly.  Besides generalist overviews, postal employees also wrote articles on postal 
history or specific policy issues.
64
  Most often these postal employees, like Chen Shiyin, were 
not “outed” as semi-official voices of the Post Office, but the content of their articles implies 
they had access to materials restricted to postal employees.
65
  Other employee-scholars like 
Zhang Liangren wrote extensively for commercial presses and popular journals.
66
 
In addition to thinly-veiled articles authored by postal employees, the Post Office also 
engaged in puffery and directly wrote anonymous overviews of postal history and development 
for popular yearbooks.  The well-known China Year Book, edited by H. G. W. Woodhead, 
always carried a section on the Chinese Post Office heavily indebted to the narratives and 
statistical tables provided in the Working Reports, usually even quoting from them directly.
67
  
The Shenbao Year Book also contains coverage of postal development drawn from the 
Directorate’s narratives.68  The Chinese Ministry of Information’s China Handbook series 
specifically cites the Directorate as the source of their information on the Post Office and the 
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Directorate literally wrote the postal section of the Shanghai Commercial Press’s Chinese Year 
Book.
69
 
 
Post Office Advertising, 1930s-1940s 
After 1927, the Post Office was often in debt.  One of the Directorate’s responses was to increase 
its advertising and promotional efforts.  Its advertising methods in the 1930s and early 1940s 
were still not designed to persuade customers to utilize basic postal services.  Instead, their 
purpose was to offset growing deficits and raise revenues by advertising new niche services, 
creating more commemorative stamps and other items for philatelists, allowing other companies 
to advertise on postal printed matter, and supporting local products to increase the use of parcel 
post.  Maintaining a surplus had its own rationale, but profitability was, said Executive Yuan 
President Wang Jingwei, vital “in order to forestall foreigners mocking us” for driving a 
formerly revenue-generating Service into debt.
70
   
At the National Postal Conference in Nanjing in early September 1934 Fujian Postal 
Commissioner J. A. Greenfield proposed the Post Office adopt modern “business practices.”71  
Greenfield’s proposal epitomized a shift in the overall psychology of the upper-level staff.  In 
early 1935 the Directorate introduced a number of new practices starting with the establishment 
of an “Advertising Section” in the Supply Department to solicit advertising copy for postal 
publications.
72
  The first of these new-style publications appeared on 30 June 1935 as the 
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Guidebook to the Post Office selling for the nominal price of five cents – the same as first-class 
postage – and intended to “help the public understand the Post Office’s services and other 
capabilities.”73  According to the Minister of Communications Zhu Jiahua there was a “great 
demand” for advertising space in the Guidebook.74  At least two-thirds of the Guidebook’s 125 
pages consist of advertisements for companies as diverse as the Stencil Paper Company of 
Vienna, the Shanghai Business Equipment Corporation, the Standard Oil Company, the KLIM 
Milk Company, Eveready Batteries, Omega watches, Westinghouse, RCA, and Ford.  
Apparently some District Head Offices also published similar guidebooks containing advertising 
for local companies.
75
  The idea of selling space in official postal publications to raise 
advertising revenues also carried over into advertisements on stamp booklets, postcards, postal 
forms, and other types of postal publications like Shanghai’s Daily Mail List, which was a flyer 
announcing the schedules for mail arrivals and despatches distributed free throughout the city.
76
  
By accepting outside advertising on publically-funded postal materials, the Directorate began 
adopting more modern business practices designed to enlarge the postal purse. 
In the 1930s the Post Office also began promoting a more extensive use of parcel post by 
advertising local products across the country, reforming complex parcel post procedures, 
negotiating with the Maritime Customs to place inspectors in Post Offices, and lobbying 
provincial governors to eliminate taxes on parcels.
77
  In 1935 the Directorate also sent 
investigators to various companies to evaluate their production capabilities, prices, and their 
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marketing and distribution networks.  The studies culminated in a book-length commercial 
handbook entitled Directory of Local Products for Places with Postal Connections in China 
distributed across the country to promote the use of parcel post.
78
  
 After World War II, the Chinese Post Office faced massive internal debt and external 
hyperinflation.  In response, the Post Office aggressively starting using a number of ingenious 
techniques to increase the use of the mails.  The Directorate negotiated with various national 
newspapers requesting they carry opinion polls.  The idea was for the public to mail their 
answers to the newspapers thus increasing postal revenues.
79
  The Post Office also inserted 
public questionnaires into newspapers like the Central Daily (中央日報) allowing readers to 
circle their answers and then mail the clippings back to the Post Office.
80
  In late 1947, the Post 
Office also convinced several newspapers to begin publishing sections entitled “Post Office: 
Questions and Answers” in their newspapers.  The public would mail their questions to the 
newspapers thus increasing postal revenues.  These special sections appeared on a weekly basis 
throughout late 1947 and early 1948 in the Central Daily, the Peace Daily, the Great Strength 
Daily, the National Salvation Daily, and the New People’s Daily.  The newspapers, who liked 
anything contributing to greater readership, colluded with the Post Office in this revenue-
generating practice while telling their readers the series was designed to “increase their postal 
knowledge.”81  
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 Promoting philatelic activities also increased in the postwar era.
82
  Philately had a long 
history in China going back to 1879 and, judging by the number of philatelic magazines, was one 
of the most popular hobbies of the Republican era.
83
  Commemorative stamps and cancellers 
serve multiple purposes such as memorializing politically significant people, events, or 
anniversaries, but the primary purpose from the perspective of postal administrations was their 
revenue-generating potential.  As the Directorate wrote, “Whenever commemorative stamps are 
issued, philatelists are always the first buyers because they treasure them.”84  The Directorate 
encouraged philatelists to literally engage in what Susan Stewart has termed the “aestheticization 
of use value” by collecting stamps rather than using them.85  Between 1896 and 1944, the Post 
Office issued fifteen commemorative stamps, but to bolster its income it produced no less than 
sixteen in the immediate postwar period.  The Post Office thus profited by the sale of the stamp 
without having to incur the expense of transmitting the letter.  The Directorate also produced 
small cardstock sheets for affixing the various denominations of a given issue to encourage 
completists.
86
  The postwar philatelic activities of the Post Office culminated in the 20 March 
1948 Stamp Exhibition held in Nanjing to commemorate National Postal Day.  After the 
Exhibition, the Directorate established special “Philatelic Rooms” in large Post Office where 
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collectors could have their questions answered and purchase rare stamps.
87
  Plans were also 
underway to create a national postal museum in Nanjing to attract tourists.
88
 
 The Post Office also understood the physical appearance of its offices as a form of 
advertising.  To draw attention from pedestrians, the Head Post Offices in Shanghai, Beiping, 
Nanjing, and Tianjin created department store-style display windows.  Postal designers created 
several versions of displays coinciding with the “Movement to Eradicate Dead Letters,” which 
the Directorate launched in 1947.  In one window titled “The Miserable Conditions of Dead 
Letters” a number of undeliverable letters lie in rows like corpses and are bookended by 
cardboard cutouts of human skulls.  For the campaign to promote airmail, the Nanjing Post 
Office displayed a large picture of camels carrying mails below the message “Speed, Speed, 
Speed” encouraging customers to switch to airmail.89   
 
Green is the Color of Posts: Color Branding and Institutional Identity 
The most unique and instantly recognizable feature of postal advertising, and identity, in the 
early twentieth century was the use of green and yellow as representative institutional colors 
(代表色).  Modern postal services throughout the world often chose and maintained the use of 
institutional colors to make themselves easily identifiable through color branding.  Color 
branding is the consistent and repetitive association between a color and an object or institution 
in order to create its color identity.  Quite often a representative color is the most stable aspect of 
an institutional identity – e.g. Coca-Cola red or McDonald’s yellow.  Usually color branding 
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draws upon on a society’s cultural associations between specific colors and values; however, at 
other times the process is reversed and colors become emblematic of values through color 
branding.  The Chinese Post Office’s choice of green and yellow was a manifestation of the latter 
phenomenon.   
The Imperial Post Office started using green and yellow as institutional colors at least by 
1906.  Over the next decades the Post Office used its institutional colors on all forms of postal 
ephemera, building facades, uniforms, postal badges, service-owned vehicles, postal flags, and 
printed matter.  The long-term relationship between green and the Post Office demonstrates the 
importance of using a distinctive color over an extended period for establishing a strong and 
stable institutional identity.
90
  While postal identity changed over the Republican era, the 
relationship between the Post Office and green did not.  Over time the public started to associate 
postal green with other elements of postal identity through the process of transference.  In the 
process of transference those elements of postal identity accepted by the public were then 
emblematized by postal green.  Green and other elements of postal identity were thus locked in a 
constant process of negotiation and renegotiation in the public mind.  Within this process, the 
Post Office was generally successful in linking its institutional values to postal green. 
 
“We are Working in a Green Atmosphere”91 
From at least 1906 onward, the Post Office used green and yellow on its tens of thousands of 
pillar boxes and all other types of postal property.
92
  Usually the postmasters painted the door 
frames, doors, window shutters, or half-pillars fronting the smaller postal establishments postal 
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green.  A new sub-office on Shanghai’s Nanjing Road was opened in the summer of 1909 – it 
was painted green with “Chinese yellow” lettering and images of missives to several Viceroys 
and the Minister of Posts and Communications on the front doors.
93
  The Imperial Post Office 
went to extra lengths with its Nanjing Road sub-office in order to compete for attention with the 
richly ornamented traditional Chinese shops lining China’s most famous shopping street, but 
even “dated and countrified” rural Post Offices framed their doors with green pillars.94  
Green postal vehicles and conveyances were a daily sight on Chinese streets.  All service-
owned vehicles including hand carts, tricycles, horse-driven mail-vans, motorcycles, trucks, and 
mobile post offices used the institutional colors.  More than the other vehicle, green postal 
bicycles invited public comment.  As the first large government institution to purchase them in 
1908, green bicycles became linked in the public imagination to the Post Office.
95
  As early as 
1911, the sight of postmen and their green bicycles was “very familiar” to the general public.96  
By the 1930s, the Post Office had some 1,400 green bicycles traversing urban roads and rural 
paths across the country.
97
  Even fictional writers liked to identify postmen by their green 
bicycles.
98
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Green appeared on all manner of other postal property.  In 1931, the Directorate decided 
that a green postal flag should represent the Post Office.
99
  A green postal pennant was also 
issued for use on mail-carrying ships.  Postal workers even used the flag as a sign of collective 
identity by emphasizing their “unity under the green postal flag.”100  The famous Postal Atlas 
was always “attractively and neatly bound in Post Office green.”101  Both green and yellow 
stamp booklets were put on sale in 1917 for collectors.
102
  In 1937 the Directorate started selling 
children’s savings banks at Post Offices throughout Shanghai “painted green and in every way 
miniatures of the P.O. pillar letter box.”103  The Directorate also distributed small green 
cardboard hand-held postal scales for weighing letters to businessmen.
104
  The attention to green 
even carried over onto the lettering on postal examination booklets for prospective employees.
105
  
 The most successful feature of postal color branding, if measured by public comment, 
was the green uniforms of postal workers; however, it was on uniforms that the Post Office used 
green inconsistently.  The exact date Postal Secretary Piry chose green uniforms for outdoor staff 
is unknown, but by 1911 they were frequently seen on the streets of Shanghai and in out-of-the-
way places.
106
  By 1917 a combination of factors, including the negative economic effects of 
World War I, made green drill difficult and costly to procure.  Co-Director General Destelan 
decided to switch the colors of postal uniforms from green to navy blue, but switched back to 
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green in 1918 as the economy improved.
107
  Still concerned about the postal economy, Destelan 
circularized all Postal Commissioners requesting their opinion on the pros and cons of green 
versus blue for uniforms in mid-1921.
108
  Some Postal Commissioners argued that blue uniforms 
would be more economical and “more national” since most common workers wore blue-colored 
clothing.
109
  Others more concerned about a distinctive postal identity questioned whether being 
“national” was an important issue.  Blue-clothed postal workers, they argued, might be 
“mistaken for soldiers” and they would “lose their identity and merge into the common 
crowd.”110  Despite the strong arguments for a distinctive and unique postal identity, Destelan 
decided to adopt blue uniforms to save money.
111
 
 In early 1926 Co-Director General Destelan was once again reconsidering the color of 
uniforms.
112
  Rather than ask the opinions of foreign Postal Commissioners, Destelan requested 
they solicit input from their men.  The postmen responded with five reasons why green was 
better: “(1) Green is the Postal color; (2) Green looks smarter than blue; (3) Postmen have worn 
green for many years and are now easily recognized; (4) most laborers wear blue clothes and 
blue is the uniform of ‘boys’ in certain firms whereas postmen in green are distinctive; (5) Green 
does not fade so easily as blue.”113  The postmen were seeking a “distinctive” and “easily 
recognized” identity that conferred a special status upon them within the public eye and among 
the working classes.  Looking “smarter” is a subjective evaluation, but their comments reveal 
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how postal workers positioned themselves within the working-class hierarchy – a hierarchy they 
partially saw through clothing.  Contrasting themselves to “most laborers” and “boys” the postal 
workers revealed both an elitist and patriarchal attitude towards other workers who wore faded 
blue jackets.  The strong feelings of the postal workers must have persuaded Destelan for green 
uniforms remained standard through the Republican era.
114
 
The unique and recognizable identity color branded onto the “lower” ranks of postal 
workers manifested itself in a number of nicknames and references to their green clothing.  Quite 
commonly postmen were referred to as “green-coated functionaries,” “green-clad postmen,” 
“green-clothed comrades,” or described as wearing something “like a soldier’s uniform, but in 
‘faded green.’”115  The most popular association, and one considered an “honor” and “special 
distinction” to the postmen, was being called “messengers in green” (綠衣使者).116  Calling 
postmen “messengers in green” was a reference to the idiom “a green-clad angel” (綠衣天使).  
The idiom originated during the Five Dynasties period (907-960) when Wang Renyu (王仁裕) 
recorded a story about a famous parrot during the time of the Xuanzong Emperor (712-756).  In 
Chang’an a wealthy man named Yang Chongyi taught his green parrot to speak like a scholar.  
When Yang’s wife and her paramour murdered Yang, the parrot told the county magistrate 
everything it had seen.  Tang Xuanzong heard the story and conferred upon this parrot the title 
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“green-clad angel.”117  In other words, “messengers in green” were responsible for bringing 
important and timely news.  As a postal worker’s doggerel put it: “Dressed in green/Specializing 
in delivery/This time I’ll deliver a piece of important news.”118   
 The process of color branding the Post Office to give it a unique and distinctive identity 
was so successful even the Communists supported the colors.  In 1949 the Communist’s First 
National Postal Conference adopted green as its official postal color.  The Conference declared 
postal green represented “directness, quickness, efficiency, safety, convenience and 
emblematized peace, youthfulness, flourishing, and prosperity.”119  The symbolic meanings of 
green to the Communists were actually elements of postal identity created by the 
Imperial/Chinese Post Office and attached to green via the subtle process of transference. 
 
Uniform(ed) Workers: Postal Workers and Institutional Identity 
Color branding the Post Office worked most convincingly on its uniforms.  Clothing itself 
constitutes a set of visible cultural elements conveying various kinds of meanings to audiences at 
differing political, economic, social, and psychological levels, but has only started to receive 
attention in Chinese history.
120
  Studies of the history of clothing in China initially focused on 
changes in clothing and style from “traditional” Chinese clothing to “modern” dress.121  More 
recently, clothing in China has been analyzed from the perspective of a multi-level Chinese 
engagement with shifting global political and cultural trends in couture as they relate to gender 
construction.
122
  Most research on Chinese clothing mentions the adoption of the Zhongshan suit 
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as a national uniform symbolizing the political and cultural masculinization of Chinese men, but 
fails to recognize the more widespread adoption of uniforms for wage laborers. 
The advent of modern uniforms in the Post Office was a manifestation of the 
globalization of Chinese industrial organization.  Modern uniforms signified their modernity 
both by the material used – cheviot, drill, duck, jean, and serge – and their identical sizes, which 
required industrial production methods.  The real revolution in clothing in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was thus the mass production of ready-to-wear clothing and uniforms.   
Uniforms, like clothing in general, work on an inner-outer dichotomy representing both 
personally- and socially-constructed meanings.  The uniqueness of uniforms, however, stems 
from the management imposing them on workers.  The general effect of mass-produced uniforms 
is to dehumanize or erase differences among the wearers, but their significance stems from 
political, social, and cultural contexts.  In some cases uniforms worn by athletes and quasi-
military organizations represent a re-masculinization of men within an industrial society that had 
eliminated older pathways to construct masculinity.  From this perspective, uniforms could lead 
to both social stability such as in sport or instability such as in fascistic organizations.  Uniforms 
for police, firemen, and postal employees were specifically designed to signify social stability by 
demonstrating their quasi-military organization and attention to order and discipline.  The 
confluence of industrial production techniques in the manufacturing of uniforms for anonymous 
bodies and the social meaning of uniforms meant that the Post Office used uniforms to civilize 
their workers to draw the public’s attention to the discipline and orderliness of postal labor. 
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In general, the Chinese Post Office forced postal workers to wear uniforms for three main 
reasons.  First, as a manifestation of the industrialization and dehumanization of the work force, 
uniforms served to “civilize” workers by sublimating their individual identities to the corporate 
identity of the Post Office.  Second, the Post Office reconstituted sub-institutional identities by 
using variations in the uniforms to signify the separation of roles and the division of labor among 
postal workers.  Third, the Post Office used the uniforms and policed how they were worn to 
prescribe conventionalized secular performances by postal workers to make them symbols of 
authority and legitimacy as employees of the state.
123
  In sum, the Post Office sublimated 
individual worker identities to the larger corporate identity to use their uniformed bodies as a 
form of advertisement for the efficiency, professionalism, trustworthiness, and dedication of the 
Post Office.
124
 
 The most significant distinction in uniforms throughout postal history was based on a 
simple dichotomy between indoor and outdoor staff.  While the Post Office always allowed 
indoor staff to wear their own clothing, the Directorate forced outdoor staff to wear uniforms.
125
  
Uniforms made the outdoor staff immediately recognizable to the general public so that when 
they looked “smart” or presented a “decent appearance” it reflected credibly on the Post Office 
and its corporate identity.  The Post Office thus conceived of uniforms as a method of control by 
making workers aware of how they appeared and acted in public.  By making workers 
recognizable the Directorate also bureaucratized their relationship to the public by physically 
showing their authority and legitimacy through their uniforms.   
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In the early years of the Post Office, when its overall bureaucracy was relatively small, 
the work functions among the staff were not highly differentiated nor were workers’ ranks 
stratified.  As the Post Office grew in size its bureaucracy became increasingly complex 
requiring a greater variety of staff members with well-defined duties.  The first and most 
important functional differentiation was between rural couriers and urban postmen.  Not only did 
couriers and postmen serve different functions – rural versus urban – but also they wore different 
uniforms.
126
  By at least 1904 outdoor staff were wearing uniforms.
127
  They all appear in the 
same light-colored Chinese-style shirts with toggle buttons, but with trousers of various colors 
and some wearing puttees.  The distinction between the postmen and couriers, one maintained 
throughout the Republican era, is that couriers are only given vests while postmen have uniforms 
of a decidedly Chinese style consisting of long sleeve shirts widening down the arm and 
extending below the hand.  Conical-style and traditional winter hats were permitted, as was 
Chinese footwear.  There is also a clear focus on the upper body as it is the portion of the body 
uniformed while various colors and the sporadic wearing of puttees are seen on the legs.   
At some point between 1910 and 1911, for reasons unknown, new Western-style 
uniforms start making their appearance in some photographs.  Quite possibly the introduction of 
new service uniforms coincided with the creation of the Supply Department in June 1910, which 
subsequently handled the manufacture and distribution of all uniforms.  Whatever the case, the 
Directorate eliminated all Chinese-style clothing for outdoor staff replacing them with Western-
style uniforms, except for rural couriers who retained the vest.  Chinese style skullcaps and other 
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headwear gave way to peaked caps.  Jackets were thigh-length, sleeves ending at the wrist, with 
Western style metal buttons, and several large pockets with a large belt cinched around the waist.  
The Directorate made all trousers the same color as the jackets and distributed Western-style 
leather shoes.  A number of other pseudo-military elements were also added to the uniforms 
including shoulder braids, brass insignia, and epaulettes. 
Some employees initially objected to the new Western-style uniforms.  Shortly after the 
western New Year’s holiday in 1913, the Yichang Postmaster ordered all postmen to wear the 
new uniforms.  After wearing the uniforms for a day, the Yichang postmen refused to wear them 
again.  When queried, the men claimed the public was “laughing at them” because of the red 
braid on the shoulder of the uniform.  When the Postmaster ignored their pleas, the postmen 
stormed out on strike.  When the Postmaster threatened to replace them, the men agreed to wear 
the uniform in exchange for an increase in salary to which the Postmaster agreed.  One of the 
first effective strikes by postmen was thus over their uniforms.
128
 
As a corollary to the new Western-style uniforms the Directorate and foreign Postmasters 
started showing greater concern with the physique and countenance of their outdoor staff.  The 
Directorate wanted “strong and healthy” candidates for couriers and postmen while Chinese 
Inspectors recommended hiring only those “who have a good appearance, are young and strong, 
[and] ride a bicycle well.”129  Chief Inspector Erik Tollefsen evinced the most extreme concern 
with the bodies of postmen.  Tollefsen suggested eliminating all those whose personal 
appearance suggested they were “slovenly, unhealthy, rascally, cunning, dishonest, quarrelsome, 
or merely unpleasant.”  Instead, only men who “look” honest and who are “of the same average 
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height and dimensions” should be hired.  Tollefsen thought that if all postmen were the same 
height and weight they “look smarter in a body” and the Directorate could save considerably on 
uniforms by only manufacturing one size.
130
 
 In the late 1910s and early 1920s postal expansion necessitated creating a much larger 
outdoor staff.  To differentiate the workers and give them occupational identities, the Directorate 
assigned uniforms according to job title.  For example, around 1917 the Post Office introduced 
trucks and river launches into the Service, which required the hiring of chauffeurs and boatmen.  
Shortly thereafter, new regulations stipulated unique uniforms for both these groups.  By 1921, 
workers classed as postmen, couriers, mail coolies, sailors, chauffeurs, and train escorts each had 
occupational uniforms.
131
  The Directorate also distributed full descriptions of all uniforms to the 
districts to eliminate minor variations introduced by District Postal Commissioners.  The 
Directorate emphasized that the “standard designs” described in the regulations “be strictly 
adhered to” in the quality and construction of each type of occupational uniform.132 
The last major alterations to postal uniforms came in 1935.  In February, Minster of 
Communications Zhu Jiahua issued new regulations for uniforms that eliminated Western-style 
uniforms in favor of modified Zhongshan jackets.
133
  In accordance with the Ministry’s 
regulations, the Directorate ordered postmen to wear green-colored, single-breasted, closed-
collared jackets with four pockets worn to the mid-thigh and sleeves to the wrist, which is a 
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description of a Zhongshan jacket except the Directorate added buttons on the sleeve.
134
  The 
postmen’s uniform provided the template for all others save the sailors who wore a distinctive 
sailor suit.  For employees ranking higher than postmen the Directorate added some element to 
the basic uniform such as yellow stripes on the sleeve for Delivery Inspectors, two rows of brass 
buttons for chauffeurs, a badge of crossed anchors for Laoda, or used white duck instead of 
green drill for Train and Steamer Postmasters.  The Directorate removed some element or used 
inferior materials for employees lower on the occupational scale than postmen – Mail and Office 
coolies had bone toggle buttons instead of brass ones, mechanics only received overalls with 
bone toggle buttons, mail escorts did not have a brass emblem, watchmen did not have pockets 
on the outside of their Zhongshan jacket, and chair coolies only received a Chinese style blouse.  
For the lowest employees, the rural couriers, the Directorate gave them a “native style waistcoat” 
with cloth frog buttons.
135
 
The new uniforms demonstrated a sartorial sensitivity by the Directorate who sought 
clothing both Chinese and modern for its workers, but clothing that signaled the Post Office’s 
unification with the revolutionary ideals espoused by the wearing of the Zhongshan jacket.
136
  
The Zhongshan jacket represented the revolutionary ideal of egalitarianism by containing no 
outward sign of rank or position.  Although the Ministry and Directorate’s regulations describe 
Zhongshan jackets, the accompanying details undermine the revolutionary spirit of those jackets 
by stratifying the workers through added or subtracted elements to the basic postman’s uniform.  
In fact, the 1935 regulations contained the most highly differentiated uniforms in postal history.  
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The purpose of adding or subtracting elements to the uniform was to symbolize a chain of 
command by creating a status system reliant on physical markers worn on the body.   
Abstractly, postal uniforms represented a modern industrial mode of production resulting 
in uniforms of high-quality fabric, precise fitting, and consistent color that transformed 
individual workers into a uniformed mass.  The collective body of uniformed workers was then 
redefined into occupational categories and a chain of command signified by distinctive uniforms.  
From the Directorate’s perspective the uniforms gave the outdoor staff an immediately 
recognizable identity to the public.  The uniformed bodies of postal workers looking and acting 
like a disciplined army of well-ordered and polite workers became a form of advertisement for 
the efficiency, professionalism, trustworthiness, and dedication of the Post Office.   
 
Shaping the Public Bodies and Behaviors of Postal Workers 
In order for the bodies of postal workers to be effective conveyors of postal identity, the Post 
Office had to discipline and police their behavior and the performance of their duties.  By 
policing the workers’ behavior, the Directorate prescribed conventionalized secular 
performances transforming postal workers into bodily representations of the larger corporate 
identity of the Post Office.  The Post Office thus used the bodies of postal workers and their 
public behavior as a form of advertisement for the efficiency, professionalism, trustworthiness, 
and dedication of the Post Office.   
Prior to industrialization most handicraft workers and peasants controlled their own pace, 
timing, and conduct of work.  Factory and modern bureaucratic discipline radically altered these 
practices.  Employers and administrators in the early twentieth century dictated how, when, and 
in what manner work was done by placing workers within an industrial disciplinary regime to 
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make them more productive, but also more tractable to modern forms of control.  Under these 
forms of discipline workers were rewarded not only according to their labor output, but also 
based on their behavior in the workplace.  The Chinese Post Office, and other similar 
institutions, have two distinguishing features; first, they lack formal “factory discipline” similar 
to that accompanying many of the steam-driven industries like textile mills; second, its labor 
force was hybridized containing significant numbers of manual laborers, public service staff, and 
white-collar employees.  Outdoor postal workers in particular did not operate under the watchful 
eye of an overseer, but on the public streets outside the disciplinary structures of the factory 
while indoor staff faced more discipline through the proceduralization of their activities and 
direct oversight by managers.  The very publicness of outdoor workers’ bodies drove the Post 
Office to institute both formal and informal methods of policing the workers’ behavior when 
they operated in public spaces.   
Starting in 1897 the Post Office introduced formal disciplinary rules by requiring fidelity 
guarantees from all Chinese employed, which Postal Secretary Piry claimed, “suits exactly the 
customs of the Chinese people.”137  The Inspectorate demanded all indoor clerks to provide 
guarantees from two substantial sources such as local money shops, small businesses, or 
landowners in amounts ranging from 200 to 1000 silver dollars depending on the rank of the 
employee.  “Lower employees” including couriers and postmen had to secure guarantees in 
addition to contributions of one silver dollar per month as a security cash deposit.  The stated 
purpose of these bonds and cash deposits was “as security for [their] honesty and good 
behavior.”138  If employees broke postal regulations or engaged in illegal behavior they forfeited 
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their cash deposit and their guarantors were legally responsible to pay the Post Office any 
additional amount lost to the Service.  
 Both the guarantee and security cash system worked effectively as countless employees 
who stole funds, stamps, or customer remittances had their cash deposits confiscated or their 
guarantors were forced to pay compensation.
139
  The very effectiveness of these two systems was 
a contributory factor in at least two workers’ strikes and numerous petitions and complaints.  In 
November 1911 more than one hundred postmen declared a strike in Guangzhou with the sole 
demand that the Post Office refund their security deposits.
140
  Similarly, in April 1922, the 
Shanghai postal workers tried to negotiate the return of their deposits, but when they failed a 
strike of some four hundred workers erupted across the city.  After several days of negotiations, 
the strikers dropped their demand in exchange for a 15 percent pay increase.
141
   
 Supplementing the guarantee and security cash systems were larger pension schemes for 
upper-level staff starting in 1919 and for lower-level staff in 1923.  Old-age pensions first 
appeared in England and the United States in the 1870s as a form of social reform to protect 
aging workers, but also to maintain the quality of the workforce.  Once enacted, the idea of 
deferred compensation, or the threatened confiscation of those funds, effectively undermined the 
militancy of employees and policed their behavior lest they lose their pensions.  Coupled with 
mandatory retirement ages – 55 for postmen and 60 for other employees – pensions were also 
designed to remove older workers without provoking hostility from other postal employees.  In 
late 1918 the Directorate ordered upper-level staff to start contributing monthly amounts to a 
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“Guarantee and Provident Fund” designed to “introduce self-responsibility” and “provide the 
Service an additional safeguard.”142  A pension system for lower-level staff known as the 
Superannuation Fund started in April 1923 to “protect the interests of the Post Office” and 
gradually replace the security cash deposit system.
143
  Mounting protests from postal workers 
and increasing trouble finding suitable investments for the funds, however, forced the Directorate 
to stop collecting contributions in early 1927.
144
  After the National Government took over the 
Post Office in 1928 a new pension fund was created, which the Directorate once again used to 
threaten workers by suggesting their pensions would be confiscated for negligence or criminal 
activity.
145
 
 While the threat of confiscating guarantees, cash deposits, or pensions was real, it was a 
distant threat primarily aimed at serious crimes or misdemeanors.  Starting in 1907 the 
Inspectorate also created a system of merits and demerits hoping to have a more immediate 
effect on workers’ behavior.  In late 1907 Shanghai Postmaster F. E. Taylor started 
experimenting with a “good-conduct stripe” scheme for postmen.  Those postmen keeping their 
uniform neat and tidy and performing their duties well received a stripe to be attached to their 
uniform as a physical manifestation of their good behavior.  Taylor, however, argued that 
Chinese did not respond to the granting of the stripes, but shaming them with their removal was 
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far more effective.
146
  While there is little information on how the postmen responded to this 
system, it remained part of the official disciplinary system until 1930 when it was replaced by a 
formal merit-demerit method for the entire staff.
147
  Instead of a visible system of stripes, 
Director General Wei Yifu (韋以黻) introduced a more private system whereby the merits or 
demerits were recorded on an employee’s personnel record rather than their body.  Each merit or 
demerit reduced or increased the time until that employee’s next promotion cycle by three 
months.  No other merit-demerit system existed alongside Wei Yifu’s until 1945 when Director 
General Xu Jizhuang (徐繼庄) started a rigorous system of fines for mistakes by postal 
workers.
148
   
Postal administrators permanently recorded all of these merits and demerits on an 
employee’s color-coded Confidential Report, which combined their personnel record with an 
evaluation of their value and behavior as an employee.  These confidential reports were compiled 
for all staff, including foreigners.  Each report was color-coded – red, pink, blue, or yellow – 
representing a four-tiered performance evaluation and likelihood for promotion.  In addition to 
constituting a Service Record, the reports contain an evaluation of an employee’s private 
conduct, their trustworthiness, level of intelligence, and industriousness.
149
  Probably the most 
controversial aspect of the reports was the comments on the staff’s private lives.  For example, in 
the file of Charles Destrées we find the information that he “has many Jew friends,” that he was 
“déséquilibre,” and that local Chinese considered him “neurotic” – he lasted just over a year in 
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the Service.
150
  J. Depardon, states his personnel file, is “handicapped by his oriental (Japanese) 
wife.”151  Similar comments invading the private life of the staff are found in the confidential 
files for all Chinese staff including whether they frequented prostitutes, enjoyed gambling, drank 
heavily, or smoked opium.  Enough employees and workers objected to the color-coded reports 
that immediately after the Nationalists appointed Liu Shufan as the new Director General in mid-
1928, he ordered their abolition.
152
  Instead, Liu replaced them with “class reports on staff,” 
which dropped the evaluations of employees’ personal lives.153 
Another popular method for removing troublesome employees was the time-honored 
practice of transferring them.  The Directorate frequently transferred upper-level staff to train 
them in new duties, but lower-level workers were not usually transferred unless there were 
special circumstances.
154
  In the early 1920s, the postal workers labor movement posed new 
challenges to the Post Office.  In response, the Directorate sanctioned the transfer of 
“troublemakers” to suburban or rural offices.  The pattern of transferring “malcontents” became 
increasingly common in the late 1920s and 1930s.  After a strike of postmen in June 1926, 
Nanjing Postal Commissioner Shields transferred the ring-leaders “as a warning to the staff and 
to prevent their stirring up further trouble.”155  During a strike in Wuhan that December union 
members publically demanded that no executive committee member of their local be transferred 
during their tenure of office.
156
  In late October 1930 Beiping Postal Commissioner Nixon stirred 
up a storm of protest when he transferred around twenty “notorious troublemakers.”157  Nixon 
used the practice so frequently, the Beiping workers started an “Anti-Nixon Movement” in 1932 
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consisting of propaganda posters claiming he was a running dog of the imperialists who “framed 
cases against the loyal working brothers and revolutionary elements transferring them to distant 
offices.”158 
Supplementing the formal disciplinary regime were a host of informal measures designed 
to control workers’ behavior.  Both foreign and Chinese postal administrators sought to create 
idealized model workers who demonstrated the qualities of discipline, trustworthiness, 
efficiency, punctuality, politeness, and enthusiasm.  The expression of and desire for these 
qualities coalesced with a larger current in modern Chinese history wherein moral-politico 
revolutionaries and reformers ranging from Jiang Jieshi to Mao Zedong attempted behavioral 
revolutions designed to create new kinds of citizens or soldiers.  Countless movements like 
Jiang’s New Life Movement (1934-1937) and new moral codes like Mao’s “Three Main Rules of 
Discipline and Eight Points for Attention” (1928-1929) operated under the assumption, like the 
postal administrators, that reforming public behavior would ultimately result in the moral 
transformation of the individual.   
The Directorate’s formal systems for circumscribing workers’ behavior were thus 
coupled with numerous attempts to place the public and physical bodies of postal workers under 
a moral regime.  Starting in 1901, the Post Office began issuing broad statements on the qualities 
held by “good” employees.  Specifically sought were workers who demonstrated efficiency in 
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postal work, zeal and punctuality in carrying out their duties, tact and politeness when dealing 
with the public, and absolute trustworthiness and scrupulous honesty in the handling money and 
mail matter.  In addition, appearance, good health, and freedom from family impediments would 
be the factors determining whether an employee was promoted.
159
  Another requirement repeated 
time and again was that all postal employees must show “discretion in act and word” and be 
“absolutely non-political” lest their words and deeds endanger the autonomy of the Service.160  
Even workers themselves partially internalized the desire to be “free from and above politics” to 
show they “have the confidence of the public and are men of repute.”161  
 By the late 1910s and early 1920s postal operations and bureaucratic development 
expanded to such an extent that the Directorate deemed it necessary to have a more 
encompassing moral code for its public workers.  Some Postal Commissioners like Erik 
Tollefsen liked to issue special staff orders.  In these orders he “tried to appeal to the Staff’s 
sense of honor, to their loyalty, to their espirit de corps, to pride in their position, and in the 
Service…in kindly language and carefully translated into easy Chinese in terms of a benevolent 
spirit.”162  All postmen and couriers were “not allowed” to loiter in the streets or to frequent tea 
houses, restaurants, houses of ill-repute or become intoxicated, smoke opium, gamble, or behave 
in a disorderly manner.  They were forbidden to race their bicycles or get drawn into quarrels on 
public streets.  There were strict prohibitions on gossiping with the public or demanding tips 
from them.
163
  Finally, the Directorate required all employees to keep their uniforms neat and 
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tidy and made them financially responsible for any damage to their uniform.
164
  The proper 
wearing and care of uniforms was of special interest to the Directorate who repeatedly warned 
staff to wash their uniforms and maintain a professional appearance.  Staff who wore sloppy or 
dirty uniforms “appearing in the public street…immediately discredit the Post Office.”165  If the 
staff fails to meet with public expectations, the Ministry of Communications admonished, “the 
future of the Post Office cannot be viewed with equanimity.”166   
In the 1930s Chinese postal officials placed greater emphasis on moral suasion for 
postmen.  In early 1936 the Directorate distributed a pamphlet entitled Handbook for Postmen 
who were ordered to “recite its contents thoroughly, commit them to memory, and observe them 
faithfully.”167  The Handbook ordered postmen to cultivate the habits of promptness, orderliness, 
industriousness, and hardiness to show their dedication.  They should also refrain from talking 
and joking amongst themselves or wandering about and horsing around.  When in direct contact 
with customers postmen should show politeness and good spirit.  If a postman was found 
whoring, gambling, smoking opium, intoxicated, being disrespectful to the public or just 
generally “whooping it up” during office hours they would be immediately reprimanded and 
given demerits.  While at work, postmen were required to wear clean uniforms, polished shoes, 
and have a burnished badge, but were forbidden to wear their uniforms after work, especially if 
they frequented teahouses, wine shops, or theaters. 
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 Like the Handbook for Postmen, the Hebei Head Post Office produced a special 
handbook in September 1948 exclusively for “window employees” who dealt directly with the 
public at the service counters.
168
  The pamphlet begins by stressing that as a public service 
institution the counter staff are the primary representatives of the Post Office and therefore 
should follow Director General Huo Xixiang’s statement, “The public is the master of the Post 
Office,” and therefore “meticulous service is needed.”  Counter staff should use “psychology” to 
project a modest, general, and “pure-hearted countenance” to assuage the public while also using 
a pleasant and clear style of speaking and maintain a “happy attitude.”  To make a positive first 
impression, the handbook recommends treating the public service area “as if it were grandiose.”  
Personnel should also look frugal and avoid ostentatiousness and loquaciousness.  Instead, they 
should always show deferential politeness to the public.  Such exhortations to be polite even 
resulted in several “kindness competitions” held by the Directorate.169 
 The discipline and punishments meted out to postal workers – both formal and informal – 
represented larger movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which modern 
industrial and bureaucratic organizations started focusing on the body as a locus of both newer 
social ethics and, as discussed in this section, as a form of publicity.  The Directorate sought to 
define and regiment the conduct of work and public behavior of postal workers seeing them as 
representations of the corporate identity of the Post Office.  Formal disciplinary rules like 
guarantees and security cash as well as merit-demerit systems and confidential reports on staff 
served to police workers’ behavior by threatening financial loss.  Moral strictures against 
behaviors like smoking opium and visiting prostitutes as well as moral suasion to act and appear 
decently sought to reform the individual’s ethical center by dictating their outward behavior.  
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While the Directorate did appear genuinely interested in the thoughts and actions of their 
employees, the larger purpose was to use them as symbols of institutional identity.  When 
workers kept themselves clean it was a moral statement about the Post Office; when postal 
workers spoke politely it was a statement about the service orientation of the Post Office; when 
postal workers avoided “corrupting” behavior it was a sign of their discipline.   
 
Conclusion 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries new ideas of government openness and 
transparency emerged in China signaling recognition of the transformations occurring between 
state and civil society.  This chapter has specifically focused on the Chinese Post Office’s 
construction of a corporate identity in broadly-defined “media” demonstrating the government’s 
growing attention to modern advertising, new conceptions of institution-building, and an 
appreciation of the value of public information.  Overall, these cross currents reveal a growing 
awareness of the overlapping relationships between state-making, institution-building, and public 
opinion within the Chinese state.  As I have tried to show, these new relationships are profitably 
viewed through the process of institutional identity in the Chinese Post Office. 
 While many processes and activities go into the making of institutions like the Post 
Office – bureaucratization, economic development, expansion, standardization – there are 
equally important questions of identity and meaning that convey given messages to the public 
and institutional members about the nature of that institution as it changes over time.  The drive 
for a coherent corporate identity forms the key ideological dimension of institutions, which is 
particularly important for those that reliant upon public acceptance and popular approval like the 
Post Office.  The content of that identity, or the elements of which it is constituted, varies widely 
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across institutions and is shaped by their own understanding of their purposes and historical 
missions.  Occasionally such an institutional identity is said to encapsulate the all-encompassing 
vision of an important “founding father” such as Robert Hart with the Customs; however, in the 
construction of an institutional identity one cannot usually designate with any certainty who is 
the creator of that identity – it is better to acknowledge that the institution itself is the author.  In 
understanding the institution as author, then, one crucial aspect as institutional identity is located.  
A second is the similarity between individual and institutional identity in that its identity is not 
crystallized at the moment of birth or initial conceptualization, but grows and changes in 
accordance with contingent factors like historical context, the particular audience being targeted, 
or the physical medium being employed.   
The corporate identity of the Chinese Post Office from 1896 to 1949 past through several 
stages.  In each stage, postal identity functioned contextually on multiple levels, was aimed at 
different audiences, and was embodied in a variety of physical forms.  Broadly speaking, the 
Post Office used the Working Reports to manufacture an origin narrative, but also to emphasize 
and disseminate its self-perceived identity characteristics like progressiveness, innovativeness, 
efficiency, competitiveness, and uniqueness.  The Directorate’s placement of advertisements, 
even more than their content, demonstrates the blurring of lines between public information and 
publicity as a strategy to shape public perceptions of the Post Office, but also to target specific 
groups with tailored advertising messages in various media.  The Directorate color branded itself 
and its bodies – buildings, vehicles, workers – green and yellow in an effort to give the Post 
Office a unique, enduring, and immediately recognizable visual identity within urban cityscapes 
and rural landscapes.  The Directorate required outdoor postal workers to wear uniforms 
transforming them into bodily advertisements for postal discipline, order, dedication, and public 
  384 
 
service.  To police the workers’ bodies, the Post Office used various formal and informal 
measures designed to shape how workers behaved and acted toward the public ensuring they 
remained representatives of the Post Office’s efficiency, professionalism, trustworthiness, and 
dedication as a public service institution.   
The Post Office thus used its Working Reports, advertising, institutional colors, the 
uniformed bodies of workers, and behavior regulations to help project varying conceptions of its 
identity sometimes to separate groups and at other times to the public at large.  To the 
government it presented a modern institution achieving success through competition, progressive 
expansion, and innovation; to the public it showed an institution focused to public service, 
politeness, efficiency, and trustworthiness; and to workers it developed an ethos of loyalty, 
dedication, and discipline.  The result of the Post Office’s efforts to link itself to such values and 
symbols was the creation of high levels of consumer confidence, administrative autonomy, and 
loyalty from its workers.  In sum, the Post Office’s succeeded in fostering a public perception of 
and reputation for the Post Office as communications medium vital to the development of the 
Chinese nation-state through its unique, distinctive, and enduring corporate identity as a modern 
public service institution.  
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Chapter 7 
Common|wealth: 
The Qiaopiju Remittance Network, the Chinese Post Office,  
and the Making of the Transnation 
 
The Post Office participated in a nation-building project in the early twentieth century to forge a 
territorially-bounded national community out of the disparate elements of the multiethnic Qing 
Empire.  It also intervened in the transnational social spaces occupied by overseas Chinese.
1
  The 
purpose of these interventions was not only to create a deterritorialized cultural identity of 
Chineseness – to decouple the ethnic nation from the territorial state by naming immigrants and 
sojourners as national ethno-citizens – but also to gain access to the financial resources of 
overseas Chinese communities in order to strengthen the economic basis of the state.
2
  The 
relationship between the Chinese Post Office and the Qiaopiju remittance network constitutes 
one of the most important long-term contacts between the state and overseas communities in the 
early twentieth century.  
 Qiaopiju (僑批局), or literally Overseas Letter Offices, is a generalized term for a type of 
business firm that appeared during one of the great waves of Chinese migration in the late 
nineteenth century.
3
  The Qiaopiju specialized in mobilizing and transporting labor overseas, 
shipping goods throughout the diasporic network, handling private and business letters, and 
providing remittance and other banking services to overseas Chinese.  As a historical 
phenomenon we can consider the Qiaopiju, and their antecedents the circumambulating Overseas 
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or South Seas Agents (水客/南洋客), as the earliest form of an institutionalized spatial network 
linking overseas Chinese to the homeland through the movement of people, remittances, goods, 
and information.
4
   
For over a hundred years, from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the 
Qiaopiju enjoyed unparalleled success in securing the remittance business of overseas Chinese.  
To maintain their market dominance, the Qiaopiju had to be economically adaptable and 
politically savvy within a variety of settings, both within and without China – during the 
disintegration of the Qing state, in the fragmented polity of the Republic, amid the recasting of 
state-business relationships by the Nationalist state, among the Southeast Asian indigenous 
states, within the pre- and post-1870 colonial regimes in mainland and archipelagic Southeast 
Asia, under Japanese occupation during World War II, and in the midst of racist and 
discriminatory policies in other countries.   
Many scholars looking for the source of the Qiaopiju’s ability to thrive in such diverse 
political and economic settings have emphasized their structure as a “traditional Chinese” style 
of business firm.  What makes the Qiaopiju traditional, these scholars argue, are their reliance on 
various forms of cultural or familial affinities, sometimes called guanxi (關係) bases,5 such as 
native-place, dialect, or real and fictive kinship relationships, in firm-customer and inter-firm 
relations.
6
  Some scholars like Chen Xunxian focus on the psychological desire – the “root” (根) 
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consciousness – of overseas Chinese to return both physically and metaphorically to the families 
and homeland as the factor giving rise to the Qiaopiju.
7
  More recently Dai Yifeng and Jiao 
Jianhua, drawing on Mark Granovetter’s economic sociology,8 are emphasizing the business 
practices of Qiaopiju as “embedded” in traditional cultural and social practices – rather than an 
idealized free market – such as interpersonal trust based on native-place or geo-consanguineous 
ties.
9
  The reliance on these traditional practices and cultural affinities, Dai Yifeng argues, 
manifested itself not only in culturally sensitive customer services with the “human touch,” but 
also in the “networkization” (網絡化) of firm-customer and inter-firm relations.10   These 
culturally sensitive policies, Dai and others argue, gave the collective Qiaopiju a competitive 
edge over “modern” remitting enterprises like banks that were reliant on systems trust – a type of 
trust defined by confidence in an impersonal system of rules.
11
  In their desire to find the 
indispensible “Chinese” elements of Qiaopiju success, previous scholars have thus overlooked 
both the modernity of adopting traditionalistic or culturalist practices and the role of the state in 
shaping transnational Chinese communities and networks. 
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In order to create a more nuanced understanding of the Qiaopiju, we must analyze not 
only the nature of their business practices, but also their interactions with the Chinese state.  The 
Qiaopiju and its network(s) were built upon a collection of colonial modern forms of business 
practices.  The culturalist business practices employed by the Qiaopiju owners were not 
traditional, but were articulated as part of the organizational process of transnationalization, viz. 
to make firm “connections” across land, border, and ocean.  By using culturalist business tactics, 
Qiaopiju businessmen created a viable type of business firm, network, and set of practices to 
operate in the interstitial gaps between nation-states, empires, and colonies at the precise moment 
that Southeast Asia became colonized, the Western nation-state system made inroads into East 
Asia, and global communications and transportation systems like telegraph lines, steamer routes, 
and modern postal services increasingly linked the world.  That is, the emergence of the Qiaopiju 
as a distinctive type of transnational business firm occurred almost exactly when these 
“institutions” – colonies, nation-states, communication systems – established regulatory regimes 
to police and control the flow of capital, information, and people.  This was no mere coincidence.  
The Qiaopiju did not adopt “traditional” cultural business practices because they were 
traditional, I argue, but discursively created and used these practices in order to secure a reliable 
market segment and exploit the incomplete, negotiable, and porous boundaries of the global 
nation-state and colonial systems.   
As a distinctively colonial modern form of transnational business, the Qiaopiju were 
reliant on cultural practices in firm-customer and inter-firm relations to gain access to 
remittances and construct their network, but relied on capitalist methods to make their profits.  
Qiaopiju owners engaged in capitalist practices, and earned the majority of their money, by 
taking advantage of the accelerated time and economic incentives offered by modern 
  389 
 
transportation, telecommunications, and financial institutions in order to engage in other 
economic activities – currency speculation, transshipping, securities trading, or arbitrage – in the 
time lag between accepting the remittances and the customer’s expectation of its delivery to 
make their profits.  In other words, the Qiaopiju owners used the remittances as short-term loans 
to engage in their own economic activities.  The colonial modernity of the Qiaopiju as a firm, 
then, stems from its unique combination of “traditional” culturalist customer relations and 
“modern” capitalist profit-making strategies in a small flexible type of business firm designed to 
successfully negotiate and adapt to the emerging regulatory regimes of the nation-state, colonial, 
and capitalist world systems in order to survive.   
An understanding of the Qiaopiju and their activities is vital to appreciating a portion of 
the complex relationship between the Chinese state and diaspora.  While many scholars view 
diasporic communities as existing outside the state, the relationship between the Post Office and 
the Qiaopiju suggests a more nuanced situation.  There are two standard perspectives on the 
significance of diasporic communities – one celebrating the rise of transnationalism as a form of 
subversive “bottom-up” resistance to the disciplinary state12 and one using a “transnational 
perspective” to study the flows, interactions, and transformations that take place “between the 
cracks” of nation-states.13 Both of these perspectives either over- or underestimate the extent to 
which the nation-state and colonial systems simultaneously liberated and restricted diasporic 
communities.  By focusing on the relations between the Post Office and Qiaopiju, I will argue 
that the Chinese state facilitated the creation and maintenance of transnational Chinese 
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communities by encouraging “diasporic nationalism” as a method of “transnational 
reincorporation” into the state discourses of ethno-nationalism.14  The Chinese state sought to 
reincorporate the overseas Chinese by discursively creating a notion of deterritorialized 
Chineseness that emphasized the responsibility of diasporic communities to contribute 
economically to the burgeoning state.  One of the ways to make such “contributions” was to send 
their remittances back “home” either through Qiaopiju or the Post Office or, eventually, both in 
cooperation.   
Over the course of the twentieth century, the relationship between the Qiaopiju and the 
Chinese Post Office seesawed between open and beneficial cooperation and closed and harmful 
competition.  From the state’s perspective, overseas Chinese remittances provided a vital source 
of foreign currency, helped level its balance of payments, solidified its claim to a postal 
monopoly, and give it some small profit through remittance handling fees.
15
  The Qiaopiju 
benefited from the relationship by being allowed to continue some operations on the mainland 
despite the state postal monopoly, received subsidized rates for international money orders and 
clubbed packages, and were exempted in many cases – after effective lobbying by their trade 
associations – from Universal Postal Union regulations prohibiting the existence of private 
transnational remittances businesses.  The relationship between the Qiaopiju and the Post Office, 
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however, was not without conflict.  During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Qiaopiju’s continued 
success, in spite of tightening postal regulations, forced the Post Office to both poach and co-opt 
many of the Qiaopiju’s business and organizational strategies to break their stranglehold on the 
loyalties of overseas remitters.
16
  The continuing weakness of the Nationalist State, the Post 
Office’s realistic assessment of the distinct advantages possessed by the Qiaopiju, and the 
Qiaopiju’s own flexible survivalist strategies forced the two sides back into a generally 
cooperative relationship by 1935.  Upon the outbreak of World War II in 1937, the Post Office 
followed a dual policy of direct cooperation with the Qiaopiju while simultaneously 
transnationalizing itself by building its own overseas network through a series of agency 
agreements between the Post Office and international banks and the creation of a domestic 
Distribution Center (分發局) network for delivering the remittances.  Time and again, however, 
the transnational dexterity and flexibility of the Qiaopiju overmatched the superior political and 
financial resources of the Republican-era states.  It was these very same qualities that brought the 
Qiaopiju into existence in the 1850s. 
 
Voyagers and Hostellers: Middlemen and the Origins of the Qiaopiju, 1850-1870 
In the mid-nineteenth century a new surge of Chinese emigration began as tens of thousands of 
coastal Chinese began looking for new economic opportunities on the “gold mountain” of 
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California and in the mines and agricultural fields of Southeast Asia.  In Southeast Asia prior to 
1870, these early immigrants entered local indigenous states whose rule was weak, diffuse, and 
decentralized and an economic system increasingly dominated by the early colonial powers – the 
Dutch in Batavia, the British in Singapore, and the Spanish in Manila.  The relations between the 
colonial regimes and local states rested for the most part on commercial treaties and agreements.  
The inconsistencies of direct/indirect local and colonial rule, the lack of demarcated territorial 
boundaries, the admixture of indigenous and Western governmentalities, and the gradual 
transition to capitalist-oriented production left open enough space for overseas Chinese to thrive 
as middle-men within this hybrid economic system from their bases in the polyglot cities 
scattered throughout mainland and archipelagic Southeast Asia.   
Overseas Chinese not only served as middlemen in the emergent capitalist economies of 
Southeast Asia between indigenous peoples and colonizers, but also in the mobilization and 
transportation of laborers from southern China to the tin mines of the Dutch East Indies, the 
rubber plantations of the Malay peninsula, and the other commercial crop fields throughout the 
region.
17
  These labor recruiters usually collected outward-bound Chinese from along the 
southeast coast or in Hong Kong and escorted them through an emerging transoceanic network 
linking together seaward China and maritime Southeast Asia.  The men who organized these 
trips and escorted the emigrants went by a number of different names – Water Bosses (水頭), 
Overseas Agents (水客), South Seas Agents (南洋客), and Voyagers (走水) – though for 
simplicity I will refer to them collectively as “overseas agents.”18  In addition to serving as labor 
recruiters, overseas agents also booked passage and arranged accommodations on credit and did 
                                                 
17
 On Chinese as middlemen in Southeast Asia, see: Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, “Introduction: Chinese 
Business in an Institutional and Historical Perspective,” in Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia, edited by R. A. 
Brown (New York: Routledge, 1995), 19. 
18
 I prefer to translate “ke” (客) as “agent” rather than the more common “guest” because the English term “agent” 
suggests both the occupational pursuits of these men and their function within the transnational migrant circuit.   
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a number of other odd jobs necessary for transporting the laborers from China to their new place 
of work.
19
  As middlemen, one of the services they began offering was to carry remittances from 
overseas Chinese back to the homeland.    
Historical evidence suggests that overseas agents were the precursors to, and frequently 
founders of, Qiaopiju firms, but there remains some ambiguity about the origins of Qiaopiju.  
Chinese scholars argue that overseas agents first emerged in the mid-nineteenth century when 
illiterate overseas Chinese began asking fellow townsmen to carry small amounts of cash back to 
their families.  Gradually, the men carrying the remittances realized the potential profits to be 
made by handling remittances and became circumambulating overseas agents.  Concerns about 
the informality and unpredictability of these initial exchanges led the agents to open small 
general stores (商號) or inns (客棧) to provide easily accessible locations for collecting the 
remittances.  They also regularized their procedures and expanded their contacts by sending 
representatives out to collect remittances.  In other cases, pre-existing general stores made 
agreements with itinerant overseas agents to transport remittances for the shops.
20
  Sometimes 
local inns concentrated in the main cities of southeast coastal China – Fuzhou, Xiamen, 
Chaozhou, Shantou, Guangzhou – maintained informal agreements with shops scattered 
throughout the Chinese diaspora to collect and transmit remittances.
21
   
Professional overseas agents undoubtedly emerged from a number of different origins, 
but previous scholarship has generally overlooked the possible connection between them and 
couriers (信客), predecessors and contemporaries of the Minxinju, who provided similar services 
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 Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home, 32-34. 
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 Peng Yingtian, Minxinju fazhan shi: Zhongguo de minjian tongxun shiye (A history of the expansion of people’s 
letter offices: China’s popular communications enterprise) (Taibei: Zhongguo wenhua daxue chubanbu, 1992), 68, 
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 Wu, Dollars, Dependents and Dogma, 31.  In the early twentieth century there were 184 such hostels in Xiamen, 
60 in Shantou, and 20 in Hong Kong.  Dai, “Wangluohua,” 71. 
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in mainland China from an earlier date.  In addition to carrying letters, remittances, and small 
parcels, couriers also frequently escorted travelers, made travel arrangements, and handled 
luggage for people throughout China.
22
  In the mid-19
th
 century, couriers and Minxinju began 
transnationalizing their operations by starting to handle letters and remittances from Guangzhou 
and surrounding environs to the colonies of Hong Kong and Macao.  Once these Minxinju firmly 
established themselves as remittance carriers between southern China and the colonies, they 
became known as Hong Kong-Macao Letter Shops (港澳信館) and probably provided an early 
example for overseas agents and Qiaopiju.
23
 
Whatever the precise origins of the overseas agents, by the late 1850s we see the 
emergence of a growing transoceanic network created and maintained by inns, general stores, 
and overseas agents linking seaward China, the entrepot of Hong Kong, and colonial cities and 
towns throughout Southeast Asia.  As one-man or small operations, there is little historical 
documentation on the business strategies and practices of these overseas agents.  What seems 
well-established, however, is that the linchpin holding together this junk-traversed transoceanic 
network – or, more precisely, multiple networks – were various types of relationships based on 
mutual affinities such as local dialect, native-place, and real or fictive kinship.  Since most of the 
laborers and overseas agents were townsmen and spoke the same dialect, and such agents 
circulated between familiar labor depots and work centers in Southeast Asia, the overseas 
Chinese gradually gave their personal trust to agents with geo-consanguineous ties.  Such 
affinity-based interpersonal relations between agents and immigrants not only provided a system 
of mutual benefit and trust, but such a system was absolutely indispensible in the days prior to 
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 Enclosure in Shanghai Despatch No. 4200 of 1919 to Co-D.G., Memorandum by Woo Yih Ching, Acting Deputy 
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 Inspectorate General of Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, Etc. of the Ports Open 
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the creation of regional financial and communications institutions that could transmit 
remittances.  In other words, overseas Chinese relied on townsmen to carry their remittances 
home not because of the procedural complexities of systems trust-based remittance institutions 
like regional banks, as some have argued, but because their economic choices were conditioned 
by the absence of such institutions.  
Interpersonal trust and mutual affinities as the basis of agent-remitter relations in the 
early years afforded a viable transactional model, but also limited the ability for business growth, 
profit-making, and introduced an element of uncertainty.  By using these so-called guanxi bases, 
both agents and remitters limited the available avenues for conducting their economic exchanges 
and narrowed their economic choices.  Agents had access to overseas Chinese with whom they 
shared relationships, but their business was restricted to that relatively small group.  Profits 
would only increase with greater remittances or an influx of new immigrants from the same 
hometown.  From the perspective of the remitter, they were locked into the remittance fees 
charged by their hometown agents, but were still exposed to possible losses.
24
  In sum, pre-1870 
agent-remitter business transactions relied on geo-consanguineous and other affinities as a basis 
for business trust, but they also exposed both sides to economic limitations, risk, and uncertainty.  
The situation underwent a momentous change around 1870. 
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 Early agents took as much as ten percent of the total remittance as their fees.  Quanzhou qiaopi ye shiliao 
(Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1994), 4 cited in Dai, “Wangluohua,” 77n6 
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Early Qiaopiju: Networking Empire, Nation, and Colony, 1870-1910
25
 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, improvements in steamship technology, the expansion of 
the submarine telegraph network, and the inauguration of modern postal services helped usher in 
the era of high imperialism in Southeast Asia by increasing its contacts with the rest of the world.  
Within the region, the construction of roads, bridges, new ports and port facilities, and railways 
increasingly linked domestic political and economic centers and integrated hinterland and 
metropole.  In effect, the region became networked to the world and the colonies and nations 
became networked to each other.
26
  When colonists, emigrants, and indigenous peoples began 
using these new transportation and communications networks they transformed the geo-political 
and economic landscape of Southeast Asia by intensifying the marketization of local economies 
and gradually hardening the nation-state/colonial systems, especially in the realms of market 
controls, territorial borders, and formal legal systems.   
The globalization of the capitalist economic model and the technological revolution in 
transportation and communication helped colonial administrators impose a more complex 
bureaucracy onto the loose, indigenous forms of political association in Southeast Asia, but the 
as yet unsolidified borders of the colonial states continued to permit enterprising Chinese traders 
to operate outside the purview of the state.  This constellation of factors presented an opportunity 
and challenge for overseas agents and other Chinese businessmen who quickly grasped that 
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steamships and telegraph lines could help them increase their business and the rather porous 
borders would allow them to operate unencumbered in interstitial areas.  Their existing business 
model of independent owner-operators, however, would need some modification to take 
advantage of these opportunities.  At the forefront of those capitalizing on the new situation were 
overseas agents who began establishing more formal Qiaopiju firms.   
Although there is little historical trace of the founders of individual Qiaopiju firms, they 
appear to have been established by people in a number of occupational categories all tied in some 
manner to the maintenance of the early transnational network.  In addition to overseas agents and 
hostel keepers, owners of overseas trading companies also began offering small remittance 
services in the 1880s.
27
  Other firms handling petty remittances included transshipping 
companies, local retailers, wholesalers, and other kinds of small businesses based either in a 
Chinese or Southeast Asian coastal port town with branches scattered throughout the local 
hinterland and abroad.
28
  Quite frequently, pre-existing money dealers, traders, and foreign 
currency exchangers throughout Fujian and Guangdong such as native banks (銀號), money 
shops (錢莊), and Gold Mountain firms (金山莊) also provided remittances services.29  In a few 
cases, men who were “Piglet purchasers” (豬仔購), selling emigrants into indentured servitude 
in the commercial agricultural fields or mines of Southeast Asia, founded Qiaopiju.
30
  Finally, in 
one of the most famous examples, a Chinese-Filipino boatman named Guo Youpin established 
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 Inspectorate General of Customs.  Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, Etc. of the Ports Open 
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 Wu, Dollars, Dependents and Dogma, 37.    
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 Liu Guangsheng, Zhongguo gudai youyi shi (History of postal stations in ancient China) (Beijing: Renmin 
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the Tianyi Qiaopiju in Zhangzhou, Fujian, which later expanded to include more than 30 
branches and 550 employees.
31
   
In the absence of formal business records, we can only partially reconstruct the shape of 
the early Qiaopiju network as it emerged in the late nineteenth century.  The first known 
Qiaopiju, the Virtuous Benefit Letter Shop (德利信局), appeared in Shantou in the late 1850s 
with another branch in Chaozhou.
32
  Over the next two decades, Qiaopiju began to spread 
throughout the larger ports of coastal China.  In the 1870s Qiaopiju appeared in places such as 
Shantou, Chaozhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Anhai, but the real explosion took place in the 
1880s when we begin to find more significant numbers throughout maritime China, including 
five in Taiwan.
33
  According to one estimate, between 1887 and 1891 there were more than fifty 
new Qiaopiju established along China’s southeast littoral zone.34  By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, sites of emigration like Xiamen and Guangdong had between thirty and forty 
remittance firms, respectively, while Qiaopiju also began to move inland, especially along 
navigable rivers, to places like Wuzhou, Guangxi.
35
    
Aside from those headquartered in China, overseas agents and companies scattered 
throughout Southeast Asia began to establish Qiaopiju during the 1880s.  By the 1890s, there 
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were already 49 Qiaopiju in Singapore.
36
  In the early twentieth century there were about 280 
Qiaopiju in Singapore and Penang in British Malaya; between thirty and forty scattered between 
Batavia, Bandong, and Semarang in the Dutch East Indies, about ten in Manila, around thirty in 
Saigon in French Cochinchina, seven in British Hong Kong, and fifty in Thailand.
37
  From its 
early development we can determine that the early Qiaopiju network builders collectively created 
a functionally efficient hub-and-spoke pattern with Head Offices in large coastal cities in China 
and Southeast Asia and smaller offices radiating out into the hinterland and secondary littoral 
cities.   
The rigidity of typical hub-and-spoke networks, and the attendant transportation and 
economic inefficiencies, were overcome by the Qiaopiju through the use of a number of inter-
firm agreements to extend the reach of their services.  The Qiaopiju utilized inter-firm 
agreements to expand their network reach, increase their customer base, and lower overhead 
costs.  Although some Head Offices might establish wholly-owned branches in nearby cities, 
more commonly Qiaopiju owners made simple financial arrangements with other firms.
38
  The 
effect of all these inter-firm agreements was a vast, overlapping series of miniature remittance 
networks.  In a study of the Qiaopiju conducted in the early twentieth century, the Bank of 
Taiwan estimated that nine out of ten Qiaopiju had some form of contractual agreements with 
other firms.
39
   
While some of the original overseas agents continued to carry currency from Southeast 
Asia to China into the middle of the twentieth century, Qiaopiju firms tended to develop a more 
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sophisticated series of business practices to produce greater profits and capitalize on the new 
communications and transportation inventions.
40
  By doing so, they started transitioning to a 
colonial modern form of business.  For example, to increase the safety of their remittances, 
Qiaopiju owners began replacing currency with small slips of paper representing the amount sent 
by each remitter.
41
  After collecting a reasonable number of slips, they placed them inside a 
single package, referred to as a “clubbed package” (總包) by the Post Office, and entrusted it to 
the Chinese supercargo of a home-bound ship who then handed it over to Qiaopiju agents at a 
port of call or destination.
42
  Instead of making most of their profits from remittance fees, as they 
had done in the past, Qiaopiju firms used the remittances as a form of temporary capital over the 
course of the days or weeks it took the supercargo to reach his destination.
43
  Frequently, 
collected remittances were pooled and used to purchase goods in Southeast Asia, the goods were 
then sold in Hong Kong or coastal China, and the profit from the sales were used to pay the 
remittances with the additional profits invested back into the company.  In other cases, Qiaopiju 
owners simply used the funds to engage in exchange rate speculation relying on free-floating 
currency markets between Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and China to make their profits.
44
  The 
time lag between when the remitter expected the money to reach China and the quickness by 
which the Qiaopiju could telegraph the remittances to Hong Kong gave the Qiaopiju all the time 
they needed to use the money for speculation and investment.  Overall, the early Qiaopiju relied 
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on new forms of transportation, communication, and financial markets to increase their profit 
margins, but, available evidence suggests, did not yet begin to offer those specialized culturally-
sensitive customer services that would complete the creation of their colonial modern business 
model – it would take direct competition from other types of remittance services to bring those to 
the fore. 
As an early form of the transnational Chinese business firm emerging in the late 
nineteenth century, and influenced by global flows of capital and technological inventions of the 
Second Industrial Revolution, several features of Qiaopiju firms up to about 1910 mark them as 
distinctly modern companies.  Despite the horizontal structure of most Qiaopiju firms, their 
owners used strategically flexible, informal inter-firm linkages to expand their geographic reach 
vertically within the hierarchy of places in Southeast Asia and China to maintain low costs.  
More fundamentally, the Qiaopiju relied almost entirely on modern transportation, 
communication, and financial institutions to generate revenue.  The Qiaopiju created their profit 
margins by using steamship transportation to move people, telegraphic communications to remit 
monies to Hong Kong, parlayed the remittances into greater profits by taking advantage of 
shifting exchange rates and fluctuating markets for raw materials, and transshipping 
manufactured products into China.
45
  Only then did they deliver the remittances.  The actual 
remittance fees taken were miniscule, but the money made playing the international markets 
gave the Qiaopiju almost their entire profit margin. 
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Growth of the Qiaopiju Network, 1910-1950 
Starting in the early twentieth century there was a rapid increase in the number of Qiaopiju firms 
both in China and Southeast Asia.
46
  Despite a clear trend towards expansion, inconsistent 
counting methods and variations in the definition of what constituted a Qiaopiju firm has resulted 
in confusion about the size of the industry after 1910.  Only in the late 1920s when the Post 
Office began trying to emulate the Qiaopiju network did postal officials make the first studies of 
the industry.  By drawing on a number of sources, I have tried to create the most comprehensive 
picture of the size of the industry though these figures should still be considered incomplete. 
With the exception of estimates in the 1890s, the first concrete figures for the number of 
Qiaopiju operating in China and abroad did not appear until the late 1910s.  According to postal 
records, 172 Minxinju/Qiaopiju operated in Guangdong in 1917.
47
  If the figure of forty Qiaopiju 
in Guangdong in the first decade of the twentieth century is correct, the number of firms more 
than quadrupled in just over ten years.  Estimates for the number of Qiaopiju operating in 
Southeast Asia shows uneven, but steady growth.  As the center of the Qiaopiju network in 
Southeast Asia, Singapore alone expanded from 49 Qiaopiju firms in the 1890s to more than 200 
by 1916 with another 70-80 in nearby Kuala Lumpur.  In other maritime Southeast Asian cities, 
however, growth was slower.
48
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 Efforts by the Post Office to study the Qiaopiju industry led to more accurate statistical 
counts starting in 1927.  In 1927, Fujian Postal Commissioner W. Stapleton-Cotton ordered a 
survey of “registered Minju.”  The resulting statistics showed 278 firms operating in Fujian with 
the vast majority, 201, being headquartered in Xiamen with another 64 stationed in local rural 
areas around Xiamen.  The other thirteen firms worked out of Fuzhou.
49
  In Fujian, then, the 
number of Qiaopiju expanded from around 30 in 1900 to 278 by 1927.  In these early counts, 
however, the Post Office usually failed to distinguish between “head” and “branch” offices.   
Only in 1931, when the Shantou First-Class Postmaster issued licenses, did he differentiate 
between “head offices” and “branches” thereby painting a more accurate picture of the local 
Qiaopiju industry.
50
  The Postmaster reported only eight Qiaopiju situated in Shantou, but those 
eight had 67 branches scattered throughout the local inland area.
51
   
With the Post Office licensing provisions for Minxinju/Qiaopiju coming into effect in 
September 1930, we begin to see more frequent counts by the Post Office.
52
   For the fiscal year 
1931-1932, the Fujian Head Office licensed a total of 240-250 firms for the entire province.
53
  In 
1934, the count for Xiamen alone showed 122 Head Offices in the city, which increased to 153 
by 1935.
54
   The increase of head Qiaopiju offices in Xiamen, the “Clearing House” of the 
industry, covers what appears to have been a general decline of the number of firms in the rest of 
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the province from 250 in 1931-32 to 185 in 1935.
55
  In Guangdong, the Head Office recorded a 
grand total of 198 firms for 1931, which declined slightly to 192 by 1933.
56
   By 1935, the 
number of firms in Guangdong had further declined to 169, but Shantou, as the center of the 
Guangdong Qiaopiju network, remained strong with 110 registered firms with a total of 790 
overseas and inland branches.
57
  Qiongzhou, on Hainan Island, also continued its prominence in 
the overseas remittance network with 65 firms in 1933, which contracted slightly to 59 by 
1935.
58
  For the entire country, the Directorate General of Posts tabulated 322 head offices with 
3363 branches in China and abroad in June 1934.
59
   Adding together the 1935 totals for Fujian 
and Guangdong there were 354 head offices in the mid-1930s.
60
 
Figures for Qiaopiju head or branch offices in Southeast Asia in the 1930s are rare.  The 
most accurate count comes to us from the South Manchurian Railway Company’s Economic 
Statistical Office, which counted a total of 515 Qiaopiju in all of Southeast Asia in 1930.  Of 
those 515, all of which were presumably head offices, there were 160 in the Dutch East Indies, 
50 in Indo-China, 80 in Thailand, 15 in the Philippines, and 210 in British Malaya and Burma.
61
   
As for the geographic extent of the Qiaopiju network in Southeast Asia, our best source is 
a petition from the Directorate to the Ministry of Communications in April 1932 in response to 
an order from the Ministry to list all cities in Southeast Asia with Qiaopiju firms.  While the 
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following list is certainly not exhaustive it provides a fairly good picture of the geographic scope 
of the Qiaopiju network. 
Table 6: Names of Places in Southeast Asia with Qiaopiju
62
 
Country Cities with Qiaopiju 
Taiwan Tainan, Taibei 
Indo-China Saigon 
Siam/Thailand Bangkok  
Burma Rangoon 
Straights Settlements Kedah, Malacca, Penang, Puket, 
Singapore 
Philippine Islands  Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Jolo, Manila 
British North Borneo  Jesselton 
Dutch East Indies Amboina, Bagan, Batavia, Bali, 
Bengalore, Cheribon, Deli, Dhambi, 
Denpasar, Java, Macasser, Menado, 
Palembang, Pekalongan, Soerabaia, 
Samarinda, Samarang, Singaraja, 
Telok Betong 
Federated Malay States Ipoh, Kelantan, Kajang, Kuala 
Lumpur, Klang, Port Dickson, Perak, 
Rembau, Serembau, Selangor, 
Taiping, Teluk Anson, Tanjang Malim  
Johore Batu Pahat, Labis, Muar, Segamat 
 
During World War II, Qiaopiju firms initially closed because of unsettled conditions and 
Japanese harassment, but then started to grow once again.
63
  By 1941, according to records of the 
Fujian Head Post Office, there were 122 Qiaopiju headquartered in Xiamen or the nearby cities 
of Jinjiang (晉江) and Gulangyu (鼓浪嶼), which maintained relations with 2559 branches 
scattered throughout inland areas and Southeast Asia.
64
  For wartime Guangdong, we only have 
accurate figures for Qiaopiju operating out of Shantou.  In the early 1940s, there were 86 
Qiaopiju head offices officially operating in Shantou; however, Japanese interference in overseas 
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remittance activities forced 23 of them to move to nearby Meixian (梅縣), Guangdong, in Free 
China.
65
  The firms that evacuated inland maintained relations with 230 branches while the 63 in 
Shantou kept up business contacts with 658 branches.
66
   
 
Marketizing Culture: The Qiaopiju, Interfirm Networks, and Customer Relations 
The growth of the Qiaopiju industry after 1910 was the result of improvements in its business 
model.  In the late nineteenth century, overseas remittance firms had a rather free hand in 
developing their remittances networks, but around 1910 the Qiaopi industry began encountering 
resistance from the colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, the Qing state, and then the newly-
established Republican government in China, all of whom were in the midst of creating more 
effective borders, regulatory regimes, and state banks.
67
  Once colonial and state authorities 
began studying the practices and transnational networks of the Qiaopiju, and began competing 
with and regulating them, the Qiaopiju began to utilize culturalist firm-customer business 
practices and flexible organizational strategies.  It was this encounter, rather than some in-born 
propensity to favor cultural in-groups, that encouraged the Qiaopiju to rely on cultural affinities 
to develop a more sophisticated set of business practices, organizational models, and inter-firm 
networks to maintain market dominance in the overseas remittance industry.  The combination of 
network structure, inter-firm relations, and culturalist customer relations would make the 
Qiaopiju one of the colonial modern business par excellence in the period between 1910 and 
1950.   
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Inter-firm relations between and among Qiaopiju in the period after 1910 are 
distinguished by their flexibility and, concomitantly, a general decline in relations based on 
cultural affinities or guanxi bases.  Certainly, native-place, dialect, or kinship relations continued 
to have some significance, but the general trend was towards intensifying inter-firm relations for 
economic and political reasons.  The primary economic motive for increased cooperation was the 
desire to expand the reach of their remittance networks.  That is, to tap markets and deliver 
remittances in areas where the originating firm had no affiliates.   The political motive for 
increased cooperation was to counteract and lobby against government efforts to restrict Qiaopiju 
business. 
While it is probably impossible to trace the never-ending arrangement and rearrangement 
of formal and informal contractual inter-firm relationships – a strength that made Qiaopiju firms 
very flexible – we can minimally point to a few different models that were probably fairly 
standard.  Research by the Japanese-controlled Bank of Taiwan suggests that there were three 
primary types of inter-firm relations: (1) yearly profits divided equally amongst all the offices in 
a network; (2) all business expenses were paid by the Head Office, which also received all the 
profits, but they paid commissions between one and two percent to the collecting offices; and (3) 
Head Offices received all the profits, but paid a commission of 0.002 to 0.004 percent on the 
amount of remittances collected to contract agents.
68
  In Fujian there was a special terminology 
to describe inter-firm relations.  Qiaopiju who acted independently were known as toupan 
(頭盤); firms that acted as agents for a number of different overseas Head Offices and delivered 
in urban or suburban areas were called erpan (二盤), and agent firms that delivered inland were 
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called sanpan (三盤).69  Conventions of naming should not prohibit us from understanding that 
any given Qiaopiju probably acted as a head office, a branch office, an affiliate, and a contract 
agent all times.
70
   
The flexibility in inter-firm relations among Qiaopiju should be recognized as one of the 
hallmarks of their success.  Such flexibility allowed them to both deepen their relations with 
firms from all over the diaspora, but also to greatly expand the reach of their networks.  If a 
Qiaopiju in Thailand collected a remittance from an overseas worker from Yunnan, but had no 
branch there, they apparently made simple and efficient agreements with a chain of Qiaopiju 
firms who could effect delivery.  Of course, it was always in the interests of any Qiaopiju firm to 
assist other as they might need the same help in the future.  For example, an inland agent in the 
Shantou area might represent ten different Qiaopiju firms.
71
 
The economic motives for increased inter-firm relations gradually pushed Qiaopiju away 
from relationships built solely on cultural affinities like native-place sentiment.  Native-place 
sentiment did continue to hold some sway for overseas-based Qiaopiju where we find, for 
example, Fujian-born owners in Singapore dividing themselves loosely into groups from 
Xiamen, Fuzhou, Xinghua, and Longyan, but in other places such as the Federated Malay States 
all Fujian-born owners worked together.
72
  One reason Fujian-born Qiaopiju owners worked 
together in the Malay States, and the most frequently cited in petitions to the government, was 
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that the Chinese government’s “alleged protection” of overseas Chinese was “merely empty 
words.”73  If the Chinese government would not help protect the interests of overseas Chinese, 
they were forced to form their own trade associations to fight for their survival. 
 
Inter-firm Relations: Trade Associations 
Starting in the late 1920s, Qiaopiju owners also maintained inter-firm relations at an industry 
level through the organization of modern trade associations (同業公會).74  Around the turn of 
the twentieth century, Chinese merchant organizations in many fields underwent associational 
restructuring as they began to change from the old-fashioned guild (會館, 公所), designed to 
regulate trade in the interests of business owners, to the modern trade association, devoted to 
promoting trade, lobbying government, and standardizing business practices.  That said, modern 
trade associations continued to manifest some native-place influence in their organizational 
practices reflecting guild traditions, but there was also a gradual and distinctive shift towards 
organization in accordance with commercial or other identities.
75
   
Qiaopiju trade associations represented a modern trend away from economic 
specialization by native place in their relations with colonial or state administrations, but whose 
internal organization often showed some signs of fragmentation along native-place lines.  The 
internal fragmentation was fostered by the overall structure of the trade associations as voluntary 
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organizations based on contractual agreements restricted to certain geographical areas rather than 
compulsory, monopolistic associations controlling the entire trade and encompassing Qiaopiju 
across the region.  Conceptually, much of the native-place influence within the Qiaopiju trade 
associations was less a function of traditional identity politics than determined by the 
concentration of emigrants from specific places within China congregating in certain cities in 
Southeast Asia.  The transnationalization of economic enterprises required a reliance on some 
organizing principle in lieu of corporate ownership of the entire network - the simplest principle 
turned out to be native place.  By the 1930s and 1940s, however, the combination of economic 
instability, the wartime disruption of regional economic activity, and heavy state interference in 
foreign exchange rates pushed the Qiaopiju into forming general trade associations eliding 
native-place sentiment.
76
 
The primary impetus in the organization of Qiaopiju trade associations was the onset of 
heavy interference by the Chinese state and colonial administrations in Southeast Asia with 
Qiaopiju activities during the late 1920s, especially the Chinese Post Office’s attempts to 
eliminate the clubbed package system from 1925 to 1928.
77
  The rapidly industrializing regional 
economy, a renewed desire to apply relevant Universal Postal Union regulations, and the 
hardening of state and colonial borders all pushed the Qiaopiju owners towards forming trade 
associations to protect their commercial interests.  In concrete terms, this meant that Qiaopiju 
owners’ cardinal reason for establishing trade associations was not to police each other or 
regularize business procedures, but to challenge the encroaching regulatory regimes of the state, 
colony, and Universal Postal Union through collective lobbying.    
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The Qiaopiju trade associations emerging in the late 1920s were situated in the cities that 
acted as clearinghouses for international remittances – frequently the largest local ports – in 
coastal China and Southeast Asia such as Xiamen, Shantou, Singapore, and Bangkok.  Although 
there may have been other informal Qiaopiju trade associations, there were trade associations in 
the following cities: Shantou (1926), Xiamen (1927), Jieyang (1931), a second one in Xiamen 
(1932), Jinjiang (1934), a second one in Shantou (1940), all-Fujian (early 1940s), and Chaoyang 
(early 1940s).
78
  Qiaopiju trade associations based overseas were situated in Thailand (1932), in 
Singapore there were associations for Chaozhou (1926-27), Fujian (unknown), and Hainan 
(unknown), in British Malaya in Pulau Pinang, Selangor, and Malacca (all in 1946).
79
  
Purportedly, there was even an alliance of overseas agents in the 1930s called the South Seas 
Overseas Agents Alliance (南洋水客聯合會) and a General Alliance of South Seas Agents 
(南洋水客聯合總會) in Shantou in 1947.80 
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Formal trade association charters usually defined their purposes in broad terms.  As to be 
expected, the mission of the association was to engage in activities beyond the purview of the 
individual firm – most important was always “maintaining the interests of the trade.”  For 
example, the organizers of the Chaozhou Overseas Chinese Remittance Trade Association 
assigned as duties the protection of the trade, strengthening services to overseas Chinese 
remitters, and arbitrating disputes between member firms.
81
  Likewise, the Shantou Municipal 
Overseas Letter Trade Association’s organizational regulations defined its functions as 
harmonizing its members’ viewpoints, guaranteeing the trade’s money orders against loss, 
promoting the interests of the collective, and redressing harm done to the business, including 
state efforts to restrict their scope of operations.
82
  Specifically, Qiaopiju trade associations 
lobbied local, national, and colonial governments on economic and regulatory polices related to 
international remittances, coordinated trade activities, standardized remittance procedures, 
arbitrated disputes, and served as the clearinghouse for telegraphic remittances and disseminator 
of local foreign exchange rates.
83
   
Although relatively little is known about the internal organization of these trade 
associations, Postal Inspector Zhang Jixi’s 1936 report gives us some insight into their 
structure.
84
  According to Zhang, fifty Qiaopiju “of large concerns” in the Shantou area 
constituted the Shantou Municipal Overseas Letter Trade Association.  Notably, this was slightly 
less than half the total of 110 registered Qiaopiju operating out of Shantou in the mid-1930s.  Of 
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the fifty members, they divided themselves into four classes according to the size of their typical 
transactions, which then determined the amount of association fees levied on individual firms.  
Pooled association funds were used to pay the salaries of seven committee members and to 
“protect the interests” of the collective group by maintaining “good connections with Shantou 
bankers and local business leaders.”  Indeed, the owner of the powerful Yuanyu (願裕) Qiaopiju 
served as Chairman of the Xiamen General Chamber of Commerce in the late 1920s.  In general, 
then, the primary purpose of this trade association was to “protect their interests” and “utilize it 
as an organ for making necessary negotiations with local authorities or outsiders.”85   
 
Culturalist Customer Services 
Prior to 1910 there are few records or descriptions of Qiaopiju customer relations, but afterwards 
Qiaopiju began using a whole host of apparently new culturalist business practices.  These 
practices gave the Qiaopiju a competitive edge and helped secure a loyal following among 
emigrants.  While many of these new practices had, to borrow Dai Yifeng’s phrase, “the human 
touch,” I argue it was external interference or an understandable response to new national, 
colonial, and international regulatory regimes that pushed the Qiaopiju towards these practices 
rather than simply a cultural affinity for fellow townsmen. 
One of the more oft-noted services offered by the Qiaopiju was writing and reading 
letters for illiterate customers.  When customers sent a remittance back to China it was almost 
always accompanied by a short letter called a pixin (批信).86  A Qiaopiju office or agent would 
offer to write the letter for an illiterate remitter.  When the remittance and letter reached their 
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destination, the courier would then read the letter aloud to the recipient.  After reading the letter, 
the courier invited the recipient to send their own letter back, which is called a huipi (回批).  Of 
course, couriers were often recruited for their literacy and familiarity with local families, 
especially since remittances were often insufficiently addressed with nothing more than a 
surname and village.
87
   
 Private letters written for customers were part of a more formal remittance procedure 
developed by Qiaopiju to protect the remittances and provide evidence of delivery.  The 
following is a description of a standard Qiaopiju remittance procedure in its mature form.  An 
agent would arrive at a work site of overseas Chinese or an emigrant would go to a Qiaopiju 
office.  After handing over the amount to be remitted, the Qiaopiju employee issued a receipt to 
the remitter and inquired if any message was to accompany the remittance.  Once the letter was 
written, the employee created a slip with a serial number on it indicating the amount remitted, 
gathered the letter and funds, and a huipi, which acted as both a return receipt and a form for a 
short message from the recipient.  Once the several forms reached their destination, the courier 
handed over the money, the receipt stating the original amount remitted, and the huipi.  If a 
message was to be returned, it was written on the huipi and despatched abroad.  Once the huipi 
was returned to its point of origin, it was taken to the original remitter and read aloud – the 
family news included in the latter, often mentioning the amount received, served as a secondary 
receipt.  At every step the Qiaopiju employees checked and double checked that all serial 
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numbers matched thus allowing them to trace ordinary letters.
88
  On average, the Qiaopiju could 
collect a remittance, delivery it, and return the huipi within 20-30 days.
89
 
 The above description is revealing in that it shows the Qiaopiju using a sophisticated, 
regularized procedure for handling remittances – actually more bureaucratic than postal 
remittances – but that also catered culturally to the unique needs of overseas Chinese and their 
families.  This kind of phenomenon in Qiaopiju practices perfectly represents their colonial 
modernity – a sophisticated procedure ensuring safe passage of remittances from colony through 
entrepot to nation with enough “human touch” to satisfy their unique clientele. 
 Another culturalist business practice designed to meet the needs of overseas Chinese 
workers was sending agents out to collect remittances.  Clearly, many overseas workers on 
Southeast Asian plantations or in mines could not leave work to trek to a large city to remit 
money.  Instead, most Qiaopiju made scheduled stops in each area to collect remittances on or 
around pay day.  In areas heavily populated by Chinese workers several Qiaopiju might have to 
bid to collect remittances from the workers who had pooled their funds in an attempt to secure a 
lower remittance rate.
90
 
 Other culturalist business practices by Qiaopiju included granting remittances on credit 
and selling “Mountain Tickets” (山票).  If a remitter needed to send money for an emergency or 
did not have enough funds in hand, Qiaopiju would offer “Advance Money” (墊款) and accept 
the remitter’s word that the money would be repaid.91  “Mountain Tickets” worked exactly like 
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stamp remittances at the Post Office.  The Qiaopiju had an assortment of pre-printed stamps with 
denominations like 5, 10, or 20 yuan they would sell to a remitter who was afraid bandits might 
waylay the Qiaopiju courier.  Once purchased, the tickets could be sent to China in the safest 
way possible and upon receipt could be cashed at the Qiaopiju.
92
 
Qiaopiju business practices in their customer relations do have something of a 
“culturalist” tinge.  They obviously catered to the particular needs of overseas Chinese far more 
than the Post Office or international remittance banks, but to suggest their entire business model 
is therefore somehow “traditional” or “culturalist” appears to miss the point.  In each of the 
above examples, we can also see typical capitalist behavior of regularizing, standardizing, or 
bureaucratizing their procedures to secure the remittances of overseas Chinese and deliver them 
safely and efficiently while also increasing their profit margins.  Every step in their remittance 
procedures shows that overseas Chinese most emphatically did not implicitly trust them.  Serial 
numbers, huipi, and personal letters were a triple check on the honesty of the Qiaopiju’s 
employees.  Rather than simply favor Qiaopiju because of certain cultural affinities, it is just as 
likely that workers preferred Qiaopiju for their almost ironclad remittance procedure.  A heavy 
emphasis on the “culturalist” nature of Qiaopiju does a disservice to their particular strengths as 
flexible, adaptable firms carefully navigating colony, nation, and international regulatory 
regimes while developing customer services to suit the times. 
 
Capitalist Profit-Making Strategies  
In the twentieth century remittances remained a “sideline” for most Qiaopiju.93  They were a 
sideline in the sense that a majority of their profits came from currency exchange speculation, 
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price arbitrage, or transshipping goods.  Qiaopiju owners favored exchange rate speculation as 
providing quicker profits, but they were not averse to arbitrage or short-term investments in 
moveable goods when exchange rates proved unfavorable.
94
   
In the process of collecting remittances Qiaopiju owners always paid particular attention to 
currency exchange rates between Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and cities in China, particularly 
Shanghai.
95
  Exchange rate speculation not only allowed Qiaopiju owners to make quick profits, 
but it was also a strategy to avoid colonial or state limits on international remittances.
96
  When 
currency speculation was undertaken, the Qiaopiju employee would quote the current exchange 
rates of local currency to Singapore, Hong Kong, or Shanghai dollars to the remitters.  Once the 
remittance was accepted at that rate, the Qiaopiju owners would then wait for the rates to shift in 
their favor.  If the rates between, for example, Singapore and Shanghai were favorable the 
Qiaopiju would then telegraphically transfer the funds to Shanghai and make the exchange.
97
  It 
appears that in most cases Qiaopiju owners might wait up to ten days for the rates to improve.
98
 
When exchange rates were unfavorable or did not improve in the allotted time, Qiaopiju 
owners might then turn to price arbitrage or transshipping goods between Southeast Asia, Hong 
Kong, and southeastern China.  Price arbitrage was simply a way Qiaopiju owners could take 
advantage of price differences in various durable goods between markets in Southeast Asia, 
Hong Kong, and southern China.  They could either engage in simultaneous telegraphic 
transactions – to lower risk – or accept greater risk by transshipping goods.  Transshipping goods 
seems to have been more common than simultaneous transactions.  In most cases, Qiaopiju 
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owners would purchase local goods such as agricultural products, cotton textiles, or Western 
goods and then ship them to Hong Kong for sale or reshipment to China.  Since transporting and 
selling goods might take an extended period, the Qiaopiju issued remittances out of working 
capital and repaid themselves once the goods sold at a profit.
 99 
 
 If some customer services offered by the Qiaopiju had the “human touch” their profit-
making strategies most certainly did not.  In actually handling the money of remitters, Qiaopiju 
owners were quite capitalistic.  They unabashedly charged remitters a fee – albeit small – for 
allowing the Qiaopiju to use the workers’ hard-earned wages as temporary capital, they 
unashamedly held back much needed remittances waiting for currency rates to improve, and 
unrepentedly masked their activities with customer relations.   
If the Qiaopiju model of business is to be lauded, it should not be celebrated as something 
“traditionally Chinese,” but as evidence of overseas Chinese businessmen’s ingenious 
exploitation of the most modern communications, transportation, and financial institutions.  
Along with their flexible inter-firm relations and culturalist customer services, their profit-
making strategies show an adaptability to twentieth century modes of capitalism, a cognizance of 
regional needs, and fluidity of movement in transnational space.  Such a powerful combination 
goes far to explain the unparalleled success of Qiaopiju firms.  One of the features that made the 
Qiaopiju particularly successful was their defense of their industry against interference by the 
Chinese state. 
 
Trans-Action Costs: Relations between the Post Office and Qiaopiju, 1920s-1940s 
The main issue at the center of the relationship between the Post Office and Qiaopiju was always 
control over, or access to, overseas remittances.  Underlying this complex relationship, however, 
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were questions of a deterritorialized Chinese identity, state power, China’s balance of foreign 
trade, and the transnationalization of the state.  The National Government exerted significant 
state power through the Directorate to regulate the Qiaopiju, but that power was often curbed by 
lobbying from Qiaopiju trade associations and Chambers of Commerce both in China and 
abroad.  At the forefront of the government’s concerns was encouraging diaspora Chinese to 
send remittances home, remittances that helped China balance its foreign trade deficit.  Such 
broad state interests ultimately trumped Post Office concerns about protecting the postal 
monopoly and the legality of the Qiaopiju.  Even after recognizing the necessity of allowing the 
Qiaopiju to continue functioning, both the National Government and Directorate understood the 
state could also directly access overseas remittances by transnationalizing the Post Office to 
mimic and directly compete with the Qiaopiju networks.   
Prior to the mid-1920s when the Directorate first began differentiating between Minxinju 
and Qiaopiju, the Post Office lumped together these two very different types of firms as “Letter 
Hongs” (民局).100  Failing to grasp the fundamental differences between these two types of firms 
meant that the Qiaopiju enjoyed subsidized clubbed package rates like the Minxinju, but were 
also subject to repeated Directorate attempts to close them down.  The 1921 effort to close all 
Minxinju, motivated by the promulgation of a new Postal Law giving the Post Office a national 
monopoly failed in the face of combined resistance by local and provincial officials supported by 
Minxinju trade association lobbying.
101
  In the face of such intense lobbying efforts the Ministry 
                                                 
100
 Although certain postal commissioners stationed in the southeast made a clear distinction between those 
accepting international and domestic remittances at various times, at other moments Qiaopiju activities appeared 
almost unknown to postal staff.  For example, the postal archives at Xiamen in 1927 contained very little 
information about Qiaopiju activities.  Fuzhou Memo. No. 5027/12384 in SHAC137.5287. 
101
 Articles 1, 2, and 5 of the 1921 Postal Law defined the government postal monopoly and provided the legal basis 
for the attempt to close all Minxinju.  “Postal Law” as enclosure to Circular No. 507, Officiating Co-Director 
General, temporarily C. Rousse, 1 November 1921 in SHAC137.2024-5. 
  420 
 
of Communications decided to delay the closure of all Minxinju/Qiaopiju until an unspecified 
later date.      
 Thwarted in his efforts to close the Minxinju/Qiaopiju, Co-Director General of Posts 
Destelan sought an external means to undermine the profitability of the Qiaopiju by eliminating 
the clubbed package system, which was their raison d’être.  In the summer of 1924, the Dutch 
East Indies representatives to the Stockholm Convention of the Universal Postal Union 
introduced a proposal to eliminate the clubbed package system, which was seconded by the 
representatives from China.  The relevant articles of the Convention did not specifically mention 
the clubbed package system, but simply codified long-standing national postal laws forbidding 
more than one letter being sent under a single cover, i.e. all letters had to be sent a decouvert 
(散寄).102  After the Convention’s adjournment the Philippines also halted the exchange of 
clubbed packages with China.  Seizing on these developments, the Directorate submitted a series 
of proposals to the Ministry of Communications in December 1925 on the general abolition of 
the international clubbed package system.  The Ministry, released from direct responsibility for 
eliminating the system, gave its approval on 31 December 1925.  By October 1926, the 
Directorate and the Southeast Asian postal administrations had fixed the date for the abolition as 
1 January 1927.
103
  On 8 October 1926, the Singapore postal administration publically 
announced plans to abolish the clubbed packages system.
104
   
Shocked by the news of the impending abolition, Qiaopiju owners throughout coastal 
China and Southeast Asia mobilized support, founded lobbying groups like the Singapore 
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Chinese Association for Reducing Postage (新加坡華僑減輕郵資大會), and sent delegations to 
meet with postal officials.  Members of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, many of 
whom were Qiaopiju owners, “assailed” the Directorate, numerous government ministries, and 
postal administrations throughout Southeast Asia with petitions requesting a three month 
delay.
105
  In Bangkok the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce telegraphed the Chinese 
Ministry of Communications claiming that the Chinese public in Thailand was “highly 
indignant” at the decision to abolish the clubbed package system.106  The All-Provincial Union of 
Chambers of Commerce and the Xiamen General Labor Union, speaking on behalf of Qiaopiju 
trade associations in Shantou and Xiamen, also lobbied the Ministry of Communications to 
rescind the abolition.
107
  On 13 February 1927, the Directorate cabled the postal administrations 
throughout Southeast Asia notifying them of the extension of the clubbed package system.
108
  
After the failure of this latest effort, Fujian Postal Commissioner Stapleton-Cotton declared that 
the “exceptionally strong” Qiaopiju trade associations would make the struggle to eliminate the 
clubbed package system “long and bitter.”109   
Following the Nationalist takeover of both the Directorate General of Posts and Ministry 
of Communications, the government announced the convening of a National Communications 
Conference to reevaluate all communications and transportation policies.
110
  In the run-up to the 
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August 1928 Conference, various Qiaopiju trade associations, representing “millions of 
impoverished overseas Chinese appealing loudly,” worked to preempt a decision to eliminate the 
Qiaopiju.
111
  Despite those efforts, the Conference delegates accepted the Directorate’s proposal 
to close all Minxinju/Qiaopiju as violators of the state postal monopoly.  The delegates officially 
delayed the closure until the end of 1930 to give the Minxinju/Qiaopiju owners and employees 
enough time to transition to new professions.
112
   
Immediately following the National Communications Conference the Chaozhou-Meixian 
General Chamber of Commerce, the Shantou Overseas Chinese Pixin Industry Trade 
Association, and the All-Provincial Union of Chambers of Commerce began an unrelenting 
lobbying effort to nullify their decision.
113
  The Qiaopiju lobbyists made remarkably similar 
arguments in their impassioned pleas.  In letter after letter, Qiaopiju owners defended their 
livelihoods claiming that the Post Office would be unable to assist illiterate overseas Chinese 
workers to writing letters and address their envelopes.  The Post Office, they claimed, charged 
exorbitant fees for small remittances and costly postage to deliver to isolated overseas Chinese 
communities.  The Post Office was not only costly but as a state institution had the deplorable 
tendency to lose remittances.
114
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Pressure from Chambers of Commerce and Minxinju/Qiaopiju trade associations 
ultimately swayed the National Government and undermined Directorate efforts.  By the opening 
of the London Congress of the Universal Postal Union in May 1929, the Ministry ordered 
Director General of Posts Liu Shufan (劉書蕃) to approach the Dutch East Indies representative 
to work out a compromise allowing the Qiaopiju to operate freely within the colony.
115
  The 
government also rescinded the abolition of all Minxinju/Qiaopiju by extending the deadline until 
1 January 1935. 
 Hamstrung by the National Government’s unwillingness to officially close the Qiaopiju, 
and frustrated by the constant contradictory orders from the same, the Directorate began building 
up a regulatory system to apply pressure on the remittance firms.  New licensing regulations, 
efforts to increase the tariff on clubbed packages, and a crackdown on smuggling were the 
Directorate’s primary weapons against the Qiaopiju.  While the period from 1928 to 1935 seems 
to represent a wholesale effort by the Directorate to hinder the operations of the Qiaopiju upon 
closer inspection it is a period of tentative steps and half measures.
116
 
In September 1930, the Directorate issued the “Provisional Regulations for Minju 
Registered Licenses.”117  The license application required Qiaopiju owners to submit full 
particulars on their ownership, relationships with other Qiaopiju, and the overseas areas they 
served.
118
  Most significantly, only Qiaopiju in existence in 1930 would be allowed to apply for a 
license – no new firms could be legally established – and if a Qiaopiju voluntarily closed its 
doors it was forbidden from selling its license.  Each license was only valid for one calendar year 
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allowing the Directorate to keep current records on the industry, its owners, and the shape of the 
Qiaopiju networks.  Despite the application deadline of 31 December 1930, enough Qiaopiju 
protested that the Ministry ordered the Directorate to grant an extension until the end of 1934.
119
  
Once again, the Directorate’s regulations – already rather circumspect – were weakened by the 
pressure applied on the Ministry by Qiaopiju trade associations.
120
   
The Directorate’s licensing provisions served as a new form of oversight of the 
international remittance industry designed to regulate its size and track network flows.  From the 
license applications the Directorate gained detailed information about the number of Qiaopiju, 
demographic information about the owners, and the size and extent of the various inland and 
international networks.  Through the yearly relicensing provision the Directorate maintained up-
to-date information about the economic condition of the industry.  The Directorate prohibited 
bankrupt firms from selling their licenses to gradually limit the size of the Qiaopiju industry, but 
they left a loophole allowing new firms to register themselves as a subsidiary company of a 
previously licensed firm – a loophole never closed.121  Most importantly, the Directorate used the 
information culled from license applications to make intensive studies of the overseas remittance 
industry.  After 1930, the Directorate began ordering frequent counts of the number of Qiaopiju 
and their branches, despatched inspectors to study their business practices, assigned accountants 
to tabulate remittances, sent postal delegations abroad to investigate local conditions, and 
assigned statisticians to accumulate all sorts of figures about the industry.  The purpose of these 
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ongoing studies was not only to regulate the industry, but also to give the Directorate enough 
information to form their own international remittance network. 
One of the results of the Directorate’s myriad studies on the Qiaopiju, and part of their 
efforts to restrict the industry, was an attempt to raise the tariff on clubbed packages.  Since the 
late 1890s, the Directorate subsidized the Qiaopiju in the form of reduced tariff rates for their 
clubbed packages – firms usually paid one-half of the international letter rate or five cents per 20 
grams on the total weight of each clubbed package.  In 1929, a Directorate inspector calculated 
the total yearly loss to the Service from these reduced rates as 170,000 yuan.
122
  Armed with this 
information, the Directorate petitioned the Ministry to raise the tariff on clubbed packages, but 
Qiaopiju protests thwarted the Directorate’s efforts.123  By the early 1930s, a readjustment of the 
exchange rate between Chinese currency and the gold franc – the official currency in which all 
international transit charges were paid – forced the Directorate to increase the international letter 
rate to 15 cents in July 1930, 20 cents in February 1931, and 25 cents in July of the same year.
124
  
Rather than immediately raise the rate on clubbed packages, the Ministry made a special 
exception allowing the Qiaopiju to continue enjoying their original five cent rate resulting in an 
additional “serious loss” to the Service.125  By September 1933, the Directorate could no longer 
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maintain such serious financial losses and raised the rate on clubbed packages to 12.5 cents per 
20 grams, or 50 percent of the international rate.
126
.   
 Ministry and Directorate thinking about the Qiaopiju between 1925 and 1935 was fraught 
with contradictions and reversals.  When the period began Co-Director General Destelan, 
Director General Liu Shufan, and Minister of Communications Wang Boqun all sought the total 
elimination of the Qiaopiju for infringing on the state postal monopoly.  Lobbying by Qiaopiju 
trade associations and interested Chambers of Commerce effectively persuaded the Ministry and 
Directorate to adopt a more incremental policy.  The Directorate did enact new licensing 
provisions, made studies of the industry, and eventually increased the tariff on clubbed packages, 
but as the period progressed new financial difficulties, including the loss of postal revenue from 
Manchuria in 1932 – resulting in the largest postal deficit on record at 5.8 million yuan – pushed 
the Ministry and Directorate towards a more conciliatory approach.  By November 1933, the 
Directorate formally abandoned its efforts to close the Qiaopiju and gave them permission to 
continue operations after the closure of all Minxinju on 1 January 1935.  The most significant 
development of this period was the Directorate’s decision to undertake extensive studies of the 
Qiaopiju and their business practices.  These studies not only laid the groundwork for a 
comprehensive Qiaopiju policy, enacted in December 1935, but also gave the Post Office the 
wherewithal to begin constructing their own overseas remittance network.
127
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The Wartime Qiaopiju Industry, 1937-1945 
The first months of the war had little effect on southeastern China or Qiaopiju operations, but the 
Japanese naval blockade begun in the spring of 1938 had a devastating impact.  After the initial 
blockade of some of the larger ports, the Japanese navy began the actual invasion in March.  
Xiamen fell to the Japanese on 13 March 1938, Fuzhou in May, Bias Bay (Guangdong) in early 
October, and Guangzhou on 21 October.  Hainan surrendered in February 1939 and Shantou in 
July.   
With the major southeastern ports captured most Qiaopiju closed down their operations.  
When conditions settled, Qiaopiju firms faced three options: close their business for the duration 
of the war, continue to operate under Japanese occupation, or move their businesses to Free 
China.  It was undoubtedly a difficult choice.  Of the 86 Qiaopiju based in Shantou in prewar 
China, 23 decided to relocate to Meixian in Free China, but 63 decided to remain in Shantou 
under Japanese control.
128
 
Qiaopiju firms remaining in occupied China faced a number of challenges from the 
Japanese and the Chinese National Government.  Within a short time, the Japanese established 
control over the entire overseas remittance industry.
129
  The main instrument of control was the 
Shantou Municipal Pixin Trade Association.
130
  The Japanese Imperial Army established the 
Trade Association in late 1939 for the “regeneration” of the overseas Chinese remittance 
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industry so the Qiaopiju could “use their genuine whole-hearted sincerity to cooperate in the 
construction of the New East Asian Order.”  All day-to-day operations of the Qiaopiju in the 
association – viz. all Qiaopiju operating in the occupied zones – were under the orders of the 
Bank of Taiwan or the Yokohama Specie Bank, who also transmitted all overseas remittances 
and converted them into military-use stamps.
131
  The Qiaopiju in the occupied zones were 
limited to sending remittances to Shantou and the surrounding counties under Japanese 
occupation.  In 1942, after conquering much of Southeast Asia, the Japanese adopted similar 
tactics by using the Bank of Taiwan to control the industry.  Of all Qiaopiju in Southeast Asia, 
only 35 decided to work with the Japanese.
132
   
In response to this move by the Japanese, the Chinese Ministry of Finance ordered the 
Guangdong Provincial Bank and the Directorate General of P.R. & S.B. to take a number of 
aggressive “countermeasures.”133  The Overseas Affairs Commission of the National 
Government notified all Chinese groups in Southeast Asia to remit their funds through 
government banks or their agents to avoid having remittances fall into Japanese hands.  The 
Ministry also recommended the Guangdong Provincial Bank establish branches at places 
bordering guerilla areas to facilitate remittances to inland areas and to lower all remittance fees.  
Finally, the Directorate should attack Qiaopiju working in occupied areas by confiscating any 
remittances they carried with the government taking 50% and 50% going as a reward to those 
who actually seized the funds.
134
 
                                                 
131
 Guanyu duifu diwei qitu xishou Huaqiao huikuan taolunhui huiyi jilu (Record of the minutes of the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission meeting on the enemy’s attempts to attract overseas Chinese remittances), 16 March 
1940 in SHAC1181-1; Report by Zhou Yundong in SHAC127(2).123. 
132
 Chen, “Chao-Shan Qiaopi,” 8. 
133
 “[Diwei] ‘Qiaopi ye gonghui jiecheng yaoling’” (Main Points of the form of the [enemy] pixin trade association) 
as attachment to “Caizhengbu yuqian tezi di 6530, caizhengbu buzhang Kong Xiangxi” (Ministry of Finance, 
Chongqing special letter no. 6530, Minister of Finance Kong Xiangxi, 6 March 1940) in SHAC1181-1. 
134
 “Report by S.K. Fong, Remittances from Overseas Chinese: An Outline Concerning the Causes of the 
Inauguration of the Service and Its Present Condition, 14 March 1938” in SHAC127(2).121. 
  429 
 
Once it became clear the Japanese only intended to occupy the coastal ports, most 
Qiaopiju firms moved inland to set up shop.  After the fall of Xiamen, Qiaopiju firms moved to 
Jinjiang, which is a small port between Xiamen and Fuzhou.  All overseas Qiaopiju were told to 
direct their remittances to Jinjiang, but since the Japanese were blockading the harbor most 
packages had to be routed through Suixi and then overland.  Eventually the delays caused by the 
Japanese blockade made Jinjiang untenable and the Qiaopiju moved en masse to Gulangyu 
Island – across the harbor from Xiamen – since it was easier to smuggle the remittances from 
Gulangyu to Xiamen or inland.
135
  Conditions near Shantou were virtually the same.  After two 
months, Qiaopiju firms moved inland and transmitted their remittances over new routes starting 
from the coast near modern-day Shenzhen, but once that route proved untenable, they shifted 
their operative routes to Mong Cai (芒街) on the northern Indochinese border through to 
Dongxing (東興), Guangxi, and then overland to Shantou.136   
 Qiaopiju firms operating in Free China were also forced to adopt new methods for 
transferring their funds from Southeast Asia.  They still engaged in currency exchange 
speculation, but rather than effect transfer through their own branches or local money shops they 
used international banks or post offices, which provided more security and less Japanese 
interference.  One method was to remit funds through the Overseas Chinese Banking 
Corporation by telegraphic transfer to Shantou, Xiamen, or Gulangyu and then despatch inland 
by messenger or against drafts to local merchants.  They could also remit directly through banks 
like the Guangdong Provincial Bank that had inland branches.  Another method was to remit 
through foreign banks to Hong Kong and then transfer inland.  Finally, they also occasionally 
                                                 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Yang, “Chao-Shan diqu,” 111-18. 
  430 
 
remitted through foreign post offices or the Chinese Post Office who could effect delivery right 
to the recipient’s door.137 
In late 1941-early 1942 there was another collapse of the overseas remittance industry as 
the Japanese began the conquest of Southeast Asia.  The Japanese almost simultaneously 
attacked Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malaya/Singapore, and Thailand and then captured the 
Dutch East Indies in March 1942.  During the invasion Japanese targeted overseas Chinese for 
their anti-Japanese activities, particularly their economic assistance to China through overseas 
remittances.  As Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew later said, “Singapore had been the centre for the 
collection of ethnic Chinese donations to Chongqing to fight the Japanese.”138  Even though the 
Japanese attempted to conciliate Chinese goodwill starting in late 1942, to gain their assistance 
in reviving the local economies, memories of Japanese atrocities against overseas Chinese such 
the Sook Ching massacre in Malaya kept most Chinese from cooperating.  As usual, the Qiaopiju 
proved adaptable to the new situation and started funneling their remittances onto the black 
market.  Black market activities became a hallmark of the Qiaopiju remittance industry starting 
in 1942 and extending all the way until the end of the Civil War in 1949.   
 
The Transnationalization of the Chinese Post Office, 1937-1945 
While the Qiaopiju attempted to keep their businesses open, the exigencies of war provided the 
Post Office with the opportunity to begin direct competition.  There had long been a sentiment in 
the Directorate that the Post Office “has an almost perfect…organization for handling overseas 
remittances,” but legal difficulties and the strength of the Qiaopiju kept the Post Office from 
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engaging in competition for the remittances.
139
  The Directorate’s desire to collect overseas 
remittances meshed well with the National Government’s continued attempts to facilitate and 
maintain links with transnational Chinese communities.  While most of the state’s previous 
attempts had been discursive, a transnational remittance network would be a solid, physical 
connection to overseas Chinese.  One might claim, as the Qiaopiju firms did repeatedly, that 
other forms of organization served the diaspora “better,” but once the war began the Directorate 
felt the Qiaopiju’s lack of an “ethical model of business” – their profit motive – worked against 
the larger purpose of overseas remittances to support the Chinese state against annihilation.
140
  
As one Directorate employee put it, “it is hoped that these Overseas Chinese [firms] will not 
spoil the good name of patriotism because of a little personal gain at the sacrifice of National 
Interest.”141  Remitting from abroad through the Post Office might be a bit more expensive, but 
its “state-run character” meant “the Post Office does not take profit as its raison d’être” and is 
therefore more suitable in “assisting our overseas compatriots.”142  “At this time of national 
difficulty,” wrote the Directorate, “our overseas brothers are devoted to contributing to the 
nation.”143 
As it emerged in late 1937 and early 1938, the Directorate’s transnational remittance 
network consisted of two parts.  First, a domestic sorting and delivery system consisting of 
newly-created Distribution Centers and special overseas remittance employees; second, a 
remittance collection system made up of international banks and other companies who acted as 
contract agents for the Directorate.  As a whole, the Post Office’s remittance network was 
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modeled almost entirely on Qiaopiju’s organizational and business practices, except the 
Directorate used more formal institutions and contracts and earned its profits on remittance fees.   
 The Chinese state’s construction of a transnational remittance network had the corollary 
effect of transnationalizing the state itself.  That is, the Chinese state became a transnational 
organization by extending itself into other countries in order to link the diaspora to the state 
through a deterritorialized notion of ethnic Han resistance to Japanese imperialism.  States, 
generally speaking, do not frequently transnationalize themselves since the whole basis of the 
Westphalian state system depends on a notion of individual states being territorially-bounded 
corporate structures that are coextensive with their political society.  International law in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also discouraged states from engaging in transnational 
activities within states of “equal” status.  Scholars have begun to discuss recent transnational 
states viewing them as the result of a global bourgeoisie class who emerged in the late twentieth 
century and who acts through supranational organizations like the United Nations, International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, etc. to promote their own interests.
144
  
The transnationalism of the Chinese state in the late 1930s was not result of a global capitalist 
class acting through supranational organizations, but rather a unique case of a state, with a 
widely-scattered diasporic population identifying closely with the ethnic nation, constructing a 
physical network of agents in other countries to collect economic resources when the existence 
of the state was threatened. 
The first step in transnationalizing the Chinese state through the creation of an overseas 
remittance network was to find overseas agents to collect the remittances.  In finding such agents 
the Directorate was very careful to skirt a number of legal issues restricting state activities in 
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postal matters extending beyond national borders.  First and foremost, Universal Postal Union 
treaties prohibited any state from engaging in any postal activities within another state.  The 
Directorate had also signed international money order treaties with most countries prohibiting 
them from dealing in international remittances with anyone except the other signatory.  To get 
around this legal issue the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, one of the earliest of the 
Directorate’s agents, proposed taking out a Qiaopiju license, which would also give them 
preferential postal rates.
145
  The Directorate had to quash this proposal as their own Qiaopiju 
regulations forbid the licensing of any new firms after 1935.
146
  The only way for an overseas 
bank or company to act as an agent for the Post Office was a careful wording of all agency 
contracts to avoid words such as “international” or “remittance.”147  Instead, agency contracts 
used terminology such as “exporting currency” (出國幣).148 
Despite careful wording and a deep-seated desire to succeed, the first attempts to create 
agency contracts were a failure.  In the fall of 1936 Deputy Director of Posts Xu Changcheng 
(徐昌成) visited Saigon to meet with prospective agents and discuss the possibilities of a state-
run transnational remittance network.
149
  In early 1937, Xu’s work bore fruit when he signed the 
first agency agreement with the Bank of East Asia-Saigon.  To the vexation of the Directorate 
and the Bank of East Asia their system could not compete with the Qiaopiju’s rates and 
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services.
150
  In April 1937, the Directorate tried again by opening negotiations with the Bank of 
Guangzhou to have its Bangkok branch collect remittances, but again business failed to develop 
because of high overhead costs.  In October 1937, Guangdong Postal Commissioner Molland 
tried to resolve some of these cost issues by recommending the elimination of all postal fees, 
which the Directorate accepted.
151
  Shortly thereafter, the Directorate accepted Molland’s 
recommendations to eliminate all postal charges and adopted the suggestion of the Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation (華僑銀行) to institute a system of small attached letters like the 
pixin and huipi.
152
 
Once the Directorate’s overseas remittance network offered virtually the same services as 
the Qiaopiju at almost the same price, it began signing agency agreements in earnest to make the 
service fully functional.  By October 1938, the Directorate signed an agreement with the 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation for collecting remittances in Malaya, the Dutch East 
Indies, Burma, and Hong Kong.  The Post Office also signed agency agreements with private 
companies and banks in Hong Kong, Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Macao, and New 
York.
153
 
The domestic side of the Post Office’s transnational remittance network was based on the 
Distribution Center.  The Distribution Center (分發局) was an office specializing in the 
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handling, sorting, and delivery of all overseas remittances.  Distribution Centers were usually 
fairly small offices, but it was important to separate them from regular postal establishments 
because of the specialized paperwork and the need to situate the Centers close to the Japanese 
lines.  The Directorate placed the first Distribution Centers in Guangzhou, Shantou, Minhou, and 
Xiamen.
154
  As the network matured, Centers were established throughout Fujian and 
Guangdong – in Fuzhou, Jinjiang, Longxi, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou, Haikou, Qianshan, 
Jiangmen, Suixi, Huiyang, and Taishan.
155
  A Distribution Center was later added in Kunming to 
handle remittances to all other areas of Free China.
156
 
 Carrying out the diverse functions of the Qiaopiju forced the Directorate to create a 
number of new staff positions to emulate the positions held by workers in Qiaopiju firms.  
Sometime in 1938, the Directorate added the positions of Overseas Remittance Specialist and 
Overseas Remittance Special Secretary, who were consolidated into Overseas Remittance Clerks 
in late 1941.  Overseas Remittance Clerks had three primary duties: (1) escort overseas 
remittances; (2) spot-check remittance stamps and their delivery; and (3) assist in all office 
matters relating to remittances.
157
  Overseas Remittance Couriers, much like postmen, simply 
delivered remittances, but not other mail matter.  In Guangdong in 1941, there were about 240 
Overseas Remittance Clerks and 400 Overseas Remittance Couriers.
158
  In addition to clerks and 
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couriers, there were also Overseas Remittance Inspectors whose duty was to constantly traverse 
the overseas remittance networks to ensure the smooth functioning of the system.
159
 
The Directorate’s remittance procedure worked essentially the same as the Qiaopiju’s 
system.  Agent banks or companies dispatched employees to collect remittances and pixin.  Once 
collected the remittances were telegraphically transferred to the appropriate Distribution Center.  
The Distribution Center then turned the currency into overseas remittances stamps, which 
contained a serial number, remittance amount, recipient’s name, Distribution Center, stamp 
issuer and was chopped with a postal dater and a superior’s signature.  The remittance stamp also 
had a receipt attached that was torn off upon delivery.  Accompanying the remittance was a 
return letter blank and envelope to be sent back to the remitter through the overseas agent.
160
 
The Directorate’s transnational remittance network was a great success for three years from 
late 1938 to late 1941.  It not only functioned efficiently in a manner very similar to the Qiaopiju 
network, but actually achieved its goal of handling more remittances than its competitors.  The 
Directorate’s overseas remittance network proved such a success primarily because of wartime 
conditions.  The war disrupted the Qiaopiju networks, forcing many firms to close, and 
undermined consumer confidence in their ability to deliver remittances safely.  With many areas 
falling under Japanese control, patriotic Chinese seemed to prefer sending their remittances 
through the Post Office.   
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Table 7: Amounts of Overseas Remittances Handled by the Post Office
161
 
1938 (October-December) 6,734,111.00 
1939 50,370,001.00 
1940 114,558,188.00 
1941 (Jan.-Oct.) 155,721,703.00 
 
After most of Southeast Asia fell to the Japanese and corruption started running rampant in 
Chongqing, the Nationalist Government’s currency began a long inflationary spiral that would 
not end until the early 1950s.  In terms of overseas remittances, the gradual and then quickening 
of inflation meant that most remitters began shifting their business back to the Qiaopiju who 
were operating on the black market.  Prior to 1942, the Directorate General had been sending 
remittances on a floating exchange rate between Chinese National Currency and the U.S. dollar.  
When the exchange rate stayed relatively stable the Post Office’s remittance network was 
successful, but once the National Government’s pegged exchange rate of $20 CNC to $1 US 
diverged from market rates overseas remittances flooded onto the black market.  The official 
exchange rate of 20:1 in June 1943 was only one-third of the market value of U.S. currency.  By 
June 1945, the black market rate was 1,705:1 while the official postal rate was still 20:1.  
Overseas Chinese made the obvious choice to shift their business back to the Qiaopiju. 
Table 8: Exchange Rates between Chinese National Currency and the US Dollar 
Year CNC per US $1.00
162
 
Official                                 Market 
1943 – June 
        – December  
18.80 
20.00 
59.00 
84.00 
1944 – June 
        – December  
20.00 
20.00 
192.00 
570.00 
1945 – June 
       – December 
20.00 
20.00 
1,705 
1,222 
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Slipping Away: The Qiaopiju and the Black Market 
After the war, a number of obstacles worked against the recovery of the overseas remittance 
business.
163
  Towards the end of World War II, and immediately after, a number of Southeast 
Asian countries instituted controls on overseas remittances.  In July 1942, the government of 
Thailand passed an act strictly limiting the amount of remittances that could be sent to China.
164
  
The British in the Singapore and Malaya followed suit in January 1946 by restricting the amount 
an individual could remit.
165
  The Dutch in the East Indies took a different approach by limiting 
the total amount of remittances for the whole colony to one million guilders a month.
166
  The 
colonies limited remittances to reduce their foreign trade deficits and help their own economies 
recover, but it had the overall effect of pushing Qiaopiju remittances onto the black market. 
If limits on remittances in Southeast Asia drove some remittances onto the black market, 
the National Government’s currency exchange policies exacerbated the tendency.  In January 
1942, the Sino-American-British Stabilization Board had fixed the official government exchange 
rate at 20 yuan to 1 US dollar.  Despite growing inflation, the 20:1 exchange rate remained in 
effect until 3 March 1946 when the National Government adjusted the official exchange rate to 
2020: 1.  Over the next year, the pegged exchange rate constantly had to be adjusted.  At various 
times the official exchange rate was 73%, 44%, 32%, and 27.5% of the market rate.
167
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With inflation spinning out of control, the Central Bank adopted a new floating exchange 
rate policy on 15 August 1947.  Under the new policy, a Foreign Exchange Stabilization Fund 
Committee met each day to set official rates.
168
  The floating exchange rate policy worked 
successfully for a few months keeping their rates between 80-90% of the market rate, but 
political pressure and criticism hampered the operation of the Committee.  Many critics argued 
the Committee’s constant devaluation of Chinese currency was actually increasing the 
inflationary trend.  The Committee published a study showing they were merely following the 
market, but the political damage had been done and in the last months of the Committee’s 
existence they were hesitant to make adjustments.  Their rates fell to between 25-50% of the 
market.
169
   
In August 1948, the National Government introduced its wide-ranging Gold Yuan 
currency reforms and returned to a pegged remittance rate system.  The Gold Yuan reforms 
worked well for about three months with rates pegged at 4:1, but hyperinflation set it again and 
by November the official pegged rate was only 66% of the market rate.  With the failure of the 
Gold Yuan reforms, the National Government returned to a floating remittance rate, but it only 
proved a success for a few months.  By January 1949 the official pegged rate was only 34% of 
the black market rate.  After April 1949, the exchange rate made little difference as the public 
had lost so much confidence in the National Government that almost no remittances were sent 
through official channels. 
 The rapid fluctuations in the official exchange rate coupled with the on-set of 
hyperinflation devastated the Post Office’s overseas remittance network.  The Directorate was 
frustrated that the Qiaopiju were “openly profiteering” on the black market and attempted to 
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institute some of their own reforms.
170
  With their own remittance business “at a standstill,” the 
Directorate convened the Guangdong Provincial Overseas Remittance Symposium in March 
1947 to hear recommendations from experts.
171
  Aside from the problems of the black market, 
the attendees focused on the problem of remittance fees.  The Directorate was literally unable to 
keep adjusting their remittance fees to keep up with hyperinflation.  In January 1947, for 
example, the Directorate ran a deficit of 70 million yuan to handle just 112 million in 
remittances.  In other words, the Directorate was losing money by accepting remittances.  In 
addition to raising remittance fees, the members of the symposium made rather weak 
recommendations such as transferring remittances faster, concentrating archives in a single 
location, and improving the efficiency of their overseas remittance workers.  There was a 
palpable sense of failure during the symposium reflected in its useless recommendations.  
Without authority over exchange rate policies or an ability to shut down the black market, the 
Directorate was literally incapable of reviving its overseas remittance business. 
 While the Directorate struggled just to keep its remittance business afloat in the late 
1940s, Qiaopiju firms rebounded quickly after the war.  In 1946 the Chinese Post Office 
relicensed 119 Qiaopiju head offices in Fujian with a declared total of 1110 branch offices in 
China and an additional 1572 abroad.
172
  In Guangdong, the Directorate tallied 98 Qiaopiju head 
offices who maintained relationships with 983 branches.
173
  The postwar Qiaopiju concentrated 
their activities on Hong Kong.  After collecting remittances in Southeast Asia, Qiaopiju firms 
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telegraphically transferred the money to Hong Kong where it was converted into local currency.  
Rather than telegraphically transfer the funds again, Qiaopiju firms carried the HK currency to 
southern China to deliver it.  Southern Chinese gladly accepted HK dollars because of the 
hyperinflation on Chinese currency.  According to statistics accumulated by Wu Chun-hsi 
roughly 80-85% of all remittances travelled on the black market through Hong Kong in the 
immediate postwar years and by 1948 more than 99% of overseas remittances entered China 
through illegal channels.
174
   
The collapse of the National Government did not mean an immediate end to the Qiaopiju 
remittance network.  In late 1949, the newly-established Communist government instituted strict 
regulations on foreign trade and remittances, but the government also understood the importance 
of the foreign currency reserves brought to China by overseas remittances.  The initial trade 
restrictions did reduce the number of Qiaopiju.  There were 185 Qiaopiju recorded in Fujian in 
November 1949, with some 2700 branches, but the number decreased to 138 in 1950, 124 in 
1951, and 104 in 1952.
175
  In Guangdong, the Shantou Post Office registered 60 Qiaopiju in 1951 
who maintained relations with 427 inland and 348 overseas branches.
176
  Over time, the 
Communist government slowly tightened restrictions on the Qiaopiju and, with other countries 
like the United States prohibiting remittances to China, by the mid-1950s the entire Qiaopiju 
remittance industry had been drastically reduced.  The government allowed a few Qiaopiju to 
continue operations into the 1960s to help provide foreign currency reserves, but the political 
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troubles of Cultural Revolution finally brought an end to the private Qiaopiju business in 
1973.
177
 
 
Conclusion 
Since the East Asian economic miracle of the four little dragons – Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and South Korea – in the 1960s, as well as the more recent meteoric rise of the 
mainland Chinese economy, scholars and commentators have sought the distinctive cultural 
elements central to this process hoping to describe a unique form of “Asian” or “Confucian 
capitalism.”  Contemporary scholars generally agree that diasporic Chinese have played a 
fundamental role in the development of transnational “Chinese capitalism” since the late 1970s.  
More recently, however, the scholars have tended to reject arguments about “Chinese capitalism” 
as a form of reverse orientializing or have failed to find anything distinctive about capitalism in 
East Asia.  While many of these economists and political scientists argue that the Maoist 
interregnum (1949-1979) broke the ties between communities in South China and Southeast 
Asia, many historians continue to employ culturalist explanations to understand transnational 
Chinese businesses successes in the late Qing and Republican eras.  Following recent economists 
and political scientists, I have argued in this chapter that transnational Chinese remittance firms 
do not represent a form of Confucian or Chinese capitalism, but instead forged a colonial modern 
type of business firm. 
 The colonial modernity of the Qiaopiju firm was a result of particular historical 
circumstances and how Qiaopiju owners reacted to them.  Qiaopiju firms had to operate in the 
transnational spaces between an imperial empire and then semi-colony in China, emerging 
nation-states and colonies in Southeast Asia, and colonial entrepots like Hong Kong.  Within this 
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transoceanic space, Qiaopiju firms also faced emergent regulatory state or international regimes 
bent on defending the nation-state system or international norms.  To operate successfully in 
such geographic and political environments, Qiaopiju owners created a type of small, flexible 
firm that could navigate in a variety of settings.  Qiaopiju owners also took advantage of the 
most cutting edge technologies – steamships, telegraphs, international postal services – to engage 
in capitalist profit-making strategies like currency exchange speculation, transshipping goods, or 
arbitrage.  Coupled with their capitalist profit-making strategies were a number of customer 
services with a culturalist tinge such as pixin and huipi or writing letters for illiterate customers.  
The combination of a small, flexible firm using capitalist profit-making strategies with culturalist 
customer relations navigating the transnational space between nations, colonies, and international 
regulatory regimes is what makes the Qiaopiju a special type of business firm I have called 
colonial modern. 
The very existence of the Qiaopiju remittance firms posed great challenges and 
opportunities for the Chinese Post Office.  As firms carrying overseas remittances before the 
Imperial Post Office was even inaugurated in 1896, the Qiaopiju offered the Post Office and the 
Chinese state a physical link to overseas Chinese communities.  The Post Office initially 
intervened in Qiaopiju business in its fight for a national postal monopoly, but lobbying by 
Qiaopiju trade associations, and their access to hundreds of millions in overseas funds, 
convinced the National Government to turn a blind eye to the Qiaopiju’s violation of 
international postal agreements.  Despite the Post Office’s desire to fully tax Qiaopiju mail 
matter, the National Government decided to grant a special subsidized postage rate to the 
Qiaopiju through the clubbed package system to encourage them to continue their business.  This 
national subsidy of overseas remittances demonstrates the central government’s desire to create 
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and maintain a deterritorialized Han identity that linked diasporic communities to the nation-state 
through the Post Office.  That is, the National Government believed that by remitting portions of 
their salary to the families in China, overseas Chinese were assisting the ethnic nation and 
modern nation-state.   
As the Directorate began to study Qiaopiju business strategies in the early 1930s, they 
realized they could cut out the middleman and collect overseas remittances directly.  As soon as 
the Qiaopiju began experiencing difficulties at the beginning of the War of Resistance, the Post 
Office undertook the unusual process of transnationalizing itself.  As a state-run institution, the 
Post Office constructed of an overseas remittance network through agency contracts with 
international banks and companies thus effectively transnationalized the state by giving it a 
physical presence within other states.  The Post Office was successful in building a transnational 
remittance network and succeeded for four years in attracting remittances, but the onset of 
inflation in the later years of the war and hyperinflation during the Civil War ended the 
effectiveness of the Directorate’s remittance business.  The Qiaopiju, as always, continued to 
thrive on the black market despite domestic and international regulatory regimes bent on 
disrupting their business. 
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Conclusion 
The State Post: The Post Office, the Government, and the State 
 
Exactly one month after the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949, the 
People’s Government established the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (郵電部).  
From December 10-28, the Ministry convened a National Postal Conference to discuss changes 
to the administration of the Nationalist Directorate General of Posts.  Heading up the conference 
was the newly-appointed Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Zhu Xuefan (朱學范) who 
had worked in the Post Office since 1924.
1
  Zhu’s most capable advisor at the Conference was 
Gu Chunfan (谷春藩), a recent Acting Director General of the Nationalist Post Office, who 
served as the new Deputy Director of Posts. 
 At the Conference, the delegates made few changes to the structure, organization, or 
personnel of the Post Office.  These decisions reflected Mao Zedong’s April 25, 1949, general 
directive on the procedures for taking over Nationalist offices and the specific policy of the 
Central Executive Committee on the Post Office.  According to those policies, the Post Office 
should retain its existing business structure, restore services as quickly as possible, announce 
basic policies and protect supplies, educate staff and remold their ideology, and study the old 
systems to plan necessary reforms.
2
  There was also a “three preservations” policy to preserve 
                                                 
1
 Zhu Xuefan (1905-1996) joined the Post Office in 1924.  In Shanghai, Zhu rose to prominence as a leader of the 
Postal Workers’ Union after the Nationalists had purified it and then he became a member of the Standing 
Committee of the National Postal Workers’ Union.  In 1928, he joined the Nationalist Party with the aid of Lu 
Jingshi (陸京士), also a labor leader in the Post Office and later on Taiwan, and the two of them soon became 
followers of Du Yuesheng in the Green Gang.  Over the next decade, Zhu served in a variety of capacities as a 
general labor leader in Shanghai attending many international labor conferences as a Nationalist representative.  In 
November 1946, Zhu left Shanghai for Hong Kong where he announced his break with the Nationalists.  In 
February 1948, he entered the Communist-controlled area and was selected as Vice-Chairman of the Chinese 
General Labor Union and Chairman of the National Work Committee.  After the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China, Zhu Xuefan served as Minister of Telecommunications from 1949 to 1966. 
2
 For an actual example of the process of the Communists taking over Post Offices, see: “Tianjin jieguanzu 
youzheng jieguan zongjie baogao” (Summary report on the takeover of the Post Office by the Tianjin Takeover 
Group) 20 March 1949 in Qiu Runxi, Tianjin youzheng shiliao (Historical materials on the Tianjin postal service) 
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the former offices, wages, and bureaucratic organization of the Nationalist Directorate.  The 
Conference delegates also adopted slogans similar to the Nationalist Post Office, retained green 
and yellow as institutional colors, kept the vast majority of the staff, and maintained almost all 
internal working rules.  The most significant changes were to staff titles and office nomenclature, 
both designed to reflect the revolutionary outlook of the new government.
3
  
 
Government and State 
The transition of the Post Office from Nationalist to Communist control went smoothly because 
the new government was content to view the Directorate as it portrayed itself – a progressive 
institution loyally serving the idea and reality of the central Chinese State.  Over the decades, the 
Post Office insulated itself from the ravages of late Qing and Republican-era politics by claiming 
and acting as a “non-political” or “neutral” bureaucratic entity carrying out its primary mission to 
transform a presiding agrarian state into a modern centralizing one.
4
  To the Post Office, the 
Communists were simply the newest in a long line of governments that had taken over the 
system with little effect on the institution itself.   In May 1911, the Qing Ministry of Posts and 
Communications secured jurisdiction over the Post Office, but only a few changes were made to 
staff titles.  Under Yuan Shikai and the warlords, the Post Office had to remit some of its surplus 
to the Ministry of Communications to cover other government debts, but experienced little other 
interference.  In early 1928, the Nationalist Government in Nanjing negotiated its own takeover 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Tianjin: Beijing hangkong hangtian daxue chubanshe, 1992), V: 9-22.  For a positive foreign perspective, see: 
Duncan C. Lee, “Changeover in the Post Office,” China Weekly Review (July 16, 1949): 146. 
3
 Postal Directors (郵務長) now simply became First-Class Postal Officials (一等郵務員); postmen (信差) became 
mail delivery men (郵遞員); rural couriers (郵差) became mail transporters (郵運員), and office coolies (聽差) 
became postal assistants (郵助員).  Tianjin youzheng guanliju tongling (renzi) di 11 hao, 22 February 1950 
(Circular No. 11, personnel, Tianjin head post office) in Qiu, Tianjin youzheng shiliao, V: 50.  This early 1950 order 
was an extension of a previous circular by the East China Directorate General of Posts.  Huabei youzheng guanli 
zongju tongling di 104 hao (East China Directorate General of Posts, circular no. 104), 6 September 1949 in 
SHAC137.5489-2. 
4
 RWCPO, 1911, 12, 
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of the Post Office, appointed a Chinese director general, declared Chinese as the official Service 
language, added some new services, but the institution continued on largely as before.  The 
Directorate also willingly worked with the Japanese occupiers and collaborator governments 
during World War II to retain administrative authority over the entire postal network.  The Post 
Office was able to survive so many government takeovers, attempts to politicize it, and shifts in 
administrative authority because of the fundamental principle behind its idea of itself. 
The administrators of the Post Office, both foreign and Chinese, shared the statist 
imperative or desire for the State.  Postal administrators and staff, as government bureaucrats, 
distinguished between the State as Idea and the conception of the State as a reality.  Their desire 
was to replicate and naturalize in China the forms and substance of the Western state as an 
impersonal, transcendent structure of power.  The belief in the need for a modern, rational state 
as an autonomous actor capable of swiftly imposing needed reforms on a territorial-based nation 
was a view widely held across the political spectrum.
5
  Although that State should have mythical, 
impersonal qualities, it could be conjured and reified by the existence of government institutions 
like the Post Office creating bureaucracies, legal regimes, and administrative practices that 
constantly reiterated the State as the locus of governance and authoritative power.  By asserting 
territorial sovereignty, fighting for a postal monopoly, developing and managing part of the 
national economy, building an information infrastructure, policing the public sphere, and linking 
to the transnation, all using the language of the State, the Post Office was reifying the idea of the 
State through its practices. 
 The distinction draw by postal administrators between the state and government was 
common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  “Government,” wrote Randolph 
                                                 
5
 There was a brief moment at the end of the nineteenth century when Chinese intellectuals considered alternatives 
to the nation-state, but their intellectual orientations gradually returned to this model.  Rebecca Karl, Staging the 
World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).   
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Bourne, “is the idea of the State put into practical operation in the hands of definite, concrete, 
fallible men.”6  The elimination or collapse of a given government, as such, did not threaten the 
existence of the state.  It is this idea manifested in the Post Office’s own practices that allowed it 
to so easily shift political masters.  As long as each political regime recognized and spoke the 
language of the state, the Post Office could serve any government and benefit them by 
continuing to act out the State.  Whether real or simply heuristic, the distinction between the state 
and government also forces us to question how we evaluate states.   
 
The Language of Stateness
7
 
Scholars have repeatedly compared the Chinese state against a Weberian model that rarely, if 
ever, existed anywhere in the world.  The question of whether the late Qing, warlord, or 
Nationalist states were weak or strong is simply asking an ahistorical question.
8
  If “definite, 
concrete, fallible” individuals pursue their own political ends in creating and running their 
government, the question is not whether that State is strong or weak or has a high or low level of 
stateness.  Instead, we need to examine the historically contingent structure, functions, and 
policies of the Chinese state as government bureaucrats and others sought to solve the questions 
they asked themselves and were asked of them.  We might say the National Government was 
strong in defending itself against warlords, but weak in solving fundamental rural economic 
problems.  As our perspective changes so does the appearance of the Chinese state.  For the 
moment, it is significant enough to say that the idea of the State, of political coherence, territorial 
                                                 
6
 Randolph Bourne, “The State,” in The Radical Will: Selected Writings, 1911-1918 (New York: Urizen Books, 
1977), 358. 
7
 The phrase “languages of stateness” comes from: Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, “Introduction: States 
of Imagination,” in States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, edited by Hansen 
and Stepputat, 1-38 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 5. 
8
 Peter Baldwin, “Beyond Weak and Strong: Rethinking the State in Comparative Policy History,” Journal of Policy 
History 17: 1 (2005): 12-33. 
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unity, and sovereignty, represented the aspirations of the Chinese nation in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries when it appeared that idea might disappear. 
 How those aspirations were manifested through the Post Office was the broad subject of 
this dissertation.  Although postal actors might subscribe to an image of the State with absolute 
control over territory, sovereign in its rights, and authoritative in its rule making, the reality was 
always undermined by historical contingency.  There were countless disjunctures within the state 
bureaucracy contributing to incoherent policies with inconsistent application (e.g. suppression of 
Minxinju), one branch of the government pitted against another (e.g. Post Office v. Ministry of 
Posts and Communications), and plans and goals rarely produced the desired results (e.g. 
subsidies of airlines).  Those disjunctures are only disruptive if we are basing our assessments of 
the Chinese state upon assumptions, ahistorical theoretical constructs, or anachronistic 
comparisons.  Rather than pursue this unpromising path, I have examined the agency of a 
specific government institution, the Post Office, as it subtly yet persuasively continued to 
reiterate the idea of the state and replicate it in its practices.  As an express history of 
bureaucrats, their institution, their practices, and their language, it has shown how their 
routinized functions gave material substance to the state. 
The historical trajectory of state formation in China contained within itself myriad 
contingencies that shaped the actual modern Chinese state.  One of the contingencies that 
profoundly shaped the Post Office, discussed in Chapter 1, was the role of foreigners in the Post 
Office.  Like cosmopolitan foreign administrators across the globe, the foreign employees of the 
Chinese Post Office shared with other Chinese the belief that the creation of a modern 
centralizing state represented the aspirations of the Chinese nation and central government.  The 
overall role of foreigners in the Chinese Post Office unquestionably contributed to its ability to 
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survive the political tumult of the early twentieth century, but I purposefully downplayed their 
significance because they shared the same fundamental vision of the state as many Chinese.  
Foreigners and Chinese alike in the late Qing worked hard to extend the Post Office out to the 
borders as a “national institution.”9  After the 1911 Revolution, the existing postal network 
continued to function nationally despite the quickening decline of central government authority 
and the shift of sovereignty from a monarch to the people.  Over the next several decades, the 
Post Office – by its mere presence and constant activity – replicated and reiterated the 
sovereignty of the impersonal state across the territory imagined as “China.”  The ability of this 
“national” institution to operate within numerous “quasi-states” controlled by warlords, 
communists, collaborators, and occupiers, reveals the shared assumption that whatever the 
government might be, the “natural” form of the Chinese state was the territory approximating the 
borders of the former Qing empire.
10
  The Post Office, more than any other central government 
institution, protected this idea by its presence throughout the country. 
A secondary theme in the first chapter was the disunity of the state represented by the 
relatively high degree of administrative independence of the Post Office between 1897 and 1928 
and even beyond.  The Post Office viewed this independence as absolutely essential to its 
survival, and the survival of the state, when confronting various attempts to either interfere with 
its operations or divide it territorially.  Postal administrators pursued a series of successful 
strategies to insulate, protect, and strengthen the institution from external disruption and 
territorial division.  There were even times when a bureaucrat such as Director General Liu 
Shufan played the politician, but active and sustained resistance by the postal staff to the 
                                                 
9
 The Post Office frequently referred to itself as a “national institution.” e.g. RWCPO, 1904, lii, RWCPO, 1911, 12.  
10
 Matthew Mosca argues that Han literati began to reinterpret their notion of geographic “China” as incorporating 
those territories conquered by the Manchu Qing at the turn of the nineteenth century.  “The Literati Rewriting of 
China in the Qianlong-Jiaqing Transition,” Late Imperial China (December 2011): 89-132.  
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“pollution” of the Post Office – either through politically-required subsidies to airlines or the 
creation of a second Directorate – crushed these threats to the “repute” of the institution and 
state. 
The relatively high degree of administrative independence by the Post Office was not 
only a function of its own strategies and practices, but also a result of a deliberate policy on the 
part of the Qing government.  Chapter Two explored these issues by focusing on the effects of 
the Qing government’s decision not to grant the Imperial Post Office a state monopoly.  The 
political environment in the late 1890s when conservatives and reformers were struggling for 
control of the central government, meant reformers succeeded in establishing the Post Office, but 
conservatives protected the “time-honored” postal relay and post station systems and the 
Wenbaoju, a pet project shared by several provincial viceroys.  Private Minxinju letter firms also 
continued to operate because Qing bureaucrats feared unemployed couriers might riot.  Lastly, 
the Qing Empire’s status as a semi-colony meant that various foreign governments and local 
Municipal Councils continued to operate independent postal services across the country.  In 
order to achieve its self-defined goal of attaining a postal monopoly, Chinese and foreign 
administrators of the Post Office employed various methods to gain sovereignty over postal 
affairs.  The various methods used were all “stately” – authority and the promise of massive 
carriage contracts to the steamship companies undermined the profitability of the Local Post 
Offices, intra-government negotiations and the administrative efficiency of the Post Office 
finally led to the displacement of the Wenbaoju and postal relay system, international 
negotiations at the Washington Conference in 1922 removed the Foreign Post Offices, and the 
Directorate finally convinced the National Government that a postal monopoly for the state was 
more valuable than the possible disruption caused by protesting Minxinju shops.  By the mid-
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1930s, the Post Office had attained full sovereignty as the supreme authority to govern postal 
affairs, which was recognized both domestically and internationally. 
Late Qing bureaucrats thoroughly understood the significance of creating a modern, 
centralizing state institution like the Post Office.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the political debate 
over whether to begin the process of transforming the presiding state into an interventionist one 
was resolved when the Guangxu Emperor authorized the creation of the Post Office during the 
Court reforms of 1895-98.  Its establishment proclaimed the emergence of a more aggressive 
central state driving its own reforms and pursuing strategies of social transformation.  To play 
such a role, the Post Office spread the “postal fabric” across the country to knit together the 
scattered communities of the empire.  To educate the subjects-citizens, and bring outside cultural 
influences to rural areas, the Post Office intentionally subsidized newspapers, magazines, and 
books showing the great lengths to which the state would go to create and educate its citizens.  
Another decisive step in the invention of the modern state in China came when the Post Office 
began managing the social and economic well-being of the people.  The Directorate promoted 
various “public services” such as money orders, parcel post, postal savings, and simple life 
insurance to transform society and the economy by acting as an “extra market” force mitigating 
some of the negative effects of capitalist development. 
 The state was absolutely crucial to the organization and the experience of coherence and 
order in modern Chinese society.  The movement and circulation of information, people, and 
goods at incredible speeds, in great volumes, and at regular intervals all contributed to reshaping 
the country and laying the foundation for the modern Chinese nation-state.  Chapter Four 
examined the Post Office’s role in this process through its creation of an “information 
infrastructure.”  This infrastructure revolutionize the sense of space, time, and speed in Chinese 
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society, but was found in the mundane contracts signed with modern transportation companies, 
the types of mail such companies transmitted, and the physical arrangements (space v. weight) 
made that shaped the flow of information and goods.  By co-opting modern transportation 
companies as stately actors – allowing them to fly the postal flag or transport official mail bags - 
and linking their networks with its own courier system, the Post Office tied together the main 
communications routes of the entire country as a state system.   
 One of the most common practices of all states is censorship as an expression of the 
legitimate use of force/violence.  Although citizens may object to specific forms of censorship, 
most agree there should be some type of legal limit on expression.  In the early twentieth 
century, those limits were defined almost exclusively by the state, but unless the state could 
control the flow of such expression it had little opportunity to suppress it.  Since modern forms 
of print communications such as books, magazines, and newspapers rely on the government for 
distribution, the state was able to police the content of such print through the institutional 
controls on the circulation of information provided by the Post Office.  To entice publishers to 
submit to such institutional controls, the Post Office provided subsidized postage rates to those 
who would register their publications.  As an institutional form, postal censorship also pushed 
the government towards less violent and more ideological forms of suppression.  Although postal 
administrators might balk at censorship for infringing on the inviolability of the mails or, of 
greater concern, slowing the sorting process, the Post Office also understood its role as a state 
institution serving its political masters in Beijing or Nanjing.    
 State institutions individually often try to make themselves real and tangible through 
symbols, texts, iconography and more permanent signs such as buildings, monuments, and 
uniforms.  Chapter Six explored the Post Office’s myriad expressions of the language of 
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stateness through its various forms of advertising and publicity campaigns.  The Post Office was 
the first government institution to actively advertise itself to the public.  In its Working Reports, 
the Post Office shaped its narratives around the unitary state, it categorized the rest of society as 
customers of the state, and materialized the state in its physical post offices, use of green as an 
institutional color, and through the unified mass of well-behaved postal workers.   Through these 
various signs, postal administrators culturally constructed a visual and discursive identity for the 
Post Office – and thus the state – as a modern, competitive, innovative, efficient, service-
oriented, and trustworthy institution.  Stamps, though not expressly discussed as a form of 
advertising, were the most ubiquitous symbol of the state throughout the entire country.  By the 
late 1940s, citizens of the Republic were attaching more than a billion stamps per year – all 
picturing state iconography – to their mail matter. 
 Although most modern states employ numerous discourses and physical offices to map 
and delineate the territory of the state  in space and time, in reality most modern states also 
recognize the porousness and permeability of their national boundaries even as they seek to 
restrict movement through passports and other control mechanisms.
11
  In the late nineteenth 
century, the Qiaopiju overseas remittance firms posed particular challenges to the Chinese state 
by employing a set of colonial modern forms of business practices to operate in the interstitial 
gaps between empires, nation-states, and colonies in maritime Southeast Asia and coastal China.  
These colonial modern business practices emerged in response to early efforts by state and 
international regulatory regimes seeking to force the flow of overseas remittances into the 
official international system governed by the Universal Postal Union.  The re-bounding of the 
overseas Chinese remitters to the Chinese state came through the routinization of the clubbed 
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 The Chinese Post Office was the first state institution to offer photographic identification cards in 1922.  Circular 
No. 525, Co-Director General Destelan, 10 November 1922 in SHAC137.2023-5. 
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package system in the Post Office.   In response to Post Office efforts to close them down or 
raise their postage rates, the Qiaopiju organized institutions such as trade associations that could 
and would be recognized by the state as legitimate social organizations for lobbying purposes.  
When that lobbying succeeded, it forced the Chinese Post Office to transnationalize itself to 
compete with these private firms. Although the state transnationalized itself through a series of 
agency agreements carefully worded to slip past the administrative purview of international 
regulatory regimes, it ultimately “failed” because as a state its commitments to the international 
system – standard currency exchange rates, banking regulations, conventions of the Postal Union 
– kept the state from operating on the black market like the Qiaopiju.  In the end, there developed 
a symbiosis between the Qiaopiju and the Chinese state whereby both benefited as allies and 
competitors in their efforts to circumvent international law to send/bring remittances “home.”  
 
The State Incarnate 
When Mao Zedong stood on the top of the Tiananmen Gate on 1 October 1949 to declare the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, he was declaring the establishment of a new 
government, but not a new state.  Mao and Jiang Jieshi might fundamental differ in their 
conceptualization of the Chinese government, but both shared a belief in the modern, 
centralizing, impersonal state as the embodiment of sovereignty.  That belief had been created in 
the late Qing and early Republic by institutions such as the Post Office and reified, acted out, and 
spread through them.  Despite the collapse of the imperial order, the ineffectiveness of various 
Chinese governments, numerous civil wars and warlord conflicts, quasi-states on the periphery 
and in the core, international imperialism and the Unequal Treaty System, aggressive Japanese 
colonialism, a World War, and the retreat by the Nationalists to Taiwan, the Post Office always 
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effectively carried out its duty to the State.  By always maintaining the idea of “a single seat of 
authority” through its every word and deed, the Post Office made the State appear the proper 
home of the new nation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: 
Total Payments to Contracted Mail Carriers
1
 
1912 410,708.37 
1913 599,228.36 
1914 637,054.25 
1915 657,731.17 
1916 612,895.30 
1917 740,318.74 
1918 661,128.07 
1919 908,187.19 
1920 951,794.65 
1921 1,377,680.12 
1922 1,525,916.91 
1923 2,207,379.16 
1924 3,306,704.62 
1925 4,037,148.92 
1926 3,846,519.62 
1927 3,551,406.31 
1928 5,047,046.32 
1929 4,670,730.41 
1930 8,425,935.66 
1931 9,676,826.03 
1932 6,741,795.73 
1933 6,120,790.03 
1934 5,879,624.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Zhang, Zhongguo youzheng,  III: 165-66. 
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Table A.2: 
Contract Payments to Steamers and Launches
2
 
Year Payments Percentage 
1912 86,111.03 37.67 
1913 125,721.09 36.37 
1914 114,743.01 31.80 
1915 131,848.17 34.21 
1916 129,172.47 34.52 
1917 136,229.16 27.47 
1918 128,172.08 24.62 
1919 217,605.17 29.52 
1920 258,845.61 32.51 
1921 294,345.87 26.04 
1922 343,544.92 27.13 
1923 485,389.63 26.77 
1924 563,148.63 19.72 
1925 629,801.65 20.37 
1926 862,811.49 30.28 
1927 680,931.77 25.13 
1928 948,915.89 30.14 
1929 962,989.13 25.04 
1930 1,064,216.58 22.27 
1931 1,085,408.00 21.64 
1932 1,074,834.28 23.86 
1933 1,066,036.62 21.63 
1934 726,296.72 16.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 168-69. 
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Table A.3: Distance of Steamer, Launches, and Native Craft Mail Routes (in miles)
3
 
1905 4,660 
1906 5,281 
1907 5,747 
1908 13,980 
1909 14,912 
1910 15,534 
1911 13,980 
1912 17,398 
1913 18,019 
1914 18,330 
1915 19,573 
1916 20,101 
1917 21,313 
1918 21,685 
1919 22,369 
1920 22,990 
1921 24,637 
1922 25,755 
1923 25,942 
1924 26,591 
1925 28,539 
1926 28,096 
1927 28,535 
1928 29,297 
1929 29,595 
1930 30,899 
1931 31,114 
1932 31,876 
1933 32,808 
1934 33,291 
1935 38,590 
1936 39,623 
1937 31,762 
1938 38,740 
1939 32,032 
1940 35,945 
1941 34,714 
1942 33,875 
1943 31,816 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., II: 23. 
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Table A.4: 
Railroad Mileage Utilized by the Post Office
4
 
1905 2,594 
1906 3,481 
1907 -- 
1908 3,884 
1909 4,039 
1910 4,660 
1911 5,282 
1912 5,592 
1913 5,903 
1914 5,903 
1915 5,903 
1916 5,903 
1917 6,058 
1918 6,214 
1919 6,214 
1920 6,338 
1921 6,587 
1922 6,680 
1923 6,959 
1924 7,122 
1925 7,271 
1926 7,393 
1927 7,658 
1928 7,863 
1929 8,048 
1930 8,254 
1931 8,295 
1932 8,424 
1933 8,526 
1934 8,836 
1935 6,991 
1936 7,203 
1937 6,991 
1938 5,722 
1939 5,290 
1940 5,427 
1941 6,178 
1942 6,310 
1943 6,678 
1944 945 
1945 5,407 
                                                 
4
 Jiaotongbu youzheng zongju, Zhongguo youzheng tongji huiji, 86-87. 
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Table 4: Continued 
1946 8,940 
1947 6,408 
1948 6,173 
 
 
Table A.5: Contract Payments to Railroads
5
 
Year Payments Percentage 
1912 26,929.95 11.78 
1913 36,687.89 10.61 
1914 34,332.40 9.51 
1915 30,393.21 7.89 
1916 27,870.73 7.45 
1917 32,159.95 6.49 
1918 30,808.58 5.92 
1919 53,427.68 7.25 
1920 45,009.28 5.65 
1921 160,930.92 14.24 
1922 140,235.63 11.07 
1923 259,022.30 14.29 
1924 763,185.70 26.73 
1925 688,734.67 22.28 
1926 556,790.87 19.54 
1927 801,463.06 29.58 
1928 790,283.11 25.11 
1929 949,213.70 24.68 
1930 1,404,560.43 29.40 
1931 1,159,524.03 23.12 
1932 749,963.80 16.65 
1933 670,632.26 13.61 
1934 674,207.60 14.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Zhang, Zhongguo youzheng, III: 170. 
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Table A.6:  
Post Roads Travelled by Buses (in miles)
6
 
1922 c. 1,250 
1923 c. 1,350 
1924 c. 1,100 
1925 c. 1,250 
1926 c. 1,350 
1927 c. 1,500 
1928 1,587 
1929 3,367 
1930 11,543 
1931 13,382 
1932 17,173 
1933 16,087 
1934 22,785 
1935 27,001 
1936 33,845 
1937 33,711 
1938 34,290 
1939 24,233 
1940 20,825 
1941 19,652 
1942 17,423 
1943 18,777 
1944 14,658 
1945 18,703 
1946 27,337 
1947 39,305 
1948 36,601 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Jiaotongbu, Zhongguo youzheng tongji huiji, 86-87.  The statistics for the years 1922-1927 are my estimates based 
up the routes mentioned in the RWCPO series. 
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Table A.7: Distance of Airmail Lines (in miles)
7
 
1930 2,266 
1931 2,709 
1932 4,746 
1933 6,755 
1934 8,250 
1935 9,140 
1936 11,184 
1937 4,722 
1938 5,002 
1939 6,835 
1940 5,965 
1941 5,033 
1942 6,027 
1943 5,343 
1944 5,393 
1945 16,150 
1946 18,766 
1947 21,352 
1948 21,227 
 
 
 
 
Table A.8: Contract Payments to Airlines
8
 
Year Payments Percentage 
1930 266,989.73 5.59 
1931 419,685.99 8.37 
1932 661,391.93 14.68 
1933 828,580.70 16.81 
1934 1,092,190.29 24.09 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Jiaotongbu, Zhongguo youzheng tongji huiji, 86-87. 
8
 Zhang, Zhongguo youzheng, III: 171-72. 
